

Pyrrhonian Scepticism and Hegel's
Theory of Judgement

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Pyrrhonian Scepticism and Hegel's Theory of Judgement

A Treatise on the Possibility of Scientific Inquiry

By

Ioannis Trisokkas



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This book is printed on acid-free paper.

*For my parents
Demetris and Kyriaki Trisokka*

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VOLUME FOREWORD

What is at stake in modern thinking, at first expressed by René Descartes, can be characterized as the attempt to overcome scepticism. After all, scepticism threatens to be the result when the self-evident certitudes of religious belief are undermined. With his essay *The Relation of Scepticism to Philosophy* (1802), the young Hegel already participated in this debate.

In this book, Ioannis Trisokkas not only develops a conscientious analysis of Hegel's argumentation against Pyrrhonian scepticism, but also argues that Hegel has elaborated in his *Science of Logic* a theory of judgement in which scepticism can be definitely refuted.

There are three important reasons to include this work in our series *Critical Studies in German Idealism*. First it highlights the current relevance of one of the central topics in Hegel's thinking. In our globalized world with its many cultural and philosophical traditions, once again scepticism seems to be the outcome of a world-wide debate, such that it seems to make sense to rethink Hegel's most fundamental arguments against scepticism. Secondly, the book represents an important position within contemporary Hegel-research by stating that not Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*, but rather his *Science of Logic* justifies the cognitive standpoint of reason against scepticism. Thirdly, the work is the first complete book in the English language which addresses these problems.

Paul Cobben, Series Editor,
Tilburg University, The Netherlands

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

- AA* I. Kant, *Gesammelte Schriften*, vols. I–XXII, ed. Königlich Preußischen Akademie der Wissenschaften (Berlin, 1902ff.); vol. XIII, ed. Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften (Berlin, 1956); vols. XXIVff., ed. Akademie der Wissenschaften in Göttingen (Berlin, 1966ff.)
- Bibl.* Photius, *Bibliothèque* [*Bibliothek*], Vol. III, ed. R. Henry (Paris: Société d' édition "Les Belles Lettres", 1962)
- DL* Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*, vol. II, books VI–X, trans. R. D. Hicks (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1925)
- Enz. I* G. W. F. Hegel, *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse I*, ed. E. Moldenhauer and K. M. Michel (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1970)
- JL* G. W. F. Hegel, *Jenenser Logik, Metaphysik und Naturphilosophie*, ed. G. Lasson (Hamburg, 1967)
- KrV* I. Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1998)
- LHP* G. W. F. Hegel, *Lectures on the History of Philosophy 1825–6 II: Greek Philosophy*, ed. R. F. Brown, trans. R. F. Brown, J. M. Stewart and H. S. Harris (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006)
- M* G. W. F. Hegel, *Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977)
- M I–VI* Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Professors* [*Adversus Mathematicos I–VI*], trans. R. G. Bury (London/Harvard, MA: Loeb, 1949)
- M VII–VIII* Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Logicians* [*Adversus Mathematicos VII–VIII*], trans. R. G. Bury (London/Harvard, MA: Loeb, 1935)
- M IX–X* Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Physicists* [*Adversus Mathematicos M IX–X*], trans. R. G. Bury (London/Harvard, MA: Loeb, 1936)
- M XI* Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Ethicists* [*Adversus Mathematicos M XI*], trans. R. G. Bury (London/Harvard, MA: Loeb, 1936)

- Meditations* R. Descartes, "Meditations on first philosophy," in J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff and D. Murdoch (editors and translators), *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes*, Vol. II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 6–62
- Meno* Plato, "Meno," in Plato, *Protagoras and Meno*, trans. A. Beresford (London: Penguin, 2005), 81–166
- Met.* Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, vols. I–II, books I–XIV, trans. H. Tredennick (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979)
- NHS* G. W. F. Hegel, *Nürnberger und Heidelberger Schriften 1808–1817*, ed. E. Moldenhauer and K. M. Michel (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1986)
- PH* Sextus Empiricus, *Outlines of Scepticism* [*Pyrrhoneioi Hypotyposeis*], ed. and trans. J. Annas and J. Barnes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000)
- Phaedo* Plato, "Phaedo," in E. A. Duke, W. F. Hicken, W. S. M. Nicoll, D. B. Robinson and J. C. G. Strachan (eds.), *Platonis Opera*, Tomus I (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1955)
- Phaedrus* Plato, "Phaedrus," in I. Burnet (ed.), *Platonis Opera*, Tomus II (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964)
- PhdG* G. W. F. Hegel, *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, ed. E. Moldenhauer and K. M. Michel (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1986)
- Republic* Plato, "Republic," in I. Burnet (ed.), *Platonis Opera*, Tomus IV (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978) [English translation: Plato, *Republic*, trans. R. Waterfield (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993)]
- Seventh Letter* Plato, "Seventh Letter," in I. Burnet (ed.), *Platonis Opera*, Tomus V (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962) [English translation: J. Harward (trans.), *The Platonic Epistles* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1932)]
- Symposium* Plato, "Symposium," in I. Burnet (ed.), *Platonis Opera*, Tomus II (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964)
- SL* G. W. F. Hegel, *Hegel's Science of Logic*, trans. A. V. Miller (Amherst, New York: Humanity Books, 1999)
- Timaeus* Plato, "Timaeus," in I. Burnet (ed.), *Platonis Opera*, Tomus IV (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978)
- VLM* G. W. F. Hegel, *Vorlesungen über Logik und Metaphysik: Heidelberg 1817*, in G. W. F. Hegel, *Ausgewählte Nachschriften und Manuskripte*, vol. 11, ed. K. Gloy (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1992)

- VSP* G. W. F. Hegel, "Verhältnis des Skeptizismus zur Philosophie. Darstellung seiner verschiedenen Modifikationen und Vergleichung des neuesten mit dem alten," in G. W. F. Hegel, *Jenaer Schriften (1801–1807)*, ed. E. Moldenhauer and K. M. Michel (Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1970), 213–272
- VSPH* G. W. F. Hegel, "On the relationship of skepticism to philosophy, exposition of its different modifications and comparison of the latest form with the ancient one," trans. H. S. Harris, in G. Di Giovanni and H. S. Harris (eds.), *Between Kant and Hegel. Texts in the Development of Post-Kantian Idealism* (Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett, 2000), 311–362
- WL I* G. W. F. Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik I*, ed. E. Moldenhauer and K. M. Michel (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1986)
- WL II* G. W. F. Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik II*, ed. E. Moldenhauer and K. M. Michel (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1986)

Quod gratis affirmatur, gratis negatur.

INTRODUCTION

Pyrrhonian scepticism can take two forms. It may be conceived as the attempt to *convince an audience* of the equal strength (or equipollence) of a number of conflicting ontological truth-claims and of the impossibility of ever resolving such conflicts. This is the weak version of Pyrrhonian scepticism and can be very easily refuted—by applying it to an audience that cannot be convinced otherwise come what may. The present study is not interested in this version of Pyrrhonian scepticism.

Yet, it may also be conceived as the attempt to demonstrate *presuppositionlessly* that such equipollence characterizes the *minimal* structure of scientific discourse and that this denotes a problematic state of affairs that can never be resolved. The crucial point here is that this demonstration and this denotation hold independently of the conviction of an audience and cannot be denied through it. Therefore, the second version of Pyrrhonian scepticism cannot be refuted by reference to the notion of ‘conviction of an audience’. This is the strong version of Pyrrhonian scepticism and is exemplified most clearly by the so-called Five Modes of Agrippa.

The term ‘Pyrrhonian problematic’, which I will frequently be using, indicates this strong version of Pyrrhonian scepticism, taken together with all its details, connotations and ramifications. On my understanding, the aim of this problematic is to make a strong case for the impossibility of acquisition of knowledge of what there is (being)—or, if you will, of the expression of the truth of being—and, therefore, for the futility of scientific inquiry (broadly conceived, including philosophy and the sciences of nature).

The thesis of the present study is that a theory can be found in the Hegel corpus which does indeed resolve the Pyrrhonian problematic and thus prove the possibility of knowledge (to wit, of the expression of truth) and of scientific inquiry. The objective is to formulate and defend such a theory.

The main steps of my argument are as follows. First, I show that in his revolutionary early essay *The Relation of Scepticism to Philosophy* Hegel suggests three things with respect to the Pyrrhonian problematic: (a) that Pyrrhonian scepticism is effective only against a model of scientific

inquiry that is based upon the acts of privileging and grounding of truth-claims; (b) that speculative philosophy, which exemplifies the cognitive standpoint of reason, overcomes Pyrrhonian scepticism because it is fundamentally based upon acts of unification of contradictory truth-claims; and (c) that this unification is concretely and positively manifested in the locus of a 'higher truth-claim', the *Vernunftssatz*.

Second, I argue that this suggestion can be effective against Pyrrhonian scepticism only if it is accompanied by a full-blooded, ontological in nature, *theory of judgement*, which would explain how exactly the judgement can come to be a locus of positive unification of contradictory truth-claims. Or simply, a theory has to be put forward that explains how exactly the judgement loses its character of 'immediacy' (which is that character that is responsible for the emergence of contradictions in the universe of discourse) and becomes 'mediated'. However, given the content of the Pyrrhonian problematic and the specific suggestion made in the aforementioned essay, the 'speculative theory of judgement' (a) has to *emerge* from a process of unification of contradictory truth-claims and (b) has to *thematize* such a process. This does not mean that the only content of the theory will be the thematization of this process of unification; it only means that the latter must be *part* of that content.

Finally, I locate this theory in Hegel's *Science of Logic* and provide a detailed description and defence of it.

The decision to advance this project was prompted by (a) the fact that Hegel was well aware of the content and significance of Pyrrhonian scepticism; (b) the fact that he conceived his philosophy as being productive of knowledge of what there is, something that Pyrrhonian scepticism explicitly repudiates; and (c) my own conviction that Pyrrhonian scepticism—as I present it—is the most important problem philosophy, and science in general, faces today. In my view, unless the Pyrrhonian problematic is philosophically resolved or unless they show us how such a resolution is intrinsically present in their theories, scientists should refrain from pompously affirming the truth of one or another object or aspect of being.

Obviously, this belief is not shared by everyone. David Chalmers, for example, begins one of his books in the following way:

Consciousness is the biggest mystery. It may be the largest outstanding obstacle in our quest for a scientific understanding of the universe. The science of physics is not yet complete, but it is well understood; the science of biology has removed many ancient mysteries surrounding the nature of life. There are gaps in our understanding of these fields, but they do not seem

intractable. We have a sense of what a solution to these problems might look like; we just need to get the details right.¹

Pace Chalmers, my impression is that the propositions expressed by “the science of physics” and “the science of biology” have not so clearly and indisputably been established as true as he thinks. In fact, *assuming that the Pyrrhonian problematic holds*, both of these sciences must be deemed sheer illusions—at least until proven otherwise. The great mistake here, so common among contemporary scientists, is the assumption that the simple positing of more and more content in the universe of scientific discourse and the advancing of more and more associations between scientific propositions promotes our “scientific understanding of the universe.” But making an expressed content richer does not by itself lead us closer to the truth of the phenomenon we yearn to obtain knowledge of. What would Chalmers say to someone who is utterly convinced that ancient physics or ‘philosophy of nature’ is both far superior and fundamentally contradictory to ‘our’ contemporary physics? Expounding the content of the latter would not be of any use; for the supporter of ancient physics can *legitimately* immediately deny each and every proposition Chalmers posits in the universe of discourse. This act of immediate denial of asserted truth-claims constitutes the essence of the Pyrrhonian problematic; hence until this problematic is resolved (and not simply ignored), Chalmers’ somewhat blind faith in the ‘positive sciences’ of today remains highly suspect.² *It is the fundamental structure of scientific discourse, the expression of truth, that is the biggest mystery, not consciousness.*

Since the problem my study addresses is the expression of truth in the corpus of ‘speculative philosophy’, the overwhelming majority of Hegel

¹ Chalmers (1997: xi).

² Natural scientists, especially physicists, more often than not show annoyance with epistemological problems, in general, and scepticism, in particular. Bais (2010), for example, attempted to argue that natural science is a domain in which truth can be expressed by humans—and yet his argument fails to address any of the worries philosophers have raised about the methods used by natural science. The following statement is characteristic of the physicist’s attitude towards epistemology (Bais 2010: 165–166): “You may be surprised or even irritated by the cavalier way in which I deal with such serious philosophical matters as the ‘scientific method’. I am sure that I do so because I am a scientific practitioner; over the years I have become tired of an overdose of philosophical, epistemological [and] ontological [...] deliberations. [...] The reason for my [...] fatigue is that I found that such considerations did not add very much to the content of science, and therefore could not give me comparable satisfaction.” For a critique of this attitude see Trisokkas (2010).

scholars would be undoubtedly surprised to find out that Hegel's 'doctrine of the speculative proposition', which he develops in the Preface to the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, does not come into view in the forthcoming discussion. Yet, there is a very simple—but also very effective—reason for this: The resolution of the Pyrrhonian problematic, due to the very nature of the latter, requires the *proof* of the truth of the speculative theory of judgement (or proposition). Such proof, and here everyone—Hegel included—would agree, cannot possibly be provided by the Preface to the *Phenomenology*, for this is posited *outside* of the systematic science and has, therefore, only a descriptive, and not an argumentative or justificatory, value; it is, as Hegel puts it, "a preliminary reflection." Thus, Hegel scholars like Chong-Fuk Lau,³ who ground their explication of Hegel's theory of the expression of truth upon the Preface's 'doctrine of the speculative proposition', would raise their hands in defeat when that theory comes face to face with Pyrrhonian scepticism. My approach, which has chosen to locate Hegel's theory of the expression of truth within that part of his writings which he himself acknowledges as constituting a *proof*, avoids that immediate defeat.

The book has been written for those students of philosophy who already have an interest in Hegel's epistemology and philosophy of language and/or his *Science of Logic*. The thesis it aspires to defend is unique in the literature—as far as I know there is no other Hegel scholar out there who attempted or attempts to make a case for the *Science of Logic*'s being that book of the Hegel corpus in which our philosopher refutes Pyrrhonian scepticism.

I finished the book in frustration: In the eleven long years it took me to write and perfect it, I did not find a single book or article in the—almost two hundred years old—Anglophone Hegel literature that provides a detailed philosophical analysis of the first two chapters of the third part—the so-called 'Logic of the Concept'—of the *Science of Logic*. These are the chapters which contain the 'speculative theory of judgement'. It is true that there are some recent brave attempts, especially by John Burbidge and Richard Winfield—but even these are either extremely short and too general or so much infused with the jargon of analytic philosophy that they come to distort rather than illuminate Hegel's thought.

³ Lau (2004).

This unpleasant experience has determined the outcome of my research. The book is written in a language that avoids the obscure jargon of analytic philosophy and of other post-Hegelian schools and is close to Hegel's own. I, moreover, do not hesitate to discuss the aforementioned two chapters in great detail—as the reader will notice, almost every sentence contained in these chapters becomes individually the object of attention. In this way, after almost two centuries of Hegel scholarship, future students of the *Science of Logic* will finally have a proper guide into the book's two most important chapters.

PART ONE

TRUTH

[...] What is the object of our science? The simplest and best understood answer to this question is this, that truth is this object.

Hegel, *Enzyklopädie I* §19, Zusatz 1

CHAPTER ONE

THE PYRRHONIAN PROBLEMATIC

1.1. *Introduction*

The Pyrrhonian sceptics (c. 330 BC–c. 200 AD)¹ developed an exciting philosophical thought, well documented and maybe² further developed by Sextus Empiricus.³ Despite their richness, however, Sextus' writings prompt different and often conflicting interpretations of Pyrrhonian scepticism.⁴ Although I do not dispute the significance of attempting to clarify the similarities and dissimilarities between the various interpretations on offer, in the present study I have chosen to focus on a single, straightforward model of Pyrrhonian scepticism. The aim of the first chapter is neither to discuss Pyrrhonian scepticism in a critical manner nor to discuss any possible resolutions of it, but rather only to provide a detailed, systematic and internally consistent *descriptive* account of it.

¹ I have situated the chronological starting-point of Pyrrhonism at c. 330 BC because at that time Pyrrho of Elis (c. 360–c. 270 BC), the founder of this school of scepticism, must have been around thirty years old, and the ending-point at c. 200 AD because it must have been around that time when Sextus Empiricus flourished; see House (1980) and Kudlien (1963) for more details. The best overall account of Pyrrhonism is given by Hankinson (1995); other important studies include Annas and Barnes (1985), Burnyeat and Frede (1997), Barnes (1990), Dal Pra (1975) and Stough (1969). Hankinson (1998) is a brief but very lucid and informative account of Pyrrhonism.

² There is controversy among scholars as to whether Sextus' work contains original thought or it is just a compilation and careful ordering of the teachings of older sceptics. See the discussion and references in Barnes (1988) and Barnes (2000: xv).

³ We possess two complete works by Sextus (PH and M I–VI), as well as the bulk of a third, which is now divided into three books (M VII–VIII, M IX–X, and M XI). For general accounts of Sextus Empiricus' life and work see Hankinson (1995: 6–7), House (1980), Heintz (1932), Janáček (1948), Janáček (1972), and Vollgraff (1902).

⁴ The extreme divergence in interpretation stems from the fact that different authors emphasize and privilege different passages or sentences in Sextus' *Outlines*. A significant point of divergence in our case is that if one begins from the Pyrrhonist's claim that permanent tranquillity follows suspension of judgment about everything (PH I 31), one will then reach a completely different conclusion than one would have if one began from the claim that the Pyrrhonist never stops investigating (PH I 1–3). Cf. Barnes (2000: xv): "[...] The *Outlines* contain, or at first sight appear to contain, various inconsistencies; in particular, Sextus does not appear to have a single and uniform philosophical stance to expound—different scepticisms jostle one another."

This model will be advanced to the effect that it does justice to what will be postulated as the three fundamental features of that kind of scepticism:

- (a) that its ultimate aim is to lead to *permanent* tranquillity ('a tranquillity without a stop');⁵
- (b) that the means to achieve this is by making a case for the impossibility of human knowledge of the true nature of *any* object or aspect of being *whatsoever* ('global scepticism');⁶ and

⁵ Tranquillity (*ἀταραξία*), the 'causal principle' or 'ultimate aim' of Pyrrhonism, is sometimes translated also as *imperturbability* (PH I 12, 25; cf. Sedley 1983: 19, 21, 23 n. 16). For the purposes of the present chapter, which focuses on the epistemological character and significance of Pyrrhonism, its ultimate goal (tranquillity) does not become an object of reflection; for a very good article that discusses tranquillity as the ultimate goal of Pyrrhonism and its relation to *ἐποχή* see Sedley (1983).

⁶ The manifestation of the impossibility of knowledge leads to suspension of judgment (*ἐποχή*), which on my interpretation signifies the *total absence* of scientific beliefs (PH I 12–15); as we will see, the means to achieve this manifestation is by opposing to every truth-claim a truth-claim with an equal status (equipollence, *ἰσοσθένεια*) (PH I 12) and then applying the so-called argument from the criterion of truth. There are some passages in PH which suggest that the Pyrrhonist does not after all oppose the activity of scientific inquiry because he cannot explicitly *say* (or 'assert') that knowledge is impossible, i.e. that reality *is* unknowable (see, for example, PH 1–4). To my mind, however, the presence of scientific inquiry is the source of 'disturbance' in the soul and, therefore, is incompatible with the model of Pyrrhonian scepticism I am developing in this study. On this matter see especially the last sentence in PH I 30. On the universality or global character of Pyrrhonian scepticism see PH I 31: "[...] Tranquillity follows suspension of judgment about everything [...]" PH I 232: "[Arcesilaus] suspends judgment about everything;" Forster (2007: 5): "Is it likely that the Pyrrhonists, who so prided themselves on being at least as radical as the Academic sceptics, would have fallen short of Arcesilaus in his aspiration to do away with *all* belief? Surely not." See also Sedley (1983: 11): "[...] When Arcesilaus advocated suspension of assent about everything, he meant suspension of all belief—refusal to regard any impression whatever, or its contradictory, as true." Frede (1979) is against this interpretation; he believes that the Pyrrhonist attacks only a certain category of truth-claims, the ones asserted by those who Frede calls "scientists" and "philosophers;" the Pyrrhonist does not, in his opinion, attack the truth-claims made by "ordinary" people. (Note that in the present study when we are referring to the 'scientists' we mean *each and every* human being who claims to have knowledge of the *true nature* of objects and aspects of being). A critique of Frede's position can be found in Burnyeat (1980a). Barnes (1983: 159–160) claims that Sextus' text does not allow resolution of the Frede-Burnyeat dispute since it supports both. Barnes (1982) argues for a modest theory of Pyrrhonism, one that combines elements from both the Fredean and Burnyeatian theories. For a critique of Barnes' 'modest theory' see Forster (1989: 203). Since the aim of the Pyrrhonists, in our model, is the complete destruction of scientific inquiry, Pyrrhonian scepticism is fundamentally different from the Cartesian scepticism of the *Meditations* and the Socratic scepticism of the *Meno*, both of which are of a *propaedeutic* nature, clearing the ground for the acquisition of knowledge. See *Meditations*; *Meno* 79e–80a, 84a–c.

- (c) that this case should be made *without* the employment of *any* 'truth-claim' (or 'dogmatic principle') on the part of the sceptic—a term which, for the Pyrrhonist, denotes a judgement (or 'proposition'), a syllogism (or 'argument') or a whole theory, which gives the impression that it purports to say, directly or indirectly, and certainly voluntarily and "with intensity,"⁷ something true about the truth of being⁸ ('presuppositionless scepticism').⁹

Given that our study takes it for granted that the essence of Pyrrhonian scepticism is constituted by these three features, the presentation of the model could be criticized only in terms of its failure to do justice to those features. The main textual material for constructing the model will be provided by Sextus Empiricus' *Outlines of Pyrrhonism*.¹⁰

⁷ PH I 28.

⁸ PH I 3: "Those who are called dogmatists in the proper sense of the word think that they have discovered the truth [...]." In PH II 4 Sextus says that the dogmatist is one who not only "thinks of," but also "affirms the reality of the things about which we are making our statements;" he also says that the dogmatist "posits the reality of things we are discussing." In PH I 8 he defines the dogmatist as one "who makes affirmations and assertions about the reality of something unclear [...]." (Note, however, that for the Pyrrhonist *all* objects posited by science are 'unclear'.) Frede (1987a: 201) refers to the dogmatists as "those philosophers who claim that something can be known." Examples of dogmatic philosophers are Aristotle, the Stoics, and Epicurus; these are called by Sextus "deluded and self-satisfied dogmatists" (PH I 62, 90).

⁹ See Forster (1989: 11ff.). This emphasis on absolute presuppositionlessness is, according to some, the major difference between Pyrrhonian and Academic sceptics; see PH I 1–4, 220–235. Cf. Frede (1987a: 212ff.); Striker (1983); Forster (1989: 198–200). Hegel discusses the issue in VSP 230–234. Sextus (PH I 13) says that the Pyrrhonists "do not hold beliefs in the sense in which some say that belief is assent to some unclear object of investigation in the sciences;" but in the rest of the book he makes it abundantly clear that there is *not even a single* "clear object of investigation in the sciences." So, as far as I can judge, what Sextus is *actually* saying is that the Pyrrhonists hold no ontological beliefs *at all*. Cf. PH II 10. Frede (1987a: 202) writes that "a main tenet of scepticism [is] the principle that one should not commit oneself to any position, that one should suspend judgment, withhold assent on any matter whatsoever."

¹⁰ Peculiarly, Annas and Barnes translated the title of Sextus' work as "Outlines of Scepticism" instead of 'Outlines of Pyrrhonism'. They comment upon this peculiarity thus (xxxiv, n. 1): "We should add a note on the title: a decent translation of Sextus' Greek title would be *Pyrrhonian Outlines* or *Outlines of Pyrrhonism*. We decided to substitute 'Scepticism' for 'Pyrrhonism', fearing (perhaps wrongly) that the latter word might be misunderstood or not understood at all. To critics, we offer the sophistical defence that *Outlines of Scepticism* is the title of our translation, not the translation of Sextus' title."

1.2. *The Universe of Discourse*

The problematic of the present inquiry—to wit, what constitutes the object of *our* interest—concerns the possibility of human knowledge of the true nature of what there is (being). The generic name used for the sphere of human activity that is meant to produce, incorporate and expand such knowledge is *science*.¹¹ The production, incorporation and expansion of knowledge require investigation or *inquiry* into the truth of being, for the simple reason that the knowledge which science—as generically defined above—is interested in is knowledge *of* the truth of being. Call this inquiry *scientific inquiry*.

Scientific inquiry, defined as *the* human inquiry into the truth of being, involves things that are done and things that are said. Anything that is said or done must *appear* and anything that appears must appear *somewhere*. We call the abstract space (the ‘somewhere’) in which everything *said* in the realm of science appears *the universe of discourse* and the abstract space in which everything *done* in the realm of science appears *the universe of praxis*. The problematic this study opens up is peculiar to what happens in the universe of discourse—*not* to what happens in the universe of praxis.¹²

In the universe of discourse there appear claims made during the activity of scientific inquiry. A number of those claims are about being and some of *these* particular claims are (*positive* or *negative*) claims about the

¹¹ Note, importantly, that, in the present context, the term ‘science’ does not limit itself to positivistic conceptions of science, which allow only activities like physics and chemistry to hold that title. In this *beginning* of our inquiry the term *science* is used quite loosely and means each and every human activity that *purports* to say something *true* about the real. Thus, each and every human being (and not just the physicists or the chemists) is potentially a *scientist*. In other words, if a farmer is making a claim to the true nature of reality, he obtains at that moment the status of a scientist.

¹² I take it that it is *beyond any doubt* that the Pyrrhonist’s problem has to do with what is *said* in science. PH I 19–20 provides the definitive proof of this (my emphasis): “When we investigate whether existing things are such as they appear, we grant that they appear, and what we investigate is not what is apparent *but what is said about what is apparent*—and this is different from investigating what is apparent itself. For example, it appears to us that honey sweetens (we concede this inasmuch as we are sweetened in a perceptual way); but whether (as far as the argument goes) it is actually sweet is something we investigate—and this is not what is apparent *but something said about what is apparent*.” (Note that, according to Sextus himself, this problem arises with any object whatsoever, including “objects of thought” (PH I 9); to wit, it is not restricted to ‘sensory’ objects. There is only one sentence (PH I 128) in the *Outlines* which unambiguously states that “the intellect” is conditioned upon “the senses.” But, of course, a Pyrrhonist cannot possibly accept this dogma.)

true nature of—or about the *truth* of—being. Now, a number of these *latter* claims come forth with the *intention* of presenting themselves as *true*—this simply means that the scientists who posit them in the universe of discourse want them to be taken seriously by their interlocutors and honestly believe that the claims they so posit, *and not their negations*, represent the truth of what there is.

Given this specific character of these claims, namely, that they, firstly, are about the *truth* of being and, secondly, come forth with the intention of presenting themselves as *true*, let us call them *truth-claims*. Narrowing the domain even further, we now postulate that the present problematic deals *only* with truth-claims and that the universe of discourse will be thematized *solely* as a space in which truth-claims appear.

Whenever a new truth-claim appears in the universe of discourse, it acquires *existence*. The latter is entailed from the truth-claim's *just* being there, having *just* appeared, having *just* been posited in the universe of discourse. Its existence has, therefore, an *immediate* character. This does not mean that the truth-claim could not develop or disclose a more elaborate, richer character, through its relations with other truth-claims. The emphasis here is rather on the very moment a truth-claim *arises* in the universe of discourse; in that primordial, minimal mode of its existence, the truth-claim has a character of *immediacy*.

There is, then, a primordial state of affairs in which the truth-claims in the universe of discourse relate to each other in a non-reflective, indifferent, only implicit manner. That is to say, there is a primordial moment when the truth-claim has not yet explicitly shown that its meaning or significance depends in any way upon other truth-claims; this issue has *not yet* become a matter of *reflection*. The immediacy that fundamentally characterizes a truth-claim posited in the universe of discourse provides the basis upon which everything forthcoming in the present study depends.

Let me make this clearer. The universe of discourse consists of truth-claims, which are posited therein by the scientists, namely by those human beings who inquire into the truth of being. Each and every truth-claim posited in the universe of discourse can be in either one of two states. A truth-claim is in a state of 'mediation' when its relation to other truth-claims is made explicit; it is in a state of 'immediacy' when that relation is *not* made explicit. What I have argued for above is that this 'immediacy' is a *necessary* feature of each and every truth-claim's overall existence. Simply, there is a *moment* in a truth-claim's 'life' (by this term I mean the period during which a truth-claim has a presence in the universe of

discourse) when it is necessarily *not* characterized by means of its relation to other truth-claims; this is undoubtedly the case when the truth-claim emerges for the *first* time in the universe of discourse.

When a truth-claim is posited for the first time, then, it necessarily has an independence of its own. Its relation to other truth-claims requires reflection and therefore comes second in the order of existence. Theories or systems, or even simple clarifications, are always constructed from individual truth-claims, a fact that proves the logical priority of the latter over the former. Surely, one may argue that a truth-claim's 'belonging to a system' is *implicitly* present even at the very beginning of its life, and I will be the first to agree with this statement, but what the notion of immediacy refers to is only what occurs *explicitly* in that very moment when a truth-claim is posited for the first time in the universe of discourse. The fact remains, then, that the relationality of a truth-claim requires *further* thought, a *reflection*, which exactly proves that there is a moment in a truth-claim's life in the universe of discourse when it has a character of immediacy.

Exactly at this point the argument becomes distinctively Pyrrhonian; for it is the Pyrrhonist who first pointed out that in such a state of immediacy and indifferent relationality there can be no *privileging* of a truth-claim over any of the others. In the universe of discourse there reigns initially a state of *equality* or *equipollence* (ἰσοσθένεια) among the truth-claims.¹³ They simply exist in that universe, standing indifferently next to one another, the one being no *truer* than the other.¹⁴

¹³ PH I 10.

¹⁴ This is a point where my interpretation differs crucially from an alternative, which can be convincingly supported by a number of passages found in the text of PH (e.g. I 8–10, 29). My attempt is to ground the equipollence of the truth-claims on their *simple* existence in the universe of discourse; the *alternative* move would be to ground this equipollence on the equal *force* they have upon the *conviction* of an *audience*. (See especially PH I 10: "By 'equipollence' we mean equality with regard to being convincing or unconvincing: none of the conflicting accounts takes precedence over any other as being more convincing.") I find the alternative unattractive because, in the case where the force *varies*, it allows for an allegedly *valid* hierarchical ordering of truth-claims based solely upon the subjective opinions of an audience. My approach avoids that danger. Sextus seems to agree with me on this issue in PH I 33–34, where he refuses to allow that *simply* universal agreement on an assertion suffices to show that it is true. Cf. Forster (1989: 20): "[...] Sextus Empiricus' commitment to the common views of men, although it surfaces at several points in his texts, has the appearance of being more a random accretion from external sources than an essential component of his sceptical position like the equipollence method." Aenesidemus, on the other hand, seems to have accepted the principle that what is commonly believed must also be true; see Rist (1970). Cf. PH I 89: "Anyone who says that we should assent to the majority view is making a puerile suggestion."

This is so because in a context of immediacy their truth is determined absolutely by their simple presence; in such a context nothing can be said for or against a truth-claim, for the simple reason that to be considered in a context of immediacy means exactly this: to be considered *before* any relations with any other truth-claims are developed. Thus, whatever is said beyond the sheer positing of a truth-claim does not matter with respect to its immediate truth-status and since they all claim the truth for themselves, none is truer than the other.

The equality of the truth-claims matters greatly when a *conflict* appears,¹⁵ when, that is, the universe of discourse—or part of it—takes the specific form of a *dispute*. This is so because in the case of conflict the *truth* regarding the nature of the object or aspect of what there is being affected *hides* itself and, therefore, is not *expressed*.¹⁶ In such an event the universe of discourse is contaminated, for the expression of truth is the very reason it exists in the first place. This calls for the removal or *resolution* of the conflict.¹⁷

At this point the second Pyrrhonian element (after *ισοσθένεια*) enters the picture of our problematic. This is the manifestation that no conflict between truth-claims can *ever* be resolved¹⁸ and hence the truth of what there is can *never* be expressed.¹⁹ It is for this reason that the sceptic calls the truth-claims posited in the universe of discourse also by the name ‘*dogmatic principles*’.

Before the sceptic’s argument for the impossibility of the resolution of conflict is presented, let me here point out what, surely, must have already become a source of puzzlement. Firstly, the sceptic seems to have moved quite arbitrarily from a universe of discourse in which the truth-claims are related only in an *indifferent* manner to a universe where such relations take the loaded form of *conflict*. The question is this: How does the Pyrrhonist conceive the move from indifferent relations to conflicting relations? Secondly, the sceptic suddenly employed a judgement affirming the *negative* relation between *truth* and *conflicting* truth-claims—namely

¹⁵ See PH I 179.

¹⁶ Sextus repeatedly puts forth the idea that conflict and opposition prevent us from “asserting what the object is in its nature;” see e.g. PH I 78, 87, 93, 123, 135, 140, 167.

¹⁷ PH I 26 (my emphasis): “[The] sceptics began to do philosophy in order to *decide* among appearances and to apprehend which are true and which false [...]”

¹⁸ PH I 112: “[...] The anomalies are in fact undecidable.” (By the term “anomalies” Sextus means ‘conflicts’.)

¹⁹ PH I 26: “[B]ut they [i.e. the sceptics] came upon equipollent dispute, and being unable to decide this they suspended judgment.” See also PH I 135.

that in case of conflict truth hides itself. How does he, then, understand this negative relation and how does he justify this understanding?

Thus, in what follows I will provide the Pyrrhonist's responses to these three questions:

- (1) How does the Pyrrhonist manifest the *impossibility of the resolution* of conflict between truth-claims?
- (2) How does the Pyrrhonist conceive a *conflict* between truth-claims in the context of immediacy of the universe of discourse?
- (3) How does the Pyrrhonist argue for the *negative* relation between truth and conflicting truth-claims in that context?

1.3. *Criterion of Truth*

Let me begin with the first question. If (a) certain truth-claims conflict with each other and (b) conflict contaminates the universe of discourse, it would seem that a choice must be made between them so as the conflict to be resolved.²⁰ The decision should not be arbitrary;²¹ one has to make sure it *guarantees* that the truth-claim chosen indeed expresses the true nature of the relevant object or aspect of being. Otherwise, why should such decision be accepted?

This need for guarantee calls for a *criterion of truth*. To posit a criterion of truth is to *say explicitly* why the one rather than the other truth-claim is true.²² But it would seem that in doing so one has to say something further (positive or negative) about the truth of being, for it would seem that a conflict about the truth of being can be resolved only if *more* is revealed about this truth. Accordingly, the criterion, whatever its peculiar form (a judgement, a syllogism, a theory), is in turn itself, directly or indirectly, a truth-claim, albeit one of a special status: it provides *the reason why* an initially posited truth-claim is true (and hence why the truth-claim which conflicts with it is false). Let us call all truth-claims initially posited in

²⁰ This claim is discussed below. Note here that ignoring a specific conflict does not solve the problem, since this state of affairs holds for each and every truth-claim in the context of immediacy. Thus, by saying—in a Kantian manner—simply that it might be the case that none of the conflicting truth-claims is true, one does not really achieve anything: we do want to show that some truth-claims are true.

²¹ Instead of “arbitrary” one could use the word ‘dogmatic’. Compare how Sextus describes the “mode of hypothesis” in PH I 168.

²² Cf. Hankinson (1998: 852).

the universe of discourse *first-order truth-claims* and the truth-claims posited therein in order to resolve conflicts between first-order truth-claims *second-order truth-claims*.

Recall now that a truth-claim, as soon as it appears, has an *immediate* existence in the universe of discourse, just because it is posited therein. If, in this universe, a truth-claim appears that conflicts with the posited criterion of truth, a decision has to be made concerning the truth of the conflicting second-order truth-claims. But this requires a further criterion of truth, which would be nothing else than a *third-order truth-claim*. It is clear that the activity of resolution of conflict in the universe of discourse takes now the form of intolerable *infinite regress*. If, further, at some point during this process a criterion of truth is invoked that has the same content as one of the previously posited criteria, then the whole process takes the more specific form of intolerable *circularity*.²³ Call this whole Pyrrhonian argument *the argument from the criterion of truth*.²⁴

Regress or circularity are intolerable (or 'vicious') because their structure²⁵ does not allow for the satisfaction of the desideratum at hand, which has been firmly determined as the resolution of conflict between *first-order* truth-claims. Circularity does not resolve that conflict because the criterion simply reiterates a truth-claim that is still in conflict with another truth-claim; and the conceptual chain built by an infinite regress may impress us due to the elaborate and continuous explanations it produces, but these remain foreign to the *truth* of the initially posited truth-claims, for they lead to no choice between them, to no resolution of *their* conflict.

Based on the argument from the criterion of truth, the Pyrrhonist maintains that the impossibility of knowledge of the truth of being has now been manifested, and this without the employment of any dogmatic principle. Indeed, if we accept (a) the necessary notion of *the universe of discourse*,

²³ For Sextus Empiricus' varied formulations of the argument from the criterion see PH I 114–117, 122–123, 166; II 20, 34ff.; M VII 16. For the specific form of circularity see PH I 116–117, 169; II 9, 36, 114, 196, 199, 202; M VIII 261, 342, 379–380. A good discussion of the argument—which however remains somehow on the surface with respect to the really important philosophical issues connected with it—can be found in Barnes (1990: 36–57, 58–89, 113–144). The reason why Barnes' discussion does not go as deep as it should is that he artificially dissociates the mode of "infinite regression" from the phenomenon of dispute (which he calls the "mode of disagreement"), i.e. from the existence of conflicting truth-claims in the universe of discourse.

²⁴ On the notion of *the criterion of truth* see especially Brunschwig (1988), Long (1978) and Striker (1990a).

²⁵ See the interesting discussion of this concept in Barnes (1990: 54–57).

the elements of which have initially (or, if you prefer, at some moment) an immediate, non-reflective, only implicitly relational existence, (b) the phenomenon of *conflict* emerging in this universe, and (c) the need for its *resolution* when it comes down to arriving at knowledge of the true nature of the objects involved, then all the sceptic has done is to have consistently applied these premises to the attempt to resolve the conflicts by means of positing criteria of truth in the universe of discourse.

1.4. 'Nothing Can Be Known'

While it seems clear that the conflicting truth-claims are not dogmatic principles espoused by the Pyrrhonist *himself*, the same does not seem to be the case with the *conclusion* he draws from the argument from the criterion of truth, namely that it is impossible to acquire knowledge of the true nature of any object or aspect of being whatsoever or, simply, that *nothing can be known*. The claim that the inference is problematic could be based upon either one of the following two reasons: It is problematic either because the asserted conclusion can be read as a truth-claim or because it cannot be inferred from the argument in the first place. I will now examine these two objections in turn.

The *first* objection has it that the Pyrrhonist concludes by *stating* that *nothing can be known* and that this is incompatible with what Pyrrhonism stands for, since it sounds like a firmly posited negative claim about the truth of any object or aspect of being whatsoever. It appears, in other words, as if the sceptic has arrived at the indisputable *knowledge* that such truth can never be obtained. The significance of this can be made more visible if we turn the negative claim into its positive equivalent; for the Pyrrhonist would in this case positively (and in a self-contradictory manner) maintain that any object or aspect of being whatsoever *is* unknowable.

The objection would be valid only if the conclusion of the argument is such as stated above. Fortunately for the sceptic, it is not. The Pyrrhonist is careful *never* to conclude his argument with a positively formulated proposition.²⁶ Indeed, the argument is constructed in such a way as to be conceived that it either *literally* regresses or *literally* spins in a circle forever. There is no need for it to close with a positively formulated conclusion in order for it to obtain the significance of a sceptical *attitude*; making

²⁶ Cf. PH I 200–201, 326; Bibl. 212, 169^b.

us realize that it formally continues up to infinity suffices for prompting all those involved in scientific inquiry to *give it up*, a phenomenon referred to by Sextus as *suspension of judgement* (ἐποχή).²⁷

The Pyrrhonist, then, aims rather at a psychological condition or practical behaviour than at a concluding proposition: the feeling of not wanting to go on or the actuality of not going on with scientific inquiry (that is, the actuality of not continuing with the positing of truth-claims in the universe of discourse).²⁸ By showing that the argument from the criterion has an internal structure that leads to circularity or infinite regress, the sceptic does *not* state that nothing can be known. It is rather the *structure* of a never-concluding argument that *imposes* a sceptical attitude upon the Pyrrhonist and all those who attend to his argument.²⁹ As Annas and Barnes put it, suspension of judgement “is something that *happens* to us, not a thing that we are *obliged* or can *choose* rationally to adopt.”³⁰ The sceptic and his attendants are giving up the pursuit of knowledge by finding themselves in a psychological condition (or following a practice) in which they are “unable to say which of the objects presented [they] ought to believe and which [they] ought to disbelieve” (ἀπορία).³¹ And, according to the Pyrrhonist, such an abandonment of scientific inquiry is immediately followed by tranquillity (ἀταραξία).³²

²⁷ PH I 8, 10; II 7, 18, 196. Cf. Barnes (1990: 42–43). The first champion of ἐποχή was probably Arcesilaus; see Sedley (1983: 10).

²⁸ PH I 7.

²⁹ If my argument is correct, Sextus’ description of the sceptical conclusions (or ‘principles’, such as ‘nothing can be known’) as *self-destroyed* elements is *superfluous*. For this assumes that they *first* acquire existence and *only then* destroy themselves. In contrast, my claim is that such conclusions are *never* formulated as *conclusions*. Cf. Forster (1989: 18–19). Hegel seems to have the same wrong idea in VSP 248–249.

³⁰ Annas and Barnes (1985: 49). Cf. Hankinson (1998: 854).

³¹ PH I 196 (my translation). See also PH I 7.

³² See especially the magnificent image of the painter Apelles in PH I 28: “A story told of the painter Apelles applies to the sceptics [i.e. the Pyrrhonists]. They say that he was painting a horse and wanted to represent in his picture the lather of the horse’s mouth; but he was so unsuccessful that he gave up, took the sponge on which he had been wiping off the colours from his brush, and flung it at the picture. And when it hit the picture, it produced a perfect representation of the horse’s lather.” See also PH I 26. Cf. Hankinson (1998: 848): “[...] The result was meant to be suspension of judgment about such matters, which would in turn lead to tranquillity of mind.” Clearly, the Pyrrhonian position that the abandonment of science entails tranquillity hits at the heart of our desire for knowledge; see Sedley (1983: 10): “There is no suggestion that any of [the] pre-Hellenistic philosophers derived much comfort from his admission of ignorance or thought of it as anything more than a regrettable expedient. Indeed, it is hard to see what comfort it could afford anybody who was not prepared to renounce a rather fundamental human trait, the

Thus, the Pyrrhonian manifestation of the impossibility of knowledge does *not* amount to positing a truth-claim in the universe of discourse stating that *nothing can be known*. Rather, the argument from the criterion exhibits a pattern that causes the *awareness* that the positing of truth-claims with the aim of resolving conflicts in the context of immediacy of the universe of discourse is either infinitely regressive or viciously circular—and this immediately produces the feeling of strongly desiring the abandonment of scientific inquiry or the actuality of giving it up. *Simply, one does not bother any more.*

So, the sceptic or his attendant *never* claims that nothing can be known. They simply *act* upon the impression they receive from the argument from the criterion of truth. It is not up to them to decide not to abandon science (that is, if they genuinely identify science with the generic inquiry into the truth of being and if they find nothing problematic with the construction of the argument); this just follows immediately from hearing or expressing the argument. Thus, the Pyrrhonist manifests that nothing can be known without ever positing the truth-claim ‘nothing can be known’ in the universe of discourse.

The only objection I can think of here is that the claim that nothing can be known would have a force against science only if it were posited as a truth-claim in the universe of discourse; simply a state of mind or a practical behaviour does not suffice for the demolition of science. The Pyrrhonist’s state of mind, however, is not *simply* a state of mind. It is the specific state of mind that *has resulted from* the exhibition of a pattern that, if accepted, *necessarily* causes the awareness that each and every attempt to privilege a truth-claim over its negation ends up in either infinite regress or vicious circularity. The impression of the pattern is so powerful that the Pyrrhonist, passively and without pursuing it,³³ abandons the sphere of science.

One really wonders why, given the powerfulness and actuality of the impression, one would still regard the positing of the truth-claim ‘nothing can be known’ as a prerequisite for admitting the total destruction of

desire for knowledge.” On the Pyrrhonian notion of tranquillity see Burnyeat (1980b) and Striker (1990b).

³³ Cf. Frede (1987a: 207–208): “[This is] a passive acquiescence or acceptance of something, in the way in which a people might accept a ruler, not by some act of approval or acknowledgment, but by acquiescence in his rule, by failing to resist, to effectively reject his rule. [...] One might, having considered matters, just acquiesce in the impression one is left with, resign oneself to it, accept the fact that this is the impression one is left with, without though taking the step to accept the impression positively by thinking the further thought that the impression is true.”

scientific inquiry. Each and every human being *who strongly desires to acquire knowledge of the true nature of things and agrees with the way the argument has been constructed* finds himself either (a) not actively pursuing any scientific inquiry or (b) actively pursuing a scientific inquiry that she herself characterizes as a futile one. Why should anyone need to witness, in addition to this image, the truth-claim ‘nothing can be known’ being posited in the universe of discourse in order to judge that scientific inquiry has indeed been annihilated?

Let us now address the *second* objection, which argues that the conclusion that *nothing can be known* simply *does not follow* from the argument from the criterion of truth. It would seem that our response to the first objection removes this second one as well, because such conclusion is never actually formulated. Nonetheless, those who put forward the second objection would really like to make an altogether different point; they would like to say that the argument from the criterion establishes only *local*, not *global*, doubt. Thus, their problem with the conclusion that nothing can be known is that its scope was *universal*, while, for them, the scope of doubt should have included only those *specific* objects and aspects of being which the truth-claims *actually* considered were referring to. As Sedley puts it, “if [the sceptic] is really an open-minded inquirer, it may be that he has always up to now found every dogmatist argument to be equally balanced by a counterargument, but why should he suppose that the same will hold of theses he has yet to investigate?”³⁴ Plainly, this line of reasoning holds even after the removal of the notion of a positively posited conclusion, for it goes *against* the complete denial of the possibility of scientific inquiry. If this argument were valid, the Pyrrhonist, contrary to *my* understanding, would *never* stop his examination of truth-claims and, consequently, would *never* enjoy full tranquillity, only *moments* of it, interspersed with moments of anxiety and disturbance (ταραχῇ).³⁵

³⁴ Sedley (1983: 21). He continues thus: “Some Sceptics responded to this problem by suggesting that in the Skeptic formula ‘To every argument an equal argument is opposed’ the noncommittal infinitive form of the verb used in the Greek should be thought of as expressing an injunction—to every argument *let us* oppose an equal argument—in order to avoid being misled into dogmatism at some future time. The move is ingenious, for an injunction is not an assertion at all, let alone a doctrinaire one.” In my view, this ‘solution’ is of no value here, exactly because the problem is fictitious. The abandonment of scientific inquiry that follows from a global suspension of judgment does *not* imply a dogmatic attitude.

³⁵ Note how much this idea of ‘momentary tranquillity’—a paradoxical notion, really—is incompatible with Sextus’ own definition of tranquillity at PH I 10: “Tranquillity is freedom from disturbance or calmness of soul.”

This argument collapses, since it mistakenly assumes that the argument from the criterion is applied separately and consecutively to specific pairs of truth-claims. This is not the case, because it is, deliberately, absolutely *formal* and its effectiveness is not dependent upon the *content* of the truth-claims. (Of course, the content of the truth-claims plays a certain role in the argument: it determines whether what an instance of the argument establishes is infinite regress or circularity. But the *effectiveness* of the argument as a whole does not require knowledge of the content of specific truth-claims and, therefore, does not depend upon such content.) All that matters therein is the status of the truth-claims *as truth-claims*. Whether a truth-claim has an empirical or a non-empirical content, and whether its content is this or that, is absolutely irrelevant to the argument from the criterion.³⁶ Hence the necessity of an ongoing examination of truth-claims cannot seriously be ascribed to a theory of Pyrrhonian scepticism. When Sedley writes that it is not likely that “the onset of *epoche* signals the cessation of inquiry” and that “resistance to the snares of doctrine must involve lifelong open-minded investigation and reinvestigation of doctrinaire [i.e. dogmatic] arguments,”³⁷

³⁶ Cf. Forster (2007: 3): “[...] The Five Tropes of Agrippa seem quite indifferent as to the nature of the beliefs against which they are directed.” (The Five Tropes (or Modes) of Agrippa [PH I 164–177] are the ones which are at play in *my* reconstruction of the Pyrrhonian problematic, and we will examine them more closely in the second chapter in relation to Hegel’s early response to Pyrrhonian scepticism. These supervene upon the Ten Modes of Aenesidemus [PH I 35–163], which attack only empirical judgments, to wit, judgments which express a ‘sensory’ object, and render them superfluous. [Yet, Sextus sometimes speaks as if they work together against “the rashness of the dogmatists” (PH I 170–177)].)

³⁷ Sedley (1983: 22). See also Frede (1987a: 210): “The skeptic has no stake in the truth of the impression he is left with. He is ever ready to consider the matter further, to change his mind. He has no attachment to the impressions he is left with. He is not responsible for having them, he did not seek them out. He is not out to prove anything, and hence feels no need to defend anything.” Although I find myself agreeing with much of what Frede says in the 1987a paper, I disagree completely with the content of this excerpt and especially with the second sentence. For here he suggests that even after the Pyrrhonist has produced his non-concluding argument and received the crucial impression that allows him to abandon scientific inquiry and become tranquil, he will still attend to scientific debates and try to adjudicate between them. But, as far as I can see, this is absurd, since the structure of the argument is *deliberately absolutely formal* and, therefore, no *content* could ever affect it in such a way so as to stop exemplifying infinite regress or circularity. Thus, as far as I am concerned, the Pyrrhonist is *not* “ready to consider the matter further, to change his mind.” He has made a point and done so *successfully*, which means that scientific inquiry as a whole has *for him* collapsed. How would then be possible for the genuine Pyrrhonist to continue attending scientific debates and arguing against them if science as a whole no more exists? Would Apelles, after flinging his brush at the picture and achieving a *perfect* representation of the horse’s lather, tear *this* picture apart and start painting the horse

he has, I am afraid, provided us with a distorted view of Pyrrhonian scepticism.³⁸

All in all, the argument from the criterion of truth manifests that knowledge of the true nature of *any* object or aspect of being *whatsoever* can *never* be achieved. This manifestation does not emerge from an asserted truth-claim that would function as the conclusion of the argument, but rather from the psychological and practical ramifications of an attendance to its formal structure. Simply, the demonstration or manifestation of a few steps into the argument makes us aware that the content of a truth-claim does not matter: a truth-claim is not cancelled out because it has a certain content, but because it has the status of a truth-claim. The immediate consequence of this awareness is the realization that *no* immediate truth-claim can *ever* be privileged over its contradictory. And it really does not matter whether or not such realization is formulated and then posited in the universe of discourse in the form of a truth-claim; for what directly follows from it is the *act* of giving up scientific inquiry. Pyrrhonian scepticism, therefore, leads necessarily to the *permanent* abandonment of scientific inquiry.

1.5. *Conflict*

The Pyrrhonian project would, of course, succeed only if there was nothing problematic regarding the move from a universe of discourse inhabited by truth-claims that stand next to each other in relations of *indifference* to a universe of discourse whose inhabitants are *conflicting* truth-claims. This brings us to the second issue in need of clarification: What does it mean for two truth-claims to stand in a relation of *conflict*?

anew?! Compare this with what Timon, the disciple of Pyrrho, says about his master (DL IX 64; my emphasis): “Aged Pyrrho, how and whence did you find escape from slavery to the opinions and empty thought of the sophists, and break the bonds of all deceit and persuasion? *You were not concerned to inquire what winds blow over Greece, and the origin and destination of each thing.*”

³⁸ Sedley and those who agree with him on this point take their lead from the very first section of PH where Sextus defines Pyrrhonian sceptics as those who “still investigate,” to wit, those who never stop investigating. As I have already explained, I do not believe that this feature belongs to the fundamental nature of Pyrrhonism, basically for two reasons: (a) it does not allow for the establishment of permanent tranquillity and (b) it is not compatible with the global scope of Pyrrhonian scepticism, the suspension of judgment *about everything*. So, in my view, in PH I 1–4—and elsewhere (e.g. PH II 10)—Sextus *misrepresents* genuine Pyrrhonism—if, that is, my interpretative model is representative of genuine Pyrrhonism.

Let us initially focus on the truth-claims taken as *judgements*. There are two reasons why we begin with the judgement rather than with the syllogism or the whole theory. Firstly, both the syllogism and the theory are composed of judgements, while the reverse does not hold; therefore, the judgement has a certain priority over the other two possible forms of a truth-claim. Secondly, even if the Pyrrhonist does not subscribe to the reason just given, he certainly applies the argument from the criterion of truth to pairs of simple judgements;³⁹ this fact alone would suffice to justify our isolation of the notion of judgement from the notions of syllogism and whole theory. Indeed, it seems that for the Pyrrhonist the object of attack does *not have to* have the form of syllogism or whole theory—it *could* be just a simple judgement.⁴⁰ Hence one should be confident that the very character of the Pyrrhonian problematic allows us to isolate the truth-claim as *judgement* and focus on it separately from the other two forms.

Thus, the truth-claim will henceforth be thematized as *judgement* and our question could also have the following form: ‘What does it mean for two *judgements* to stand in a relation of conflict?’ Observation of Sextus’ many descriptions of the historically actual disputes of the dogmatists reveals that two truth-claims (considered now as judgements) conflict with one another when (a) they refer to the *same* object or aspect of being and (b) the *property* or characteristic one of them assigns to this object or aspect cannot *coexist* with the property or characteristic the second of

³⁹ See, for example, PH III 65: “It is assumed by ordinary life and by some philosophers that motion exists, but by Parmenides, Melissus, and certain others that it does not exist; while the sceptics have manifested that it is no more existent than non-existent;” PH I 151: “We oppose dogmatic principles to one another when we say that some people assert that there is one element, others infinitely many; some that the soul is mortal, others immortal; some that human affairs are directed by divine providence, other non-providentially;” PH I 173: “[...] If the interlocutor is convincing when he makes his hypothesis, we will keep hypothesizing the opposite and will be no more unconvincing.”

⁴⁰ Cf. Forster (1989: 186): “On the one hand, Sextus Empiricus’s method of bringing about a suspension of judgment is almost invariably in practice one of balancing opposed *arguments*, not merely propositions, so that this sense of *logos* must surely be involved in his definition of Pyrrhonist procedure. On the other hand, any opposition of arguments is of course at the same time an opposition of the propositions which are their conclusions, and more important, Sextus does not quite *always* advocate a balancing of opposed arguments. For example, in the fourth type of Agrippa opposed propositions are balanced against one another without any supporting arguments on either side as the means of including a suspension of judgment.” (Note that Forster is simply wrong when he writes that “Sextus Empiricus’s method of bringing about a suspension of judgment is *almost invariably in practice* one of balancing opposed *arguments*, not merely propositions;” it is rather the opposite that is true.)

them assigns to it.⁴¹ This impossibility of coexistence takes logically the specific form of the one of the properties either *being* or *being reduced* to the *negation* of the other.⁴² Thus, if (a) a certain truth-claim *tc*₁ assigns the property *p*₁ to a certain object or aspect of being and a certain other truth-claim *tc*₂ assigns the property *p*₂ to the same object or aspect of being and (b) *p*₂ either is or can be reduced to the negation of *p*₁, then *tc*₁ and *tc*₂ stand in relation of conflict to each other.

This response makes two fundamental claims: *Firstly*, it is said that if we observe the universe of discourse and see one truth-claim being the negative of another in the manner just described, then we can immediately judge that they are in conflict. *Secondly*, it is said that if a truth-claim, which assigns a certain property to an object or aspect of reality, can be transformed explicitly into the negative of some other truth-claim that already inhabits the universe of discourse, then we can again conclude that they are in conflict.

Now, one might object to the second claim (call it 'the reductionist claim') for the following two reasons:

(1) Any property can be seen as the negation of any other property (to wit, it is the property that it is and *not* any other property). But there are properties that despite being *such* a negation of a certain other property do not conflict with it; for example, *being a man* with *being wise*. So, the idea of reducing certain properties to the negation of others must be qualified if it is to satisfy the notion of *conflict* between truth-claims. Such qualification, however, requires *reflective* considerations of relations between properties and their *taxonomy* into comprehensive categories and systems. These constructions would call for the positing of truth-claims affirming the character and interrelations of properties. Given his commitment to argue without using dogmatic principles, namely without making claims about the truth of being, the Pyrrhonist would really want to avoid such deliberations in the course of constructing his problematic.

(2) The second reason makes the same point as the first but from a slightly different perspective. That is, even if one accepts that a certain property *can* be reduced to the ('proper', namely conflict-inducing) negation of some other property, one is left in darkness regarding such operations of reduction. What is the mechanism behind such operations? The

⁴¹ See e.g. PH I 32–33; II 55–56; and, of course, the discussion of the so-called Ten Modes of Aenesidemus in PH I 35–164.

⁴² Cf. PH I 10.

relations of *indifference* holding among the truth-claims of the universe of discourse do not seem to allow for such reduction; and the explanation of the meaning of a conflicting relation does not seem to matter, since a relation of this kind becomes manifest only after the reduction has taken place. If this reduction is to be possible, certain specific relations among the properties employed in the truth-claims of the universe of discourse must have already been existing and become apparent before the event of the reduction itself, and certainly such relations cannot be indifferent; otherwise, it remains a mystery how some property *p*₂ has suddenly become the (proper) negation of some property *p*₁! Be this correct, however, the Pyrrhonist should respond to the challenge by providing us with an account of the way those non-indifferent relations have been produced in the first place. An enterprise of this sort could be the cause of deep trouble for any scepticism whatsoever and much more for the Pyrrhonian. For while positive and complicated analysis (which is the sign of the involvement of *truth-claims* regarding property-systems) would undoubtedly accompany it, the Pyrrhonist denies the employment of any such analysis in the formulation of his position.

This is a fair objection and the Pyrrhonist has to give a proper response if his programme is to survive. This is done in two steps. Firstly, on many occasions Sextus makes it abundantly clear that in the overwhelming majority of cases truth-claims can be judged to be in a state of conflict simply because the 'scientists' or 'dogmatists' take them to be so. Thus, seen from the perspective of the sceptic, conflicts between truth-claims are constructed by using 'data' offered by the dogmatic theories and debates themselves. The Pyrrhonist just takes truth-claims he finds here and there in the universe of discourse, truth-claims which have been posited therein by the 'scientists', makes a compilation and leaves it up to them to decide whether they are in or can be reduced to conflict. As soon as *they* characterize a relation as one of conflict, the sceptic would make manifest the impossibility of resolving it.⁴³ In this way, the reductionist claim would clearly *not* entail the Pyrrhonist's commitment to a theory of property-categorization, for the reduction will be made by the scientists themselves. (Note that the fact that there is a *process* through which the *scientists*

⁴³ There are some passages in the *Outlines* which clearly support this view: PH I 98; PH I 165 (my emphasis): "According to the mode deriving from dispute, we find that undecidable dissension about the subject-matter *has come about both in ordinary life and among philosophers*. Because of this we are not able either to choose or to rule out anything, and we end up with suspension of judgment."

achieve the reductions does not pose any threat to the Pyrrhonist, for in the context of immediacy such process is presuppositionlessly eliminated: all that matters therein is the sheer presence of the truth-claims. The second reason above poses a threat to the Pyrrhonist *only* insofar as *he* is the one who is trying to explain the operations of reduction.)

The first step, however, needs to be supplemented with a second; otherwise a huge problem arises for Pyrrhonian scepticism—the vanishing of its *universal appeal* (or *global scope*). For, if the second step is not made, whether a relation between truth-claims is one of conflict or not would depend solely upon the opinions of the scientists. It is *they* who will now be deciding whether a truth-claim *tc*₁ conflicts with a certain truth-claim *tc*₂. Had this been the case, however, Pyrrhonian scepticism, due to its *universality*, would immediately collapse, since it would allow the possibility of the existence of truth-claims in the universe of discourse that are *not* entangled in conflicting relations and, therefore, it would not be the case that the true nature of *any* object or aspect of reality *whatsoever* can be manifested as being beyond human knowledge.⁴⁴ Simply, the sheer *agreement* within a scientific community that *tc*₁ does not conflict with *tc*₂ (or any other truth-claim) would entail that *tc*₁ indeed does not conflict with *tc*₂ (or any other truth-claim) and, therefore, that the truth of *tc*₁ can be expressed.

To safeguard his programme against this possibility the Pyrrhonist must find an undogmatic way to bring all those truth-claims that are judged by the ‘scientists’ to be free of conflict into conflict. This can be done by employing the presuppositionless notion of *immediate positing*, which may take two forms:

(a) If there is a truth-claim in the universe of discourse that assigns the property *p*₁ to a certain object or aspect of being and the scientists behave as if this truth-claim is free of conflict, the Pyrrhonist *himself* will posit another truth-claim in this universe which could be *reduced* to a truth-claim that *denies* the assignment of *p*₁ to that object or aspect of

⁴⁴ This holds even when the dispute refers to all possible objects—for even in this case it is relative to the specific scientific community which thematizes it. In the following passage (PH I 178), for example, it is a dispute “which has occurred among natural scientists”—in another scientific community this dispute might not exist: “That nothing is apprehended by means of itself is, they say, clear from the dispute which has occurred among natural scientists over, I suppose, all objects of perception and of thought—a dispute which is undecidable, since we cannot use either an object of perception or an object of thought as a standard because anything we may take has been disputed and so is unconvincing.”

what there is. Since, however, the Pyrrhonist cannot affirm that reduction himself, he would have to convince the scientists that such a reduction must be accepted by *them*. But then there is, of course, the possibility that a whole community of scientists would simply refuse to accept a certain reduction. This calls for the second form of immediate positing done by the Pyrrhonist.

(b) If there is a truth-claim in the universe of discourse that assigns the property *p*₁ to a certain object or aspect of what there is and the scientists behave as if this truth-claim is free of conflict, the Pyrrhonist *himself* will posit another truth-claim in this universe which straightforwardly denies the assignment of *p*₁ to that object or aspect of what there is. If, for example, there exists the truth-claim “the world is governed by providence,” the sceptic will posit the truth-claim “the world is not governed by providence.”⁴⁵ As soon as the latter truth-claim is posited, it acquires an immediate existence in the universe of discourse and this allows it to have an equal truth-status with the former truth-claim.⁴⁶ And as soon as *this* takes place any attempt to adjudicate between them would be entangled in the whirlwind of the argument from the criterion of truth. Clearly, the success of this second form of the immediate positing done by the Pyrrhonist no longer depends upon the subjectivity of the scientists.

This argument could be attacked only on the basis that there is something wrong with the Pyrrhonist *himself* positing a truth-claim in the universe of discourse. There are two points I would like to make here:

(1) This positing in no way implies that the Pyrrhonist should ‘assent’ or be committed to the relevant truth-claim; such criticism is trivial and totally irrelevant to the matter at hand. The sceptic could posit a truth-claim only for the sake of argument (as a “mere thought,” in Sextus’ words), as much as he could use a truth-claim *actually* espoused by a dogmatist.⁴⁷

⁴⁵ PH I 151.

⁴⁶ See PH I 8–10, 31, 202–205.

⁴⁷ I take it that these two modes of negation provide the content of what Sextus calls the scepticism’s “ability to set out oppositions” (PH I 8). See also PH I 31; PH II 1–10. Cf. Barnes (1990: 55); Forster (1989: 12): “For the ancient skeptic’s strategy of setting up opposing propositions or arguments of equal weight on each issue in order to induce a suspension of belief did not require that they believe any of the propositions or arguments thus deployed.” As Sextus (PH I 10) polemically points out, “a sceptic is not barred from having thoughts, if they [...] do not at all imply the reality of what is being thought of.” Amico (1993: 33) also agrees on this issue. Frede (1987a: 203–204) does not seem to realize that the sceptic has the liberty to use premises that are not explicitly endorsed by his opponents and still make a case against them.

(2) To *forbid* the Pyrrhonist (who represents in this instance each and every human being who is genuinely interested in acquiring knowledge of the truth of being) to posit the negation of a truth-claim (that is, *another* truth-claim) in the universe of discourse is to explicitly conceive the latter as having a despotic or terrorizing character, to conceive it namely as an element that strips human beings of their *freedom* to say *whatever they want to say* at the beginning of a scientific inquiry. But even for the scientists themselves, who would not really want to be *gagged* by someone who disagrees with them, it is a *fundamental* feature of the universe of discourse that it exemplifies the freedom of scientific expression, which therefore is a *constitutive* feature of its *presuppositionless* character. Thus, in the same way you are free to assign truth to any claim you like in a context of immediacy, so the sceptic is free to deny the truth of your claim (just for the sake of argument, of course). Consequently, unless the 'scientists' are prepared to accept the cancellation of discourse altogether, any attempt to forbid the sceptic to posit negations of truth-claims in the context of immediacy of the universe of discourse is doomed to failure.

Given, then, the Pyrrhonist's freedom to posit the straightforward, non-reductive negation of any remaining undisputed truth-claim in the context of immediacy of the universe of discourse, let us hold fast that there is not even a single truth-claim that does not find itself immediately in conflict with its negation in that context. But since the Pyrrhonist is able to show that each and every immediate truth-claim taken as *judgement* is *always* paired with its negation in the universe of discourse and since he 'manifests' that conflicts between simple *judgements* establish the impossibility of knowledge, the consideration of the other two possible forms of truth-claim, namely the syllogism and the whole theory, does not add any extra effectiveness to Pyrrhonian scepticism.

Simply, the *first* judgement one makes on one's way to construct or expound an argument or a theory will be *immediately* negated in the universe of discourse. We are all familiar with those discussions where a certain speaker is always interrupted by the negative comments of one of her interlocutors and despite the fact that she gets immensely angry, asking that person to 'let her finish', this never happens. The Pyrrhonist represents exactly that interlocutor who always interrupts the flow of scientific talk; but he does that based on his freedom as a human being and his strong desire to allow only an undogmatic way of doing science. Given then that the Pyrrhonist can manifest the *total* annihilation of scientific inquiry by making a case against truth-claims taken as *judgements*, any further attack on the other two forms of the truth-claim would be valueless.

We can therefore now conclude that the construction of *negative* truth-claims—via either a ‘scientific’ reduction or an immediate positing—and their relation to positive truth-claims, considered as having the form of *judgement*, will be here taken as the *only* content of the notion of *conflict* that can be incorporated in our model of Pyrrhonian scepticism.⁴⁸ (Note that this signification of *negation* does not exclude the possibility that it might have other, more sophisticated functions or meanings as well; yet, the meaning clarified above is the one that dominates the universe of discourse when the latter is embedded in a context of *immediacy*. This simply follows from the very character of such context, which suppresses the appearance of all other, more sophisticated meanings.)

This conclusion turns my interpretation into one of the most radical interpretations of Pyrrhonian scepticism ever suggested. While first-rank scholars of Pyrrhonism, like Sedley, Frede, Hankinson and others, present the Pyrrhonist as someone who spends quite a lot of time in trying to *understand* the scientific arguments and theories proposed by the scientists and then come up with a counterargument or countertheory so as to convince an *audience* of their equal strength, my systematic analysis of Pyrrhonian scepticism has shown that such a picture is extremely problematic. The Pyrrhonist, as a philosopher of freedom and presuppositionlessness, simply constructs or acknowledges conflicting relations between simple scientific judgements⁴⁹ and then applies the argument from the criterion of truth to them so as to manifest the impossibility of knowledge. The *only* way for my argument to collapse is if those scholars could convince us that the Pyrrhonist has something *extra* to gain from making a case not only against truth-claims taken as single judgements (or propositions) but also against truth-claims taken as syllogisms (or arguments) or

⁴⁸ At this point Sextus seems to betray once more what I believe to be the genuine spirit of Pyrrhonism; see PH I 10: “By ‘opposed accounts’ we do not necessarily have in mind affirmation and negation, but take the phrase simply in the sense of ‘conflicting accounts’.”

⁴⁹ Cf. PH I 9 (my emphasis): “[...] We take the phrase with ‘the things which appear and are thought of’, to show that we are *not* to investigate *how* what appears appears or *how* what is thought of is thought of, but are simply *to take them for granted*.” M IX 1: “With regard to the physical division of philosophy we shall pursue again the same method of inquiry, and not delay long on particular points as Clitomachus has done and the rest of the Academic troupe (for by plunging into alien subject-matter and framing their arguments on the basis of dogmatic assumptions not their own have unduly prolonged their counterstatement).”

whole theories.⁵⁰ But, in my opinion, given the preceding detailed analysis of the fundamental structure of the Pyrrhonian problematic, this cannot be done.

1.6. *Truth and the Law of Non-Contradiction*

In the previous section an explanation has been offered as to what it means for truth-claims to be in conflict and how this conflict comes about in the universe of discourse. That explanation, however, does not explain the asserted negative relation between truth and conflicting truth-claims. The present section attempts to satisfy this demand and thereby respond to the third question raised earlier.

The Pyrrhonian problematic, as it has been described in the preceding discussion, can be sustained only if assent is given to the claim that relations of conflict between truth-claims cause the true nature of the relevant object or aspect of what there is to go, as it were, out of sight. In other words, it seems that for the Pyrrhonist the conjunction of *a is p* and *a is not p*, where *a* denotes an object or aspect of being and *p* a property or characteristic of *a*, cannot possibly be said to express (part of) the true nature of *a*. From this it can be derived (a) that knowledge of the truth of *a is p* requires that *a is not p* does not exist in the universe of discourse and (b) that the truth of *a is p* excludes the truth of *a is not p*. More generally, it can be derived (a) that knowledge of the true nature of an object or aspect of being requires that this object or aspect is *not said* to accommodate both a certain property and its negation and (b) that the

⁵⁰ This is not the same as asking for *textual evidence* that Sextus did indeed think that the Pyrrhonist should produce *arguments* against the arguments of the dogmatists. As I have already admitted, Sextus did think that sometimes (but not always). This is so when he says that the Pyrrhonists “do touch on natural science in order to be able to oppose to every account an equal account” (PH I 18), that they speak against those who claim that there is providence by opposing “the view that often the good do badly while the bad do well and [concluding] from this that there is no providence” (PH I 32), that they “oppose what is thought of to what appears, as Anaxagoras did when to the view that snow is white, he opposed the thought that snow is frozen water and water is black and snow is therefore black” (PH I 33), and so on. Also, in his discussion of the Ten Modes of Aenesidemus (PH I 35–163) Sextus obviously intends to *convince* us, through the citing of a plethora of empirical examples, that the positing of the negation of a dogmatic statement or argument is ‘justified’. (He frequently describes what he is doing as a ‘deduction’ of a negative or general statement; see, for example, PH I 96; I 136; I 144). In the present chapter I have tried to argue against the Pyrrhonism’s dependence upon such subjective notions as ‘convincing an audience’.

true nature of that object or aspect *does not* include both that property and its negation.

For the Pyrrhonist argument to be sustained, therefore, the Pyrrhonist *himself* must assent to *the law of non-contradiction*, taken here as saying that *it is impossible that a is p and a is not p*. If no assent is given to this law, the simple *description* of a relation of conflict in the universe of discourse has no bearing on the issue of truth and, therefore, cannot be used against scientific inquiry. Indeed, the existence of conflicting truth-claims in the universe of discourse constitutes a *problem* (an “anomaly in things,” as Sextus puts it)⁵¹ *only* if the sceptic accepts that the conflict must be resolved, and the *only* reason that can be given for such demand is the truth of the law of non-contradiction.

If this argument were correct, Pyrrhonist scepticism would immediately collapse: While the programmatic statements of the sceptical project make it clear that absolutely no dogmatic principles should be employed in its actualization, the law of non-contradiction seems to be a dogmatic principle, for it purports to say something true of the true nature of being. The Pyrrhonist, however, has already a powerful reply up his sleeve: ‘You’ve got it all wrong once more’, he would say; ‘the law of non-contradiction is a principle averred by all those who get involved in scientific inquiry and I, the Pyrrhonist, employ that principle only in order to show those ‘scientists’ that if *they* accept the law, then no knowledge of truth is ever possible. If, on the other hand, *they* do *not* accept the law as true, (a) there remains a picture of the universe of discourse in which *any* given truth-claim (that is, not only the positive truth-claims but also their *negations*) would be accommodated therein and (b) all these truth-claims would then have to be taken as being true. In other words, in the context of immediacy of the universe of discourse *anything said would be true*. And I really do not have a problem with this image because all it pictures is chaos in the sphere of science!’

This response seems to clear the Pyrrhonist of the accusation that he ‘assents’ to the law of non-contradiction. It is rather up to the ‘scientists’ or ‘dogmatists’ *themselves* whether the law would be asserted as true or false or not be asserted at all. If *they* deny it or remain indifferent to its truth, they will get nothing but a scientific framework in which—as often

⁵¹ PH I 12, 29, 112, 163. Sextus certainly treats the expressions “anomaly in things” and “anomalies among the appearances” (PH I 114, 132) as being synonymous.

said—‘anything goes’, and such state of affairs would just prove the Pyrrhonist’s point. If, on the other hand, *they* accept the truth of the law, they will allow the involvement of the argument from the criterion of truth, which manifests that no conflict in the universe of discourse can ever be resolved.⁵²

While this response works for the sceptic, it causes enormous difficulties to those of us who still hope that there is a way of refuting Pyrrhonian scepticism. On the one hand, we have to agree that the denial of the law of non-contradiction generates a scientific framework in which ‘anything goes’, a total chaos. Consequently, the denial of the law is not an option for us. On the other hand, given the preceding discussion, the only option available to us, namely the acceptance of the law, seems to exclude the possibility of ever refuting Pyrrhonian scepticism, for it provides the basis of the argument from the criterion of truth.

Things have now become crystal clear. The possible refutation of Pyrrhonian scepticism requires the successful occurrence of two distinct moves. First, one needs to prove the truth of the law of non-contradiction against the Pyrrhonian problematic. Second, one needs to show that the truth of the law of non-contradiction does not necessarily initiate the argument from the criterion of truth.

Fortunately for us, the first move, the proof of the truth of the law of non-contradiction, derives automatically from the minimal structure of scientific discourse, which is the subject-matter of the Pyrrhonian problematic (that is to say, it is that structure without which there can be no Pyrrhonian problematic, since it is that specific structure that the Pyrrhonian problematic *thematizes*). If you recall, each judgement that is posited in the universe of discourse *comes forth with the intention of presenting itself as true*. But what does this mean? It means exactly that the scientist who posits a certain judgement in the universe of discourse takes it that it is this judgement, *and not its negation*, that represents the truth of what there is. This, however, is nothing but the affirmation of the law of non-contradiction, for what this law tells us is that a property cannot be both affirmed and denied of an object or aspect of what there is.

⁵² On the relation between scepticism and the classical logical laws see the interesting remark in Forster (1989: 195–197).

Thus, at least with respect to the minimal structure of scientific discourse the law of non-contradiction must be accepted as true. If the law were not true, and only in this case, the minimal structure of scientific discourse would dissolve. But the minimal structure of scientific discourse is a fact; therefore, the law of non-contradiction is true.

This holds even if the single judgement that is posited in the universe of discourse has a *content* that violates the law—even if, for example, it says that *a is p and a is not p*. When this judgement appears, it comes forth as an element that can in turn be negated (*a is not both p and not p*). Each and every judgement posited in the context of immediacy of the universe of discourse, including the law of non-contradiction, has a *form* that turns it into a judgement that can be immediately negated—indeed, that it *is* immediately negated. But besides a form and a content, a posited judgement has an *intention*—the intention of presenting itself as *true*. This intention is constitutive of the minimal structure of scientific discourse, that is, it cannot be removed from this structure. This proves the truth of the law of non-contradiction in the context of immediacy of scientific discourse, precisely because the intention demands that the posited judgement, *and not its negation*, is the truth. Therefore, the minimal structure of scientific discourse both generates conflicts and demands that these conflicts should be resolved.

The objection may be raised here that the truth of the law of non-contradiction is independent of the minimal structure of scientific discourse. The truth of the law has to do with the truth of the object and the latter surely is not determined by the universe of discourse. A judgement posited in this universe is true only if it *corresponds* to the object, which is something non-linguistic, something other than the subject of the judgement. The fact that the posited judgement comes forth with the intention of being true does not entail that *the object itself* is not characterized in truth by both a property and its (proper) negation.

This objection is based upon the assumptions that there is such a thing as ‘the object itself’, which is different from the subject of the judgement, and that truth is a matter of ‘correspondence’ between the judgement and this object. None of these assumptions, however, derives directly from the minimal structure of scientific discourse and, therefore, given the line we have followed in our exposition of the Pyrrhonian problematic, they must be deemed arbitrary or, if you prefer, ‘dogmatic’. All philosophy begins with the minimal structure of scientific discourse and this structure, includes neither the notion of an ‘object itself’ that is different from the subject

of the judgement nor the notion of truth as ‘correspondence’ between the judgement and the ‘object itself’. The only notion of ‘object’ that this structure initially supports is the object as the subject of the judgement and the only notion of ‘truth’ it initially accepts is truth (a) as the content of the subject of the judgement and (b) as the judgement that is not in conflict with its negation in the universe of discourse. These two notions, accompanied by the argument above, do indeed prove the truth of the law of non-contradiction in the context of immediacy of the universe of discourse. Consequently, the raised objection does not hold.

1.7. *Conclusion*

Scientific inquiry, defined as *the* human inquiry into the *truth* of being, involves things that are done and things that are said. *Both* things that are done *and* things that are said have an *appearance*. The abstract space in which things that are done in the realm of science appear is called *the universe of praxis* and the abstract space in which things that are said in the realm of science appear is called *the universe of discourse*. The problematic the present study opens up is peculiar to what happens in the universe of discourse—not to what happens in the universe of praxis.

The things said are *judgements* (or propositions) and emerge in the universe of discourse because they are posited therein by the scientists, namely by those human beings who inquire into the truth of being. Each and every judgement posited in the universe of discourse can be in either one of two states. A judgement is in a state of ‘mediation’ when its relation to other judgements is made explicit; it is in a state of ‘immediacy’ when that relation is *not* made explicit. What follows directly from the notion of science-as-something-said is that this ‘immediacy’ is a *necessary* feature of each and every judgement’s overall existence. Simply, there is a moment in a judgement’s life when it is necessarily *not* characterized by means of its relation to other judgements; this is undoubtedly the case when the judgement emerges for the *first* time in the universe of discourse.

In such a context of immediacy, the posited judgement comes forth with the intention of presenting itself as *true*—it is, namely, a *truth-claim*. The present study thematizes the universe of discourse only with respect to its containing truth-claims. These truth-claims can be either positive or negative. The emergence of positive and negative judgements in the context of immediacy of the universe of discourse is one of the fundamental features of the minimal structure of scientific discourse.

This fundamental feature of the minimal structure of scientific discourse opens up a problematic that has since the ancient times been called *the Pyrrhonian problematic*. The problem is generated by the fact that when the universe of discourse accommodates both the immediate judgement and its *negation*, the truth-status of the one is equal to the truth-status of the other. This is so precisely because in a context of immediacy nothing matters but their sheer existence. So, the context of immediacy, which *necessarily* shapes a part or dimension of the universe of discourse, *necessarily* gives rise to conflicts (or contradictions) between judgements. This is the second fundamental characteristic of the minimal structure of scientific discourse. In other words, scientific discourse consists first and foremost not only of the presence of immediate positive and negative judgements, but also of conflicts between those judgements. This state of affairs is catastrophic for scientific inquiry, for the immediate judgements fail to actualize their intention, which is that *they*, and *not* their negations, are the truth. There is not a single scientific discipline that is not plagued by this problem; for their very character as 'sciences' entails that at least some of their claims are posited with the intention of presenting themselves as true.

Thus, the urgent task of science is to find a way out of such a context of immediacy whose surface is fully occupied by contradictions; or, in simpler terms, it has to find a way to resolve the conflicts between immediate judgements. To this effect, there appeared in the ancient and medieval times the attempt to resolve such conflicts by *privileging* a judgement over its contradictory through the positing of *grounds* (or *criteria of truth*) in the universe of discourse. The ground would resolve the conflict by providing support for one of the two conflicting judgements. This is the core of the method followed by the so-called *traditional metaphysics*.

It is exactly at this point that the Pyrrhonian problematic generates *scepticism*. Pyrrhonian scepticism is a presuppositionless way of showing that the process of privileging and grounding, proposed by traditional metaphysics, can *never* manage to resolve a conflict between immediate judgements. Indeed, given that the grounds posited in the universe of discourse are themselves truth-claims, such a process soon ends up in the establishment of either vicious infinite regress or vicious circularity. For the positing of a truth-claim as a ground will immediately generate a conflict that will require another ground for its resolution. The Pyrrhonists take it that their scepticism shows beyond any doubt and in a completely undogmatic way that human beings can never acquire knowledge of the truth of being.

As having been presented, Pyrrhonian scepticism is a philosophy⁵³ (a) of freedom and (b) of the impossibility of knowledge of truth. It is the first because it actualizes our freedom as scientists to posit any truth-claim we want in the context of immediacy of the universe of discourse. It is the second because it manifests that no conflict between immediate judgements could ever be resolved and, consequently, that scientific inquiry is a futile enterprise.

I have argued that this form of scepticism is *presuppositionless*. This is so because none of the elements upon which this scepticism is based are dogmatic principles espoused by the Pyrrhonist *himself*. Pyrrhonian scepticism is based upon (a) the belief that each and every judgement posited in the universe of discourse has a moment of *immediacy*, (b) the belief that the context of immediacy of the universe of discourse generates *conflicts* or *contradictions* between judgements, (c) the belief that a conflict must be *resolved* if truth is to be disclosed (that is, the belief in the truth of the law of non-contradiction), and (d) the argument from the criterion of truth. As shown, the three beliefs derive directly from the *minimal* (or *fundamental*) structure of scientific discourse (or, if you prefer, from the minimal structure of the notion of science-as-something-said), which is the subject-matter of our inquiry. The argument from the criterion of truth is the direct consequence of the acceptance of those three beliefs *and the suggestion by some 'scientists' that conflicts can be resolved through the positing of 'grounds' or 'criteria of truth' in the universe of discourse*.

Let me finish with some important observations. Note, *firstly*, that Pyrrhonian scepticism has an altogether different character from the one which is peculiar to those forms of scepticism that are based upon the *dogmatic* principle that there is a distinction between an internal mind and an external reality (for example, Cartesian, Humean, and Kantian scepticism).⁵⁴ For, as shown, the Pyrrhonian problematic makes no use

⁵³ One should not be surprised by or object to the description of Pyrrhonian scepticism as 'philosophy'. This derives from the innocent fact that Sextus wrote a *book* in which he expounds what the label 'Pyrrhonism' *means*; the word 'philosophy' does not here imply commitment to *dogmatic* beliefs (i.e. truth-claims). (Sextus himself uses the phrase "sceptical philosophy" in PH I 5.) Cf. PH I 16.

⁵⁴ Frede (1987a: 221), somewhat reluctantly, acknowledges this crucial point: "For all he [i.e. the Pyrrhonist] knows it might be a mistake to distinguish quite generally and globally between how things appear and how they really are. There are some cases where it seems to be useful to make such distinctions, e.g., in the case of illusions, or in the case of deception. But for these cases we have ways to ascertain what really is the case which allow us in the first place to draw, for these cases, a reasonably clear distinction between how things appear and how they really are. But how are we supposed to know what is

of the notion of a *discrepancy* or a *gap* between what *appears* and what *really* is. The Pyrrhonist's essential worry is rather that in the context of immediacy of the universe of discourse a positive truth-claim has an equal truth-status to its negation. The recognition of this contrast between Pyrrhonian scepticism and those other forms of scepticism is of the utmost importance for the present study, precisely because it makes clear (a) that the successful resolution of the Pyrrhonian problematic need not contain an explanation of how the alleged 'gap' between an internal mind and an external reality could be 'bridged' and (b) that, given the dogmatic character of the other forms of scepticism, they are not on a par with Pyrrhonian scepticism—they are 'inferior' to it, in the sense that the undogmatic structure of Pyrrhonian scepticism would not allow *their* appearance in the first place.

Note, *secondly*, that two of the currently most popular moves toward the resolution of the Pyrrhonian problematic dramatically fail. The first, the *positivistic* move, has it that the problematic is resolved as soon as we acknowledge that what happens in the universe of *praxis* can provide support for truth-claims in the universe of discourse. In particular, this is the case with regards to experimentation or simple empirical observation: An experiment or a simple empirical observation functions as the ground by means of which a conflict can be resolved. But these activities can perform this role only if they *themselves* are posited as *criteria of truth* in the universe of *discourse*. This exactly shows that they are unable to perform the role they are supposed to perform—for, given the minimal structure of scientific discourse, their positing in the context of immediacy automatically generates a conflict between them and their negations. Therefore, the positivistic move fails to resolve the Pyrrhonian problematic.

asked for when we are asked what things are really like in cases where we have not yet found that out? In short, I see no reason why a classical skeptic should accept the global contrast between appearance and reality." This point is also acknowledged by Hegel (VSP 225, 247–248). Forster (2007: 10), in contrast, seems to understand, mistakenly, the Pyrrhonist as one who accepts the distinction between an internal mind and an external reality: "[...] It is an acceptance by the skeptic that his mental affections are thus and so in him, but without any implication that they represent the external realities correctly, and hence it [sic] does not attain truth or constitute belief." The same holds for Amico (1993: 26): "Sextus is acknowledging a distinction between how things appear to us and how they are in themselves (i.e. how they really are; what is really true)." Maybe Forster and Amico were misled by the fact that Sextus himself *sometimes* succumbs (or *seems* to succumb?) to this *dogma*; see PH I 15 (my emphasis): "But the main point is this: in uttering these phrases they [i.e. the Pyrrhonists] say what is apparent to themselves and report their own feelings without holding opinions, affirming nothing about *external* objects." See also PH I 45, 99.

The second popular move that fails against Pyrrhonian scepticism is the one made by the *phenomenologists*, and I here have in mind the early Husserl and Heidegger, both of whom, tried to resolve the Pyrrhonian problematic by *dissolving* it altogether. The early Husserl attempted this by claiming that the starting-point of an investigation into the phenomenon of knowledge should be a detailed description and analysis of *intentionality*. Because Husserl took intentionality to be not only an indubitable phenomenon but also the starting-point of every epistemological investigation, he came to believe in the establishment of a realm of truth that contained all those truth-claims that resulted from the description of intentionality. In this way, the Pyrrhonian problematic vanishes from the scene. A similar move is made by Heidegger, who tried to convince us that the phenomenon of knowledge is predetermined in a number of its aspects by its having already been embedded in a more primitive structure, *Dasein's being-in-the-world*. For Heidegger, it is a phenomenological description of our being-in-the-world that should be the starting-point of every investigation of human phenomena, including the phenomenon of knowledge. By the time Heidegger finishes with his account of this primitive structure, human knowing acquires such a rich content that the Pyrrhonian problematic, with its immense simplicity, is no longer able to perform its devastating sceptical function. Unfortunately, both Husserl's and Heidegger's move collapse, for neither intentionality nor being-in-the-world can provide the starting-point of an investigation into the phenomenon of human knowledge. Indeed, the very fact that their description and analysis is achieved by means of positing judgements in the universe of discourse shows that they come *second* in the order of that investigation. Any claim to the contrary is simply self-refuting. Thus, the Pyrrhonian problematic is more fundamental to the phenomenon of knowledge than intentionality and being-in-the-world.

Note, *thirdly*, that if my presentation of the Pyrrhonian problematic is correct, philosophy does not 'begin with wonder' and, therefore, *pace* Amico,⁵⁵ analysis of the phenomenon of asking questions does not offer much—if anything—towards the resolution of that problematic.

⁵⁵ Amico (1993: 1–16). On page 7 he writes: "[...] A problem is always a question. A statement never poses a problem. For example, the statement 'knowledge is impossible' is not a problem, but rather simply a statement about the possibility of knowledge. If we then add the question 'How, then, should we explain our intuition that we do indeed know many things?' we do seem to have a problem." I disagree with Amico here. The Pyrrhonian problematic shows clearly that the problem arises from the positing of a statement—not from the positing of a question. In fact, it seems that the whole Pyrrhonian problematic

Philosophy begins with the positing of ontological statements (truth-claims) in the context of immediacy of the universe of discourse and it is only reflection on *this* phenomenon that could provide us with the solution to the Pyrrhonian problematic.

Finally, note that the Pyrrhonian problematic ridicules the idea of 'self-evident' truth-claims—what Sextus, following the Stoics, calls "cognitive impressions."⁵⁶ In the *Topics* Aristotle states:⁵⁷

[...] No one in his senses would [...] make a problem of what is obvious to everyone or to most people: for [it] admits of no doubt.

For the Pyrrhonian sceptic this statement is nonsensical. Since the minimal structure of scientific discourse necessarily generates contradictions, *everything is doubtful*. There are, therefore, no self-evident truth-claims, for each and every truth-claim is immediately entangled in a contradiction. To deny this is to deny the very basis of scientific inquiry: the *freedom* of humanity and the uncompromised quest for *truth*.

could be constructed and maintain its force even if we never employ the notion of a question.

⁵⁶ Sextus describes a cognitive impression as "[a proposition that is] imprinted and impressed by a real object and in accordance with that object itself, and such as could not be produced by anything not real." See M I 402, 248, 252.

⁵⁷ Topics 104a6.

CHAPTER TWO

REASON AND UNIFICATION OF TRUTH-CLAIMS

2.1. *Introduction*

With the death of Sextus Empiricus in the third century AD and the gradual intellectual and political dominance of the Christian Church, the Pyrrhonian problematic started fading. Soon even the name 'Pyrrhonism' vanished from the scene and most of the Pyrrhonists' writings were consigned to the flames by religious zealots. The few survived manuscripts were thrown into the deepest dungeons of the monasteries and no beam of light shone upon them for more than a thousand years.

The fate of Pyrrhonism changed dramatically with the Fall of Constantinople in 1453. The fleeing Byzantine monks carried with them in Italy a vast amount of precious Greek manuscripts, which gradually were disseminated throughout Europe. It was in 1562 when Henri Estienne published his Latin translation of Sextus' *Outlines of Pyrrhonism* in Paris. The book immediately became the focus of French intellectuals and soon all philosophical debates had to start from one version or another of the Pyrrhonian problematic. By the end of the 17th-century Sextus was being characterized as "the father of modern philosophy"¹ and the work of Montaigne, Bayle, Gassendi, Mersenne and even of Descartes, Hume and Kant can be seen as a direct or indirect response to the Pyrrhonian problematic. Pyrrhonian scepticism, then, became the hidden force that mobilized and shaped modern European philosophy.²

It is no surprise, therefore, that when Hegel graduated from the Tübingen Theological Seminary in 1793 he was obsessed with the task of resolving the Pyrrhonian problematic. And yet, a number of years went by and no way of accomplishing this had been found. Hegel spent the next seven

¹ Popkin (1960: 17): "The historical accident of the rediscovery of Sextus Empiricus' works at precisely the moment when the skeptical problem of the criterion had been raised gave the ideas of Sextus a sudden and greater prominence that they had ever had before [...]. Thus, Sextus, a recently discovered oddity, metamorphosed into 'the divine Sextus' who, by the end of the 17th century, was regarded as the father of modern philosophy."

² For the immense influence exerted by Pyrrhonism on modern European thought see Schmitt (1983) and the impressive study by Popkin (1972).

years as a tutor in various houses, a period during which he perfected his knowledge of ancient scepticism. In 1801 he joins his friend Schelling in Jena and becomes the co-editor of the *Critical Journal of Philosophy*. It is then when he finally decides to publish his proposed way of resolving the Pyrrhonian problematic. This was done in one of the most revolutionary texts ever written in post-Kantian German philosophy, entitled *The Relation of Scepticism to Philosophy*, also known as ‘the *Skeptizismus* essay’.³

In this early—and for many years unduly neglected⁴—essay, published in 1802, Hegel provides, as part of a review of G. E. Schulze’s latest book against “theoretical philosophy,”⁵ an extended discussion of Pyrrhonian

³ *Verhältnis der Skeptizismus zur Philosophie*; hereafter ‘VSP’. The essay was published in the second issue of the *Critical Journal of Philosophy*, which was edited by Hegel himself and F. W. J. von Schelling, who was then still one of Hegel’s best friends and *außerordentlicher* Professor at the University of Jena. On the question “Wie kam Hegel, gerade auf dem Weg zum absoluten Idealismus, überhaupt dazu, sich in den entscheidenden Anfängen seines Philosophierens, in der späteren Frankfurter und frühen Jenaer Zeit, mit dem Skeptizismus zu befassen?” see the very interesting paper by Buchner (1969; the quotation is taken from page 50). Buchner correctly emphasizes that Hegel’s uniquely detailed account of the history and systematic arguments of Pyrrhonism strongly suggests that he must have studied the ancient sceptics quite some time before he came to Jena (1800). Another reason that suggests this is the difference in style between this essay and all the others that Hegel published in the *Critical Journal*: while VSP is clearly written and quite easy to understand, all the others are written in an abstruse and complicated medium; this suggests that Hegel was quite familiar with ancient scepticism. Compare Rosenkranz’s testimony (1844: 100; my emphasis) about Hegel’s reading habits in the Frankfurt period, which immediately *precedes* the Jena one: “Aus den zufällig noch erhaltenen Buchhändlerrechnungen, welche Hegel in Frankfurt bezahlte, ersehen wir, daß er vorzüglich Schellings Schriften und Griechische Klassiker in den besten, neuesten Ausgaben kaufte. Besonders muß er den Platon und *Sextus Empirikus* viel studiert haben.” On the question when exactly Hegel *wrote* VSP see Buchner (1965).

⁴ Until very recently, when the relation between Pyrrhonism and Hegel has been revived by Kenneth Westphal (1989, 1998, 2000, 2003), Michael Forster (1989) and Paul Franks (2008), VSP, despite its enormous philosophical significance, has been neglected by Hegel scholars writing in the English medium. Kaufmann (1966: 30), for example, writes: “The article is seventy-four pages in length and cannot be summarized here. We shall begin by considering four passages.” In fact, Kaufmann begins *and ends* with the consideration of the four passages and three quarters of this ‘consideration’ are occupied by direct quotations from the essay; half of the remaining quarter consists in Kaufmann’s informing us of his own view of the “history of philosophy,” which, he clearly states, is “not Hegel’s” (p. 65). The two most popular anthologies in the Anglophone world, Inwood (1989) and Houlgate (1998), have also ignored the essay. The cause of this attitude can be detected in the reception of Hegel by his contemporaries as a philosopher who was uninterested in epistemological issues—a diagnosis that surely surprises anyone who reads the *Phenomenology of Spirit* or the *Science of Logic* today. On this reception of Hegel see Köhnke (1986).

⁵ Schulze (1801). Note, interestingly enough, that Schulze signed his books with the alias ‘Aenesidemus’.

scepticism.⁶ Hegel begins by informing us that besides “dogmatism” and “scepticism” there is also “philosophy,” a term which he uses interchangeably with “speculative philosophy” and “true philosophy.”⁷ He then goes on to specify that this term refers to the cognitive standpoint of reason, which investigates and produces knowledge of a certain realm or dimension of what there is: *the rational*.

Hegel endeavours to defend the thesis that Pyrrhonian scepticism, which he values as “superior to modern scepticism,” has a “noble essence”⁸ that (a) works successfully against dogmatism, but (b) fails against speculative philosophy. It owes its failure partly to the fact that speculative philosophy “incorporates” it, that it is “in its inmost heart at one with [...] true philosophy.”⁹ The other factor pertaining to this failure is the function of “unification” of contradictories, with which the “incorporation” of the “noble essence” of Pyrrhonian scepticism is closely linked.

⁶ The essay can be seen as having three main parts: (1) VSP 213–222 introduces Schulze’s scepticism and its claim against speculative philosophy; (2) VSP 222–250 discusses *ancient* scepticism and its relation to (i) speculative philosophy, (ii) dogmatism and (iii) Schulze’s scepticism; and (3) VSP 250–272 reflects on the ‘tools’ and ‘assumptions’ that Schulzean scepticism uses against speculative philosophy, as well as on its particular claims against Leibnizean, Kantian and Fichtean ‘theoretical philosophy’. As H. S. Harris (VSPH 313) correctly points out, by the end of the essay one gets the impression that the discussion of Pyrrhonism was far more important to Hegel than the discussion of Schulze’s position, which is presented quite crudely anyway. Buchner (1969: 50–51) made the same point long before Harris: “Aber schon der Titel der Abhandlung zeigt, daß Schulzes Werk, für Hegel ein flacher und später Ableger der sog. Reflexions-Philosophie, nur der Aufhänger war, der ihm eine weit ausholende und höchst differenzierte Darstellung der spekulativen Bedeutung des ‘ächten Skeptizismus’ ermöglichte. Der eigentliche Grund für diese Darstellung war keineswegs Schulzes Werk, auch nicht der sonstige zeitgenössische, ja überhaupt nicht der neuzeitliche, mit Hume beginnende Skeptizismus, den Hegel hier gerade aufs Schärfste zurückweist und ad absurdum führt. Vielmehr ging es Hegel hier um die Ausarbeitung der legitimen, spekulativen Momente des alten, griechischen Skeptizismus gerade im Gegensatz gegen den modernen, und dabei schließlich um die Rettung des ‘ächten’ skeptischen Momentes für ein Philosophieren unter dem Anspruch des Absoluten.”

⁷ Cf. VSP 230: “Ganz unbegreiflich ist es, wie in Herrn Schulze vollends durch den Sextus nicht auch nur im allgemeinen der Begriff gekommen ist, dass es außer dem Skeptizismus und Dogmatismus noch ein Drittes, nämlich eine Philosophie gebe [...]” VSP 234: “[...] Es bleibt die Philosophie überhaupt übrig, welche kein Dogmatismus ist [...]”

⁸ VSP 214, 249, 250.

⁹ VSP 227. In conceiving Pyrrhonian scepticism as having a ‘noble essence’ Hegel finds himself opposed to many philosophers, including Hume and Fichte, who saw nothing of value in that form of scepticism. See Hume (1748: 204–207 [section 12, part 2]); Fichte (1794/95: 118); Vernaux (1955: 140–142); Forster (1989: 9–35). For Kant’s understanding of Pyrrhonism see Tonelli (1967). Cf. Buchner (1969: 51): “In dem Versuch [...], den ‘ächten Skeptizismus’ für eine Entfaltung jenes Anspruchs des Absoluten zu retten und neu zu denken, steht Hegel, so weit wir sehen, in seiner Zeit allein da.”

In this chapter I explore the *Skeptizismus* essay with the aim of gaining an understanding of Hegel's argument for the above thesis and of seeing how it can advance his main task, the resolution of the Pyrrhonian problematic. Let me begin with a general characterization of the relation between 'scepticism', 'dogmatism' and '(speculative) philosophy' in the essay's context.

2.2. *Scepticism, Dogmatism and Speculative Philosophy*

The essay suggests that the resolution of the Pyrrhonian problematic could be accomplished by means of a theory which would prove that the cognitive standpoint of *reason* (*Vernunft*) can provide human beings with knowledge of the true nature of at least some objects or aspects of what there is. These objects or aspects of being whose true nature—so it is stipulated—can indeed be known by reason are collectively called *the rational* (*das Vernünftige*).¹⁰ And the truth-claims posited in the universe of discourse claiming knowledge of the rational are called *truth-claims-of-reason* or simply *propositions-of-reason* (*Vernunftsätze*).

The cognitive standpoint of reason is exemplified by 'philosophy', which therefore aspires to generate knowledge of the rational. In the context of his discussion of Schulze's peculiar scepticism¹¹ Hegel is anxious to distin-

¹⁰ Maker (1994: 40) refers to "various domains of reality" which can be known by or within "the system of reason."

¹¹ Schulze's position, as Hegel presents it, is quite complicated (or, rather, confused); but it is clear that, for Hegel, when Schulze refers to the "indisputable certainty" (*unleugbare Gewißheit*) of the "facts of consciousness" (*Tatsachen des Bewußtseins*) (VSP 220, 222, 237, 242), he takes it that the latter arise only through the *immediacy* of *human sensibility*; see VSP 221 (for the sensibility factor see the whole page; for the immediacy factor see the last three lines), 222, 223 (fifth line), 224 (fifth line from the end), 225, 248, 263 (compare, however, with VSP 265). Hegel's analysis of Schulze's critique of speculative philosophy reveals the following confused position: According to Schulze, the *speculative philosophers* believe that there is a distinction between thought and being, and that the latter is further divided into conditioned and unconditioned (being). Thought, i.e. the activity of *reason* (*Vernunft*), is equipped only with *concepts*, while being (both conditioned and unconditioned) is constituted by *things*. The unconditioned things (which lie *hidden*—*verborgen*—'behind' or 'outside' the conditioned things: VSP 219, 225) ground the conditioned things, and therefore *knowledge* of the latter requires *knowledge* of the former. But the unconditioned things can be known only by *reason*, so the *speculative philosophers* say. Now, according to Schulze himself, given these beliefs of the speculative philosophers, and given also Schulze's own belief that all things have an absolutely sensory content or, at least, that their truth arises from such a content, i.e. a content which one can become aware of only through one's sensibility, any epistemic correspondence between thought and being is just impossible to obtain; for the distinction is one of total *qualitative* difference. So, at the end

guish his idea of the rational from two extreme views. On the one hand, the rational does not, as Schulze claims, refer to features of *hyperphysical* things—or to any such things themselves.¹² On the other hand, it should not be identified with the so-called *facts of consciousness*, namely with the immediate sensory aspects of physical things. (Schulze was a naive realist.) For Hegel, the rational dwells *in* the physical things, but is not reducible to their immediate sensory dimensions. (This does not mean that it does not—somehow—include those dimensions.)¹³

of the day, Schulze builds up this peculiar scepticism by employing (1) the premise that *the speculative philosophers themselves* (i) make two distinctions: (a) thought versus being and (b) conditioned versus unconditioned being and (ii) also hold that being is constituted only by *things* and thought only by *concepts*; and (2) *his own belief* that things' essences have only an *absolutely sensory* content (which means that they cannot be known through concepts). According to Schulze, the whole problematic collapses if we acknowledge that the unconditioned things can be known (*erkannt/gewußt werden*), not by reason, but by *consciousness*, which, for him, has the form of *human sensibility*; this aspect of Schulze's scepticism is what Hegel calls its "positive side" (VSP 220) and which he understands to be dogmatic through and through (since it allows certain truth-claims to be posited as true, i.e. the ones which are, allegedly, grounded upon human sensibility) (VSP 237–238). Hegel *also* wants the problematic to collapse, but not in the same way as Schulze; he, therefore, tries to show, on the one hand, that Schulze has a distorted view of speculative philosophy (see especially the bottom lines in VSP 219 and the top lines in VSP 220) and, on the other hand, that human sensibility could not possibly function as the sole source of knowledge of truth. In his attempt to prove the last point he refers to the Ten Modes of Aenesidemus, which he regards as being successful against the "common consciousness [...] which [holds fast] to the [sensory] given [and] the fact [and] regards it as something known, certain [and] eternal" (VSP 240, 241). (For Hegel, the Ten Modes represent "the ancient genuine scepticism" (VSP 237), a phrase by which he understands a scepticism that is *not* directed against speculative philosophy or *reason*, but only against "empirical" or "common consciousness" (VSP 240). Hegel also thinks—mistakenly—that the Ten Modes would be ineffective against reason because in their attempt to destroy "empirical" or "common consciousness" they use *rational* principles (VSP 240). He also sometimes uses *psychological* arguments against Schulze's extreme empiricism: see mainly VSP 221–222. For the overall account given above see especially the discussion in VSP 250–260. Cf. Enz. I §39, where Hegel seems to identify Hume's position with Schulze's: "Der *Humesche* Skeptizismus [...] ist übrigens vom *Griechischen Skeptizismus* sehr wohl zu unterscheiden. Der *Humesche* legt die *Wahrheit* des Empirischen, des Gefühls, der Anschauung zum Grunde und bestreitet die allgemeinen Bestimmungen und Gesetze von da aus, aus dem Grunde, weil sie nicht eine Berechtigung durch die sinnliche Wahrnehmung haben. Der alte Skeptizismus war so weit entfernt, das Gefühl, die Anschauung zum Prinzip der Wahrheit zu machen, daß er sich vielmehr zuallererst gegen das Sinnliche kehrte." The definitive refutation of this "positive" side of Schulzean scepticism is provided in the first chapter of PhdG (82–92), *Sense-Certainty*. On Hegel's critique of Schulze see Engstler (1996), Franks (2008) and Beiser (1987: 266–284).

¹² VSP 219–220, 225, 247, 257.

¹³ The "somehow" alludes to the Kantian categories as principles of organization of sensory affects.

Within the general sphere of 'philosophy', which affirms that the true nature of at least some objects or aspects of being can be known by means of reason, two 'attitudes' towards the manner in which this knowledge is obtained are distinguished: (a) 'dogmatism'¹⁴ and (b) 'speculative philosophy' or 'true philosophy' or, simply, 'Philosophy'. (I will be writing the latter term with a capital 'p' so as to prevent terminological confusion.) How exactly this distinction comes about is the main question the present chapter aspires to give an answer to.

Hegel illuminates their distinction by examining the relation of the two 'attitudes' to Pyrrhonian scepticism, and in particular their relation to the so-called Five Modes of Agrippa (in short: Five Modes). These are (i) the Mode from Difference (or Disagreement or Diversity), (ii) the Mode from Infinite Regress, (iii) the Mode from Relation, (iv) the Mode from Hypothesis (or Assumption), and (v) the Mode from Reciprocal Dependence (or Circularity). The Five Modes are nothing but a slightly more complicated characterization of the Pyrrhonian problematic than the one presented in the first chapter.

The significance of *Hegel's* discussion of the Five Modes *for us* is that it manages, firstly, to bring to the fore that 'principle' in the Pyrrhonian problematic which makes the latter so destructive of scientific inquiry and, secondly, to show why one would be right to claim that this 'principle' should *and can* be absent from that part of the universe of scientific discourse that concerns itself with the inquiry into the rational. (Call this part of the universe of scientific discourse *the universe of rational discourse*.) The term 'dogmatism' is used by Hegel in such a way as to denote exactly that 'attitude' in the sphere of 'philosophy' (as defined above), which proceeds by positing truth-claims from the cognitive standpoint of reason, but whose approach to knowledge-acquisition (that is to say, its approach to the problem of resolving contradictions in the universe of rational discourse) is—in contradistinction to 'speculative philosophy'—shaped through and through by the affirmation of the aforementioned 'principle'.

Hegel correctly remarks that the Five Modes, in contrast to the Ten Modes of Aenesidemus (which were formulated by the earlier Pyrrhonists

¹⁴ In VSP Schulze too is called "dogmatist" (see, for example, pp. 238, 240, 250). In this sense, *empiricism* and *dogmatic rationalism* are two species of *dogmatism*. Let us, however, simplify things by keeping with the firm technical distinction between 'empiricism', 'dogmatism' and 'speculative philosophy' (or 'philosophy' or 'true philosophy'). (On the other hand, Schulze uses the term "dogmatists" to refer to speculative philosophers!)

and directed in the main against the empirical content of truth-claims),¹⁵ were meant to refute not only empirical science and common-sense, not only “experience” and “sense-perception,” but also, and mainly, *dogmatism* and *speculative philosophy* (or, simply, *Philosophy*),¹⁶ to wit, “rational cognition.” But, he argues, while the Five Modes succeed in refuting dogmatism, they are “completely ineffective against Philosophy.”¹⁷ The general reason given for this ineffectiveness is that

they [i.e. the Five Modes] contain plainly reflective concepts.¹⁸

He explains:

Directed against dogmatism they appear from the side where they belong to reason, setting the other term of the necessary antinomy alongside the one asserted by dogmatism; directed against Philosophy, on the other hand, they appear from the side where they belong to reflection. Against dogmatism they must necessarily be victorious therefore; but in the face of Philosophy, they fall apart internally, or they are themselves dogmatic.¹⁹

The conclusion stated in the last sentence is, of course, at the moment not apparent to us. What is clear is only (a) that the Five Modes can thwart dogmatism because of their ability to give rise to “antinomies” (or, in the terminology of the Pyrrhonian problematic, ‘conflicts’ or ‘contradictions’) and (b) that they cannot destroy Philosophy because when they confront it “they appear from the side where they belong to reflection.” The next two sections will try to shed some light on these promising but cryptic remarks.

Before we continue let me note that if the above argument is correct, Paul Franks’ thesis that in the *Skeptizismus* essay Hegel’s main concern is to show that “the method of speculative philosophy must not be the

¹⁵ VSP 225, 238–243. Contrast, however, with PH I 145–147.

¹⁶ VSP 243: “Auf [...] die nunmehrige Richtung des Skeptizismus teils gegen den Dogmatismus, teils gegen die Philosophie selbst, beziehen sich ganz allein die *späteren fünf Tropen* der Skeptiker, welche die eigentliche Rüstkammer ihrer Waffen gegen philosophische Erkenntnis ausmachen [...]”; VSP 244–245: “Man sieht [...] aus ihrem ganzem Inhalt, daß die Absicht dieser fünf Tropen ganz verschieden von der Tendenz der zehn ersten ist und daß sie allein die spätere Wendung des Skeptizismus gegen die Philosophie betreffen”; VSP 240: “Noch mehr aber beweist der Inhalt dieser [letzten zehn] Tropen, wie entfernt sie von einer Tendenz gegen die Philosophie sind und wie sie ganz allein gegen den Dogmatismus des gemeinen Menschenverstandes gehen.”

¹⁷ VSP 244–245: “Es gibt keine tauglicheren Waffen gegen den Dogmatismus [...], aber sie sind völlig unbrauchbar gegen die Philosophie [...]”

¹⁸ VSP 245.

¹⁹ VSP 245.

method of natural science”²⁰ is largely mistaken. Hegel’s ‘enemy’ is ‘dogmatism’, not ‘naturalism’. ‘Dogmatism’ denotes a particular attitude or method in that domain of philosophy (as we commonly understand this word) which concerns itself with the inquiry into the *rational* dimension of being. Of course, further research may show that for Hegel dogmatism underlies the method of natural science, but still it is greatly misleading to claim that Hegel’s main concern in the *Skeptizismus* essay is to distance the method of speculative philosophy from the method of natural science. His main concern is to distance the method of speculative philosophy from another method *in philosophy*.

2.3. *The Refutation of Dogmatism*

Although we already know how exactly Pyrrhonism refutes dogmatism, it is of the utmost importance to give a description of Hegel’s own version of that refutation. This is so because Hegel defines speculative philosophy in terms of *his own* description of dogmatism’s inability to overcome Pyrrhonian scepticism.

At this juncture the question may be asked why we did not *begin* our inquiry with Hegel’s version of Pyrrhonian scepticism. In this way, we would not have to give *two* accounts of Pyrrhonism’s refutation of dogmatism. The answer is this—if we had done so, important elements of the Pyrrhonian problematic (such as the distinction between immediacy and mediation, or the scientist’s freedom of positing truth-claims in the universe of discourse) would have either been seriously underplayed or not appeared at all. By giving an independent description of our main problem, I wanted to make sure that this problem is presented in its true dimensions and not through the subjective lenses of Hegel’s interpretation. Of course, my claim will be that Hegel’s solution to the problem as he understands it works also against the problem as presented in the first chapter of the present study.

As already pointed out, for Hegel, the Pyrrhonian refutation of dogmatism is accomplished by means of the Five Modes, which he sees as providing the constitutive parts of a *single* argument. The presentation of this argument will first help us understand what the essence of *dogmatism* is and exactly why it cannot overcome Pyrrhonian scepticism. Based

²⁰ Franks (2008: 58).

on this result, we will then be able to define the essence of *speculative philosophy*.

Hegel uses a quasi-logical, quasi-ontological and quasi-epistemological vocabulary in his account of the argument. We will follow his terminology, but at the end we will translate his conclusions into a language that fits our discussion in a better way, to wit, we will use his conclusions in such a way as to formulate a response that works against Pyrrhonian scepticism *as this has been described in the first chapter of the present study*. (It is *that* problem which we aspire to find a solution to.) Thus, one should go through the argument without demanding too much in terms of *justification* (that is, without wondering whether dogmatism is indeed refuted by Hegel's argument or not), since *for us* its conclusions are grounded on what has been said in the first chapter. In general, Hegel's discussion will be here taken more as an *illumination* of the fundamental structure (or 'essence') of that scientific model that Pyrrhonism destroys (namely, *dogmatism*) than as a strong argument against it.

The Hegelian argument from the Five Modes against dogmatism goes as follows.²¹ To begin with, the dogmatist, as an inquirer into the truth of the rational dimensions of being, holds on to certain content and treats it as if it were "the absolute," namely the absolute truth: as a content whose truth arises solely from itself, independently of any relations to other contents. Reason, however, which the dogmatist himself accepts as the means to knowledge of the rational, finds itself unable to *determine* the posited content unless it relates it to *other* contents and especially to those which are *opposed* (*entgegengesetzt*) to it.²² This realization of reason (which is the same reason that holds on to a content as being the absolute) exemplifies the Third Mode, the "mode from relation," and discloses the *finitude* or *limitedness* of the posited content: It is no longer the absolute, but

²¹ The whole argument can be found in VSP 245–246.

²² Hegel had already mentioned this "principle of determinacy" in his previous discussion of the Eighth Mode of Aenesidemus; see VSP 239: "[...] Am ausgedehntesten, merkt Sextus an, ist der achte Punkt, der die Bedingtheit jedes Endlichen durch ein Anderes, oder daß jedes nur im Verhältnis zu einem Anderen ist, betrifft." Hegel claims, wrongly in my opinion, that the *early* Pyrrhonists were able to *undogmatically* formulate such "principles" because their target was not "science" but only "common consciousness". (The truth is that the 'early' Pyrrhonists, like the 'later' ones, used no principles which they *themselves* were adhering to; indeed, Hegel seems to be correcting himself in the first lines of VSP 241.) For his claim that the principle is one of "reason" see VSP 240: "[...] Zum Teil betrifft er das Verhältnis überhaupt, oder daß alles Wirkliche bedingt sei durch ein Anderes, und insofern drückt er ein Vernunftprinzip aus."

rather a content whose self-subsistence is limited by the contents that oppose it.²³

Note at this point how Hegel's understanding of the issue of the emergence of conflicts in the universe of discourse differs from the genuine Pyrrhonist's (as this has been expounded in the first chapter). While the genuine Pyrrhonist understands these conflicts as being the product of the activity—the 'positing'—of either the dogmatists or the sceptic, Hegel's Pyrrhonist opines that they emerge due to the content's own need for determinacy. Despite this difference, however, the end-result is the same: both Hegel's Pyrrhonist and the genuine Pyrrhonist start their argument against the dogmatist by making it clear to the latter that the universe of discourse is not inhabited by absolute, self-subsistent contents, but rather by contents relating to each other in terms of conflict.

It may be worth emphasizing that Hegel's point of view does not in any way undermine the central idea of the Pyrrhonian problematic that scientific contents emerge in the universe of discourse in a context of *immediacy*. In fact, as we will see in forthcoming chapters, there are numerous passages from his mature work in which Hegel himself affirms this idea. When our philosopher has the Pyrrhonist say that "reason finds itself unable to determine the posited content unless it relates it to its contradictories," all he means by that is that when reason *reflects* on its understanding of a certain content ('what it really means'), it finds itself unable to determine it unless it relates it to its contradictories. This, however, says nothing *against* the idea that when contents emerge for the first time in the universe of discourse, they enjoy an independence of their own, to wit, the idea that there is an *unreflective* (or *prereflective*) understanding of them which does not involve any *explicit* reference to other contents.

Now, the dogmatist conceives such kind of relation—the relation between conflicting, contradictory contents—as a sign of the vanishing of truth and wishes to destroy it. He, therefore, posits a content as the *ground* of the truth of *one* of the relata, which immediately obtains the status of *what-is-grounded*. It may be the case that a content has to relate to its opposite for it to be determinate, but in terms of *truth*, a *grounding* content can easily effect their separation. This grounding-relation is meant to establish the self-subsistence of the initially posited content—that is,

²³ VSP 245: "[...] Die Vernunft [...] zeigt [...] von diesem Absoluten, daß es eine Beziehung auf das von ihm Ausgeschlossene hat und nur durch und in dieser Beziehung auf ein Anderes, also nicht absolut ist, nach dem *dritten Tropus* des Verhältnisses."

its independence from its opposite—in terms of truth and, via an indirect route, thereby secure its absoluteness. The same faculty of reason, though, which posits this grounding-relation in order to resolve a conflict, finds itself wondering how it is that the posited grounding content grounds the initially posited content *and not its contradictory*. What is it that makes *this* content be the ground of *that* content? This question, which reason itself raises, brings forth three responses, the failure of each of which leads the projected relation between *truth* and *ground* to collapse.

(a) *Circularity*: The first response asserts that the grounding content grounds a content A and not a content B (which is the opposite of A) because it owes its very existence to A; in other words, the grounding content comes into being *because* of A, *not* because of B. Its truth arises from the very fact that it grounds A, and the truth of A arises from the fact that it is grounded by what has been determined as the grounding content. But this response clearly shows that the same faculty of reason which posits the grounding-relation finds itself unable to determine it unless *both* of its relata are assigned the status of a ground and each is taken to ground the other. This realization of reason exemplifies the Fifth Mode, the “mode from reciprocal dependence,” which discloses the *circularity* of the grounding-relation in the realm of reason.²⁴ But the dogmatist *himself* finds circularity and truth incompatible and, therefore, wishes to destroy the former, without, however, destroying the grounding-relation.

(b) *Hypothesis*: In order to achieve this the dogmatist makes it explicit that the posited grounding content will be taken as being the *self-grounded* or *ungrounded* ground of A by *hypothesis* or *assumption*. The same faculty of reason, however, that supports the positing of self-grounded grounds by hypothesis acknowledges that, if the assignment of the ground-status is made only by hypothesis, then two irresolvable problems arise: (i) in this case the truth of content B (the negation of A) could be said to be equally validly grounded by a self-grounded ground; and/or (ii) since the grounding content is simply assumed to be true, *its own* opposite content (its own negation) could equally validly be posited as true. This realization of reason is exemplified by the Fourth Mode, the “mode from hypothesis”

²⁴ VSP 245: “Soll dies Andere seinen Grund in dem Ersten sowie das Erste seinen Grund in dem Anderen haben, so ist dies ein Zirkel und fällt in den *fünften*, den diallelischen Tropus [...]” Cf. VSP 244: “Der fünfte ist das *Gegenseitige*, wenn dasjenige, was zum Beweise eines Anderen dienen soll, selbst zum seinem Beweise desjenigen bedarf, welches durch dasselbe bewiesen werden soll.”

and is directed against the arbitrariness of the grounding-relation.²⁵ Nonetheless, it is not only we, but also the dogmatist *himself*, who finds this arbitrariness incompatible with his idea of scientific truth and wishes to overcome it; he still insists, though, on maintaining the grounding-relation between contents as the proper entrance into the truth of the rational.

(c) *Infinity*: Aiming to achieve this, the dogmatist now maintains that there is a *reason why* the posited grounding content grounds the truth of A and not of B or *why* it itself, rather than *its* negation, is the truth. In other words, there is an objective ground that grounds the posited grounding content. But the same faculty of reason that posits this objective ground asks itself whether there is a *reason why* that ground is objective and not a mere ‘hypothesis’. Since it cannot assign it an objective status by hypothesis or assumption, it posits *another* content as the objective ground that grounds another ground. An *infinite regress* of grounds is now initiated. This exemplifies the Second Mode, the “mode from infinite regress,” which represents the final stage of the dogmatist’s futile appeal to the notion of *ground*.²⁶

The failed appeal to the grounding-relation as the entrance into the truth of the rational forces the dogmatist to return to and reflect on the simple relation between a content and its contradictory. What the dogmatist desires is the *absolutization* of one of those contents; he desires, that is, to show that there is a posited content whose truth is totally independent of other contents (and especially of its contradictory). He now finds himself in a state of impasse, since, firstly, the grounding-relation has proven to be unsuitable for the satisfaction of his desire and, secondly,

²⁵ VSP 245: “[...] Soll kein Zirkel begangen werden, sondern dieses Andere als Grund des Ersten in sich selbst gegründet sein und wird es zur unbegründeten Voraussetzung gemacht, so hat es, weil es ein Begründendes ist, ein Entgegengesetztes, und dies sein Entgegengesetztes kann mit eben dem Rechte als ein Unbewiesenes oder Unbegründetes vorausgesetzt werden, weil hier einmal das Begründen anerkannt worden ist nach dem vierten Tropus der Voraussetzungen [...]” Cf. VSP 244: “Der vierte betrifft die *Voraussetzungen*—gegen die Dogmatiker, die, um nicht ins Unendliche getrieben zu werden, etwas als schlechthin Erstes und Unbewiesenes setzen—, welche die Skeptiker sogleich dadurch nachahmen, daß sie mit eben dem Rechte das Gegenteil jenes Vorausgesetzten ohne Beweis setzen.”

²⁶ VSP 245: “[...] Oder aber dies Andere als Grund soll wieder in einem Anderen begründet sein, so wird dies Begründete auf die Reflexions-Unendlichkeit an Endlichen ins Unendliche fortgetrieben und ist wieder grundlos nach dem zweiten Tropus.” Cf. VSP 244: “Der zweite ist, der *aufs Unendliche* treibt; Sextus gebraucht ihn so häufig, als er in neueren Zeiten als Begründungstendenz vorgekommen ist; er ist das Bekannte, daß für ein Begründendes eine neue Begründung, für diese wieder [eine] und so fort ins Unendliche gefordert wird.”

what appears now before him is a manifoldness of limited or finite—not absolute—contents, relating to each other in terms of contradiction.

The only way out for the dogmatist is the way of *ignorance*: He ignores the presence of the contradiction and unashamedly chooses a single content as what is absolutely true. Yet the same faculty of reason that acts in this way has already become aware—through the Third Mode—of the presence of a plurality of contradictory immediate contents and wonders on what basis one chooses a single content *and not its opposite*. This state of affairs exemplifies the First Mode, the “mode from difference,” which makes manifest that the positing of a content as true in the context of immediacy has absolutely no value in itself, for the opposite of this content is at the same time and equally validly also posited as true.²⁷

This question of reason—the question of the ‘basis’ upon which the dogmatist chooses a single content and not its contradictory—forces the dogmatist to relapse into the employment of the grounding-relation, since this is the only kind of ‘basis’ he endorses. In this way, however, the whole argument from the Five Modes repeats itself infinitely, showing thereby how the dogmatist imprisons himself in it.

For Hegel, this argument reveals dogmatism’s essence and self-destructive nature, because it makes crystal-clear, *firstly*, what dogmatism aims at and, *secondly*, why it cannot achieve it. It aims at the resolution of conflict between contents but admits an outcome as successful only if the *one* of the contents has *totally vanished* and (as a consequence) the *other* has been *absolutized*. This is the essence of dogmatism, to wit, it privileges, or desires to privilege, one part in a relation of contradiction over the other and thereby absolutizes it.²⁸ It is due to this character of its essence that

²⁷ VSP 246: “Endlich müsste jenes endliche Absolute des Dogmatismus auch ein Allgemeines sein; allein dies wird sich notwendig nicht finden, weil es ein Beschränktes ist, und hierher gehört der *erste Tropus* der Verschiedenheit.” Cf. VSP 244: “Der *erste* unter diesen Tropen der Epoche ist der von der *Verschiedenheit*, nämlich jetzt nicht mehr der Tiere oder der Menschen, wie in den zehn ersten, sondern der gemeinen Meinungen und der Lehren der Philosophen, sowohl beider gegeneinander als beider innerhalb seiner selbst,—ein Tropus, über den die Skeptiker immer sehr weitläufig sind und überall Verschiedenheit erblicken und hineinragen [...]”

²⁸ VSP 245: “[...] Das Wesen des Dogmatismus [besteht] darin [...], daß er ein Endliches, mit einer Entgegensetzung Behaftetes [...] als das Absolute setzt [...]” Compare this definition of dogmatism with Fichte’s ‘psychologistic’ version (1797–1800: 11): “If [the philosopher] abstracts from the thing, then he is left with an intellect in itself as the explanatory ground of experience; that is to say, he is left with the intellect in abstraction from its relationship to experience. If he abstracts from the intellect, then he is left with a thing in itself (that is, in abstraction from the fact that it occurs within experience) as the explanatory ground of experience. The first way of proceeding is called *idealism*; the second is

the only means available to dogmatism for fulfilling its aim is the activity of *grounding*. This is so because the decision to privilege one content over another requires justification, that is, a *reason* must be given for it. But such reason is exactly what would *ground* the privileged content.

Dogmatism collapses, for the notion of *ground* that it itself cherishes *allows* one to make manifest the impossibility of ever privileging one content over its opposite in the realm of reason. This manifestation has been accomplished through the Five Modes, which, therefore, have been successful in their attack against dogmatism.²⁹ Hence the same faculty of reason which the dogmatist employs in order to resolve relations of opposition makes manifest that they cannot be resolved *if the aim is to privilege one content over another*. What Hegel wants to emphasize here, agreeing with the Pyrrhonists, is exactly the inability of reason, due to its own internal structure, to resolve a conflict between propositions-of-reason *by privileging one of its parts*. But, Hegel immediately adds, *this* peculiar employment of reason as a means to resolve conflicts belongs to dogmatism, not to speculative philosophy.³⁰

Let us now transfer this diagnosis to the setting of our main working framework. As explained in the first chapter, conflict appears in the universe of discourse as soon as the negation of a truth-claim is posited therein. Since such a state of affairs undermines the truth of the posited

called *dogmatism*." Compare it also with Kant's 'methodological' definition in the first Critique (KrV Bxxxv): "Dogmatism ist [...] das dogmatische Verfahren der reinen Vernunft, ohne vorangehende Kritik ihres eigenen Vermögens." Fichte (1791: 22) seems to have been influenced by Maimon's definition of dogmatism as the position that "believes itself to be in possession of cognitions of *things in themselves*;" see Maimon (1794: 342). This definition by Maimon, however, seems to be anticipated in Kant (KrV A389): "Nur sind wir nach den gemeinen Begriffen unserer Vernunft in Ansehung der Gemeinschaft, darin unser denkendes Subjekt mit den Dingen außer uns steht, dogmatisch und sehen diese als wahrhafte unabhängig von uns bestehende Gegenstände an, nach einem gewissen transzendentalen Dualism, der jene äußere Erscheinungen nicht als Vorstellungen zum Subjekte zählt, sondern sie, so wie sinnliche Anschauung sie uns liefert, außer uns als Objekte versetzt und sie von dem denkenden Subjekte gänzlich abtrennt." For more on the adventures of the term 'dogmatism' in the writings of the German Idealists, including Schelling's contribution, see D. Breazeale's "Introduction" to Fichte (1797–1800). Note that Hegel's definition of the term in VSP is at first sight distinct from all the other definitions.

²⁹ VSP 246: "Diese dem Dogmatismus unüberwindlichen Tropen hat Sextus mit großem Glück gegen den Dogmatismus [...] gebraucht."

³⁰ This suggestion has been ignored by both Schulze (VSP 214–216) and, before him, Kant (KrV Bvii, Bxv), who committed the fallacy of inferring from the conflict between philosophical systems in the history of philosophy that there is something *wrong* with *reason*, which produces but, *for them*, cannot resolve these conflicts. Hegel completely ridicules this position (VSP 217).

truth-claims, the aim is to resolve the conflict and thereby enable the expression of truth. The dogmatist claims that conflicts between truth-claims-of-reason can be resolved if a *ground* is posited which would allow the *privileging* of the one truth-claim over the other. But the Pyrrhonian argument has shown that such privileging cannot be achieved. Hegel's diagnosis has made it clear that this failure to resolve the Pyrrhonian problematic through *grounding* is intrinsically related to the posited *aim*, that is, the privileging (or 'absolutizing') of the one truth-claim-of-reason over the other. *This means that if one shows that conflicts in the realm of reason could be resolved without this privileging taking place, it would no longer be necessary to employ the 'reflective' notion of 'ground' in such an enterprise and, therefore, the Pyrrhonian argument could not be formulated in the first place.* This conclusion is extremely important, for it shows that it is because they are the 'scientists' *themselves* who attempt to resolve the conflicts in the universe of discourse by means of *privileging* and *grounding* that the Pyrrhonian argument is so effective against them.

2.4. *Speculative Philosophy and the Rational*

In contrast to dogmatism, speculative philosophy (in the passage below: "reason") overcomes the obstacle of the Five Modes because

[as] directed against reason [...] they [i.e. the Five Modes] retain as their peculiarity the pure difference by which they are affected; their rational aspect is already in reason.³¹

In this section an attempt will be made to decipher this cryptic statement by citing and briefly commenting on those extracts of the essay which make specific suggestions as to how exactly speculative philosophy (to wit, *reason* speculatively—not dogmatically—conceived and exemplified) and its subject-matter, the rational, overcome and define themselves through the challenge raised by each of the Five Modes. This brief commentary will enable us to elucidate the exact way in which the Five Modes "retain [...] the pure difference by which they are affected" and how it is that "their rational aspect is already in reason."

Let us first see how speculative philosophy responds to the challenge raised by the First Mode:

³¹ VSP 246.

As far as the First Mode ('from difference') is concerned, the rational is always and everywhere self-identical; pure inequality is possible only for the understanding [i.e. dogmatism], and everything unlike is posited by reason as one.³²

Recall that the First Mode was directed against the dogmatist's belief that a singular content can be immediately posited as true in isolation from other contents. What is present in the context of immediacy is not a true singular content but a multiplicity (or *difference*) of contents, which relate to each other in terms of opposition or contradiction and which all make an equally valid claim to truth. But while this works against dogmatism, it fails against speculative philosophy. This is so because, on the one hand, speculative reason agrees with the First Mode that the context of immediacy is occupied by contradictions between contents all of which make an equally valid claim to truth, but, on the other hand, it regards this difference as part of the self-identity of the rational. Hegel's latter point is that the contents in the context of immediacy are not taken by speculative philosophy to be absolute, totally independent from one another, permanently polarized contents. In the realm of speculative reason, in contrast to what happens in the realm of dogmatic reason, difference is not maintained as an indifferent polarity, as a permanent isolation of opposed contents. Rather, difference proves to be a fundamental element of the rational's *self-identity*.

How exactly difference proves to be part of the rational's self-identity is a question that will occupy our attention in the forthcoming chapters. What we should presently understand is the reason why the First Mode fails against speculative philosophy. According to this Mode, the context of immediacy of the universe of discourse is inhabited not by a single absolute content but by a multiplicity of 'absolute' contents that relate to each other in terms of opposition. With regards to this aspect of the First Mode, the latter fails against speculative reason, because this kind of reason views the context of immediacy of the universe of rational discourse in exactly the same way as the First Mode does.

There is, however, one more aspect of the First Mode that needs to be taken into consideration—the idea that the conflicts in the context of immediacy are not resolvable and, therefore, that the universe of discourse can never express the truth of rational being. In the passage above Hegel reacts exactly against this idea—there is no such thing as “pure

³² VSP 246.

inequality" (that is, permanently polarized difference) in the realm of speculative reason. All difference is 'sublated' into the 'oneness' of the content. Thus, Hegel claims, there is indeed a multiplicity of contradictory contents—as the First Mode shows—but there is also a 'sublation' of these contradictions into a singular content. Speculative reason "posits everything unlike"—that is to say, it posits the conflicts in the context of immediacy—"as one." This response to the second aspect of the First Mode seems at the moment no less than arbitrary. The understanding of Hegel's point and the removal of its arbitrariness is my main aim in the remainder of this book.

Speculative philosophy defies the Third Mode ("from relation") as well, because

it cannot be shown of the rational, in accordance with the Third Mode, that it only exists within the relation, that it stands in a necessary connection to an other; for it is itself nothing but the relation.³³

The Third Mode undermined the dogmatist's claim that a content can have immediately a determinate existence without relating to its opposite; rather each content "exists only through and in" its relation to its opposite."³⁴ Thus, the dogmatist's belief in an immediately positive, undifferentiated, absolute determinate content collapses when confronted with this Mode. But speculative philosophy does not face such a problem, for the rational stands in no relation to an opposite, not because it can isolate itself from it and ignore it, but because it is the *relation* between opposites *itself*. The purpose of philosophy, then, for Hegel, is not to posit and defend absolute, undifferentiated determinate contents, but to make manifest relations between contradictories, since it is those that constitute the subject-matter of reason.

It is now the turn of the Fifth Mode ("from reciprocal dependence") to prove ineffective against speculative philosophy:

Since the rational is the relation itself, it escapes from the circle (or the Fifth Mode: 'from reciprocal dependence'), in contradistinction to the *relata*, which, when they are posited by the understanding [i.e. dogmatism], are supposed to ground one another, and therefore should necessarily fall therein; indeed, with respect to the relation itself nothing is reciprocally grounded.³⁵

³³ VSP 246.

³⁴ VSP 245.

³⁵ VSP 246–247.

Dogmatism has it that a content in the realm of reason could be grounded upon a content that it itself brings into existence. The Fifth Mode manifests the absurdity of this claim by making it explicit that in such a grounding-relation both contents deserve the status of a *ground*. But while this destroys dogmatism, it fails against speculative philosophy because, since the rational is the relation itself, it has no *other* to which it could relate in terms of *ground*.

Speculative philosophy escapes from the Fourth Mode (“from hypothesis”) as well, since

the rational is not an unproven assumption, in accordance with the Fourth Mode, so that its counterpart could with equal right be presupposed unproven in opposition to it; for the rational has no opposed counterpart; it includes both of the finite opposites, which are mutual counterparts, within itself.³⁶

The Fourth Mode was directed against the ‘hypothetical’ positing of a ground, making it explicit that the hypothetical grounding of a content is no truer than the hypothetical grounding of its opposite. This notion of ‘hypothetical grounding’, however, is irrelevant to speculative philosophy, precisely because the rational has no opposite; it rather *incorporates* oppositions (“it includes both of the finite opposites, which are mutual counterparts, within itself”).

Finally, since the speculative reason’s activity has been so vividly shown to be at odds with the idea of positing absolute, undifferentiated contents and adjudicating between them by means of *grounds*, it comes as no surprise that speculative philosophy undermines the Second Mode (“from infinite regress”) as well. Here is how Hegel puts it, in this most illuminating passage:

The two preceding Modes both contain the concept of a ground and of a consequent, according to which, one term would be grounded through another; since, for reason, there is no opposition of one term against another, these two Modes, as well as the demand for a ground that is posited in the sphere of oppositions and repeated endlessly (in the Second Mode: ‘from infinite regress’), become irrelevant. Neither that demand for a ground nor this infinity is of any concern to reason.³⁷

Indeed, if the “demand for a ground” is not present in speculative philosophy, then obviously no infinite regress of grounds can be found therein

³⁶ VSP 247.

³⁷ VSP 247.

and, therefore, the Second Mode proves to be inapplicable to speculative reason's activity.

All in all, the Five Modes are ineffective against speculative philosophy because the elements upon which they base their attack and from which they derive their power against dogmatism are not constitutive or 'determinative' of speculative philosophy or, if you prefer, are present therein only as elements that are *already* overcome.³⁸ These elements are (a) the tendency to privilege or 'absolutize' only one of the relata in a relation of conflict and (b) the tendency to go about achieving this through the positing of a ground (*Begründungstendenz*).³⁹

There is, however, one more 'tendency' which is only indirectly present in dogmatism, but directly present in the argument from the Five Modes and which is entailed from the two main tendencies of dogmatism. This is the tendency to *maintain* a permanent polarity (a 'fixity', in Hegel's terminology) between oppositions in the context of immediacy. Such tendency is only indirectly present in dogmatism because its acknowledgement requires a premise that is not recognized by the dogmatist—the premise that the context of immediacy is fully occupied by contradictions *whose constituents have an equal truth-value in that context*. Since the argument from the Five Modes establishes, to the mind of the sceptic, that the dogmatist is never able to resolve these contradictions, it follows that, to the mind of the sceptic, these contradictions are *permanently maintained*, that they are 'fixed'. This is why Hegel says that the Five Modes "retain [...] the pure difference by which they are affected," the term "pure difference" here meaning 'permanent polarization', 'fixity'. This third tendency, which is hidden in dogmatism but surfaces in the argument from the Five Modes, is also absent in speculative philosophy. Lacking these three 'tendencies', speculative philosophy has a completely different character from dogmatism.

It is, I believe, now quite clear why the argument of the Five Modes fails against speculative philosophy. And yet by simply saying that speculative philosophy *lacks* the tendencies of dogmatism, one provides only a negative characterization of it. The problem is that a positive characterization is also needed if the Pyrrhonian problematic is to be resolved: There still remains the need to propose a way of resolving the conflicts between truth-claims in the context of immediacy and thereby expressing the truth

³⁸ Cf. Röttges (1987: 27).

³⁹ VSP 244, 247.

of being. Elements of such a positive characterization, however, are not absent from the passages we examined in the present section. Indeed, Hegel makes three claims that are meant to distinguish speculative philosophy from dogmatism in *positive* terms. These are as follows:

- (1) The rational is always and everywhere *self-identical* (or, if you prefer, speculative reason posits everything unlike as *one*).
- (2) The rational is a *relation*, not a *relatum*.
- (3) The relata included in the relation of the rational are *contradictories*.

How exactly would this positive characterization of speculative philosophy enable the resolution of conflict between *truth-claims-of-reason* in the context of immediacy of the universe of discourse? Can any of these claims help us with the Pyrrhonian problematic? And how could they themselves—since they are truth-claims—not fall victims of this problematic? To give a proper response to these questions we must first clarify the relation between speculative philosophy (or ‘speculative reason’) and what Hegel calls “the noble essence of Pyrrhonian scepticism.”

2.5. *Contradiction and Unification of Truth-Claims-of-Reason*

Pyrrhonian scepticism purports to show that the resolution of conflict in the universe of discourse is impossible. It has now been made clear, however, that the successful manifestation of this impossibility requires that the ‘scientists’, whose position the Pyrrhonist wishes to destroy, have two unwarranted beliefs: (a) that the only way the conflict can be resolved is by *privileging* or *absolutizing* one of the truth-claims in a relation of conflict and (b) that the only way this privileging can be achieved is by positing a *ground* or *criterion of truth*. Speculative philosophy professes to have overcome Pyrrhonian scepticism, which *must* mean that it has discovered a way to resolve the conflict between truth-claims-of-reason without assenting to those two beliefs. Thus, *if the Pyrrhonist’s challenge is that we should resolve the conflict between truth-claims-of-reason without privileging one of them and/or without employing a criterion of truth, then, Hegel maintains, we are indeed able to respond successfully to that challenge.*

This response is determined by the ‘positive’ character of speculative philosophy, as this was described in the previous section, and especially by the claims that the rational is a relation, not a relatum, and that the

relata included in this relation are contradictories. Hegel's ingenious insight is that a conflict can be resolved, not by privileging one of the relata, but by *uniting* or *incorporating* or *sublating* them in what he calls "a higher truth-claim-of-reason." This 'higher' truth-claim is the expression of the truth of the rational itself and, therefore, is *not* an absolute or privileged content that has nothing to do with contradiction. The content of the 'higher' truth-claim-of-reason is nothing but the *relation* between conflicting 'lower' truth-claims-of-reason. In this way, the 'higher' status of the third truth-claim does not have a peculiar, mysterious meaning, but rather a simple, *technical* one: it is just the truth-claim whose determinate content's analysis would produce truth-claims-of-reason whose relation is one of contradiction. Here is how Hegel puts it:

If in some proposition which expresses knowledge of the rational, what is considered is the reflected aspect of it, that is, the concepts which are contained in it taken in isolation and the manner in which these concepts are connected, then what must show itself is that these concepts are at the same time sublated or that they are united in such a way that they contradict themselves; otherwise, such proposition would be not one of reason, but only of the understanding [i.e. dogmatism].⁴⁰

Also:

[...] Every such *proposition* of reason lets itself be dissolved into two absolutely conflicting [*propositions*]*—e.g.* God is cause and God is not cause [...].⁴¹

Clearly, there is a problem here: the exact characterization of the relation between (a) the notion of contradiction and (b) the 'higher' truth-claim-of-reason that *unites* contradictories. For since it aspires to *resolve* conflicts in the universe of rational discourse, speculative philosophy must

⁴⁰ VSP 229.

⁴¹ VSP 230 (my emphasis): "[...] *Jeder* solcher Vernunftsatz [läßt] sich in zwei sich schlechthin widerstrebende [Sätze] auflösen—z.B. Gott ist Ursache und Gott ist nicht Ursache [...]." See the whole passage in VSP 229–230: "Oder wenn ein anderer Satz des Spinoza so lautet: 'Gott ist die immanente, nicht die vorübergehende Ursache der Welt', so hat er, indem er die Ursache immanent, also die Ursache eins mit der Wirkung setzt—weil die Ursache nur Ursache ist, insofern sie der Wirkung entgegengesetzt wird—, den Begriff von Ursache und Wirkung negiert [...]. Indem jeder solcher Vernunftsatz sich in zwei sich schlechthin widerstrebende auflösen läßt—z.B. Gott ist Ursache und Gott ist nicht Ursache; er ist Eins und nicht Eins, Vieles und nicht Vieles [...] —, so tritt das Prinzip des Skeptizismus: *παντι λόγω λόγος ἴσος ἀντίκειται*, in seiner ganzen Stärke auf." (Note, importantly, that this passage goes beyond the particular example used—the proposition from Spinoza—and is meant to say something about the character of *each and every* proposition-of-reason.)

surely conceive such states of affairs as *problematic*, which means that it accepts the validity of the law of non-contradiction. But the formulation of this resolution as the unification of contradictories seems to deny the validity of the law and affirm the truth of a contradictory state of affairs. Thus, there should be a concrete difference between (a) that state of affairs which exemplifies a *problematic* contradiction in the universe of rational discourse and (b) that state of affairs which exemplifies a *non-problematic* contradiction therein. We already know that a problematic contradiction is one that relates two truth-claims that are posited as *absolute*. Consequently, this absoluteness must be what is missing from the non-problematic, 'true' contradiction. Hegel writes:

The so-called law [*Satz*] of non-contradiction is thus so far from possessing formal truth for reason, that on the contrary every proposition [*Satz*] of reason must, with respect to the concepts, contain a violation of it; for a proposition [*Satz*] to be *merely* formal, means this for reason: to be posited purely for itself, without the parallel affirmation of what is contradictorily opposed to it; and just for this reason it is false. To recognize the law [*Satz*] of non-contradiction as formal means, then, to obtain at the same time knowledge of its falsity.⁴²

Thus, there is a way in which the law of non-contradiction is invalidated in the realm of reason and it is only through *this* event that knowledge of the rational becomes possible.

Contradiction must, therefore, be present in the 'higher' truth-claim-of-reason where the conflicting truth-claims are united or incorporated, but *not* in such a way that these truth-claims would be posited as absolute or self-subsistent.⁴³ This specific response to the Pyrrhonian problematic reveals that Hegel's idea of speculative philosophy is one of a theoretical activity that moves *forward* by constructing (or recognizing or acknowledging) *positive unities* of *contradictory* elements; in contrast, dogmatism has the image of a theoretical activity that moves *backwards* by constructing (or recognizing or acknowledging) *grounds* or *absolute* elements. In other words, while dogmatism is *regressive* in nature, speculative philosophy is *progressive*.

⁴² VSP 230.

⁴³ For a similar approach, see Lau (2004: 165–166); especially this passage from page 165: "Freilich meint Hegel nicht, daß der Vernunftsatz in Form einer schlechtweg sich widersprechenden Aussage geeignet ist, die spekulative Wahrheit darzustellen;" and this passage from page 166: "Dennoch würde es auch nicht helfen, wenn das positive und das negative Urteil einfach zusammengenommen und in einem 'Vernunftsatz' ausgesprochen würden."

Nevertheless, there is a feature which both dogmatism and speculative philosophy share: The moving force behind both movements is nothing other than the *essence of Pyrrhonism*, to wit, the positing or, simply, the emergence of contradictories in the universe of discourse. But whereas dogmatism regards contradiction as a vice that needs to be ostracized, speculative philosophy admits its unavoidability and seeks to do justice to it in its attempt to arrive at knowledge of the truth of being.⁴⁴ “True philosophy,” then, could not exist without the incorporation of the “pure negativity” of Pyrrhonism⁴⁵ or, as Hegel puts it,

true philosophy has *necessarily* a negative side, which [...] is directed [...] against all limited [i.e. posited as self-subsistent or absolute] contents.⁴⁶

It is *exactly* because of this necessary incorporation of ‘negativity’ or contradiction within *Philosophy* that Hegel characterizes the essence of Pyrrhonian scepticism as *noble*⁴⁷ and maintains that “[Pyrrhonian] scepticism itself belonged to Philosophy.”⁴⁸ This also reveals in what sense

⁴⁴ Cf. Koch (2002: 29): “Statt über derlei Restriktionen zu brüten, sollten wir indes anerkennen, daß der Diskurs als solcher widerspruchsvoll und die Norm der Widerspruchsfreiheit ein Sollen im Hegelschen Sinne ist [...]”; Kaufmann (1966: 64): “The problem of philosophical disagreement [...] concerned Hegel from the start, and instead of simply ignoring it and giving reasons for his own views, he made it the very basis of his own philosophy;” Collins (2003: 83): “When, therefore, Hegel talks about resolving a contradiction, he does not mean that we get rid of it or neutralize its contradictory opposition. He means that we endorse the necessary connection between the opposites.”

⁴⁵ VSP 237.

⁴⁶ VSP 227–228. See also VSP 229: “Dieser Skeptizismus [...] ist [...] in jedem echten philosophischen Systeme *implicite* zu finden, denn er ist die freie Seite einer jeden Philosophie [...]”; VSP 230: “Da jede echte Philosophie diese negative Seite hat oder den Satz des Widerspruchs ewig aufhebt, so kann, wer Lust hat, unmittelbar diese negative Seite herausheben und sich aus jeder einen Skeptizismus darstellen;” VSP 237: “[Die] Philosophie [schließt] zugleich den Skeptizismus in sich [...]”. Cf. Buchner (1969: 54): “Für Hegel liegt in dieser möglichen Trennung des ‘vernünftigen Skeptisierens’ von der ‘ächten Philosophie’, also in der Herauslösung und Verselbstständigung des Skeptizismus gegenüber dem Anspruch des Absoluten seine eigentliche Gefahr und mögliche Unwahrheit. Der Skeptizismus wird dann zu einem bloß Instrument des Verstandesmechanismus.”

⁴⁷ VSP 249–250. Cf. Forster (1989: 32): “According to this [i.e. Hegel’s] insight, the philosophical importance of the skeptical tradition lies in its development of the method of equipollence, of bringing equally plausible arguments on both sides of each issue into opposition with one another;” Buchner (1969: 52): “Gerade in diesem Flüssigmachen und Vernichten der vom Verstand absolut fixierten Gegensätze und d.h. Endlichkeiten besteht nun für den damaligen Hegel die Aufgabe des ‘ächten Skeptizismus’, der demgemäß zur Wahrheit des Absoluten selbst gehört und der es, wie Hegel im Skeptizismus-Aufsatz betont, eigentlich gar nicht mit dem sogenannte Zweifeln zu tun haben [...]”; Buchner (1969: 55): “[Der] sachlicher Ort [des Skeptizismus ist dies]: das Vernichten des Endlichen und seiner Fixierungen im Übergehen des Absoluten zu sich selbst.”

⁴⁸ VSP 234, 237.

“the rational aspect of the Five Modes is already in reason;” for like Philosophy, they too depict all (allegedly) absolute contents as being limited by their opposites.⁴⁹ (Such relation of opposition or contradiction is, for Hegel, also a ‘reflective’ one; this is why he says that the Five Modes “contain reflective concepts”).⁵⁰ They *must*, therefore, fail against Philosophy because what *they* do not deny, *it* also does not deny.

To make it absolutely clear: Hegel thinks that the Pyrrhonists are right when they affirm the presence of *contradictory* relations in the universe of rational discourse; yet, their ‘manifestation’ of the *impossibility* of resolving these contradictions does not work against speculative reason. Hegel believes that the *unification* of contradictories is immune to Pyrrhonism’s attack. He conceives this unification in such a way that it does *not* involve the elimination of contradiction *altogether*. For example, the proposition ‘God is the immanent cause of the world’ does not entail that the propositions ‘God is a cause’ and ‘God is an effect’ are false; or even that there is something nonsensical about this predication; for Hegel, it entails rather that they are *both* true.

What the unification eliminates is only a certain dimension of the phenomenon of contradiction, the *problematic* one. This is the dimension that exemplifies the *indifference* or *fixity* of the one contradictory against the other. As I understand it, this means that the problematic contradiction allows or even supports the possibility that the relation of the contradictories is resolvable *in favour of the one of them*. This is why Hegel believes that the ‘formal’ aspect of the law of non-contradiction is present here and that through this aspect it must be said to be false. In this way, Hegel seems to be claiming that the scientists whom the Pyrrhonists want to destroy, namely, the dogmatists, approach knowledge-acquisition the way they do because they cherish only the ‘formal’ aspect of the law of non-contradiction. This, for Hegel, means that they stick to the finite, to one-sidedness, to fixity, to “limited cognition.”⁵¹ It is this attitude that Pyrrhonism takes advantage of in order to destroy them—and, by contrast, it is because such fixity is missing from the rational that Pyrrhonism

⁴⁹ VSP 246: “Gegen den Dogmatismus sind diese Tropen darum vernünftig, weil sie gegen das Endliche des Dogmatismus das Entgegengesetzte, wovon er abstrahierte, auftreten lasse, also die Antinomie herstellen [...]”

⁵⁰ See, for example, VSP 235. For Hegel ‘whole and parts’, ‘cause and effect’, ‘one and many’, ‘essence and existence’, and so on, are “reflective concepts,” in the sense that the one refers immediately to the other (it is “reflected in the other”), but at the same time is the *contradictory* of the other.

⁵¹ VSP 250.

cannot destroy Philosophy. Simply, Philosophy ‘evolves’ from finitude to infinity, that is, from fixity to unification.⁵²

Note, however, that this does *not* mean that Hegel denies the validity of the law altogether—he does agree with those scientists and the Pyrrhonists that contradictions in the context of immediacy of the universe of discourse must be resolved for truth to reappear. It is just that, for him, this resolution involves—somehow—the *maintaining* of the contradiction in a special *unity* expressed by what he calls the “proposition of reason” (*Vernunftsatz*). It is this paradox and this notion of the *Vernunftsatz*, and especially its form as a ‘higher’ *Vernunftsatz*, that we need to clarify if we want to understand how exactly Hegel resolves the Pyrrhonian problematic.

2.6. Conclusion

In his essay *The Relation of Scepticism to Philosophy* Hegel proposes to resolve the Pyrrhonian problematic by abandoning the idea of grounding absolute truth-claims and introducing the idea of unifying contradictory truth-claims in a ‘higher’ truth-claim-of-reason. The notion of a ‘higher truth-claim’, however, requires further elucidation. All one learns from the essay is that the ‘higher’ truth-claim can be analysed into a group of contradictory judgements, to wit, the ones which it unites. But its simple characterization as the *unity* of contradictories says nothing to help us distinguish it from that state of affairs which denotes a simple *conjunction* of contradictories. True, the Pyrrhonist can *no longer* ‘make manifest’ that such conjunction in the sphere of reason results necessarily in the abandonment of scientific inquiry, but this has now been conditioned upon speculative reason’s being able to prove that a unity of contradictory truth-claims can occur which is not reducible to their simple conjunction. Otherwise, all Hegel has done is to have reinstated the problem itself.

⁵² VSP 240; VSP 243: “Auf diese völlige Trennung der Philosophien und das völlige Festwerden ihrer Dogmen und Unterscheidungen, sowie auf die nunmehrige Richtung des Skeptizismus teils gegen den Dogmatismus, teils gegen die Philosophie selbst, beziehen sich ganz allein die *späteren fünf Tropen* der Skeptiker, welche die eigentliche Rüstkammer ihrer Waffen gegen philosophische Erkenntnis ausmachen [...]” VSP 247: “Da also diese Tropen alle den Begriff eines Endlichen in sich schließen und sich darauf gründen, so geschieht durch ihre Anwendung auf das Vernünftige unmittelbar, daß sie dasselbe in ein Endliches verkehren, daß sie ihm, um es kratzen zu können, die Krätze der Beschränktheit geben.”

What can be deduced from the above is that the 'higher' truth-claim-of-reason, despite its being nothing but the 'unity' of contradictories, has a *content* that is qualitatively different from their simple conjunction. But how exactly does a content like this *emerge* in the universe of discourse? What *form* would it have? Would it still be possible to accommodate it in a *judgement* or should one invoke other forms of truth-claim? Is it not the case that for any judgement posited in the universe of discourse its negation immediately pops up therein, thus giving rise to relations of conflict? How would then this infinite *progression* fare better than the infinite *regression* of the dogmatist? To all these questions the essay *The Relation of Scepticism to Philosophy* offers no response.

Therefore, what one who is interested in finding out Hegel's resolution of the Pyrrhonian problematic should be looking for is the meaning and structure of what Hegel himself calls *the Vernunftsatz*—more specifically, the meaning and structure of the 'higher' *Vernunftsatz*. We need to know how it is possible to move from (a) a truth-claim-of-reason whose structure as a judgement forces it to be conjoined immediately with its negation to (b) a truth-claim-of-reason whose structure allows it to accommodate and express that conjunction in a *positive, non-problematic, truthful* manner. The explication of this meaning and structure will constitute what we will be calling *the theory of the Vernunftsatz*.

Since the possibility of resolution of conflict between truth-claims-of-reason has now been made dependent upon the formulation of the theory of the *Vernunftsatz*, this theory has acquired ontological significance: The success or failure of its formulation will determine the possibility or impossibility of scientific inquiry and thereby of knowledge of the truth of being. This means, though, that the propositions that will express the theory will be ontologically loaded, something that the Pyrrhonist will take advantage of—he will, that is, proceed to apply the Pyrrhonian problematic to the formulation of the theory.

Thus, the fact that the propositions that constitute the theory are ontologically loaded allows the Pyrrhonist to treat them as truth-claims. As a consequence, what the Pyrrhonist now expects is that the speculative philosopher will start positing truth-claims in the universe of discourse, stating what he believes to be the *Vernunftsatz*'s meaning and structure. But, the Pyrrhonist would argue, whatever it is that he would like to say, he would not be able to say it, since for any truth-claim he makes, its negation will immediately pop up in the universe of discourse.

In terms of *our* inquiry, what the speculative philosopher has until now accomplished is simply to have pointed out to the Pyrrhonist that, given

his own description of the problem, one could attempt to resolve a conflict in the sphere of reason not only by means of privileging and grounding, but also by means of unification. The crucial point has now been reached when the Pyrrhonist simply *waits to hear* what the concrete characterization of that possibility is. *Therefore, the immediate concern of the speculative philosopher is to provide this characterization in the sphere of reason without simply reinstating the Pyrrhonian problematic.* The result of such characterization should be a full-blooded theory of the *Vernunftsatz*, to wit, an account of how it is possible to move from that structure of the judgement which generates conflicts to a structure of it that transforms those conflicts into something positive, non-problematic and truthful.

The huge importance of the essay *The Relation of Scepticism to Philosophy* lies in that it makes it clear that Hegel envisions the resolution of the Pyrrhonian problematic in *linguistic* terms, that is, in terms of the *expression* of truth. He refers specifically to a 'proposition' (or 'judgement') whose presence facilitates—somehow—the transformation of a contradiction from a problematic, purely negative state of affairs to a non-problematic, positive one.

The idea of a unificatory *Vernunftsatz* reveals Hegel's idiosyncratic conception of the law of non-contradiction; for it follows from this idea that for Hegel the law is both true and false. He must regard it as true because the indifferent presence of the contradictories in the context of immediacy, a presence which polarizes (or 'fixes') their self-subsistence and thereby 'absolutizes' them, is taken by him to be a *problem*. In other words, the 'fixity' of the contradictories translates into an exclusive 'either-or': *either* the one *or* the other is true. In such a state of affairs their coexistence in the universe of discourse is deemed as problematic, as an element that must be overcome. But this is exactly what the law of non-contradiction affirms.

Yet, by dissociating the *solution* of this problem from the activities of privileging and grounding, and by associating it with the activity of unification, Hegel must regard the law as false. For the very content of the unification is the coexistence of contradictories.

The law of non-contradiction is true, for Hegel, in the context of *immediacy* of the universe of discourse—and this truth, as seen in the first chapter, derives directly from the minimal structure of that universe. The truth of the law prompts the escape from a situation of indifferent polarity or 'fixity'—a situation that, as explained, is catastrophic for scientific inquiry. On the other hand, the law's falsity enables the possibility of a 'progressive' solution to the problem; for what makes the idea of a

unificatory *Vernunftsatz* so appealing is that it does not dispense with the contradictories (and thereby simply posit another ‘problematic’ truth-claim in the context of immediacy of the universe of discourse), but it maintains them instead. So, the law is false, not in the context of immediacy of the universe of discourse, but rather in a context characterized by the *mediation* of the contradictories by a third, ‘higher’ judgement. It is the explanation of this context of mediation, in which the law of non-contradiction proves to be false, that is the focus of our study.

A final note: The present study, as a study that aims solely at resolving the Pyrrhonian problematic by means of the discovery and formulation of Hegel’s ‘theory of the *Vernunftsatz*’, may be in need of supplementation with a study that will investigate the possibility of a *regressive* solution to the Pyrrhonian problematic *by means of the Cartesian or the Kantian project*. For it seems that the Pyrrhonian argument did not consider the possibility that the truth-claim posited for the purpose of resolving a conflict might not have the character of an ontological claim, but rather the character of the subjectivist determination of the Cogito or of the starting-point of a transcendental argument. Indeed, it would seem that the presence of the first-person pronoun in such truth-claims makes it impossible that the positing of such truth-claims immediately generates a conflict.

Nevertheless, note that the success or failure of a Cartesian or Kantian resolution of the Pyrrhonian problematic would *not* endanger the success of an already proven progressive resolution. So, the success or failure of the Hegelian project does not really depend upon the success or failure of any of these two projects. The investigation of the possibility of a regressive resolution would be required only if one aspires to show that Hegel’s refutation of Pyrrhonian scepticism is the *only one* that is successful.

Yet, the decision whether to promote such a regressive resolution or to promote the progressive resolution which I have identified with Hegel’s project is absolutely crucial because *different pathways of philosophizing* are opened up in each case. On the one hand, the progressive path turns philosophy mainly into philosophy of language, philosophy of the logos. On the other hand, the regressive path opens up the spheres of transcendental psychology, philosophy of mind and philosophy of perception, which are seriously undervalued in Hegel’s speculative framework.

CHAPTER THREE

FORMS OF CONSCIOUSNESS

3.1. *Introduction*

The previous chapter concluded with the *suggestion* that Pyrrhonian scepticism can be refuted by *the cognitive standpoint of reason*—exemplified by speculative philosophy—because the truth-claims made from that standpoint can indeed be *proven*. This can be done precisely because the expression of truth from that standpoint involves a special judgement, or a special aspect of the judgement as such, represented by the notion of the *Vernunftsatz*, which designates—among other possible functions—the function of *unification* of contradictory judgements. Yet, this suggestion can be effective against Pyrrhonian scepticism only if it is accompanied by a *theory of judgement* which will explain how and in what sense the judgement can be a *Vernunftsatz*, namely, how and in what sense the judgement can perform the function of positive unification of contradictories. But, given the ontological significance assigned to this judgement, the Pyrrhonist would be satisfied only if the proposed theory of judgement is itself *proven*. Given the results of our discussion, such a proof can be provided only by means of positive unification of contradictory judgements. Thus, the resolution of the Pyrrhonian problematic requires (a) that a theory of judgement *emerges* from a process of unification of contradictory judgements and (b) that at least a part of this theory *the-matizes* such a process.

Before we examine how such a theory of judgement emerges in the corpus of speculative philosophy, we shall turn our attention to Hegel's Introduction to the *Phenomenology of Spirit* (hereafter referred to simply as 'the Introduction').¹ The reason for this move is as follows: One might argue that the successful formulation of the speculative theory of judgement would prove the truth-claims-of-reason only if the cognitive standpoint of reason was not *itself* entangled in conflicting relations with *other cognitive standpoints*. Simply, Hegel might be asked to justify his preference for

¹ PhdG 68–81.

the cognitive standpoint of reason over other *competing* cognitive standpoints. In my view, the phenomenological project, whose general structure is provided in the *Introduction*, takes itself to be addressing exactly this issue and finally justifying the claim that the cognitive standpoint of reason is the *scientific* cognitive standpoint. In the present chapter I discuss the phenomenological project with the aim of, firstly, clarifying its task and content and, secondly, evaluating its success.

Before I begin, let me emphasize that the chapter deals only with the *Introduction* to the *Phenomenology* and not with the text that follows it (namely, not with the content of the actualized forms of consciousness). Thus, whenever I refer to the phenomenological *project* or *movement* or *aim*, and so on, I will be referring to the abstract meaning these notions acquire through the *Introduction*. It is, of course, to be expected that what the *Introduction* describes should find an application and be verified in the main corpus of the *Phenomenology*. Yet, in the strange case that this does not happen (and this does not belong to my concerns here), the analysis provided in the present chapter will not be compromised.²

3.2. *Pyrrhonian Scepticism and the Phenomenological Problematic*

The *Introduction* determines the whole phenomenological project in terms of (a) a *sceptical problem* and (b) a peculiar *general criterion of truth* by reference to which that problem should be solved. First, the *problem*:³ There is a multiplicity of *self-proclaimed* cognitive standpoints on offer, namely general spheres of inquiry which explicitly *intend* to produce

² For a critique of this approach see Collins (2003: 73).

³ In fact, the *Introduction* refers to *two* sceptical problems: (a) to that which represents a kind of Cartesian or Kantian scepticism (PhdG 68–70) and (b) that which represents a kind of Pyrrhonian scepticism (PhdG 68, 71–72). In this chapter I will deal only with the second kind of scepticism. There is a reason why I ignore the first: Hegel completely ridicules this position, which he takes to be self-contradictory, in the sense that its very logical structure (the ‘medium-instrument’ structure) prevents it from achieving the aim it itself posits (namely, knowledge of truth); see esp. PhdG 68–69 (my emphasis): “Wir gebrauchen in beiden Fällen ein *Mittel*, welches *unmittelbar* das Gegenteil seines Zwecks hervorbringt; oder das Widersinnige ist vielmehr, daß wir uns überhaupt eines Mittels bedienen.” Hegel provides a knock down argument against this kind of scepticism in the first three pages of the *Introduction*. Since it seems that the phenomenological project could add nothing more to this argument in terms of effectiveness, the first kind of scepticism does not seem to be of much relevance to it.

knowledge of truth.⁴ From this entire multitude the speculative philosopher selects and posits the cognitive standpoint of *reason* or, what is now used synonymously, of *thought*, as the truly scientific standpoint, namely, the standpoint that *actually* produces knowledge of truth. Yet, since all those cognitive standpoints claim the scientific status for themselves, how does one *justify* one's selection, to wit, how does one prove that the cognitive standpoint of thought is indeed the scientific standpoint?⁵

⁴ The term 'knowledge of truth' is one that Hegel himself uses; see WL I 66. He defines the subject-matter of philosophy in the first sentence of the *Introduction* (PhdG 68); this is "die Sache selbst, nämlich [...] das wirkliche Erkennen dessen, was in Wahrheit ist." At the end of the same sentence he identifies "was in Wahrheit ist" with "das Absolute." Yet, one should be extremely careful not to attach a loaded significance to this term *at the beginning* of the phenomenological movement. In particular, one should not assign a *functional* role to it, in the sense that its (projected) meaning would direct or in any other way determine the development of the phenomenological movement. Indeed, "das Absolute" is at the beginning totally identical with "was in Wahrheit ist," which in its turn is initially absolutely devoid of any content. In other words, what there is in truth is, strictly speaking, *not known* at the beginning of the phenomenological project; it is only *assumed* or *suggested* that this is *thought* or *reason* and its *determinations*. It may be worth noting here that the mistake of identifying "was in Wahrheit ist" with a *loaded* significance of "das Absolute" *from the beginning* is quite common in discussions of Hegel's philosophy and that in most of them this attitude is supported by reference to the sentence "the true is the whole," found in the Preface to the *Phenomenology* (PhdG 24). Against this attitude one could simply point out that in its very *immediacy* this sentence is as true as its opposite! Cf. WL I 74; K. R. Westphal (2003: 8).

⁵ One asks this question because one is *interested* in *discovering* the scientific cognitive standpoint, which in the peculiar phenomenological framework means *selecting* it from a multiplicity of self-proclaimed cognitive standpoints. And one is *interested* in this act or event or process of selection because one associates it with the desire to arrive at *knowledge of truth*, the *scientific* cognitive standpoint. (Cf. Fichte (1797–1800: 5): "I write for readers for whom science and conviction still retain some meaning and who are themselves driven by a lively zeal to seek the same.") The problem is described in the context of Hegel's description of the medium-instrument model (PhdG 68): "Die Besorgnis scheint gerecht, [...] daß es verschiedene Arten der Erkenntnis geben, und darunter eine geschickter als eine andere zur Erreichung dieses Endzweckes sein möchte, hiermit durch falsche Wahl unter ihnen [...] Wolken des Irrtums statt des Himmels der Wahrheit erfaßt werden." It is of the utmost importance to note here that Hegel is *not* challenging the truth of the statement that follows the "daß." What he *does* challenge is the specific way the *medium-instrument* model goes about conceptualizing this problem (which in his opinion is utterly self-contradictory). The same holds for this statement (PhdG 68): "Die Besorgnis scheint gerecht, [...] daß, indem das Erkennen ein Vermögen von bestimmter Art und Umfange ist, ohne die genauere Bestimmung seiner Natur und Grenze Wolken des Irrtums statt des Himmels der Wahrheit erfaßt werden." Hegel never doubts (in the *Introduction*) that one should determine the nature and limits of the sphere or 'faculty' of knowledge; what he *does* doubt is the suggestion that this determination could be made *only* through the *medium-instrument* model. All those Hegel scholars and other philosophers who still believe that Hegelian philosophy completely ignores or neglects scepticism and/or epistemology and who base their judgement upon these two statements should pay particular attention to this point. (If they had done so, they would have avoided pompous

Importantly, the *Introduction* raises a second question alongside the first. It is concerned not only with justifying the cognitive standpoint of thought (period!), but also with proving that *no other* cognitive standpoint is a scientific standpoint.⁶ A specific reason is given for why this second question ('how does one show that no other cognitive standpoint than the one of thought is the scientific cognitive standpoint?') is asked. This is so because, given the actual existence of a multiplicity of self-proclaimed cognitive standpoints, one could simply select one of them and remain there, being convinced that one has selected a truly scientific standpoint, without ever moving oneself to the standpoint of thought. By refuting all cognitive standpoints *but the one of thought*, the phenomenological project would 'force', as it were, all genuine inquirers into truth to 'move' to the standpoint of thought.⁷

The combination of these two questions assigns a Pyrrhonian character to the problem the *Introduction* poses; for it puzzles not only over the possibility of justifying a cognitive standpoint (period!), but also over the possibility of justifiably *denying* the assignment of scientific status to those cognitive standpoints which are indeed non-scientific. Thus, the phenom-

titles like this one: *Beyond Epistemology: New Studies in the Philosophy of Hegel* (Weiss: 1974)!) For notable exceptions to this attitude see K. R. Westphal (2000), K. R. Westphal (2003), Forster (1989), Rockmore (1996), Rockmore (1997). See also PhdG 69: "Oder wenn die Prüfung des Erkennens, das wir als ein *Medium* uns vorstellen, und das Gesetz seiner Strahlenbrechung keinen lehrt, so nützt es ebenso nichts, sie im Resultate abzuziehen; denn nicht das Brechen des Strahls, sondern der Strahl selbst, wodurch die Wahrheit uns berührt, ist das Erkennen, und dieses abgezogen, wäre uns nur die reine Richtung oder der leere Ort bezeichnen worden." Note that the need for a "Prüfung des Erkennens" is not challenged in this passage (and this becomes absolutely clear in PhdG 75: *diese Darstellung als [...] Untersuchung und Prüfung der Realität des Erkennens vorgestellt*), only the need for a "Prüfung" of an "Erkennen, das wir als ein *Medium* uns vorstellen." The beginning of PhdG 70 also makes it clear that Hegel is attacking the medium-instrument model, not epistemology in general. The same can be said about the infamous passage in PhdG 69: "[...] Wenn die Besorgnis, in Irrtum zu geraten, ein Mißtrauen in die Wissenschaft setzt, welche ohne dergleichen Bedenklichkeiten ans Werk selbst geht und wirklich erkennt, so ist nicht abzusehen, warum nicht umgekehrt ein Mißtrauen in dies Mißtrauen gesetzt und besorgt werden soll, daß diese Furcht zu irren schon der Irrtum selbst ist." One should be *extremely* careful here *not* to understand this sentence as saying that we should not be interested in the possibility of error, that we should not have the "fear of error;" what Hegel is saying here is only that this "fear of error" must not translate into the 'fear of doing science'. In other words, the possibility of error does *not* entail the impossibility of science. But this does *not* mean that the possibility of error should not be thematized as a problem and solved within science.

⁶ Collins (2003: 85) disagrees with me on this point: "The *Phenomenology* does not [seek to] discredit ordinary phenomenal consciousness and justify Hegelian science as the only possible alternative."

⁷ Cf. Collins (2003: 73–74) and Forster (1998: 11–125).

enological problematic aims at *selecting* the scientific standpoint from a multitude of self-proclaimed cognitive standpoints by actively and justifiably *denying* the possibility that any cognitive standpoint other than the one of thought could be the scientific standpoint. The Pyrrhonist would then raise the question whether such a selection could ever be made 'in a legitimate way'. In our working framework, this could mean only one thing: How can the selection be made without giving rise to *the argument from the criterion of truth*?

Now, Hegel posits that the fundamental character of the cognitive standpoint of thought is 'the identity of knowing and being itself'; and that for the moment no other element whatsoever is ascribed to this standpoint. Simply, the cognitive standpoint of thought *is* the identity of knowing and being itself *and nothing else*. Consequently, the common characteristic of *all* those cognitive standpoints which *compete* with the cognitive standpoint of thought must be 'the non-identity of knowing and being itself'. Thus, there is a super cognitive standpoint, under which *each and every* cognitive standpoint other than the one of thought falls and which is fundamentally characterized by that non-identity. Hegel calls this super cognitive standpoint *consciousness* and each of its various manifestations *a form of consciousness*.

What has emerged is a state of affairs characterized by the equipollence between *consciousness* and *thought*. The phenomenological aim can, then, be more sharply determined as the proof that *thought* is the scientific cognitive standpoint, *not consciousness*. The Pyrrhonist would now inquire into the possibility of this proof, namely, into whether such a proof could be provided without giving rise to the argument from the criterion of truth.

3.3. *Cognitive Standpoints and Truth-Claims*

Before I examine how exactly the phenomenological project responds to the Pyrrhonian challenge, let me here note an important difference between the original Pyrrhonian problematic and the phenomenological one: While the latter is concerned directly with the truth of posited cognitive standpoints, the former is concerned directly with the truth of posited truth-claims.⁸ *It is crucial for our purposes to keep always in mind that for*

⁸ Cf. K. R. Westphal (2003: 44).

the original Pyrrhonian problematic to be resolved the truth of the cognitive standpoint that will emerge victorious from the phenomenological project should entail the truth of the truth-claims that are made from it.

This distinction can be made clearer if we note that the positing of thought and consciousness is not reducible to the positing of two truth-claims, although the positing of truth-claims is involved in each of them. Thought and consciousness are *cognitive standpoints*, general frameworks for the inquiry into truth, *not truth-claims*. When Hegel posits thought as the identity of knowing and being, he does not *characterize* an object or aspect of *what there is*; rather, he postulates the most general character of a certain framework for inquiry into the truth of what there is. Simply, such a positing informs us about the general character of the framework (or cognitive standpoint) within which (or from which) truth-claims are made; the framework itself is not a truth-claim. (And, of course, it is for this reason that the resolution of the Pyrrhonian problematic requires that the truth of the cognitive standpoint should entail the truth of the truth-claims that are made *from it*.)

Truth-claims that are made from the cognitive standpoint of thought or of consciousness have a certain character which they gain by being made from that standpoint. What that character exactly (or explicitly) is should become apparent through the *actual* positing of those truth-claims from that standpoint.

Thus, the phenomenological problematic can be determined even more sharply as follows: There is initially the *suggestion* that there exists a cognitive standpoint, thought or reason, which is fundamentally characterized by the identity of knowing and being, and that truth-claims made from *this* standpoint are indeed true. But then another *suggestion* is made, that there is another cognitive standpoint, consciousness, which is fundamentally characterized by the non-identity of knowing and being (and, therefore, is incompatible with the cognitive standpoint of thought), and that truth-claims made from this standpoint are the ones which are true. The problem of the *phenomenological project* is to discover which *one* of the two proposed cognitive standpoints (*which exhaust the domain of the notion of 'cognitive standpoint'*) can produce truth-claims that are indeed true.

3.4. *The General Structure of Consciousness*

As already noted, the *Introduction* not only defines the problem the phenomenological project has to solve; it also provides a peculiar gen-

eral criterion of truth by reference to which that solution should be achieved. Before, however, we see what the nature of this criterion is and how it avoids entangling itself in the argument from the criterion of truth, we shall say a bit more about the general character (or structure) of the cognitive standpoint of *consciousness*, which is the element that the phenomenological project thematizes. The reason for this move is that the general criterion derives *automatically* from the general character of consciousness.

As explained, the general character of consciousness is fundamentally determined by *the non-identity of knowing and being*. As such, it must be composed of *two*, initially quite *distinct*, fundamental elements, knowing and being. Since, however, consciousness is a *cognitive* standpoint (that is, it aspires to produce knowledge of the truth *of what there is*), its two constituents are, *in their distinctness*, inherently *related*. It is exactly through this inherent relation that *knowledge of truth* should emerge for consciousness.

So, consciousness, in general, 'refers', on the one hand, to *what there is, being*, the *object-of-knowing* (what Hegel calls *Gegenstand*), and, on the other hand, to *knowing* (what Hegel calls *Wissen* or, sometimes, *Begriff*). This 'reference' is made by means of *expressed views*, which are peculiar to the *form of consciousness* thematized. In other words, a specific characterization of the object-of-knowing and of knowing itself can only be made from a specific form of consciousness (and *not* from another).⁹ The views employed to characterize the object-of-knowing are ontological claims, namely, *truth-claims*, in the strong sense in which *we* use this expression. And the views employed to characterize knowing are *conditions for knowing* the form of consciousness' peculiar object-of-knowing; or, to put it differently, they are epistemological specifications of what it means to obtain or have *knowledge of truth*. If these two, simultaneously arising, aspects of the general structure of consciousness are put together (as they should), it becomes clear that in the phenomenological framework the fundamental epistemological claims that emerge automatically from a form of consciousness are necessarily, intrinsically and automatically accompanied by certain fundamental ontological claims (namely, *truth-claims*, in the strict, ontological sense of the word).

⁹ PhdG 78: "Entspricht sich in dieser Vergleichung beides nicht, so scheint das Bewußtsein sein Wissen ändern zu müssen, um es dem Gegenstande gemäß zu machen, aber in der Veränderung des Wissens ändert sich ihm in der Tat auch der Gegenstand selbst; denn das vorhandene Wissen war wesentlich ein Wissen von dem Gegenstande; mit dem Wissen wird auch er ein anderer, denn er gehörte wesentlich diesem Wissen an."

Consciousness, then, as a *cognitive standpoint*, denotes that generic framework for scientific inquiry in virtue of which an epistemological theory is necessarily accompanied by an ontological theory and the structure of the object-of-knowing exemplified by the latter is (somehow) inherently related to the knowing-conditions exemplified by the former. A *form of consciousness* is nothing but an actual and concrete manifestation of consciousness.¹⁰ The various forms of consciousness constitute the multiplicity of those cognitive standpoints which *compete* with the cognitive standpoint of thought for the status of the *scientific* cognitive standpoint.

3.5. *The General Criterion of Truth*

Given the above definition of consciousness, the general criterion of the truth of any form of consciousness is as follows: *Knowledge of truth can be said to occur—or a form of consciousness can be said to be true—when the knowing-conditions specified by the epistemological theory are satisfied by the object exemplified by the ontological theory that accompanies it; or when there is correspondence between them.*¹¹ Hegel's strategy against the Pyrrhonist is to show (a) that the positing of this general criterion does not succumb to the argument from the criterion of truth and (b) that all forms of consciousness fail to satisfy that criterion.¹² As soon as both (a) and (b) are actualized, the conflict between consciousness and thought will be resolved in favour of thought.

Note that it is not enough to show just (b); for if the positing of the general criterion was not shown to escape the argument from the criterion of truth, its application to a form of consciousness would no longer matter. We would not be able to either prove or disprove the standpoint of consciousness if the general criterion were a phoney one; and in this case, the equipollence between consciousness and thought would remain unresolved. (In fact, in such a case, the phenomenological project could not even begin.) This illustrates how serious Hegel was when he under-

¹⁰ PhdG 80.

¹¹ PhdG 74, 77, 78.

¹² Cf. K. R. Westphal (2003: 8): "Hegel repeatedly analyzes various 'certainties' in the *Phenomenology*. These certainties are antecedent convictions about what there is and how or whether we know what there is [...]. Hegel examines these 'certainties' in order to expose them as premature and at least somewhat erroneous convictions that, however insightful or informative, cannot ultimately be justified."

took the task of evaluating the scientific status of consciousness; for if he provided consciousness with a criterion that was immediately destroyed by the Pyrrhonian argument, that seriousness would immediately vanish.

So, how does Hegel argue for (a)? The general criterion derives directly from the fundamental characterization of consciousness. For (i) consciousness denotes a self-proclaimed *cognitive* standpoint and, therefore, its very existence depends on its proving that it can produce *knowledge of truth*; (ii) its general structure consists of the *necessary* relation between some knowing-conditions and an (ontologically explicated) object-of-knowledge; and (iii) to suppose that the explicated object does *not* satisfy the posited knowing-conditions is nothing but to suppose that consciousness *fails* to achieve knowledge of truth. In this sense, the formulation of the general criterion simply makes explicit what is implicit in the fundamental characterization of consciousness. As Stephen Houlgate puts it, “since consciousness distinguishes in this way between its own knowledge of the object and the object itself, it *cannot but* ask itself whether these two elements always *correspond* to each other.”¹³

So, the general criterion of the truth of consciousness is not really an immediate positing; rather, it derives directly from the positing of the cognitive standpoint of consciousness itself. But this exactly means that its negation *cannot* be posited immediately (or freely) in the universe of discourse. For such a negation would be asking for the vanishing of *consciousness*, which would have the immediate effect of the vanishing of *the equipollence between consciousness and thought*. This, of course, is not something the Pyrrhonist wishes for, since his goal is the *maintenance* of the conflict, not its immediate resolution. Thus, the general criterion does not succumb to the argument from the criterion of truth, because without the positing of a negative truth-claim in the context of immediacy of the universe of discourse this argument cannot take off.

I think the Pyrrhonist has to accept this argument and, therefore, has to accept the validity of the general criterion. Yet, one might still argue that the phenomenological project is doomed from the beginning because one could immediately negate the *truth-claims* made by a form of consciousness. It is the great virtue of the phenomenological project, however, that this possibility is excluded by the general character of consciousness. This is so because the truth-claims made (that is, the posited ontological

¹³ Houlgate (2006: 149).

theory) are inherently *bound* to some specific knowing-conditions (the posited epistemological theory): Since the knowing-conditions are such-and-such, the truth-claims made are *necessarily* so-and-so. Thus, the fundamental truth-claims a form of consciousness makes cannot be immediately negated in the universe of discourse, for in such a case one would have to negate also the knowing-conditions. The latter, though, are *not* truth-claims and, therefore, given our working framework, cannot be immediately negated.

On the whole, Hegel seems to be very serious and honest in his projected examination of the truth of consciousness, for he provides it with a general criterion of truth which (a) does not succumb to the argument from the criterion of truth and (b), if successful, establishes the truth of certain fundamental truth-claims. Thus, the phenomenological movement begins with the real prospect that consciousness could indeed produce knowledge of truth and, therefore, resolve the Pyrrhonian problematic *from within its own domain*. Clearly, a problem arises in this instance; for, if truth could emerge in this way, the *negation of thought* does not seem to be needed anymore. Surely, this makes the phenomenological aim quite suspect, since it casts doubt upon the *necessity* of the relation between (a) the resolution of the super-*equipollence* we specified at the beginning and (b) the establishment of truth. However, let us for the moment put this problem aside.

3.6. *Satisfaction and the 'Mere Being' of a Form of Consciousness*

Having shown that the general criterion does not succumb to the Pyrrhonian argument from the criterion of truth, we can now focus on the notion of *satisfaction* (or *correspondence*) that is at play therein. There are two questions we should raise: What would it mean for the object-of-knowing to *fail* to satisfy the knowing-conditions specified by a form of consciousness? And what would it mean for it to *satisfy* such knowing-conditions? If the phenomenological problematic is to be resolved in favour of thought (which is the aim of the phenomenological project), the answer to these questions should be such that it would enable the privileging of thought over consciousness.

These questions cannot be given a viable response from within the context of immediate positing. This would simply say that the truth-claims of a form of consciousness are true just because this form of consciousness exists; that the object-of-knowing satisfies the knowing-conditions just

because the form of consciousness has a presence. There are two problems here: *Firstly*, in such a case the question of non-satisfaction would not even arise; for each and every form of consciousness posits itself as true, namely, *as if* its object-of-knowing does *indeed* satisfy the knowing-conditions. Yet, this means there is no way to determine whether such satisfaction actually takes place or not. A false form of consciousness would still appear as true in the context of immediacy. *Secondly*, if consciousness' appeal to truth rests solely on its sheer presence, thought can also appeal to its own presence as the proof of its truth. This means, however, that in the context of immediacy the equipollence between consciousness and thought would remain unresolved; and, therefore, the phenomenological project would be unable to fulfil its aim.¹⁴

Our problem has now become clearer: What context *other than the context of immediate positing* (to wit, other than the 'mere being' of a form of consciousness) would enable us to discover whether a form of consciousness is true or not, namely, whether the object-of-knowing satisfies the specified knowing-conditions or fails to do so?

3.7. *Phenomenological Experience*

To the above question the *Introduction* gives a specific answer: It is only when a form of consciousness is placed in the context of its own *experience* that the evaluation of its content (i.e. the evaluation of the satisfaction-relation) becomes possible. Instead of trying to evaluate forms of consciousness by considering only their sheer presence (an enterprise doomed to failure), one should observe the experience generated when a certain epistemological theory (namely, some knowing-conditions) *applies* itself to the peculiar object-of-knowing; or, simply, when a form of consciousness *actually* attempts to *prove* that it can acquire knowledge of its peculiar object.¹⁵

¹⁴ PhdG 71.

¹⁵ PhdG 75 (my emphasis): "[...] Die Prüfung besteht in dem *Anlegen* eines angemessenen Maßstabes, und in der *sich ergebenden* Gleichheit oder Ungleichheit dessen, was geprüft wird [...]." Note here, *extremely importantly*, that this character of proof is *not* denied by Hegel in the phenomenological framework (there is *absolutely no evidence* that he does that). He is rather trying to give an answer to the question how such proof can be realized given that a form of consciousness cannot be *immediately* judged to be true. On the notion of 'active proof' see K. R. Westphal (1989: 105, 108–109, 117, 119).

The generated experience determines the status of a form of consciousness in the following way. If the form of consciousness which undergoes the experience *retains* its epistemological and ontological views through it, then the object-of-knowing does indeed satisfy the knowing-conditions and, therefore, this form of consciousness is indeed *science*. Yet, if through this experience its views (and, accordingly, its object-of-knowing) are *transformed*, the former knowing-conditions have proven not to have been satisfied by the object-of-knowing and, therefore, the search for science must *continue*.¹⁶

The appeal to the notion of experience improves upon the appeal to the 'mere being' of a form of consciousness: *One could now envisage the possibility of a form of consciousness proving to itself and us, in an intrinsic and immanent manner, that its claim to science is justified; or, indeed, that it is not*. Significantly, the explication of the satisfaction-relation in terms of experience still keeps the Pyrrhonist at bay. This is so because the notion of 'experience' denotes nothing but what remains after the collapse of proof-as-the-positing-of-the-*mere-being*-of-a-form-of-consciousness.

Experience as a proof derives directly from the general character of consciousness; it designates simply the *interaction* between the knowing-conditions and the explicated object-of-knowing. Such an interaction (or *active* proof) is what remains after the *passive* (or *static*) state of affairs associated with the simple presence of a form of consciousness has been removed. Of course, since this notion derives directly from the general character of consciousness, it cannot be immediately negated, as I have already explained. In this way, the Pyrrhonian argument cannot be applied to the employment of this notion.

There is one more important point that needs to be made here. The involvement of the element of experience in the satisfaction-relation of the general criterion of truth makes it clear that the fulfilment or non-

¹⁶ The technical notion of experience (*Erfahrung*) is first mentioned in PhdG 72. See also PhdG 78–79 and PhdG 80. Hegel seems to understand *experience* more as a *negative* result or process, in the sense that it always leads to or takes the shape of *content-transformation*. Yet, if the latter is to be a sign of *untruth* (cf. PhdG 79) or, less strongly, of *deficiency* or *inadequacy*, then the very core of experience must necessarily include also the possibility of *non-transformation*. Hegel is not saying just that consciousness experiences itself; he is saying more specifically that it experiences itself *and that through this experience it proves to itself and us that it has been deficient or untrue*; this means, as far as I can see, that experience is meant to function as a *criterion of truth*. Collins (2003: 77, 78, 81) objects to this argument; she thinks that Hegel does *not* hold the belief that content-transformation (or what she calls "self-contradiction") is a sign of untruth.

fulfilment of the latter would emerge only from and be applicable only to that form of consciousness whose scientific status is currently under self-examination. No external factors could possibly influence such an experience by providing criteria of truth.¹⁷ For, in this case, the Pyrrhonist would be able to attack each one of these criteria and the whole enterprise would collapse.

Thus, the introduction of the element of experience in the phenomenological problematic makes it even more explicit than before that the manner in which the general criterion is fulfilled is *totally internal* to a form of consciousness.¹⁸ Now, nothing has been said so far to *exclude* the possibility of a form of consciousness' satisfying the general criterion through its unique and totally internal experience. *This is a problem because it hinders the privileging of thought over consciousness* (which is, if you recall, the aim of the phenomenological project). Therefore, Hegel will seek to make the necessary moves to ensure that the employment of the element of experience in the phenomenological project does indeed manage, undogmatically and unproblematically, to privilege the cognitive standpoint of thought over the cognitive standpoint of consciousness.

3.8. *Transformation of Content and the Ordered Series of the Forms of Consciousness*

Let me first clarify a bit more what is minimally involved in the conceptual relation between *satisfaction* (or *correspondence*) and *experience*. The explication of this relation has been made in terms of *transformation* or *non-transformation of content*, that is, in terms of the transformation or

¹⁷ PhdG 74, 76. Cf. WL II 250: "Die wahrhafte Widerlegung muß in die Kraft des Gegners eingehen und sich in den Umkreis seiner Stärke stellen; ihn außerhalb seiner selbst zu behalten, wo er nicht ist, fördert die Sache nicht."

¹⁸ PhdG 77: "[...] Das Wesentliche aber ist, dies für die ganze Untersuchung festzuhalten, daß diese Momente, *Begriff* und *Gegenstand*, *Für-ein-Anderes*- und *An-sich-selbst-Sein*, in das Wissen [d.h. in eine Gestalt des Bewußtseins], das wir untersuchen, selbst fallen, und hiermit wir nicht nötig haben, Maßstäbe mitzubringen, und *unsere* Einfälle und Gedanken bei der Untersuchung zu applizieren; dadurch, daß wir diese weglassen, erreichen wir es, die Sache, wie sie *an* und *für sich* selbst ist, zu betrachten;" PhdG 77: "Aber nicht nur nach dieser Seite, daß *Begriff* und *Gegenstand*, der Maßstab und das zu Prüfende, in dem Bewußtsein selbst vorhanden sind, wird eine Zutat von uns überflüssig, sondern wir werden auch der Mühe der Vergleichung beider und der eigentlichen Prüfung überhoben, so daß, indem das Bewußtsein sich selbst prüft, uns auch von dieser Seite nur das reine Zusehen bleibt."

non-transformation of the two fundamental aspects of the self-examined form of consciousness (knowing-conditions and the explicated object-of-knowing). If in the active attempt of a form of consciousness to prove its content, namely, in its experience of itself, its epistemological and ontological views *transform* themselves (that is, if through its own activity a form of consciousness finds itself having *different* or *modified* epistemological and ontological views as opposed to the ones it had initially projected), then its content has been refuted and the object-of-knowing has been shown to *not* satisfy the knowing-conditions.¹⁹ In this case the object-of-knowing has been proven *non-responsive* to the knowing-conditions specified by that form of consciousness.²⁰ On the other hand, if in the process of experience those views prove *resilient* to transformation, the content of the form of consciousness in question will have indeed been verified; namely, it will have been proven that the object-of-knowing does indeed satisfy the posited knowing-conditions. In this case, the object-of-knowing will prove to be *responsive* to the peculiar knowing-conditions and, therefore, the form of consciousness under examination will prove to be scientific in nature (i.e. productive of knowledge of truth).²¹

As soon as this conceptual relation between satisfaction and experience has been clarified, there arises the pressing question whether consciousness has transformative or non-transformative content. Clearly, there is only one way to find this out, by stepping back and observing the experience of the self-examined consciousness. This observation reveals the following:

- (1) Each self-examined form of consciousness proves—through its own experience—to have a transformative content.
- (2) The refutation of a form of consciousness does not result in nothingness; rather, a new content—and, therefore, a new form of consciousness—arises from it.²²

¹⁹ Hegel describes the process of content-transformation in quite a detail (PhdG 76–80). For an excellent analysis of this issue see K. R. Westphal (1989: 100–128).

²⁰ Cf. K. R. Westphal (1989: 109, 119) and K. R. Westphal (2003: 41).

²¹ Cf. Houlgate (2005: 55–56): “For all we know at the start, we might begin with sense-certainty, find that its object proves in experience to be exactly what it initially appears to be, and so discover nothing in consciousness that would move us on to the standpoint of absolute knowing.” Here Houlgate, consciously or unconsciously, takes experience to be a criterion of truth.

²² PhdG 73: “Die Darstellung des nicht wahrhaften Bewußtseins in seiner Unwahrheit [ist] nicht eine bloß *negative* Bewegung.”

- (3) The new form of consciousness contains, besides elements that are peculiar to it, elements found in those forms of consciousness whose refutation has come to produce it. In this instance, some elements present in the refuted content are said to have been *sublated* (or *incorporated*) in the content that has newly emerged. (Hegel says that what survives the refutation in this way is what the refuted form of consciousness had “true in itself.”)²³
- (4) The beginning with the most minimal form consciousness could have (“sense-certainty”) proves to generate *an ordered series of forms of consciousness*.²⁴ The relation between the ordered forms is one of *necessity*.²⁵ This is so for two reasons: (a) *no external factors* are involved in the generation of one form from another; and (b) the self-examined form of consciousness, being a *cognitive* standpoint and, therefore, being fundamentally determined by the *intention* to prove itself productive of knowledge of truth, exhausts *all* possibilities before it negates itself—this exactly means that the emerged content could *not* be other than the one it is.
- (5) Finally, the ordered series of forms of consciousness that comprises the phenomenological corpus culminates in (namely, *gives rise to*) a

²³ PhdG 74: “Das Nichts ist aber nur, genommen als das Nichts dessen, woraus es herkömmt, in der Tat das wahrhafte Resultat; es ist hiermit selbst ein *bestimmtes* und hat einen *Inhalt*.” PhdG 79: “Dieser neue Gegenstand enthält die Nichtigkeit des ersten, er ist die über ihn gemachte Erfahrung,” PhdG 79: “Er ist [...] dies in der Tat auch derselbe Umstand, von welchem oben schon in Ansehung des Verhältnisses dieser Darstellung zum Skeptizismus die Rede war, daß nämlich das jedesmalige Resultat, welches sich an einem nicht wahrhaften Wissen ergibt, nicht in ein leeres Nichts zusammenlaufen dürfte, sondern notwendig als Nichts desjenigen, dessen Resultat es ist, aufgefasst werden müsse; ein Resultat, welches das enthält, was das vorhergehende Wissen Wahres an ihm hat.” Cf. Houlgate (2005: 54) and Lauer (2005: 45).

²⁴ Hegel speaks of consciousness’ “journey to true knowledge or science” (*der Weg des natürlichen Bewußtseins, das zum wahren Wissen dringt; die ausführliche Geschichte der Bildung des Bewußtseins selbst zur Wissenschaft*) (PhdG 72) and understands this journey as being “the series of the forms [or shapes] of consciousness” (*die Reihe der Gestaltungen des Bewußtseins*) (PhdG 73) or “the series of the forms [or shapes] of the soul” (*die Reihe der Gestaltungen der Seele*) (PhdG 72). In PhdG 73 and PhdG 74 he speaks of “Fortgang” (progress) and “Zusammenhang” (interconnection) among the forms of consciousness; and in PhdG 79–80 the interconnection between the forms of consciousness is described as “the series of the experiences of consciousness” (*die Reihe der Erfahrungen des Bewußtseins*).

²⁵ It is because of this feature of ‘necessity’ that the phenomenological movement is, misleadingly, characterized as ‘science’; see PhdG 80: “Durch diese Notwendigkeit ist dieser Weg zur Wissenschaft selbst schon *Wissenschaft*, und nach ihrem Inhalte nach hiermit *Wissenschaft der Erfahrung des Bewußtseins*.” See also PhdG 73: “Die Vollständigkeit der Formen des nicht realen Bewußtseins wird sich durch die Notwendigkeit des Fortgangs und Zusammenhangs selbst ergeben.”

content which negates the very general character of consciousness itself, for it affirms the identity of knowing and being. This content is what Hegel calls “absolute knowing.”²⁶

Note, firstly, that none of the above is susceptible to the Pyrrhonian attack, since they all arise from the simple, uninvolved observation of the experience of consciousness. They are not principles one posits from outside of the domain of consciousness. Secondly, given (a) that the process of self-examination begins with the most minimal form consciousness could have, (b) that the generated series of forms of consciousness is necessary, and (c) that this series culminates in a content that refutes consciousness, the phenomenological project proves that the examined series consists of *all* forms of consciousness.²⁷ Thirdly, since any emerged content incorporates elements from the contents out of which it has arisen, it must be the case that the final content, ‘absolute knowing’, is in itself *rich*—despite the fact that its general character is diametrically opposed to the general character of consciousness.²⁸

(It is sometimes argued that the series of the forms of consciousness presented in the phenomenological project is *historically conditioned*—to wit, that it just ‘mirrors’, in a phenomenological manner, actual (namely, empirical) historical events or states of affairs—and that, therefore, this project can never be completed, in the sense that there will always be new forms of consciousness, which should be actively shown to have transformative content. In short, speculative philosophy will never free itself from phenomenology. I disagree with this claim completely. Hegel is very clear that the forms of consciousness are logical exemplifications of the structure of consciousness and, therefore, are not in themselves historically conditioned. But independently of Hegel’s own assertions and assurances, the three unproblematic facts specified in the previous paragraph exclude

²⁶ Cf. WL I 17, 42, 44, 60; PhdG 80–8, 582–583, 589; Houlgate (1998a: 56–63).

²⁷ Hegel describes the phenomenological ‘journey’ as the “*ausführliche Geschichte der Bildung des Bewußtseins selbst zur Wissenschaft*” (PhdG 73), the “*sich auf den ganzen Umfang des erscheinenden Wissens richtende Skeptizismus*” (PhdG 73), the “*vollständige Erfahrung der Seele*” (PhdG 72), the “*sich vollbringende Skeptizismus*” (PhdG 72), the “*vollständige Reihe der Gestalten [des Bewußtseins]*” (PhdG 74), and the “*ganze Folge der Gestalten des Bewußtseins in ihrer Notwendigkeit*” (PhdG 79–80).

²⁸ How a rich content emerges from the phenomenological movement is explained masterfully by K. R. Westphal (1989: chapters 8 and 9). For a discussion of the problematic relation between the rich content that emerges from the dialectic of consciousness and “absolute knowing” see Collins (2003: 75ff.).

the possibility that a new form of consciousness can appear whose content could be non-transformative. Of course, new forms of consciousness do appear; yet, these are *necessarily* reducible to one or another of the forms of consciousness presented in the phenomenological project. So, yes, phenomenology will still be performed after the completion of the phenomenological project, but it will have a completely different character than the latter. Its aim will no longer be to present the experience of consciousness, how a form of consciousness *gives rise* to another (*horizontal phenomenology*), but to *reduce* a form of consciousness to a more primordial one, to one that has *already* presented and refuted itself in the phenomenological series (*vertical phenomenology*).²⁹

The phenomenological project proves, then, that *all* forms of consciousness have transformative content and that, therefore, none satisfies the general criterion of truth. In this way the cognitive standpoint of consciousness has to collapse. So, it seems that the super-equipollence between consciousness and thought has been resolved in favour of thought, in the sense that consciousness has now lost its self-proclaimed scientific status and thought no longer stands in opposition to consciousness. Does this mean that the phenomenological aim has been fulfilled? And does it mean that the original Pyrrhonian problematic has been resolved? The first would be the case only if the resolution of the equipollence entailed the *truth* of the cognitive standpoint of thought (namely, if it *justified* it). And the second would be the case only if the isolation of the cognitive standpoint of thought entailed the truth of the *truth-claims* that are made from it. In the final section I argue that neither of these two conditions holds and that, therefore, both of our questions must be answered in the negative.

²⁹ K. R. Westphal (2003: 46) disagrees with me on this point: "Since Hegel published the *Phenomenology* in 1807, a wide range of new theories of knowledge have been developed, along with new variants of older theories of knowledge. All of these must be carefully considered in order to reassess and so far as possible preserve, or if need be diminish the justification of an epistemology, whether Hegel's or any other." What I am saying is that the project of the *Phenomenology*, if internally successful, has nothing to fear from any 'new theories of knowledge'. Westphal continues by claiming that "Hegel's epistemology and its attendant meta-epistemology require of us *lots* of intensive homework," in the sense that the Hegelian phenomenologist should consider each "new theory of knowledge" and try to show why it is deficient. In my opinion, Westphal is utterly mistaken here if he identifies this "intensive homework" with "horizontal phenomenology" (which is the only phenomenology that could pose a threat to the establishment of the scientific cognitive standpoint).

3.9. *Truth and the Isolation of the Cognitive Standpoint of Thought*

According to the preceding argument, the cognitive standpoint of consciousness collapses because each of its forms fails to satisfy the undogmatic general criterion of truth. The element of correspondence or non-correspondence that comprises the heart of this general criterion has been exemplified in terms of the undogmatic element of experience. The latter (a) refers to the *active interaction* between the two fundamental constituents of a form of consciousness, namely knowing-conditions (epistemological theory) and the explicated object-of-knowing (ontological theory), and (b) is *totally internal* to the form of consciousness under examination. This means that whether a form of consciousness is true or false depends *solely* upon the results of its own experience. Yet, this exactly means that the question of the truth or falsity of consciousness has nothing to gain from the resolution of the equipollence between consciousness and thought. But if the resolution of the equipollence cannot determine the truth or falsity of the one part of the equipollence, it is necessarily the case that it also cannot determine the truth or falsity of the other part. Consequently, the collapse of the cognitive standpoint of consciousness does not entail the truth of (i.e. does not justify) the cognitive standpoint of thought and, therefore, the phenomenological project has failed to fulfil its aim.

The only possible objection to this argument is to claim that the experience of consciousness does not suffice for the determination of its truth; that for its truth to be determined one needs to determine also the truth of thought. Yet, this objection is hugely problematic; for, given (a) that the element of experience derives undogmatically from the general character of consciousness and (b) that the proposed additional criterion does not do the same, consciousness is entitled to refuse to accept this second criterion. But this exactly means that a new equipollence will emerge that involves the second criterion of truth and its negation and, therefore, that the Pyrrhonian problematic will in this instance re-emerge.

This state of affairs, however, is invalidly constructed. Since the general criterion of truth (a) derives directly from the notion of consciousness and (b) does not involve the determination of the truth of thought, neither the Pyrrhonist nor anyone else has the right to involve this determination in the determination of the truth of consciousness. Thus, the re-emergence of the Pyrrhonian problematic is immediately destroyed. (Things might get complicated if one suggests that the experience of consciousness *contains* the feature of determining the latter's truth via the determina-

tion of the truth of thought. But this is a ridiculous suggestion, for such a feature does not derive undogmatically from the general character of consciousness.)

Now, while one certainly has to agree that the phenomenological project has failed to establish the truth of the cognitive standpoint of thought *directly*, one might argue that it has not failed to do so *indirectly*. Note, *firstly*, that the actual self-refutation of consciousness has not resulted in a nullity, but rather in the *isolation* of the cognitive standpoint of thought. Since, as already explained, consciousness and thought *exhaust* the domain of the 'cognitive standpoint', this isolation has the significance of the cognitive standpoint of thought's acquiring the status of the only possible scientific cognitive standpoint. *Secondly*, the self-refutation of consciousness produced a content, 'absolute knowing', whose general character is identical with the one of thought (namely, identity of knowing and being); therefore, "absolute knowing" should be identified with the cognitive standpoint of thought. *Thirdly*, "absolute knowing", and hence the cognitive standpoint of thought, is a *rich* content, for, as already explained, it contains all those 'truthful' determinations that have been 'transferred' to the final stage of the phenomenological movement.

The suggestion is this: Since the only possible scientific cognitive standpoint is the one of thought and since it has been proven that this standpoint has an extremely rich content, why do we not just declare this standpoint and its content as true? Since consciousness has collapsed, one surely could just posit this rich content and assert it as true! Since there remain no other candidates for science, it has to be the case that the sheer positing of a content that is irreducible to a form of consciousness must be enough to guarantee its scientific status!

Unfortunately, this suggestion fails because the simple presence—the 'mere being'—of this isolated rich content does not entail its truth. There are two reasons why this is so. *Firstly*, the rich content has emerged through the internal proof (the experience) of *consciousness*; since it is no longer part of consciousness, it cannot be said that its truth is *proven*.³⁰

³⁰ Note at this point that the truth of 'absolute knowing' cannot be proven through any *further* 'experience' or 'internal proof'—these notions understood as they appeared in our discussion, to wit, in terms of consciousness—for the simple reason that it is no longer fundamentally characterized by the relation between certain epistemological conceptions and a distinct, ontologically explicated object-of-knowing. This is the mistake that Kenneth Westphal makes, who conceives the end of the phenomenological project as exemplifying a form of consciousness whose content has (or can be) fallibilistically proven to be non-transformative; see, for example, K. R. Westphal (1989: 110).

Indeed, we really do not know what truth-status this content would have if it were considered within the framework of *thought*. Thus, it has to be, somehow, shown what truth-status the rich content would have when examined from a cognitive standpoint whose general character is determined by the *identity* of knower and the known,³¹ of epistemology and ontology. Such rich content therefore, cannot *simply* be posited as true.³²

Secondly, and more importantly for our purposes, as soon as consciousness collapses, the darkness of Pyrrhonian scepticism returns to haunt the new state of affairs. For since the truth-claims made from the cognitive standpoint of thought, namely, the truth-claims that constitute the rich content, are no longer *bound* to a *distinct* epistemological theory, nothing prevents the positing of their negations in the context of *immediacy* of the universe of discourse. *Indeed, recall that Pyrrhonian scepticism has been developed from within a framework which was not characterized by any distinction between knower and the known, between knowing and its object, between epistemology and ontology; the Pyrrhonist does not assume that "understanding being properly is [...] a matter of gaining 'access' to being that is other than [thought], of gaining the right 'perspective' on being, or of building the right 'bridge' between [thought] and being."*³³ Thus, the fact that we are now embedded in a cognitive standpoint whose nature is determined by the identity of those elements says absolute nothing against the Pyrrhonist.³⁴ Therefore, the *Science of Logic*, which will seek to prove the truth of the emerged rich content from within the framework of 'the identity of the knower and the known', must once more battle against

³¹ The phrase "the identity of knower and the known" is borrowed from Houlgate (1998a: 62).

³² This, of course, implies the 'reworking' of the phenomenological movement, of the content of the experience of consciousness. Cf. Houlgate (1998a: 64–65): "At the end of the PhdG, phenomenological knowing shows that consciousness cannot sustain the idea that being is something other than it and so has to come to understand the true nature of being to be disclosed within thought. Phenomenological absolute knowing thus shows that consciousness itself must become absolute knowing in its full, logical–ontological sense." This, however, does *not* mean that "the *Phenomenology* does not discredit ordinary phenomenal consciousness," as Collins (2003: 85) claims.

³³ Houlgate (1998a: 58).

³⁴ In Houlgate (1998a: 65) Houlgate says that the phenomenological knowing has demonstrated the "necessity" of absolute knowing. This statement is correct as long as "necessity" is not here identified with 'truth'. This is exactly the mistake Hegel himself seems to make in WL I 67 (my emphasis): "Die Logik hat insofern die Wissenschaft des erscheinenden Geistes zu ihrer Voraussetzung, welche die Notwendigkeit *und damit den Beweis der Wahrheit* des Standpunkts, der das reine Wissen ist, wie dessen Vermittlung überhaupt enthält und aufzeigt." This statement is a 'mistake' exactly because 'absolute knowing' is necessary, but—given the two reasons just specified—not yet true.

Pyrrhonian scepticism and explicitly make a case against the effectiveness of the argument from the criterion of truth.

3.10. Conclusion

In this chapter I have shown that the phenomenological project does not resolve the Pyrrhonian problematic, because it does not fulfil its aim, which is to prove that the cognitive standpoint of thought is the standpoint of science (to wit, productive of knowledge of truth).³⁵ All it has proven is merely that the cognitive standpoint of thought (or reason) is the only *possible* scientific cognitive standpoint. For this possibility to become actuality one must show how exactly the truth-claims that are posited from that standpoint—namely, the rich content—can escape the trap of Pyrrhonian scepticism. In my view, this is an enterprise undertaken and successfully completed in the corpus of speculative logic, developed in Hegel's *Science of Logic*.

Yet, the fact that the phenomenological project does not resolve the Pyrrhonian problematic does not mean it has no value. It has an enormous value as a *propaedeutic* enterprise,³⁶ because it shows in a concrete and effective manner why the cognitive standpoint of thought *must* be taken into account by those who strongly and genuinely desire to acquire knowledge of truth. In other words, it manages to shake our faith in the cognitive standpoint of consciousness, “liberate” us from it,³⁷ and direct our mind's eye to the cognitive standpoint of thought.³⁸

The phenomenological project has been developed because Hegel's positing of the cognitive standpoint of thought as the standpoint of science requires justification. This project was meant to provide such justification by resolving the equipollence between consciousness and thought in favour of thought. In the present chapter I have tried to show that the resolution of this equipollence has nothing to do with the issue of justifying the positing of the cognitive standpoint of thought as the scientific cognitive standpoint: For the isolation of the cognitive standpoint of thought would not prove anything for or against the truth-claims that are

³⁵ This goes against Kenneth Westphal, who believes that the *Phenomenology* does indeed refute Pyrrhonian scepticism; see K. R. Westphal (1998).

³⁶ Cf. Gabler (1827: 11ff.); Pöggeler (1993a); Hösle (1998: 58ff.).

³⁷ WL I 43, 60, 67–68.

³⁸ Cf. Lau (2004: 68–76).

made from it. Thus, if one wants to find out whether Hegel is justified in his positing of the cognitive standpoint of thought as the standpoint of science, one has absolutely nothing to gain by referring to and examining the *Phenomenology of Spirit*.³⁹

³⁹ Houlgate (1998a: 65) seems to disagree: "The only way philosophy can avoid begging the question against contemporary consciousness is by examining the internal consistency of ordinary consciousness itself and seeing whether philosophy's position is necessitated by such consciousness." Cf. Fichte (1797–1800: 5): "[...] My system can be evaluated only on its own terms and cannot be judged by the principles of any other philosophy. It only has to agree with itself. It can be explained only by itself, and it can be proven—or refuted—only on its own terms. One must either accept it completely or reject it in its entirety."

CHAPTER FOUR

THE BEGINNING OF SCIENCE

4.1. Introduction

The last chapter concluded that the phenomenological movement culminates in ‘absolute knowing’ (or, as is now also called, “pure knowing”),¹ a structure that fundamentally characterizes the cognitive standpoint of ‘thought’ or ‘reason’. This structure consists of two main elements: (a) a rich content and (b) the general character of the identity of knowing and being. The relationship each of these elements has with *truth* is significantly different.

On the one hand, the rich content—which exemplifies all those truth-claims belonging to the framework of reason—cannot *justifiably* be said to be true; its immediate existence denotes nothing but “an empty word or some assumed, unjustified conception.”² Still, it is projected that it is true. Consequently, it has to be *proven* true.

On the other hand, the element of the identity of knowing and being can be immediately said to be true. This truth arises from its sheer presence, *not* from the resolution of the super-equipollence between consciousness and thought. Yet, it is only a trivial truth, since it does not encompass the rich content of this element; it is, in other words, a *content-less* truth.³

¹ WL I 67: “[...] In der Logik [...] ist dasjenige die Voraussetzung, was aus jener Betrachtung [des Bewußtseins] sich als das Resultat erwiesen hatte,—die Idee als reines Wissen.”

² WL I 72: “Daß der Anfang Anfang der Philosophie ist, daraus kann eigentlich auch keine *nähere Bestimmung* oder ein *positiver* Inhalt für denselben genommen werden. Denn die Philosophie ist hier im Anfange [...] ein leeres Wort oder irgendeine angenommene ungerechtfertigte Vorstellung. Das reine Wissen gibt nur diese negative Bestimmung, daß er der *abstrakte* Anfang sein soll.”

³ In my view, this is why Hegel says that “consciousness has for result the *concept* of science, i.e. pure knowing” (WL I 67: “das Bewußtsein [hat] den *Begriff* der Wissenschaft, d.i. das reine Wissen, zum Resultat”). He italicizes the word “concept” (*Begriff*) here because he wants to emphasize that the result of consciousness is not science proper, but *only* the concept of the latter, to wit, only its formal framework. Cf. WL I 71 (my emphasis): “Zugleich ergibt sich, daß das was den Anfang macht, indem es darin das noch Unentwickelte, *Inhaltslose* ist, im Anfange *noch nicht wahrhaft erkannt wird* und daß erst die Wissenschaft, und zwar in ihrer ganzen Entwicklung, seine vollendete, *inhaltsvolle* und erst *wahrhaft begründete* Erkenntnis ist;” WL I 69: “Wie er nicht gegen Anderes eine

For this reason, the identity here designated is a *pure* identity of knowing and being. Its sheer immediate existence does not entail the truth of its own rich content. *Just because one posits this identity it does not mean that one will acquire knowledge of truth.*

This polarity (rich content—pure identity) determines the challenge the phenomenological project left us with: How can the truth of the rich content, namely, the truth of the truth-claims-of-reason, be *proven* when all one has at one's disposal *in terms of truth* is the pure, contentless identity of knowing and being itself? The logical project, exemplified in Hegel's *Science of Logic*, is nothing but an attempt to respond to this specific question.

Our inquiry will *evaluate* this attempt of the logical project by examining *how it manages to avoid falling into the trap of Pyrrhonian scepticism*. For, if you recall, truth, *for us*, is established when, and only when, the presuppositionless, primordial Pyrrhonian problematic is fully resolved. The present chapter is intended both as an introduction to the logical project and as a clarification of its relation to that problematic. The main textual context is provided by Hegel's introductory essay in the *Science of Logic* entitled *With What Must the Science Begin?*⁴

A general remark before we take off: The previous discussion has shown Hegel to be above all a philosopher of *truth*.⁵ The main question he raises and attempts to respond to is the perennial and most important philosophical question: What is there *in truth*?⁶ All other aims and aspects of Hegel's philosophy follow from this concern with the discovery of truth. Hegel is not *primarily* interested in what it means to 'think' or in our making our world 'intelligible' or in philosophizing 'without presuppositions' or in constructing 'a radically self-critical philosophy' or in making us 'feel at home in the world'. Moreover, *pace* Pippin and others, Hegel's *primary* concern is *not* "to complete the Kantian project"⁷ (although this does not

Bestimmung haben kann, so kann er auch keine in sich, keinen Inhalt enthalten [...];" WL I 73: "[...] Der Anfang, als des *Denkens*, [soll] ganz abstrakt, ganz allgemein, ganz Form ohne allen Inhalt sein; wir hätten somit gar nichts als die Vorstellung von einem bloßen Anfang als solchem."

⁴ WL I 65–79. The best analysis of the beginning of the *Science of Logic* is to be found in Houlgate (2006: 29–53, 263–283). Other noteworthy studies include Fulda (1965), Henrich (1964), Maker (1990), and Römpf (1989).

⁵ And not a "philosopher of modernity," as Maker (1994: 26) thinks.

⁶ Cf. *Enz.* I § 19, Zusatz 1: "[...] Was ist der Gegenstand unserer Wissenschaft? Die einfachste und verständlichste Antwort auf diese Frage ist die, daß die *Wahrheit* dieser Gegenstand ist."

⁷ Cf. Pippin (1989); Houlgate (2006: 52–53); Höhle (1998: chapter 2).

mean he does not actually achieve this). All these issues appear in Hegel's philosophy only because they arise from a consideration of the primary questions: What is there *in truth*? What does it mean to think *the truth*? How do we acquire knowledge *of truth*?⁸

4.2. *Presuppositionless Beginning, Radical Self-Criticism and the Emergence of the Rich Content*⁹

Consider first the following straightforward argument. Since (a) the only true element present at the beginning of the logical project is the pure, content-less¹⁰ identity of knowing and being and (b) there remains no other possible scientific cognitive standpoint than the one of thought, any progression in terms of truth has to be made from that element. This entails that *emergence* from that pure identity is a *necessary condition* for *proving* the rich content's truth. Thus, there is only one thing we can do here—to simply focus on that pure identity and see if and how it develops.¹¹ As Hegel puts it, “[...] starting from this determination of

⁸ So, I do not deny that some or all of those issues and aims are intrinsically related to Hegel's project; what I want to argue for is that they all derive from the primordial positing of the question of truth. The approach one takes on this issue *does* matter, because if one starts, let us say, from Hegel's relation to Kant, then Kantian philosophy is given a central place in our attempt to understand Hegel; but if one starts from the question of truth, Kant might not be given such a central place. In this latter case, it would all depend upon the formulation of that question. Thus, since for us the question of truth is formulated in terms of the Pyrrhonian problematic and since we claim that this problematic is more primordial than the Kantian one, Hegel's relation to Pyrrhonism is much more important than his relation to Kant. What is really disappointing in contemporary research on Hegel is that most authors do not seem to be willing to challenge the unjustified assumption that Hegel's *primary* concern is to “complete the Kantian project.” Sandkühler (2005a: 80; my emphasis), for example, writes: “[...] und der erkenntnistheoretische Idealismus Fichtes, Schellings und Hegels, die auf ganz unterschiedliche Weise und in Auseinandersetzung miteinander bemüht sind, das ihnen *bei Kant* ungelöst erscheinende Problem der Beziehung zwischen subjektiver Erkenntnis und objektiver Realität zu lösen.” The idea that the Kantian problematic might not be the source of the epistemology of German Idealism never occurs to Sandkühler. The same arbitrariness characterizes Maker's work on Hegel, who posits as his starting-point the alleged fact that “Hegel sought to articulate a distinctively modern conception of philosophical rationality or reason in order to address what he regarded as distinctively modern theoretical and practical problems” (Maker 1994: 21). But this obsession with ‘modernity’ and ‘modern problems’ is definitely not Hegel's; he was more interested in solving ‘perennial’ rather than ‘peculiarly modern’ problems.

⁹ This section has been influenced by Stern (2009).

¹⁰ That is, ‘contentless’ in terms of *truth*: it does not exhibit a content that can be *immediately* asserted as *true*.

¹¹ See the discussion in Houlgate (2006: 32–53); see especially page 32: “Hegel may not assume [...] that we are to proceed beyond that initial consideration of indeterminate

pure knowing, all that is needed to ensure that the beginning remains immanent in its scientific development is to consider, or rather, ridding oneself of all other reflections and opinions whatever, simply to take up, *what is there before us*.¹² Indeed, all one needs in order to discover truth is “simply the resolve, which one could see as an arbitrariness,¹³ [to] consider *thought as such* [...]”.¹⁴ It follows from this that the logical beginning is a *presuppositionless* one; this is so because it denotes *no* rich content (namely, truth-claims), only the sheer framework of reason (namely, the pure identity).

So, for this argument, presuppositionlessness *simply* follows from the *necessary* and *unavoidable* beginning of the logical project, the general character of reason. This would go against Houlgate, who argues that presuppositionlessness is a feature that *must* be present in the logical project *if* the latter is to be “radically self-critical.”¹⁵ Houlgate grounds the need for

being according to any prescribed rules, nor indeed that we are to proceed beyond that thought at all, for to do so would be to take too much for granted;” and page 51: “The presuppositionless philosopher must begin with the category of pure being alone, without assuming in advance that the category is in fact the beginning of the thought of the Idea, the Absolute, or infinity. Indeed, he or she may not assume that the category of being leads to any further categories at all but must wait and see *whether* any such categories arise. The aim of the presuppositionless philosopher is thus not to set out to demonstrate that the thought of being generates a more complex—dialectical or nondialectical—view of the world; it is simply to consider the indeterminate thought of being itself, to dwell with that category for its own sake, and to observe where, if anywhere it takes us.” See also White (1983: 57): “[...] The speculative thinker in the process of determining the categories, as they arise for the first time, does not know where, if anywhere, he is headed.” I fully endorse the content of these three passages.

¹² WL I 68: “Daß nun von dieser Bestimmung des reinen Wissens aus der Anfang seiner Wissenschaft immanent bleibe, ist nichts zu tun, als das zu betrachten oder vielmehr mit Beiseitsetzung aller Reflexionen, aller Meinungen, die man sonst hat, nur aufzunehmen, *was vorhanden ist*.” See also VLM 21. With this emphasis on ‘simple observation’ on our side, the ‘method’ of the logical project seems to be no different from the ‘method’ of the phenomenological one. Compare PhdG 77.

¹³ This specific reference to “arbitrariness” verifies my thesis in the previous chapter, for Hegel seems to be saying that the beginning of the logical project has not been ‘justified’ by the phenomenological movement. This does not mean that the beginning *could* be made in a different way; simply, the beginning is made with the subject-matter of the inquiry, namely ‘thought’.

¹⁴ WL I 68: “Nur der Entschluß, den man auch für eine Willkür ansehen kann, nämlich daß man das *Denken als solches* betrachten wolle, ist vorhanden.” Cf. WL I 68: “[...] Soll aber keine Voraussetzung gemacht, der Anfang selbst *unmittelbar* genommen werden, so bestimmt er sich nur dadurch, daß es der Anfang der Logik, des Denkens für sich, sein soll.”

¹⁵ Houlgate (2006: 24–28). See also Houlgate (2006: 31): “If we are to examine thought without presupposing that it has any particular structure, operates with any particular concepts, or is governed by any particular rules, what are we to understand thought to be? What is to be the object of our examination? What is thought *minimally*? Hegel’s answer is

radical self-criticism on a *historical* “fact,” *the peculiar character of modernity*, which is, according to him, fundamentally determined by *the demand to be absolutely free*.¹⁶ Thus, for Houlgate, “the demand for absolute freedom” accounts for “the demand for radical self-criticism,” and the latter accounts for “the presuppositionless beginning” of the logical project. So, if one showed that the presuppositionless character of this beginning has nothing to do with “the demand for radical self-criticism”—which is the

indicated by his statement in §78 of the *Encyclopedia Logic* that the ‘freedom that abstracts from everything... grasps its own pure abstraction, the simplicity of thinking.’ What a supporter of the ‘straightforward argument’ would find problematic in this passage is that it seems to imply that *we have a choice* in how to proceed in our examination of thought—while in fact, he would argue, we do not. Indeed, it is *not* up to us to *not* presuppose that thought has some particular structure. That we have to act in this way is entailed by the *unavoidable* beginning of the *Logic*. The “freedom that abstracts from everything” is not our freedom as subjective agents; it is the freedom of thought itself, the freedom embedded in its own beginning. See also Houlgate (2006: 31–32): “The path of ‘universal doubt’ that leads into Hegel’s science of logic is clearly very similar to that taken by Descartes. Hegel’s conclusion, however, is not ‘I think, therefore I am’ but rather ‘thinking, therefore *is*.’” In fact, however, it is not similar at all with that path—so says the supporter of the ‘straightforward argument’; for no ‘universal doubt’ is operative at the beginning of the logical project, only the *presence* of the pure identity of knowing and being itself. See also Houlgate (2006: 37): “For Hegel, if philosophical thought is to be fully self-critical and free, it can accept nothing on authority or as simply given and so can take nothing for granted about thought itself except its sheer indeterminate being; it must, in other words, be radically presuppositionless.” Indeed, philosophical thought “can accept nothing on authority or as simply given and so can take nothing for granted about thought itself except its sheer indeterminate being;” but this is not *conditioned* upon some demand or desire to be fully self-critical and free! It has to be so simply because philosophical thought *can* begin *only* with pure knowing and this has *absolutely no true content* at the beginning. See also Houlgate (2006: 42): “But he [i.e. Hegel] goes on, ‘at the same time I know that it is the only true method’—because he sees no alternative for philosophy in the modern world than to undertake a fully self-critical study of thought that suspends all previous assumptions about thought and draws out patently and carefully the categories that are immanent and implicit in the sheer indeterminate *being* of thought itself.” It is not the case, the objector concludes, that Hegel simply “*sees* no alternative for philosophy in the modern world than to undertake a fully self-critical study of thought;” he *proves* that there is no such alternative (whether in the ‘modern’ or any other world) and this proof is inherently associated with a content-less beginning.

¹⁶ Houlgate (2006: 49): “What one might call the historical ground of the thought of pure being is the act of abstraction undertaken at the beginning of the *Logic* by the thinker who wishes to suspend all his or her assumptions about thought and discover from scratch what it is to think. (This historical ground is itself rational insofar as it follows logically from the modern demand for radical self-criticism, but it is still an historical act.)” In my opinion, the beginning of the logical project has no historical ground and no external act of abstraction takes place therein. Also, in my view, the *Logic* is mainly, *not* for those who wish to “discover from scratch what it is to think,” but for those who wish to discover what there is in truth. (This latter criticism may be removed if what Houlgate means here is rather that the *Logic* is for those who wish to discover what it is to think *the truth*.)

exact claim of the above ‘straightforward argument’—Houlgate’s argument would collapse.

Obviously, one must here ask the question ‘*why* does Houlgate think that presuppositionlessness *should* be intrinsically related to radical self-criticism?’ Houlgate, it seems to me, introduces the need for radical self-criticism by pointing out—against the ‘straightforward argument’—that, while it is indeed a fact that the only true element present at the beginning of the logical project is the pure identity and that there remains no other possible scientific cognitive standpoint than the one of thought, it *does not follow* from these two premises that the *emergence* of the rich content from that pure identity is a *necessary condition* for proving its truth. Houlgate is anxious to make us realize that, even with those premises being true, the rich content—or certain parts of it—could be *posited* in the universe of discourse *from the cognitive standpoint of thought*. Simply, after the cognitive standpoint of thought has been identified as the only possible scientific cognitive standpoint, one could begin one’s attempt to characterize ‘thought’ by directly positing certain determinations in the universe of discourse—instead of allowing those determinations to *emerge* from the pure identity. Indeed, Houlgate claims, all philosophers other than Hegel, who also investigate the truth of being from the cognitive standpoint of reason (for example, the continental rationalists or the other German idealists), begin their investigation, not with *the pure identity itself*, but with the *positing of a rich content* in the universe of discourse.

Now, one could take Houlgate as saying that Hegel does not behave like those other philosophers, that his starting-point is absolutely presuppositionless, *because* he is radically self-critical. In other words, radical self-criticism is what forces him to take this different stance. If we ask, why Hegel opts for radical self-criticism, Houlgate will respond that it is *because* he takes the modern demand for freedom from presuppositions more seriously than the others.

But why should Hegel take “the demand for freedom from presuppositions” so seriously? Houlgate’s response to this most crucial of all questions is, I think, that it is only through this “freedom from presuppositions” that the true nature of “thought” is revealed to us. But, then, all those other philosophers would immediately deny this: they would claim that one could begin by positing a rich content in the universe of rational discourse and still manage to reveal the true nature of ‘thought’. So, if Houlgate wants to save his argument, he must make a case against this claim. He has to argue, namely, (a) that the beginning with the *positing* of

a rich content from the cognitive standpoint of thought does *not* lead to the proof of the posited content's truth and (b) that for this proof to take place that content *should* emerge immanently (or necessarily) from the pure identity (to wit, from a state of affairs that is absolutely 'free from presuppositions.')

As far as I can see, Houlgate provides two reasons for (a). The *first* is that the immediate positing of a rich content in the universe of discourse gives immediately rise to its negation.¹⁷ The *second*, quite independent from the first, is that nothing guarantees, or makes it explicit, that the immediate positing of a rich content from the cognitive standpoint of thought gives us a content that indeed belongs to 'thought';¹⁸ in other words, this rich content would be *arbitrary*. Houlgate's support for (b) is that it avoids these two complications.

The first reason for (a), however, is not effective at all, because the existence of a presuppositionless beginning does *not* entail that no conflict will arise in the sphere of thought. And if that conflict remained unresolved, it would designate nothing but a state of affairs in which "one bare assurance stands unproven against another." So, the success of Houlgate's support for (b) rests solely on whether it avoids the complication specified by the *second* reason for (a).

In my view, Houlgate is right on this: (b) does indeed avoid the complication in question. The starting-point of the logical project is the positing of the pure identity of knowing and being. Yet, the sheer presence of this identity does not exclude the possibility that rich content might be *posited* from the cognitive standpoint that this identity characterizes (i.e. 'thought'). Simply, the simple presence of the pure identity does not by itself exclude the freedom of the rationalist philosopher to begin his inquiry into truth by positing truth-claims-of-reason. Nevertheless, in this case nothing guarantees, or makes it explicit, that what is posited in this way does indeed belong to 'thought'.¹⁹ Therefore, such a positing is an arbitrary one. On the contrary, the *emergence* from that pure identity does offer that guarantee. Thus, the emergence in question functions as a *binding force*, an element that binds the rich content *with* 'thought' and proves that it is the rich content *of* 'thought'. Indeed, Hegel has already

¹⁷ Houlgate (2006: 24–25).

¹⁸ Houlgate makes this point by reference to Fichte's critique of Kant; see Houlgate (2006: 23–24).

¹⁹ This is reminiscent of Fichte's critique of Kant; see Fichte (1797–1800: 25–28). Cf. *Enz.* I § 42; *WL* I 41.

suggested that much in the quotation cited in the first paragraph of the present section: We simply “take up what is there before us” *because* we need “to ensure that the beginning remains immanent in its scientific development.”

Note, however, that although this argument makes a strong case against the ‘straightforward argument’, it also makes a strong case against Houlgate’s idea of a close connection between ‘presuppositionlessness’ and ‘radical self-criticism’. Indeed, on the one hand, the *emergence* of the rich content from the pure identity is a *necessary condition* for *proving* the truth of the rich content, *not* because—as the ‘straightforward argument’ claimed—this follows directly from the all-encompassing presence of the pure identity, *but* because only this emergence guarantees, or makes it explicit, that what is ‘posited’ from the cognitive standpoint of thought does indeed belong to thought. Yet, on the other hand, this modification of the ‘straightforward argument’ makes it clear that the logical project begins with a state of affairs that is absolutely ‘free from presuppositions’, not because there is the arbitrary demand for radical self-criticism, but simply because only the beginning with the pure identity avoids the above major complication and ‘*presuppositionlessness*’ is *entailed by the sheer presence of that identity*.²⁰

On the whole, we have now established (a) that the beginning of the logical project *should* be made with the pure identity (for this is what determines the general character of what will be thematized, namely, the cognitive standpoint of thought or reason), (b) that the emergence of the rich content from that pure identity is a *necessary condition* for the proof of its truth, and (c) that the beginning is ‘presuppositionless’, not because this is demanded by some arbitrary need for ‘radical self-criticism’ or for ‘freedom from presuppositions’, but simply because ‘presuppositionlessness’ belongs to the very nature of the *pure* identity.

²⁰ So, Houlgate is right when he implies that there can be a dispute regarding the beginning of philosophy: this can be made either from the pure identity or from a rich content that is posited immediately from the cognitive standpoint of thought as such. But he is not right when he says that Hegel chooses the first because his project is radically self-critical. First, Hegel is, strictly speaking, not making any ‘choice’ here, for we *already* know (from the conclusion of the phenomenological project) that the pure identity belongs *truly* to thought as such (it is the very framework that constitutes thought as such, the most minimal feature of the logical space). Second, Hegel simply points out that the immediate positing of a rich content from the cognitive standpoint of thought as such does *not* entail that this content *indeed* belongs to thought as such, whereas this content’s *emergence* from what is true of thought as such, to wit, from the pure identity, *does* entail this desideratum.

4.3. *The Logical Project and the Pyrrhonian Problematic*

Unfortunately, the emergence of the rich content might be a necessary condition, but is *not* also a *sufficient* one for the proof of its truth. Two intertwined considerations make a case against its sufficiency. *Firstly*, the emergence of the rich content must be *expressed* if knowledge of truth is to occur²¹ and this is done with the use of *judgements*;²² and since the pure identity has an intrinsic ontological character—because it is the identity of knowing and *being itself*—the judgements used are necessarily and inherently *truth-claims*. Secondly, the generic universe of discourse, upon whose presuppositionless structure the Pyrrhonian problematic was built, is *not* ‘hostile’ to that pure identity, in the sense that it does not attack *only* truth-claims that are made from the standpoint of consciousness. In other words, the truth-claims made from the cognitive standpoint of thought must appear in the universe of discourse.²³ Yet, this exactly means that the proof of the rich content’s truth must face and resolve the difficulties created by that presuppositionless problematic. It is this last point that complicates things; for it entails that simply the expression—the ‘performance’—of the emergence of the rich content from the pure identity does not suffice for the establishment of knowledge of truth. *It must also be shown how this expression escapes the presuppositionless*

²¹ If truth were either inexpressible or not expressed, we would not be aware of it. But the whole point is that we desire to be indeed aware of it.

²² This is a trivial fact, which can be verified by simply opening the *Science of Logic* and immediately seeing that it is composed of judgements, including the section that explicates the beginning. The employment of the judgement in this instance is *not* externally associated with the beginning and does *not* assign any content to it. Moreover, it does not imply that the judgement is ‘the proper form of thinking’ or ‘the form of truth’; all it implies is that the judgement is *a* (but *not* the *sole*) locus of the *expression* (and, therefore, of *knowledge*) of truth.

²³ See Houlgate (2006: 39): “To the extent that they [the critics] proceed from some tacit or explicitly acknowledged assumptions about thought and so do not suspend all such assumptions, they necessarily fall short of what, according to Hegel, is demanded of a modern, self-critical philosophy. Whether they part company with Hegel because they assume (with Marx) that thought is conditioned by social and economic practices or (with Nietzsche) that thought is an expression of the will to power or (with many contemporary analytic philosophers) that thought is governed by the rules of formal or symbolic logic makes little difference.” It is important to note here that this passage says nothing against presuppositionless (Pyrrhonian) scepticism, which, as shown, makes no assumptions whatsoever. All it ‘assumes’ is that we speak, that we are interested in discovering the truth of what-there-is, and that we are free to express our views (i.e. that we are not gagged)! Clearly, these ‘assumptions’ are shared by the speculative philosopher himself (if he wants to *say* anything) and, more importantly, do not affect the purity of the logical beginning. So, Hegel has to solve the problem without *ignoring* this freedom of ‘saying’.

Pyrrhonian problematic.²⁴ (Pyrrhonian scepticism, namely, is not refuted by the *simple* positing of the pure identity and the *simple*—unqualified—emergence of the rich content from it.)

4.4. *The Logical Project and the Theory of the Vernunftsatz*

Prior to our discussion of the phenomenological project a specific response had been given to the Pyrrhonian challenge. It had been *suggested* that speculative philosophy (the cognitive standpoint of thought) resolves the Pyrrhonian problematic by unifying the conflicting truth-claims-of-reason in a higher truth-claim, the *Vernunftsatz*. Still, for this suggestion to become effective against Pyrrhonian scepticism, answers to the following questions must be provided:

- (a) How exactly can the *Vernunftsatz* be a unity of contradictories that is *not* reducible to a simple contradiction?
- (b) How can the *theory* of the *Vernunftsatz* be *formulated* in an *undogmatic* way, given that it must now be developed from within a framework which does not allow for the distinction between epistemological and ontological elements? Simply, how can it be formulated in a context in which *all* appearing judgements are *truth-claims*, namely claims about the truth of what there is? This would mean that its exposition has to be made through truth-claims, whose appearance in the universe of discourse would cause the immediate emergence of their negation. How could this exposition even begin if the first judgement uttered is immediately confronted with its negation?

The answer to the first question will become manifest only at the end of the present study. Why this *must* be so becomes clear from the content of the second question; for in order to know what the *Vernunftsatz* (or, as

²⁴ Houlgate (2006: 35) asks: "But if we cannot evaluate Hegel's arguments by reference to traditional standards of rationality or by reference to any preconceived notion of dialectic, how is it possible to criticize what he says at all? Can presuppositionless thought be criticized, or is it simply beyond all reproach by definition? What is so disturbing about Hegel's insistence on presuppositionlessness is that it appears to render his philosophy invulnerable to any rational critique." It should be clear by now that "presuppositionless thought" is *not* "beyond all reproach by definition," for its "definition" does *not* exclude the presence of presuppositionless scepticism therein *from the beginning*. In other words, "presuppositionless thought" fails if it fails to resolve the presuppositionless Pyrrhonian problematic.

Hegel calls it in the *Science of Logic*, for reasons that will become apparent later, the 'judgement of the concept') is, a *theory* of the *Vernunftsat* must be formulated. Since this theory can be formulated only from the cognitive standpoint of thought, it is necessarily a full-blooded ontological theory, in the sense that the judgements through which its formulation would be accomplished must be truth-claims. The theory of the *Vernunftsat* is, therefore, an extremely peculiar theory; for it seeks to *justify* the truth-claims-of-reason by *using* (the same) truth-claims-of-reason. Nevertheless, given that there remains only one possible scientific framework, such *circular justification* is unavoidable. As Hegel puts it:

[...] to want the nature of cognition clarified *prior* to science is to demand that it be considered *outside* the science; *outside* the science this cannot be accomplished, at least not in a scientific manner and such a manner is alone here in place.²⁵

This is the picture we now have before us: It has been *suggested* that the Pyrrhonian problematic can be resolved in the sphere of reason through the existence of a certain element, the *Vernunftsat*. Yet, the latter should first be explicated (so that we can understand what it is) and this has to be done through a theory, the theory of the *Vernunftsat*. However, since, after the collapse of the structure of consciousness, this theory cannot be formulated as an epistemological theory *distinct* from an ontological one, as *simply* a theory of what it means to acquire knowledge of truth, it must be formulated within the framework of 'thought'. This means, though, that the judgements that constitute it should be (some or all of) the truth-claims that compose the rich content which awaits its justification in the framework of 'thought'. Simply, the theory of the *Vernunftsat* must *emerge* from the element of pure identity; and the truth-claims that will precede its *full* appearance must receive their justification from that appearance itself.

Clearly, then, what remains to be done in the present study is *simply* to give an immanent account of how the theory of the *Vernunftsat*—the theory of *the judgement of the concept*—emerges from the pure identity that characterizes the very first appearance of the cognitive standpoint of thought. The *result* of this account should be a concrete and complete formulation of that theory, which will provide us with the resolution of the Pyrrhonian problematic. (Note that the theory of the *Vernunftsat* will

²⁵ WL I 67.

not in any way *direct* or *influence* the account of how this theory emerges. We will not even assume that such a theory will eventually emerge; *all* there is for thought at the beginning of the logical project is its own *sheer presence*.)²⁶ Before we embark on this journey, though, let me first very briefly clarify three issues related to the above argument: (a) the relation between *categories* and *judgements*; (b) the relation between the notion of *ground* and the *pure identity* that constitutes the beginning of the logical movement; and (c) the relation between the notion of *circle* and the *two fundamental constituents* of the logical project (namely, pure identity and rich content).

4.5. *Categories and Judgements*

According to Hegel, the subject matter of the *Logic* consists of the so-called *determinations of thought*, which he also calls *categories*. The first term is somewhat misleading, though, for the ‘determinations of thought’ are not solely subjective determinations, to wit, determinations only of the knowing subject. They are rather determinations of what there is in truth, of the *rational* structure that permeates *being itself* (which, if you recall, includes *knowing itself*). This is so because, as already explained, the cognitive standpoint of ‘thought’ is inherently an ontological standpoint, in the sense that specifications of knowledge (knowing-conditions) are *immediately* posited to be inherent elements of being itself. Whenever, therefore, we refer to the subject matter of the logical project, we will be using the term ‘categories’ (or ‘rational categories’ or ‘onto-logical categories’) rather than the misleading term ‘determinations of thought’;

²⁶ Thus I totally agree with Houlgate on this point; see Houlgate (2006: 32): “Not only must we begin by conceiving thought itself as wholly indeterminate being, but we must also conduct our examination of thought without assuming that it should take any particular course or follow any particular rule of procedure;” Houlgate (2006: 32): “[...] Hegel may not presuppose that we are to proceed *dialectically* in the *Logic* by showing, say, how one category passes over into, or contains, its opposite and then is taken up with that opposite into a third category that synthesizes the first two. The indeterminate concept of being may well prove on further examination to be dialectical and disappear into the concept of nothing, but we may not assume at the outset that this will be the case or that our method should be to look for such dialectical slippage in other categories. All we may do is consider the concept of indeterminate being and note what, if anything, that concept *itself* turns out to be or do;” Houlgate (2006: 35): “[...] Prior to any particular transition in the *Logic*, we have no model available by which to judge how that transition *should* proceed.”

and by that term we will mean those elements of thought or reason that exemplify features or structures of being itself—what we previously called ‘rational aspects or dimensions of what there is’.

The *rational* character of those features or structures is *not* externally imposed upon them; it derives *directly* from the fact that they emerge from the pure identity of knowing and being itself. Simply, a determination is a rational category *if and only if* it emerges from that pure identity. Consequently, one should not puzzle over what the term ‘reason’ or ‘thought’ means here. Its meaning will be gradually disclosed through the emergence of those categories themselves.

Now, the categories are not themselves *truth-claims*, namely *judgements* that purport to express something true about what there is; but they are *expressed* through such judgements. Nevertheless, there is no one-to-one matching between categories and judgements. Rather, a cluster of judgements is used for the formulation and expression of one category or of the relation between two or more categories.

Most (but not all) of the judgements that belong to this cluster are doing a kind of ‘investigative’ and ‘clarificatory’ work, in the sense that they strive to express the meaning of a category or relation between categories in the clearest way possible, but they do not quite achieve it. Yet, precisely because it is projected that such categories exist and are distinct from one another, there must be stages in their development where the meaning of each category and of each relation between categories becomes clear enough and, therefore, there must be stages in that development where each category and each relation between categories is expressed either (a) by a succinct and precise single judgement or (b) by a succinct and precise sub-cluster of judgements. *It is only these judgements that need to be justified for the theory of the Vernunftszatz to be justified.* Simply, the development of the onto-logical categories is expressed by a multiplicity of judgements, but some (that is, the majority) of them work towards the formulation and clarification (but not justification) of certain others, namely those which succinctly and precisely express the meaning either of a certain category or of a certain relation between categories; and the *truth* of the expression of the categories can be *proven* or *disproven*—in a way that will be specified in the theory of the *Vernunftszatz*—through those succinct and precise judgements alone.

The logical project, then, aspires to express the truth of what there is by using certain judgements which denote the rational categories of being itself. Those judgements are the truth-claims-of-reason and what

gives them this status is simply their emergence from the pure identity.²⁷ Reason, therefore, and its subject matter, the rational, express or exemplify their content only through the development of that pure identity. In this way, Hegel avoids providing us with a *dogmatic* theory which would purport to express and justify reason in an external and arbitrary fashion. Rather, reason and the rational become what they are and mean what they mean only through the immanent development of the pure identity of knowing and being.

4.6. *Ground*

As was pointed out, the whole cognitive standpoint of thought is, *in terms of truth*, initially *fully* occupied by the pure identity. Still, as was also mentioned, the rich content that comprises that standpoint is *projected* to be true. From these two premises, plus the refutation of the position of those who would like to begin the investigation of 'thought' with the immediate positing of a rich content, it follows that the *emergence* of the rich content (namely, of the onto-logical categories) from that pure identity is a necessary condition of its truth.

Does this not mean, however, that the pure identity functions as a justificatory *ground*? An unqualifiedly positive answer to this question would be problematic for Hegel. Indeed, if you recall, in the second chapter we saw him explicitly stating that speculative philosophy has nothing to do with the positing of grounds; that its purpose is rather to unify conflicting determinations. In this way, its nature had been determined as progressive, while dogmatism's had been determined as regressive. In contrast, one might now argue that Hegel reintroduces the notion of *ground* as that *prior* element through which the whole movement of the logical categories will obtain its justification. The following passage seems to verify this worry:

[...] The beginning must be an absolute, or what is synonymous here, an abstract beginning; and so it may not presuppose anything, must not be mediated by anything nor have a ground; *rather it is to be itself the ground of the entire science.*²⁸

²⁷ Compare this with Winfield (1988: 127, 129).

²⁸ WL I 68–69 (my emphasis; Hegel's emphasis has been removed).

Clearly, though, even if the beginning of the logical movement can be described as 'ground', the latter's meaning is *totally* different from the meaning of that notion of ground that the Pyrrhonist has refuted. Indeed, whereas in the sphere of dogmatism ground is posited *in order to* resolve conflicts, in the logical project ground has *simply* the character of a *source* out of which the rich content should emerge. Even if the emergence of the rich content will prove to be characterized by such conflicts,²⁹ the pure identity has not been posited there *in order to* resolve them. In fact, as already explained, the pure identity has absolutely no *function*, only a *presence*. It just *is*; it is not *supposed* to privilege (or 'ground') anything. This difference is of the utmost importance, for the *infinite regress of grounds* appears only when a ground is posited *with the aim of resolving a conflict*.

As this ground that is only a source of content and does not aim at the resolution of conflict, the *pure* identity of knowing and being is no different notion from what we have called 'universe of discourse', considered independently of its relation to the truth-claims that are posited in it. Only that this time, it has the character of *reason*, of *speculative philosophy*. It is initially the abstract, content-less space which waits to be filled in with truth-claims, with the realization of science.³⁰ In this sense, the logical project is nothing but the attempt to explicate the rich content of the universe of discourse *in the sphere of reason*; and it does that by focusing on the sheer presence of this element, allowing it thereby to evolve and structure itself immanently.

4.7. Circle

Our preliminary characterization of the logical project, however, suggests not only that the pure identity 'grounds' the rich content, but also that there is a sense in which the rich content 'grounds' that pure identity. On the one hand, the pure identity 'grounds' the rich content because it is

²⁹ Cf. WL I 71: "Das Fortgehen besteht nicht darin, daß nur ein *Anderes* abgeleitet oder daß in ein wahrhaft *Anderes* übergegangen würde;—und insofern dies Übergehen vorkommt, so hebt es sich ebensosehr wieder auf."

³⁰ Cf. Koch (2002: 29): "Die Wissenschaft der Logik betrachtet nicht unmittelbar den logischen Raum, sondern ein reines Denken, das ihn seinerseits betrachtet. In seiner Voraussetzungslosigkeit darf dieses Denken nicht botanisieren, nicht diese und jene Bestimmung im logischen Raum auflesen, sondern muß beginnen mit dem logischen Raum als solchen, von dessen Reichtum abstrahiert wird und der als reines, unmittelbares und unbestimmtes Sein zu nehmen ist."

the primordial source out of which it emerges. *As this primordial source*, it determines the general character of the whole development (as one of reason or ‘thought’) by remaining present in each and every stage of the latter; that is, each and every category is a *rational* determination of being (or a determination *of* the rational), precisely because it *always* relates to that pure identity.³¹ As Hegel puts it:

[...] The *progress* from that which forms the beginning is to be regarded as only a further determination of it, hence that which forms the starting-point of the development remains at the base of all that follows and does not vanish from it. [...] Thus, the beginning of philosophy is the foundation which is present and preserved throughout the entire subsequent development, remaining completely immanent in its further determinations.³²

On the other hand, the rich content can emerge *from* the pure identity only if it (somehow) *already* exists therein. The pure identity develops the way it develops exactly because it contains that rich content. Moreover, that identity acquires its determination as the beginning *of reason* only through the content that comes out of it, for it is only through this content that reason will reveal itself as what it really is. Simply, the beginning is the beginning *of* x and this x is specified only *through* the content that emerges from the pure identity that characterizes the beginning. In this sense, the rich content determines or ‘grounds’ the pure identity, the beginning of philosophy.³³ Philosophy begins in the way it does *because* a

³¹ Thus, as the content becomes richer and richer, it is the pure identity, the rational or thought *itself*, which becomes more and more concrete and complex. Cf. Houlgate (2006: 45).

³² WL I 71 (translation: SL 71).

³³ According to Houlgate, the end of the *Logic*, the absolute idea, can be characterized as the ground of the beginning of the *Logic* because, by having emerged from it, *it requires it to come first*. In other words, the full explication of the rational, which takes place in the category of the absolute idea (Houlgate calls this “the logical ground”), has as its content that it should have been preceded (as in fact it were) by the pure identity of knowing and being itself (which, as we shall see shortly, denotes nothing but pure, indeterminate being; Houlgate calls this “the historical ground”). See Houlgate (2006: 50): “[...] Unlike the historical ground of the thought of sheer being, the logical ground of that thought does not and cannot precede it precisely because that logical ground—the true character of thought as the unity of all its categories—can only emerge through the (self-)transformation *of* the thought of sheer being. The logical ground of that empty category of being grounds it, therefore, by *requiring it to come first*. It presupposes that category, but is not *prior* cause. But, of course, the true character of thought can in fact only *come to* presuppose the thought of pure being because it itself has to emerge as that which requires the thought of pure being as its point of origin. [...] The thought of sheer indeterminate being thus itself *gives rise* to the thought of the absolute Idea, which in turn *requires* the thought of sheer being to precede it.” See also Collins (2003).

specific content will be generated from that beginning. "The advance is," therefore, "a retreat into the ground, to that which is primary and true, on which it depends and, in fact, from which it originates."³⁴

So, at each stage of the logical movement one finds both the source and the manifestation of a certain part of the rich content, and the one 'grounds' the other. And if we focus specifically on that moment where the rich content is *fully* manifested, it becomes clear that the *whole* framework of thought must have the structure of a *circle*.³⁵ This is so because in that moment the rich content and the pure identity will be explicitly shown to be—in terms of *truth*—one and the same. As Hegel puts it:

What is essential for science is not so much that the beginning is made through pure immediacy, but rather that the whole of science forms within itself a circle, wherein the first becomes the last and the last the first.³⁶

How does all this relate to *our* inquiry? If we take the verb 'to ground' as a synonym for 'to justify' in this context, it would seem that the above remarks assign a circular justificatory structure to the logical project. For they imply that the theory of the *Vernunftsatz*, which should fully appear at a certain stage of the logical movement and is intended—in our working framework—as a justification of the expression of the rich content's truth, both gives rise to and arises from what precedes it. Does this not mean that Hegel has fallen into the trap of Pyrrhonian scepticism, since the latter uses 'the mode from reciprocal dependence' as a means to destroy the possibility of scientific inquiry?

The answer to this question must be a negative one, the reason being that, like his notion of 'ground', Hegel's notion of 'circle' has a different meaning than the meaning of the one the Pyrrhonist has refuted. For the pure identity does not aim at privileging the theory of the *Vernunftsatz* over some other theory of justification, nor does the theory of the *Vernunftsatz* aim at privileging the pure identity over some other beginning of the logical movement. (In fact, all there is at the beginning of that movement is the pure identity; and this designates a—trivially—true element, so it is not problematic in terms of its own truth *as a beginning*, it does not need justification: "The said beginning is neither an arbitrary and merely

³⁴ WL I 70.

³⁵ WL I 71: "Durch diesen Fortgang denn verliert der Anfang, was er in dieser Bestimmtheit, ein Unmittelbares und Abstraktes überhaupt zu sein, Einseitiges hat; er wird ein Vermitteltes, und die Linie der wissenschaftlichen Fortbewegung macht sich damit zu *einem Kreise*."

³⁶ WL I 70.

provisional assumption, nor is it something which appears to be arbitrarily and tentatively presupposed, but which is subsequently shown to have been properly made the beginning^{37, 38}) Yet, with that aim being absent, the Pyrrhonist cannot employ 'the mode from reciprocal dependence' against the proof of truth. Thus, the theory of the *Vernunftssatz* can both 'ground' what precedes it and 'be grounded' by it without thereby falling into the trap of Pyrrhonian scepticism.³⁹

4.8. *From Indeterminate to Determinate Being: A Sketch of the First Few Logical Moves in the Science of Logic*

The pure identity of knowing and being is the beginning of science. Still, if this expression is to be taken seriously, it already says too much; for if knowing and being are in truth *absolutely* identical, to wit, if their identity is indeed *pure*, then all that expression could designate is *sheer, indeterminate being, simple immediacy*.⁴⁰ In other words, the element of knowing must suppress itself at the beginning, allowing only its sheer being to manifest itself. As Hegel puts it:

Pure knowing as concentrated into this unity has sublated all reference to an other and to mediation; it is without any distinction and as thus distinctionless, ceases itself to be knowing; what is present is only *simple immediacy*.⁴¹

³⁷ That is to say, the beginning of the logical movement is the proper, i.e. true, beginning from the beginning.

³⁸ WL I 71 (translation: SL 72).

³⁹ Houlgate (2006: 49–50) is anxious to make his reader realize that the circular structure of the logical project is something that emerges from the development of the logical categories and is fully manifested at the end of the *Logic*, not something that can be presupposed at its beginning. Houlgate is absolutely right in this, but his point does not say anything against those who would want to use circular justification as a means to attack the *Logic*. For *they* are *not* interested in whether the circle is presupposed at the beginning or not; all it matters to them is that a circle *finally* emerges. In my view (which has been fully grounded in the whole previous discussion), this objection cannot be sustained because it inherently depends on the actuality of an act of *privileging* and such an act is foreign to the beginning of the *Logic*.

⁴⁰ Cf. Houlgate (2006: 31): "In Hegel's view, free, self-critical thought that suspends all its presuppositions about itself is left with nothing to think but itself, its own simple *being*. To put it another way [...], thought that sets aside all its assumptions about *what* it is, is left with nothing to think but the simple thought *that* it is."

⁴¹ WL I 68. See also WL I 72: "Dies reine Sein ist die Einheit, in die das reine Wissen zurückgeht [...];" WL I 72–73: "[...] Indem das reine Sein als die Einheit zu betrachten ist, in die das Wissen auf seiner höchsten Spitze der Einigung mit dem Objekte zusammengefallen, so ist das Wissen in diese Einheit verschwunden und hat keinen Unterschied von ihr und somit keine Bestimmung für sie übriggelassen.—Auch sonst ist nicht etwas oder

And a little further:

This simple immediacy [...] in its true expression is pure being. [...] Pure being is to mean nothing but *being* in general: being and nothing else, without any further specification and filling.⁴²

Thus, pure being is where the logical project properly begins.⁴³ I will finish this chapter by giving a sketch of how the first few categories are generated from this pure being. My aim is simply to show in a descriptive—rather than in an argumentative—way that the *Vernunftssatz* is indeed involved in the logical project from the beginning.

The first category of the logical project is *being*, taken in its “pure indeterminateness and emptiness.”⁴⁴ As an absolute purity, it contains no determinations in itself. The truth of this purity can only be expressed as a *tautology*: *Being is being*; or, simply, *is is is*. This tautology is *not* a truth-claim, for all it does is positing *the cognitive standpoint of thought* itself, the very universe of rational discourse. (If you recall, cognitive standpoints are not truth-claims.) In other words, it just posits the subject-matter of the inquiry: reason or ‘thought’ or—as has now become apparent—*being*.

Since, however, *being* lacks any determination whatsoever, it is equal to *nothing*. That is to say, the true expression of being is now this: *Being is nothing*. But, the emergence of this expression forces us to retrospectively conceive the aforementioned tautology as a genuine truth-claim; for now the possibility has arisen that the determination of being as simply ‘being’ might have been mistaken. This is so because *being is being* finds itself now in conflict with *being is nothing*. It is exactly this conflict which turns it into a truth-claim, into a judgement.

irgendein Inhalt vorhanden, der gebraucht werden könnte, um damit den bestimmteren Anfang zu machen.”

⁴² WL I 68. See also WL I 69 (my emphasis): “[...] was zunächst nur zu *diesem selbst Allereinfachsten, dem logischen Anfang* gehört [...]”

⁴³ WL I 69: “[Der Anfang] muß [...] schlechthin *ein* Unmittelbares sein oder vielmehr nur *das Unmittelbare* selbst. Wie er nicht gegen Anderes eine Bestimmung haben kann, so kann er auch keine in sich, keinen Inhalt enthalten, denn dergleichen wäre Unterscheidung und Beziehung von Verschiedenem aufeinander, somit eine Vermittlung. Der Anfang ist also das *reine Sein*.” See also WL I 72: “Es liegt [...] in der *Natur des Anfangs selbst*, daß er das Sein sei und sonst nichts. Es bedarf daher keiner sonstigen Vorbereitungen, um in die Philosophie hineinzukommen, noch anderweitiger Reflexionen und Anknüpfungspunkte;” and WL I 75: “Was den Anfang macht, der Anfang selbst, ist [...] als ein Nichtanalysierbares, in seiner einfachen unerfüllten Unmittelbarkeit, also *als Sein*, als das ganz Leere zu nehmen.”

⁴⁴ WL I 82: “Es ist die reine Unbestimmtheit und Leere.”

Nothing, now, is “complete emptiness, absence of all determination and content.”⁴⁵ As such, though, nothing *is* thought and, since no distinction can here be made between thought and being, nothing *is*. It has an immediacy of its own that turns it back into being. Being, then, turns into nothing and nothing turns into being. Each one is *vanishing* into the other. This vanishing Hegel names *becoming*. Being and nothing cannot be maintained in themselves but, precisely because of their purity, can exist only as moments of pure becoming. What there is in truth, to wit, being itself, shows itself now to be becoming; its expression must then be this: *Being is becoming*.

This first simple movement in Hegel’s *Logic* shows that, *logically*, being, taken in its pure immediacy, is indistinguishable from nothing. Theories of what there is in truth, therefore, which claim that ultimate reality is pure being, pure indeterminate immediacy, sheer positivity with no trait of negativity in it (like, for example, Parmenides’ theory, or the theory put forth by Plato in the *Republic* or in the *Seventh Letter*),⁴⁶ cannot really be sustained: Pure, indeterminate immediacy cannot stick with *being* and exclude *nothing* from it. Rather, pure being and pure nothing go always together *as vanishing moments of pure becoming*.

Thought does not remain still in *becoming* but undermines this structure of being as well: The category of becoming proves immanently to be self-contradictory. It has been shown that becoming is the vanishing of being and nothing into one another. *In* this vanishing being and nothing find themselves in an immediate unity: Being passes over into nothing and nothing over into being, showing in this way that they are *indistinct*.

At the same time, however, for this passing-over (becoming) to take place there must be a minimal difference between being and nothing. In this way, they are *distinct* from each other.⁴⁷ It is clear that there is a contradiction inherent in the structure of becoming and, therefore, becoming cannot be maintained.⁴⁸ Indeed, if becoming is taken *as the immediate*

⁴⁵ WL I 83: “[...] Es ist [...] vollkommene Leerheit, Bestimmungs- und Inhaltslosigkeit [...]”

⁴⁶ As Houlgate (2006: 44) points out, the same holds for Descartes, Spinoza and Kant. Cf. WL I 98: “[...] Bei Parmenides wie bei Spinoza soll von dem Sein oder der absoluten Substanz nicht fortgegangen werden zu dem Negativen [...]”

⁴⁷ WL I 113: “Sein und Nichts sind in ihm [d.h. dem Werden] nur als Verschwindende; aber das Werden als solches ist nur durch die Unterschiedenheit derselben.”

⁴⁸ WL I 113: “Das Werden ist das Verschwinden von Sein in Nichts und von Nichts in Sein und das Verschwinden von Sein und Nichts überhaupt; aber es beruht zugleich auf dem Unterschiede derselben. Es widerspricht sich also in sich selbst, weil es solches in sich vereint, das sich entgegengesetzt ist; eine solche Vereinigung aber zerstört sich.”

unity of being and nothing, the difference between them vanishes. But the vanishing of that difference means the vanishing of the vanishing itself, namely the vanishing of becoming. Again, if becoming is taken *as the immediate difference of being and nothing*, the immediate unity of being and nothing vanishes. Yet, the vanishing of that unity means the vanishing of the vanishing itself, namely the vanishing of becoming.

Becoming, then, *has* to vanish. The expression of the truth of being takes now the following form: *Being is not becoming*. However, this does not mean that the result of this vanishing is *nothing*. In fact, it cannot be *nothing*, because if it were *nothing*, sheer becoming would re-emerge. But what is it that vanishes? What vanishes is the thought of becoming. What is becoming? Becoming is that *pure*, immediate movement where *pure* being vanishes into *pure* nothing. This pure vanishing is the result of the very *purity* of being and nothing. With the vanishing of becoming, then, what vanishes is nothing else than the *purity* of being and nothing. Hegel is very clear on this point:

The result is the vanishing of becoming, but it is not *nothing*; as such it would only be a relapse into one of the already sublated determinations, not the resultant of nothing *and* being. It is the unity of being and nothing which has settled into a stable oneness.⁴⁹

Thus, being no more vanishes into nothing and nothing no more vanishes into being. Having lost their purity, being and nothing are now in a stable unity. This unity Hegel names *determinate being*.⁵⁰ So, the truth of being is now expressed as follows: *Being is determinate being*.

Given that being and nothing are in a *stable unity*, the negative changes from *nothing* to *non-being*. Since the *stability* of this unity gives it the form of *being*, what brings *determinacy* in it is the *non-being*. This is why Hegel names the moment of non-being in the unity of being and non-being *determinacy*. However, as shown, the moment of determinacy is inseparable from *being*. Therefore, determinacy is in fact always *determinate being*. He writes:

Determinate being as the result of its becoming is, in general, being with a non-being such that this non-being is taken up into simple unity with being.

⁴⁹ WL I 113.

⁵⁰ WL I 113: "Das Werden so [als] Übergehen in die Einheit des Seins und Nichts, welche als *seiend* ist oder die Gestalt der einseitigen *unmittelbaren* Einheit dieser Momente hat, ist das Dasein."

Non-being thus taken up into being in such a way that the concrete whole is in the form of being, of immediacy, constitutes *determinacy* as such.⁵¹

Exactly this moment of determinacy that is in being Hegel names *quality*:

Determinacy thus isolated by itself in the form of *being* is *quality*.⁵²

Thus, quality refers to the same as determinate being but with the emphasis on the negative (namely, on determinacy).⁵³ As seen, *determinate being* is the stable unity of being and non-being; *quality* is the moment of non-being that is in being. This *quality* presents itself in its *simplest* form, in its *immediacy*, and consequently, it is thought as such only in the form of *being*.⁵⁴ In this way, quality is initially brought forward as an *affirmative quality*. The structure of quality as such, however, forces thought to think quality not only in its affirmative but also in its negative. This is because, as seen, quality is not only in being but also in non-being. If it were *only* in being, it would be *pure being*; pure being, however, has already vanished. Quality, therefore, cannot be only *affirmative* quality; it must also be *negative* quality.⁵⁵

Thus, quality has to split itself into affirmative quality and negative quality: Quality is both *non-being* that is in being and non-being that is in *being*. Both of these qualities are differentiated parts of *one* quality, something that is exhibited by their identical structure. Their differentiation cannot be conceived outside of that unity:⁵⁶ Affirmative quality is the affirmative form *of* the negative quality and negative quality is the negative form *of* the affirmative quality. This fact turns each of them into a *relational* differentiated quality. Affirmative quality is that which is differentiated *from* the negative quality and negative quality that which is

⁵¹ WL I 116.

⁵² WL I 118.

⁵³ Cf. Burbidge (1981: 47): "When dialectic thus follows through with the implication of the terms isolated by understanding, it clarifies a double relation between the two categories: *a being* [i.e. determinate being] is both the same as, and yet different from, its *quality*. The difference, however, is not really significant. While *quality* distinguishes *a being* from *being* it is not in fact different from that indeterminate characteristic suggested in the indefinite article. Thought passes over from *a being* to its being *qualified* only to pass back again. Speculative reason considers this total process and affirms that what is being thought is a *qualified being*."

⁵⁴ Enz. I § 90: "Das *Dasein* ist Sein mit einer *Bestimmtheit*, die als unmittelbare oder seiende Bestimmtheit ist, die *Qualität*;" Enz. I § 90, Zusatz: "Die *Qualität* ist überhaupt die mit dem Sein identische, unmittelbare Bestimmtheit [...]"

⁵⁵ In other words, as Burbidge (1981: 47) puts it, "[quality] as determination [...] negates the pure indeterminacy of *being*."

⁵⁶ Otherwise, there would be a return to pure being and pure nothing.

differentiated *from* the affirmative quality. Hegel names affirmative quality (i.e. non-being that *is*) *reality* and negative quality (*non-being* that *is*) *negation*:

Quality, taken in the distinct character of *being*, is *reality*; as burdened with a negative it is *negation* [...].⁵⁷

Note that reality and negation are *relational* categories. Reality can never be conceived as pure positivity. This is Hegel's criticism of traditional accounts of reality. He writes:

Both are determinate being, but in *reality* as quality with the accent on *being*, the fact is concealed that it contains determinacy and therefore also negation. Consequently, reality is given the value only of something positive from which negation, limitation and deficiency are excluded. Negation taken as mere deficiency would be equivalent to nothing; but it is *determinate* being, a quality, only determined with a non-being.⁵⁸

Thus the structure of being as *determinate being* has now bifurcated itself and the expression of its truth takes the following form: *being is reality*, but also *being is negation*.

The above sketch (and it is, unfortunately, nothing but a sketch) of the move from indeterminate to determinate being makes it crystal clear that there is indeed present in the logical project an event characterized by the unification of contradictory truth-claims. For the tautology "being is being" produced its own negation, "being is nothing," and both were united under the higher truth-claim "being is becoming." The latter is, therefore, a (higher) *Vernunftsatz*. In this way, a *concrete example* has been given as to how it is possible to unite two contradictory judgements *in a single judgement that is not their simple conjunction*. It has also been concretely shown how that particular *Vernunftsatz* in turn produced its own negation, the judgement "being is not becoming," and how both were once more united under the higher truth-claim "being is determinate being." Finally, the latter dissolved once more into a more complex conflict, the relation between "being is reality" and "being is negation."

Three points should be made here. *First*, let us be aware that the above sketch provided only an example, a concrete individual manifestation of what the *Vernunftsatz* is and how it works. Hence generalizations should be avoided at this point. A full articulation of the meaning of this notion

⁵⁷ WL I 118.

⁵⁸ WL I 118. See also WL I 119–122.

can be provided only by the *theory* of the *Vernunftsatz*. It might very well be that the *Vernunftsatz* has a much more complex structure than what the above sketch suggests. The reader, therefore, should be patient and not jump to any conclusions before the end of the present study. *Second*, note, *pace* Michael Forster, that the above structure has *not* been the result of the *application* of a so-called ‘method’;⁵⁹ it has emerged immanently and totally internally from sheer, indeterminate being. It is in this same way that the *theory* of the *Vernunftsatz* should emerge. *Third*, note that the conflicts between categories are not created through external positings, as it was the case in the original Pyrrhonian problematic, but rather emerge internally from the sheer existence of a certain category.⁶⁰ In this way, Hegel assigns an internal character to the Pyrrhonian problematic, while still maintaining its essential and presuppositionless features, namely, the existence of conflicts and the necessity of resolving them. Note also here that this emphasis on the immanent derivation of conflicts does not have the effect of *ignoring* Pyrrhonian scepticism or arbitrarily denying the *freedom* to *posit* negations in the universe of rational discourse. *Hegel’s genius consists in precisely not doing this; rather, he pre-empts this freedom by showing how the pure identity itself generates what the Pyrrhonian sceptic would like to see in the universe of rational discourse, namely conflicts.*

4.9. Conclusion

In this transitional chapter I have tried to establish a link between the Pyrrhonian problematic and Hegel’s *Science of Logic*. As seen, the logical project, which the latter exemplifies, begins necessarily with the *pure* identity of knowing and being, an element that could denote nothing but pure, indeterminate being. My strong claim in this chapter, which has been supported by the whole previous discussion, has been that such beginning does not *prima facie* cancel Pyrrhonian scepticism out.

Yet, if this is correct, the logical project (or speculative philosophy), as an inquiry into the truth of what there is and as the *only* possible scientific cognitive standpoint, cannot but explicitly attempt to resolve the Pyrrhonian problematic. But in the second chapter we saw Hegel *suggesting* a particular way in which such resolution could be accomplished: through the employment of the (higher) *Vernunftsatz*, a higher perspective in

⁵⁹ See Forster (1993).

⁶⁰ Cf. WL I 49, 50–5; WL II 561; Enz. I §81; Houlgate (2006: 42, 43).

which conflicts are resolved and the conflicting truth-claims reveal their truth.

Since, however, a *suggestion* cannot succeed against the Pyrrhonist, the *theory* of the *Vernunftsatz* must itself be justified within the framework of the logical project itself, which is constituted by truth-claims-of-reason. Consequently, the theory of the *Vernunftsatz*, if it emerges at all, would both justify and be justified by truth-claims. *They* would justify *it* because they would emerge immanently from pure, indeterminate being; *it* would justify *them* because it would make it explicit how the Pyrrhonian problematic is fully resolved by them and their interrelations.

In the last section we have seen how the scientific content ('the rich content') starts emerging from pure, indeterminate being and have witnessed how the expression of the first few logical moves makes use of higher *Vernunftsätze*. The categories exemplified by the latter are the ones which unite contradictories, namely a positive content and its negation, and, therefore, establish their truth; for their conflict is *indeed* resolved and that is exactly what was demanded by the Pyrrhonists. Even though the higher *Vernunftsatz* is entangled in a new conflict, that *original* conflict no longer exists. The truth of the relation between pure being and pure nothing, for example, is *indeed* becoming. Of course, the Pyrrhonists will be fully satisfied only when a moment is reached when no more conflicts will arise. Still, the fact that they must now admit that certain conflicts have indeed been resolved is a huge first victory against them.

In the next three chapters, which constitute the second part of the present study, I will provide a detailed analysis of the category of *the concept*, whose structure gives rise to the theory of the *Vernunftsatz* or *judgement of the concept*. My primary aim is to facilitate a smooth passage to that theory and hence make the third and final part of the study more comprehensible. Due to space restrictions, I will unfortunately not be able to give an account of the immanent derivation of the categories that fall between *pure being* and *the concept* and, therefore, of the conflicts and unifications of truth-claims that take place therein. It will be assumed that such derivation satisfies all requirements of necessity and rigour placed upon it by Hegel himself.

PART TWO

CONCEPT

As the absolute form itself, [the concept] is the whole of determinacy, but in such a way that the latter is in its truth.

Hegel, *Enzyklopädie* I § 163, Zusatz 2

CHAPTER FIVE

UNIVERSALITY

5.1. Introduction

The first part of our study has shown (a) that the resolution of the Pyrrhonian problematic requires the formulation of a theory of the *Vernunftssatz* and (b) that such a theory has to emerge from the immanent development of the onto-logical categories that constitute the rich content of the cognitive standpoint of thought. In the second part we will examine in detail the category of the *concept*, which is the category that immediately precedes the category of the *judgement*, in whose sphere the theory of the *Vernunftssatz* should come into view.

Speculative logic, as expounded in Hegel's *Science of Logic*,¹ is that part of his systematic philosophy whose aim is to show how knowledge of the truth of being can be attained in the sphere of reason; and to do this through the process of producing or explicating the fundamental determinations of the rational. It consists of three particular logics: the logic of being, the logic of essence, and the logic of the concept. The relation holding between them is derivational or developmental in character; the starting-point of the logic of essence derives immanently from the outcome of the logic of being and the starting-point of the logic of the concept derives immanently from the outcome of the logic of essence. The specific character each starting-point has is absolutely crucial for the *manner* in which each onto-logical sphere develops its categories, both with respect to their individual content and with respect to the content emerging from their interrelations.

In the present chapter I propose to examine the starting-point of the final logical sphere, the logic of the *concept*.² The first general category in this sphere is *the pure concept* or *concept as such*³ or, simply, *the concept* and its first onto-logical determination (or, again, category) is called

¹ WL I contains the logic of being; WL II contains the logic of essence and the logic of the concept.

² The term 'concept' translates the German word 'Begriff'. It is frequently also translated as 'Notion'; see SL and McTaggart (1910: 189).

³ Enz. I § 163.

universality or *the universal concept* or, simply, *the universal*. Thus, the latter will be the object of our inquiry.

A complete clarification of this determination would require the fulfilment of three distinct tasks: (a) to give a detailed account of the move from the last stages of the logic of essence, especially the dialectic of *causality*, to the concluding category of this logical sphere, the category of *reciprocity*, whose content/structure is taken over, represented, and further explicated by universality;⁴ (b) to provide a detailed analysis of its own independent structure;⁵ and (c) to explain how it relates to the other two fundamental determinations of the pure concept, namely *particularity* and *individuality*.⁶ As already noted, restrictions of space prevent us from fully satisfying the first task; nonetheless, some brief remarks regarding this point will be made at the beginning of the next section and, whenever the opportunity arises, during the course of the remainder of this study. The other two tasks will be fully accomplished in this and the next two chapters.

5.2. *Self-Identity and Full Determinacy*

The category and whole sphere of the concept gain an *explicit* existence through the result of the dialectic of *causality*, the last purely essentialist category in the logic of essence.⁷ Causality develops its content in three stages:

- (a) As *formal* causality, it designates the simple opposition of cause and effect; this opposition collapses because the independent existence of the effect transforms it into a simple content (to wit, a content that is no longer an effect) and this immediately transforms the cause into a simple content as well (namely, a content that is no longer a cause).
- (b) As *determinate* causality, it expresses a single element that distributes itself to two different substances, to the one as the cause, to the other as the effect. What determines the distribution is the character of the one of the substances, which presents itself as an *active* substance. Yet, as an independent substance it must *become* active; if this is to be

⁴ WL II 217–240; see also WL II 245–251.

⁵ WL II 274–279.

⁶ WL II 280–288 (particularity) and WL II 296–301 (individuality).

⁷ What follows owes a lot to Burbidge (2006: 74–80).

achieved through *stimulation* (which is the only interaction available in the logic of essence), there must be another cause; obviously this leads to an infinite regress of causes and effects.

- (c) As *conditioned* causality, it designates the relation between an active and a *passive* substance; for it is not enough for there being only an active substance for the explication of causality; the active substance acts *upon* a passive substance. But the active substance, as seen, escapes its simple independence through its stimulation and, therefore, is itself also passive. On the other hand, as has just been pointed out, there *has to be* a passive substance for there to be an active substance. Yet, this exactly means that the passive substance is a *condition* of the active substance. This turns it into an active substance as well.

Causality has now become *reciprocity*, a structure in which a manifold of substances determine one another by being simultaneously both active and passive with regard to one another. This mutual interaction signals the emergence of a new relation, in which the relata are bound non-causally; they emerge *together* in one, *self-identical* relation.⁸ The new relation takes the name *concept* and the first moment of its explicit characterization is called *universality*.⁹

Universality denotes, initially, the *simple presence*¹⁰ of a structure shaped by reciprocity's two dominant features:

- (a) The universal is absolutely *self-contained* or *self-identical*. This must be so because the *relation* of the substances is *non-causal*, they emerge *together* in a *single* unity. With respect to this relation, then, the new structure, the universal, has no *other*; its determination arises out of its own self. It is simple (*ein Einfaches*) and relates only to itself.¹¹

⁸ Burbidge (2006: 82) describes the new relation as "intimate togetherness."

⁹ For a more detailed analysis of the move from the logic of essence to the logic of the concept see Houlgate (2004); in conjunction with this article read also Houlgate (2000). The most detailed account of the dialectic of the *pure concept* (universality, particularity, individuality) I am aware of is given by Schick (1994: 183–228). Winfield (2006: 67–88) and Winfield (1999: 35–46) also provide a detailed analysis of this section, infused, however, with rather too many idiosyncratic remarks. Finally, Burbidge (1981: 111–124) offers some great insights into this section, even if with a rather excessive 'psychological' twist.

¹⁰ Cf. Burbidge (1981: 217): "[...] It is only from something simple [...] that any process begins;" Johnson (1988: 253): "Whatsoever the beginning be made with [...], it ought always to be made with something immediate."

¹¹ Cf. Schick (1994: 187, 196).

- (b) But, secondly, the universal is *determinate*, something that requires the existence of *differentiating* relations and, therefore, the presence of the *other*. Moreover, this determinacy, being within a self-contained element, must lack nothing. That is to say, it is not the case that there are substances which determine others and still are not determined themselves through those others.¹² Clearly, in such realm of absolute interaction the universal must have its *whole* determinacy within itself. As Hegel puts it:

It is [...] the nature of the universal to be that simple [element], which [...] contains *within itself* the highest difference and determinacy.¹³

Thus, it is not only that the universal has a determinate content; it is also that it has the *most* determinate content. I understand this to mean that the universal, as self-contained, requires no element that is not be found in itself in order to be *fully* determined. Its *whole* determinacy lies within it.¹⁴ By having its whole determinacy within itself and thereby being in no need or under the influence of external elements, the universal exemplifies the highest form of *freedom*.¹⁵

As having the most determinate content, the universal is sharply distinguished from *pure being*, which was the *only* previous category that was also absolutely self-contained.¹⁶ The difference lies in the fact that pure being had *the most indeterminate* content, since its involvement in

¹² Cf. McTaggart (1910: 191): "At the end of Essence we had attained to the idea of completely necessary determination. The category of Reciprocity asserts that everything is so connected with other things that the existence and nature of the one is completely dependent on the existence and nature of the other, and *vice versa*. And the connexions of this nature, direct or indirect, which belong to each thing, extend to everything else in the universe, so that the universe forms a connected whole."

¹³ WL II 275.

¹⁴ Enz. I § 160, Zusatz: "[...] Der Begriff [...] beschließt [...] die Fülle alles Inhalts [...] in sich [...]." This is why Hegel calls the concept "the absolutely concrete" (Enz. I § 160, Zusatz und Enz. I § 164).

¹⁵ Enz. I § 163, Zusatz 2: "[...] Der Begriff [ist] die unendliche Form oder die freie, schöpferische Tätigkeit [...], welche nicht eines außerhalb ihrer vorhandenen Stoffs bedarf, um sich zu realisieren." Cf. Schick (1994: 191): "Frei heißt er [d.h. der Begriff] darum, weil er, indem er sich auf seine Unterschiede bezieht, ganz auf sich bezogen bleibt. Seine Unterschiede behalten gegen ihn nichts Vorausgesetztes und damit Äußeres"; Iber (2002: 183–184): "Die Unterschiede der Sache haben so gegen ihren Begriff nichts Vorausgesetztes, Äußeres oder Fremdes mehr. Damit eröffnet der Begriff das 'Reich der Freiheit' des Denkens." See also the critical discussion in McTaggart (1910: 191–193).

¹⁶ WL I 65–81, 82–111. Cf. Iber (2002: 190); Burbidge (1981: 219): "*Pure being* was originally thought simply as a bare category, accepted as the most indeterminate of all indeterminate concepts [...]."

relations was explicitly denied. The immanent development of that category had shown that its absolute indeterminacy was an illusion (or, better, an under-determination of the subject-matter) and soon *becoming* took its place as the truth of being. Yet, the vanishing of pure being results not only in the loss of absolute indeterminacy, but also in the loss of self-identity. All categories from *becoming* to *causality* are nothing but manifestations of the immanent struggle of thought to harmonize the element of determinacy with that lost element of self-identity (or self-containment). The *universal* is the exact point at which this harmonization finds its *explicit* fulfilment, even if only in a still undeveloped fashion. As Hegel has it:

Being, as *immediate*, is a simple [element] [...]. In contrast, the *universal* is that simple [element], which no less is *within itself the richest* [...].¹⁷

Having specified these simplest features of the universal, speculative logic attempts to provide an explicit account of the *manner* (the *How*) of their *unity*. How exactly can it be shown that self-identity and full determinacy belong together in an inherent unity without any problems occurring?

5.3. *Persistence*

Universality, then, is minimally characterized as a self-identity which has the most *determinate* content. The analysis of *quality* in the logic of being has already shown that determination is produced through *negative* relations between *different* elements.¹⁸ Therefore, it must be the case that, since (a) the universal is self-identical and (b) its content is constituted by negative relations between different elements, the universal *persists* (or *continues* or *develops*) through this spectrum of negative differentiation. Something must be differentiated in order for the ‘most determinate content’ to be produced; this something *cannot*, however, be the universal *per se*. Yet determinacy is not a *limit* to the universal, a point which demarcates its passage to an *other*. It is rather the *field* in which it maintains its identity.¹⁹ As Hegel puts it:

¹⁷ WL II 275.

¹⁸ See esp. WL I 125–149.

¹⁹ WL II 276. Compare what Hegel says in LHP by reference to Greek philosophy: “Here [...] the specific aspect is preserved within the universal, so that the universal becomes organic and develops.”

Given this primordial unity [i.e. the feature of self-identity], [...] *determination* is not a limit to the universal; rather, the latter *maintains itself therein* and is [therein] positively identical with itself.²⁰

This further characterization of the universal as persistence is a feature that distinguishes it from (a) a typical categorial structure in the logic of being and (b) a typical categorial structure in the logic of essence. A category in the sphere of *being* has two fundamental characteristics; firstly, it is *immediate* and, secondly, its relation to its other is one of *passing over* (*übergehen*). Its *immediacy* denotes the fact that it initially appears *as if* it had a content that could be explicated independently of any reference to its opposite. Finitude, for example, develops its content without any reference to infinity. When it becomes evident that finitude must necessarily transform itself to infinity, this transformation does not *immediately* take the form of a synthesis, but one of *passing over*: infinity is now what is true in being and the independence of finitude vanishes altogether. Simply, in the logic of being all being is *in truth* is explicitly expressed each time by a single category, taken independently from its other.²¹ In contrast, the universal's relation to the other is not one of passing over, but one of *persistence*.²² Hegel writes:

The universal, on the other hand [i.e. in contrast to *being*], even when it posits itself in a determination, *remains* therein what it is. It is the *soul* of the concrete, in which it dwells, unimpeded and equal to itself in its manifoldness and diversity. It is not dismembered through [a process of] *becoming* [like being does], but rather *continues* through it undisturbed and has the power of unchangeable, immortal self-preservation.²³

This passage deals specifically with the relation of universality to *its* determination and distinguishes it sharply from the relation of being to *its* determination. In contrast to being, the universal *remains* the same in the process of its determination. Each of its determining moments

²⁰ WL II 276.

²¹ WL II 276: "Daher die qualitative Bestimmung als solche in ihrer anderen unterging und eine von ihr *verschiedene* Bestimmung zu ihrer Wahrheit hat." See also WL II 321, where Hegel characteristically says that in the sphere of being "Etwas" relates to "ein Anderes" that is "außer ihm."

²² Cf. Burbidge (1981: 113): "A *being*, *something* and *being-for-its-own-sake* were implicitly the identity of all their qualitative determinations. But since each distinct moment was thought independently, it was left behind when intelligence moved on to another category. The universal, however, continues through all its various moments, remaining explicitly present in each, unaltered and complete."

²³ WL II 276.

contains it in the same amount as any of the others.²⁴ It might be the case that the content of the universal requires differentiation and manifoldness, but in the very process whereby these elements are actualized the universal *explicitly* persists as one and the same. Being does *not* behave in this way; in each categorial transformation being becomes *explicitly* something other than it was. Being is essentially *becoming*; the universal is essentially *persistence*.

The characterization of the universal as persistence brings forth also its distinction from the typical categorial structure in the sphere of *essence*. An essentialist category, similarly, relates immediately to its other, but this relation is one of *dominance* (*Herrschaft*), not one of persistence.²⁵ Dominance arises because relations in the sphere of essence are the result of the activity of *positing* (*Setzen*): An essentialist category posits its *other*, to which it is irreducibly bound, so as to establish its own logical *priority* and *superior* reality over it. In this way, *essence* posits *seeming* or *immediate being*; *ground* posits *what-is-grounded*; *substance* posits the *accidents*; and *cause* posits the *effect*. The problem is that what does the positing comes into existence (or becomes meaningful) only *through* what is posited (*das Gesetzte*)!²⁶ Thus, the claimed logical priority and/or superior reality of the one part of a given essentialist pair over the other turns out to be only the product of an *external* opinion: It is simply decided, without taking into consideration the true logical behaviour of the terms, that one is prior to or superior over the other.²⁷ In contrast, the universal, as persistence, does *not* relate to an other from a *prior* or *superior* standpoint. It is rather absolutely present *in* the determinations that are so bound in relations of otherness.²⁸ As Burbidge puts it, in the sphere of the universal

²⁴ Cf. Iber (2002: 189).

²⁵ Cf. Theunissen (1980: 25–37, 301–332).

²⁶ Cf. Houlgate (2004: 34–38).

²⁷ WL II 276: "Sie [d.h. die Reflexionsbestimmung] *gibt sich* in ihrem Anderen *kund*, aber *scheint* nur erst an ihm, und das Scheinen eines jeden an dem Anderen oder ihr gegenseitiges Bestimmen hat bei ihrer Selbständigkeit die Form eines äußerlichen Tuns."

²⁸ The universal is the substance that has no other place or framework of existence than the place occupied by the relata and their relation. Also, it is an absolute *positedness* (*Gesetztheit*): what is there as posited without being so posited by an external act. Since it is present in *all* elements, the universal manifests itself as an absolute *unity* and *identity*, a *dynamic tautology* or *free power*. See WL II 277: "Das Allgemeine ist daher die *freie Macht*; es ist es selbst und greift über sein Anderes über; aber nicht als ein *Gewaltsames*, sondern das vielmehr in demselben ruhig und *bei sich selbst* ist. Wie es die freie Macht genannt worden, so könnte es auch die *freie Liebe* und *schrankselose Seligkeit* genannt werden, denn es ist ein Verhalten seiner zu dem *Unterschiedenen* nur als *zu sich selbst*; in demselben ist es zu sich selbst zurückgekehrt."

“the negative differences are not simply excluded as other, but are incorporated as constituent moments of the relating identity.”²⁹

5.4. *How the Universal Persists: Absolute Negativity*

The problem of the manner of the unity of self-identity and full determinacy has been illuminated through the notion of persistence. But the question re-emerges in a different guise: How does *this* persistence take place? Speculative logic insists that the manner of the universal's persistence in the field of its own determinacy has the structure of *absolute negativity*:

[...] The concept is, first of all, the absolute identity with itself and this only as [or in the manner of] *the negation of negation* or as *the endless unity of negativity with itself*. This pure relation of the concept to itself, which is this relation only through *its own positing through negativity*, is the universality of the concept.³⁰

It is [...] the nature of the universal to be that simple [structure] which, *through absolute negativity*, contains the highest difference and determinacy in itself.³¹

[The universal] is [...] in itself that absolute mediation, which, indeed, is *the negation of negation* or *absolute negativity*.³²

But how can this notion be specified and how does it relate to the fundamental determinations of universality?

Absolute negativity is a *process of double negation*. It is, firstly, a negation and, secondly, a negation of that first negation. Both negations are constitutive of the nature of the universal. The first negation constitutes the universal's *own* field of *determinacy*. It designates a field in which differentiations (to wit, negative relations) take place, which—if you recall—are absolutely necessary for determinacy to be realized. Yet, if differentiations are present, a manifoldness of relations and relata must occupy the space of the determinacy of the universal. This specific manifestation of the universal as a manifoldness of relations and relata, that is, as a field in which negation is present all over, is called in speculative logic *particularity* (*Besonderheit*):

²⁹ Burbidge (1981: 113).

³⁰ WL II 274–275 (my emphasis; Hegel's emphasis has been removed).

³¹ WL II 275 (my emphasis; Hegel's emphasis has been removed).

³² WL II 276 (my emphasis).

As negativity *per se*, or based on the *first, immediate* negation, it [i.e. the universal] exemplifies determinacy [...] as *particularity* [...].³³

Focusing on this first negation, it [i.e. the universal] is *particular* [...].³⁴

Particularity, however, manifests only the *determinacy* of the universal; the latter must be manifested *also* as *self-identical* and *the most determinate* (that is, not *just* determinate). This is achieved through the logical move of the second negation, which negates the first. What is negated is the *negativity* of the manifoldness present in the universal's field of determinacy. In a later stage, the dialectic will show that this second negation brings forth a *double* result: *firstly*, the concept will be shown to have returned into itself from the negativity of particularity and been exemplified as an explicit totality;³⁵ but, *secondly*, it will be shown to have become the totally other of itself, concreteness or the "non-conceptual" content.³⁶ This structure, where the universal, through the negation of the negativity of determinacy's manifoldness, manifests specifically these two aspects, is called *individuality* (*Einzelheit*):

As this second, as the negation of negation, it [i.e. the universal] is [...] *individuality* [...].³⁷

In this chapter we are not interested in the peculiar development of the structure of individuality, but only in the formal fact that, *given its simplest characterization*, the universal *must* come to exemplify itself *also* as the individual, and thereby actualize the full circle of its onto-logical existence.

We began this inquiry into the nature of universality by specifying that it takes over the content that has emerged from the collapse of essentialism and that this content is fundamentally characterized as self-identical and the most determinate. From its self-identity we deduced its persistence in the field of *its own* determinacy. Next, we saw that speculative logic characterizes the *manner* (the *how*) in which this persistence is logically actualized as absolute negativity. Finally, this has been explicated as involving two negations. The first is expressive of a *manifoldness* of relations and relata; the second is expressive of the *subsumption* of this manifoldness under a single whole, a totality. The content of this overall

³³ WL II 277.

³⁴ WL II 278.

³⁵ Cf. WL II 274.

³⁶ WL II 274, 277.

³⁷ WL II 277.

movement allows the following description of the constituent moments of the *pure concept*:

- (a) *Universality* is the concept's simplest and most immediate content. It is characterized absolutely as self-identical and the most determinate. In its very purity it suppresses (although it does not annul) the *specification* of its *determinate* structure.³⁸
- (b) *Particularity* makes explicit what is involved in the characterization of the universal as being *determinate*. It brings forth the differentiation that must be present in the content of the universal, an element that specifies the universal's field of determinacy as a *manifoldness* of relations and relata. Such differentiation and manifoldness entails that the universal's content is absorbed in *other*-oriented relations of negation (simple negativity).³⁹
- (c) *Individuality* is that specific manifestation of the concept which clarifies, as it were, that the universal is not *just* particularity, is not *just* a manifoldness of relations and relata; it is also a *single* whole which *contains* that manifoldness, a *totality*. This, of course, holds also *vice versa*: a given manifoldness shows itself through individuality to be *intrinsically* a whole, a totality. Thus much can be *minimally* said of the individual; its further explication in the logic of individuality will show that this 'return of the concept into itself' (the second negation) must incorporate what is totally *other* than it, the *non-conceptual* or *concrete* element.

In this way we have reached the end of the *first* part of the speculative logical theory of universality. This is supplemented with a *second*, which focuses on the relation between the moments of *universality* and *particularity*, but it does that only from the standpoint of the first moment, the moment of pure universality—and, in fact, only from the standpoint of its self-identical character. The question that this second part aspires to provide an answer to is this: How is it that determinacy, *in being determinacy*, is still a *self-identical* universal? Or, as Burbidge puts it, "how does

³⁸ Cf. Schick (1994: 192): "Wenn wir von etwas 'im allgemeinen' reden, reden wir von ihm als von etwas Einfachem—als von *einem* Gegenstand des Nachdenkens. Zugleich reden wir von diesem Einen in dem Bewußtsein, von *vielen* zu reden. 'Die Besonderen' sind in der Rede vom Allgemeinen unterstellt; und sie sind darin nicht unterstellt als selbstständige andere Gegenstände."

³⁹ Cf. Burbidge (1981: 113): "Insofar as it has distinct moments, then, the *universal* itself acts negatively, and this introduces *particularity*."

the universal in its totality exhibit its determinate character?"⁴⁰ It is of the utmost importance to keep always in mind that the question will be discussed not from the standpoint of individuality or particularity, but from the standpoint of self-identical universality. Indeed, we are still *not* interested in (a) how the field of determinacy dissolves into *individuality* or even (b) how exactly the field of determinacy *functions* as such, but rather in (c) how the persisting element of universality manifests its self-identical character in the field of its own determinacy.⁴¹ Simply, we want to understand what it means to say, on this *primitive* level, that particularity, as determinacy, is the manifestation of a self-identical universal.

5.5. *The Single Movement Model: Shining Outwards*

Speculative logic explicates the fusion of universality and particularity in the sphere of *self-identical* universality through the identification of the structure of universality with *double shining* (or *double seeming*).⁴² This exemplifies the unity of two distinct operations: on the one, the universal *shines outwards*; on the other, it *shines inwards*. The task is to understand what these expressions mean here, how exactly their unity is achieved, and how *their* unity corresponds to the unity of self-identical universality and particularity. In order to fulfil this task I will firstly develop a model of explication that employs only the shining outwards (call it the Single Movement Model [SMM]); next, I will show that such model is deficient; finally, it will be shown that if a second model complements the shining outwards with a second logical move, the shining inwards, the problem created by the SMM can be removed (call this second model the Double Movement Model [DMM]). My claim is that this route from the SMM to

⁴⁰ Burbidge (1981: 114).

⁴¹ WL II 278 (my emphasis; Hegel's emphasis has been removed): "Näher ergibt sich das Allgemeine so als diese Totalität. Insofern es die Bestimmtheit in sich hat, ist sie nicht nur die *erste* Negation, sondern auch die Reflexion derselben in sich. Mit jener ersten Negation für sich genommen, ist es Besonderes, wie es sogleich wird betrachtet werden [i.e. in the section on the 'particular concept']; aber es ist in dieser Bestimmtheit wesentlich noch Allgemeines; *diese Seite muß hier noch aufgefaßt werden.*" Cf. Burbidge (1981: 114): "[...] That which determines a *universal* is not different from it, but is reflectively included within it. In due course this determination will be isolated as the *particular per se*. At this point, however, speculative reason is interested in the way it renders the universal determinate while yet not being distinguished from it." Cf. Burbidge (1981: 114).

⁴² WL II 278–279.

the DMM represents the exact content of the second part of the speculative logical theory of universality.

First the Single Movement Model. To begin with, the universal, as distinct from pure being, has a *determinate* character and hence must exhibit a structure expressive of *negativity*. Since all that is present in the current onto-logical sphere is the element of *universality*, such structure arises out of the negative relations a certain universal develops with *other universals*.⁴³ This specific move *entails* that the universal in question also relates to a *higher universal* (*höheres Allgemeines*) or *genus* (*Gattung*).⁴⁴ This is because (a) by relating to another universal, it becomes a *relative* universal or, simply, a *particular* which confronts an *other* particular, and (b) *the* universal should remain *self-identical*, namely it should *not* relate to an *other*;⁴⁵ the positing of a higher universal is meant to save the *self-identity* of *the* universal.

The peculiarity of the SMM consists in the fact that it conceives the positing of the higher universal as entailing that the latter, precisely by virtue of its *higher* status, cannot be described as an *other* to all those universals which behave to each other as particulars. For the SMM, the whole point of having a higher universal is so that the *negatively* related universals can be *dissolved* (*aufgelöst*) therein and the self-identity of the universal can thereby be restored. As elements whose whole existence is determined by their dissolution into a higher universal, the dissolved universals are more specifically called *species* (*Arten*).

Thus the SMM holds three theses:

- (1) The *determinacy* of the universal requires that a multiplicity of universals relate *negatively* to each other.
- (2) The *self-identity* of the universal requires that the negatively related universals are *dissolved* into a *higher* universal.

⁴³ Cf. Burbidge (1981: 114): "Its [i.e. the universal's] determination may become evident as it differentiates the one universal from another, external to it."

⁴⁴ WL II 278: "Jenes äußerliche Scheinen macht einen Unterschied gegen *Anderes*; das Allgemeine hat hiernach eine *Besonderheit*, welche ihre Auflösung in einem höheren Allgemeinen hat."

⁴⁵ It should be noted here that the issue at this point is how to secure the self-identity of *the universal*, not the self-identity of *something*. In the logic of being, where the category of *something* is developed, the existence of *distinct* somethings does not in any way hinder the explication of the self-identity of *something*. In the dialectic of the universal, however, the existence of *distinct* universals, taken purely by itself, does indeed hinder the explication of the self-identity of *the universal*.

- (3) The higher universal, which is *the* universal restored in its self-identity, does not relate to the dissolved universals in terms of *otherness*.

The first two theses constitute the content of the *shining outwards* (*Scheinen nach außen*) and represent the two fundamental features of the single movement of determinacy or particularity as this occurs within the ontological constellation of the *self-identity* of the universal. They belong to a *single* movement because they are both expressions of a relation in terms of *otherness*. The *shining outwards* means here nothing else than relation-to-an-other. In contrast, the third thesis is not expressive of a movement toward an *other*, but rather of what *results* from that movement.

5.6. *The Problematic Character of the Single Movement Model*

The pressing question at this point is exactly why the SMM does *not* suffice for the explication of the self-identical universal in the field of its own determinacy. Why *should* there be a second movement, a shining inwards? This question must surely be raised, for the SMM seems to have *indeed* achieved the task that speculative theory has set for itself, namely to show how the *self-identical* universal maintains itself in the differentiation that is constitutive of its own structure. The SMM has shown that the self-identical universal must be explicated in terms of (a) negative relations among distinct universals and (b) an act of dissolution of these distinct universals into a higher universal or *genus* (*Gattung*). Hence one does get what one has desired to get: both determinacy and self-identity in a single structure. The *self-identity* of the universal *in* the field of its own determinacy is achieved through an act of *dissolution* of negatively related universals. Yet, there is a twofold problem with this model:

- (a) It leaves the issue of the *determinacy* of the *higher* universal unspecified.
- (b) It *allows* for a specification of this issue that would *fail* to give a successful account of the harmonic fusion of self-identity and determinacy in the structure of the universal.

Taken without any further clarification or addition, theses (1) and (3) of the SMM lead to an undesirable conclusion regarding the specification of the *higher* universal's determinacy. Thesis (1) demands that the universal should relate to an *other* if it will gain determinacy; thesis (3) specifies

that the higher universal is *not* related to the dissolved universals in terms of *otherness*. Thus, there are only two possible conclusions here: either (a) the higher universal is rendered *indeterminate*, which is an option that does not fit in well with the structure of universality in the present working framework, or (b) the higher universal gains determinacy by developing relations with other *non-dissolved* universals.

The remaining second option, however, is equally ineffective, for the relations the higher universal develops with other non-dissolved universals have to be *dissolved* once more into an even higher universal.⁴⁶ This follows necessarily from the premise that relations of otherness designate the loss of the self-identity of the universal. Clearly, the need for determining the higher universal initiates in this instance a progress of universals.

This result is problematic in two ways:

- (a) Given the endless need for determining the ever higher universal, such progress of universals becomes *infinite*. Infinite progress, however, does not fit in well with a model that purports to explicate the *self-identity* of the universal. It implies that the latter will *always* be a step *prior* to its actualization.
- (b) Given the endless need for determining the ever higher universal *and* the premise that the *dissolved* universals do not play any role in this process of determination, it seems that the progress of universals must be accompanied with the *elimination* of large chunks of lower-order determinacy. In other words, the higher universal will become more and more *abstract*. But since universality is fundamentally characterized not simply by determinacy, but rather by the *full* determinacy, a model of explication of universality which results in the elimination of large chunks of determinacy must be deemed insufficient for satisfying our expectations.⁴⁷

⁴⁶ WL II 279: "Dieses [d.h. das höhere Allgemeine] kann auch wieder als Gattung, aber als eine abstraktere aufgefaßt werden, gehört aber immer wieder nur der Seite des bestimmten Begriffes an, die nach außen geht." To my mind, what Hegel is getting at here is this: The relations the higher universal develops with other non-dissolved universals have to be *dissolved* once more into an even higher universal.

⁴⁷ Regarding this second formulation of the problematic character of the SMM (which seems to be the one that Hegel has in mind when he criticizes it), Schick (1994: 186–187, 198–199) argues that Hegel's point is that this process of elimination of lower-order determinacy culminates in a universal which has no other universals 'around' it through which it could gain its determinacy. This last universal, according to Schick, would be represented by nothing but the unwanted thought of an empty substrate or of pure, indeterminate being (see esp. page 199: "Die Bewegung wird sich, einmal eingeleitet, bei keinem

In this section I have tried to show that the SMM is a deficient model for the explication of the harmonic fusion of self-identical universality and determinacy (or particularity). Its deficiency results basically from the fact that its content, firstly, leaves the issue of the *determinacy* of the higher universal *unspecified* and, secondly, allows the development from within it of a specification of this issue that ends up being supportive of a process of *elimination* of parts of the universal's *own determinacy*. It is because of this failure of the SMM that the speculative logical theory of universality develops the notion of *double shining* as the appropriate exemplification of this fusion.

5.7. *The Double Movement Model: Shining Outwards and Shining Inwards*

The DMM develops a structure which incorporates the fundamental determinations of the SMM, but adds to those the *shining inwards* with the aim of avoiding the pitfalls of the latter. In this new model, the determination of *the universal still* requires the existence of simple negative relations among universals; and for the self-identity of *the universal* to be maintained the dissolution (or subsumption) of the particulars in (or under) a higher universal is *still* needed. But instead of repeating this process with respect to the higher universal's determination, this is achieved through a reverse movement or "shining inwards" (*Scheinen nach innen*), a movement that is directed *back* to the structure of simple negativity, back namely to the species or dissolved universals. As Hegel puts it:

The truly higher universal is that in which this side of going outwards is taken back inwards, the second negation, in which the determination subsists absolutely only *as posited* or *as shining*.⁴⁸

irgend Bestimmten endgültig beruhigen können. So konvergiert sich an ihrem Ende mit dem Gedanken des leeren Substrats"). Yet, while the notion of indeterminacy will play a pivotal role in the dialectic of *particularity* (the next stage in the development of the concept), I see in *the present framework* (i.e. in the discussion about *the problematic character of the SMM*) neither the logical validity in postulating a *final* stage of the progress of universals—although as we will see later this feature emerges validly from within the structure of the DMM—nor why Hegel's argument would require such a move. Surely, (a) what follows from the content of the SMM is *only* that there has to be a process of elimination of lower-order determinacy (but *not* also that there will be a point where this elimination will logically come to its end) and (b) since universality is fundamentally characterized not simply by determinacy, but rather by the *highest*, the *fullest*, *full* determinacy, a model of explication of universality which results in the elimination of large chunks of determinacy must be deemed unable to satisfy our expectations.

⁴⁸ WL II 279.

The structure of the *determination* of the self-identical universal requires, then, according to *this* model, namely according to speculative logical theory itself, *not only* a move “outwards,” *but also* a move “inwards”:

This determinacy, as it exists in the concept, is namely the total reflection, the double shining: on the one hand, the *shining outwards*, the reflection-in-an-other, on the other hand, the *shining inwards*, the reflection-in-itself.⁴⁹

The shining inwards is described as *the second negation*;⁵⁰ clearly, then, it acts against the shining outwards; this means it goes against both (a) the negative relationality of universals and (b) the process of dissolution of particular universals into a higher universal. But since these features of the determinate self-identical universal are *not* dispensable, but rather necessary aspects of it, establishing the shining inwards cannot possibly imply their annihilation. Negating the shining outwards does not mean cancelling it out. What does it mean then?

At this point the notion of *character* (*Charakter*) is introduced. Hegel writes:

[The universal] maintains itself in its determinacy, not only so that in its connection with it it remains simply in a position of standing indifferently against it (in that case, it [i.e. the universal] would only be posited *alongside* it [i.e. its determinacy]), but [also] so that it is exactly that which was previously called the *shining inwards*. The determinacy, as determinate *concept*, is *bent back into itself* out of the outwardness; it is the autonomous immanent *character* (*der eigene immanente Charakter*), which is something essential through the fact that by being incorporated into and permeated by universality, it obtains the same range as the latter and becomes identical with it, and thus, in its turn, equally permeates it. It is the character which belongs to the *genus* as the determinacy that is inseparable from the universal.⁵¹

The universal relates to the field of determinacy not only by dissolving it into a higher form of itself (an act, which, as seen, taken in isolation would only mean that the universal is indifferent to its own determinacy, namely, to the dissolved universals), but also by *incorporating* (*aufnehmen*) and *permeating* (*durchdringen*) it as its immanently built *character*. This character built into the field of determinacy is the manifestation of the genus, in which the negatively related universals have *already* been dissolved. The manifestation of the character of the genus in (or through)

⁴⁹ WL II 278.

⁵⁰ WL II 279.

⁵¹ WL II 278.

its own determinacy constitutes the *exact* content of what speculative logical theory calls the *shining inwards* of the universal.⁵²

One way to illuminate this further is to specify how the relation between 'shining inwards' and 'shining outwards' should *not* be conceived. Hegel is not saying that the manifestation of the character of the genus is the *result* of the process of dissolution of species into a genus. He does not namely argue that the shining outwards and the process of dissolution *produce* the shining inwards. *Nor* is he saying that the genus *causes* the process of dissolution to manifest its character. This kind of relation has been left behind for good with the demise of essentialism. (It is exactly for this reason that the shining inwards is described as *absolute* positedness or *absolute* shining: It is a positedness or shining that does *not* arise out of a *prior* positing or essence and, therefore, does not express a relation in which one of the relata makes a claim to a superior reality.)

What Hegel *does* say is that for the determinacy of the self-identical universal to be successfully explicated there should be not only a process of dissolution of species into a genus, but also the manifestation of the character of the genus through the process of dissolution. Neither of those processes *causes* the other; in fact, they represent one and the same process. *Nonetheless, they must be characterized in this twofold manner, because the simple notion of a process of dissolution of species into a genus does not fulfil the present task of speculative logical theory, that is, the explication of the determinacy of the self-identical universal.*

Thus, the shining inwards is the negation of the shining outwards, not in the sense that it cancels it altogether, but rather in the sense that it cancels its *self-subsistence*. The speculative logical analysis has shown that to think of a determinate self-identical universal means (a) to think of a process of dissolution of particular universals into a higher universal *and* (b) to think this very same process as the manifestation of the character of that very same higher universal. The structure of double shining, therefore, is constituted by two acts, which are (a) both necessary and (b) complementary of each other.

This double structure is necessary because the process of dissolution, taken in isolation, does not suffice for the explication of the *self-identity* of the determinate universal. But why does the process of *manifestation of character* not suffice for such an explication? Why must *it* be complemented with a process of dissolution? The answer is this: The manifestation

⁵² WL II 278.

of the character of the universal is made through *determinacy* and *particularity*, which require the existence of negative relations among distinct universals; but the whole point of the theory of universality's developing a second part has been to show that *despite* this differentiation and manifoldness, the universal can still be characterized as *self-identical*. Something *extra*, therefore, must be *said* in order to move beyond such differentiation and manifoldness. To say that the distinct universals are manifestations of the character of their *single* genus is *exactly* to say that they are dissolved into a *higher* universal. Having two distinct universals standing alongside one another does *not* entail that they express the self-identity of the universal; one has to *mention* this higher universal, and, in particular, to mention it as something that has a *distinct* existence from either one of the particular universals. The complication stems from the fact that the distinctness of this third universal should not be taken as requiring the elimination of the first two universals. But there is only one way for this to be avoided, that is, by specifying that the third universal manifests its character in the first two universals and that, in fact, it is nothing but the process of that manifestation.

In general, the DMM provides a subtle and logically necessary critique (a) of that picture which presents the universal-as-genus as *arising out* of its species, as if the species were something *primary* and existing *independently* of the genus and (b) of that picture which presents the species as *arising out* of the universal-as-genus, as if the universal-as-genus was something *more fundamental* and existing *independently* of the species. Against this picture, Hegel maintains (a) that the process of dissolution of the species into their genus is only an expression or manifestation of this genus, not its source or cause and (b) that the content of the genus is nothing but that process of dissolution, not its source or cause. Nevertheless, and I am sure this is the exact point that causes a feeling of uneasiness to the reader, for speculative logical theory, the species (or particular universals or differentiating elements) must *still dissolve* themselves into their genus (or higher universal), as much as the latter must *still* show itself to be *nothing* but those species and their interrelations by permeating or incorporating them.⁵³

⁵³ Cf. WL I 171. Based on this conclusion of my analysis I must disagree with Burbidge's employment of the notion of *hypothesis* as a function that is (allegedly) necessary for the explication of the determinacy of a *self-identical* universal (1981: 114). Burbidge understands the problem *correctly*: "How in fact is the external determination as particular related to the internal determination as character? It appears as if the universal simply becomes

5.8. *The Absolutization of the Higher Universal*

Let me now briefly refer to an interesting and controversial ramification of the above argument. The universal has been treated as the locus wherein the particular universals dissolve *and* as the character manifested in them and their interrelations. One might argue, though, that conceiving the higher universal in this way does not exclude the possibility of there being a *multiplicity* of higher universals, *totally unconnected with each other* and still *totally determined*. Indeed, given that *its own* character and species determine it absolutely, there would be no need for a certain higher universal to relate to *other* higher universals. In other words, this higher universal's complex relation to its own species suffices for explicating its self-identity and determinacy.

This picture, however, entails that the universal would now lose its *self-identity* and *self-containment*. This is because the existence of a multiplicity of universals, which are *totally unconnected* with each other, implies that *the* universal is now disparate and irreducibly divided. But, if you recall, it

a sub-genus for a more general universal, in which case the perspective of totality [i.e. self-identity] is lost and the synthetic conjunction of the two moments disappears into a progression of even more abstract genera that are related simply by external reflection." And he formulates the *correct* solution *superbly*: "The move to a synthesis will break down unless the process of external reflection is itself included within the totality. The genuinely *universal* act of relating, then, must reflect on itself; the moment of reflecting is not something distinct and independent but a constituent moment of the universally relating dynamic of conceptual thought." So far, so good. But then Burbidge *arbitrarily* decides to make the explication of the determinacy of the self-identical universal dependent upon a function of *hypothesis*: "By considering what it *would* be like if it *were* to show itself, the universal gives itself a determinate character. There is no longer need for a reflection that is external; the difference is proposed only to be immediately cancelled. Through this intrinsic, active process the universal escapes the dialectical paradox. [...] Speculative reason then comprehends the intellectual process signified by *universal concept*—namely as that which relates its terms not simply positively but also negatively by distinguishing hypothetically whatever is not originally distinct. In this way the process of conceiving remains self-identical and self-contained." Burbidge makes two mistakes here. Firstly, the text does not support his use of a function of hypothesis; secondly, and more importantly, the "process of conceiving" can be explicated as "self-identical and self-contained" without incorporating this function of hypothesis. Thought is explicated as self-identical by *non-hypothetically* differentiating itself as species, by *non-hypothetically* subordinating these species to the genus, and by *non-hypothetically* recognizing the latter as what was all along being manifested in those processes of differentiation and subordination. I really do not see what value the function of hypothesis could have in this instance. Moreover, it seems to me that with this move Burbidge gives a certain privilege to the determination of universality as *self-identity*; as far as I can see, though, Hegel is anxious to be understood as saying that not only self-identity, but also *full determinacy* belongs to the fundamental determination of universality.

is a fundamental and already justified premise of the current problematic that the universal is self-identical and self-contained. The fact, then, that a higher universal might be absolutely *determined* through its own species does *not* suffice for regarding it as not relating to other higher universals, that is, *if it is posited that other higher universals do really exist*.

Assuming, therefore, that at a given moment there exists a multiplicity of higher universals, speculative logical theory must explain how the universal's self-identity arises out of it. There are two options available: it either (1) employs once more the notion of *dissolution* into an even higher universal or (2) affirms that there remain *no more* universals which are *not* dissolved into a certain higher universal. The first option, taken in isolation (that is, as it operates in the SMM), must be rejected, for—as already shown—it achieves self-identity without achieving determinacy, and *vice versa*; but even if it is taken in its more advanced state (that is, as it is exemplified in the DMM) it would still be problematic because it would still not possess the power to exclude the postulation of the above assumption. The latter can be prevented *only* if the DMM is, in turn, complemented with the second option above. Thus, if the theory is to achieve its programmatic aim, there must be a point in the dialectic where the process of dissolution stops and *all* universals are shown to dissolve into a certain higher universal. Next, *this* higher universal will obtain its *determinacy* in the manner described in the DMM. Precisely because there can be no universals that are *not* dissolved therein, this latter universal should now more succinctly be called *the highest universal*.

Thus, the logic of Hegel's argument demands the absolutization of the higher universal, its transformation into the *highest* universal. This new element does not change much of the essence of the DMM, except that it now becomes crystal clear that the *shining inwards*, which differentiates this model from the SMM, takes place from the standpoint of the highest universal (and not from the standpoint of any higher universal whatsoever). The character which the particular universals manifest is the character of their *own* genus; but the latter is now revealed to be the *highest* universal into which they dissolve themselves.⁵⁴

⁵⁴ This feature of the speculative theory of universality follows logically from the fundamental determinations it immanently assigns to the universal. Although it is not immediately obvious, the text itself is acknowledging the need for turning the higher universal into the highest one in the last sentence of the penultimate paragraph of the section on "the universal concept." After reducing, in a somewhat confusing manner, the number of ultimate higher universals to four (*life, the I, finite spirit, absolute concept or idea*) and explaining that they are not to be placed above and beyond the determinations of the

5.9. *The Schick-Iber Argument against the Absolutization of the Higher Universal*

I will end this chapter by considering an argument against the absolutization of the higher universal put forth by Friedrike Schick and Christian Iber.⁵⁵ These two philosophers separately argue (in an almost identical way) that the absolutization of the higher universal is both (a) a *needless* move on Hegel's side⁵⁶ and (b) a move that actually goes *against* his attempt to characterize the universal in non-causal, non-grounding terms.⁵⁷ They *correctly* point out that the speculative logical theory of universality ends up making a claim for the existence of a complete knowledge-system (Schick)⁵⁸ or of a metaphysical monism (Iber),⁵⁹ in which a particular universal has existence only as a moment-of-the-one-concept, a moment-of-the-one-universal. Yet, they think that this is problematic and they give two reasons for this judgement:

- (a) They maintain that by turning the particular universal into a moment-of-the-one-universal, speculative logical theory makes an *irresolvable* distinction between the highest universal and the particular universal,

universals that are dissolved into them, Hegel goes on to subsume the first three of them to the fourth, turning thus the latter into the *highest* universal. Here is the crucial passage (WL II 279; my emphasis; Hegel's emphasis has been removed): "Insofern Leben, Ich, endlicher Geist wohl auch nur bestimmte Begriffe sind, so ist ihre *absolute Auflösung* in demjenigen Allgemeinen, welches als wahrhaft absoluter Begriff, als Idee des unendlichen Geistes zu fassen ist, dessen Gesetzsein die unendliche, durchsichtige Realität ist [...]" To my mind, what Hegel says (or implies) here is simply that *if* life, the I and finite spirit are each taken to be the highest universal in a specific sphere of determination, without at the same time relating to *each other*, the self-identity of the universal will vanish. In order to avoid *this* problem, the specification must be made that they dissolve themselves *absolutely* into the (one and only) highest universal. Although it is, of course, extremely important that the highest universal is described as "the idea of infinite spirit" and those super-universals as "life, the I, and finite spirit," our inquiry does not need to deal with this issue. The existence of textual evidence that supports our argument for the logical necessity of the absolutization of the higher universal is all that matters in our working framework.

⁵⁵ Schick (1994) and Iber (2002).

⁵⁶ Schick (1994: 202).

⁵⁷ Schick (1994: 200).

⁵⁸ Schick (1994: 200): "Unter dem Anspruch vollendeter Systematizität allen Wissens kann jedes bestimmte Allgemeine nur dann als begriffen gelten, wenn es als Moment des-einen-Begriffs, des-einen-Allgemeines gedacht ist."

⁵⁹ Iber (2002: 192): "Im Versuch, alle bestimmten Begriffe in einem zweiten Schritt in einem absoluten Begriff zu begründen, verfällt Hegels Begriffslehre einem metaphysischen Monismus, der Hegels Tendenz der Vergöttlichung des Begriffs zwar nicht plausibel, aber verständlich werden läßt."

which, therefore, endangers the *harmonic fusion* of determinacy (or particularity) and self-identity.⁶⁰

- (b) They also claim that what necessarily follows from this distinction is the *absolute indeterminacy* of the highest universal, a result that would ruin the attempt to realize the programmatic aim of the speculative logical theory of universality.⁶¹

Since both Schick and Iber *do* acknowledge the impossibility of accepting the process of dissolution of particular universals into a higher universal without also accepting the transformation of the latter into the highest universal, they demand the *total* removal of this process of dissolution (and hence of the very notion of a *higher* universal) from a model that aspires to explicate the determinate and self-identical universal.⁶² The successful explication of such universal would require, they argue, the employment *only* of a process of *manifestation* of a *character* that has its *whole* being in the manifoldness and differentiation of particular universals. As Schick puts it:

The universal is neither the end nor the beginning of the process [of determinacy], but only the process itself.⁶³

Let me now briefly show, by referring back to my description of the DMM, why the two objections raised by Schick and Iber against the notion of the highest universal cannot be sustained:

- (a) The first objection states that the process of dissolution results in the *irresolvable* distinction between particular universals and a certain highest universal; that is to say, through this process the particular universals are irrevocably manifested as what is *other* to *the* universal. As already shown, however, the whole point of speculative logical theory's employing the notion of *shining inwards* is because it wants

⁶⁰ Schick (1994: 199–202).

⁶¹ Schick (1994: 202): "Damit es alle Bestimmtheit aus sich hervorbringe, ist von diesem höchsten Allgemeinen Indifferenz gegen allen Unterschied verlangt"; "[...] So kommen wir nur wieder bei dem undurchführbaren Anliegen heraus, Bestimmtheit aus dem Gedanken des ganz und gar Bestimmungslosen zu gewinnen"; Iber (2002: 192): "[...] Das wahrhafte Allgemeine des absoluten Begriffs [zahlt] für seine Integrationsleistung den Preis der Indifferenz und Unbestimmtheit gegen alle bestimmten Begriffe."

⁶² Iber (2002: 192): "Es ist allerdings nicht abzusehen, wie aus dem Aufstieg zu immer höheren, abstrakteren Allgemeinen das 'wahrhaft höhere Allgemeine' hervorgehen soll."

⁶³ Schick (1994: 190).

to make sure that the distinction between particular universals and the highest universal is *indeed resolvable*. Through this notion a particular universal shows itself to be the expression of the character of its own genus: it is *this* expression which constitutes the highest universal. In this instance, therefore, the particular universal and the highest universal simply converge. Hence, *pace* Schick and Iber, the distinction between them can indeed be fully resolved.

- (b) Their second objection states that a distinction between the highest universal and a plurality of particular universals which dissolve into it turns the former into *absolute indeterminacy*. They ground this claim in a twofold manner, by using two distinct premises: The *first* says that the process of dissolution is a process of *abstraction* and, therefore, must culminate in a universal which lacks all the determinacy that has been dissolved into it. The *second* premise states that if the highest universal is to be identified with the genus of the particular universals and *still conceived as being distinct from them*, the manifestation of its character through them must be *caused* or *generated* or *engendered* by it. Yet, they argue, if the highest universal is to generate the whole of determinacy, it must in itself be “the totally empty substrate.” None of these premises, however, can possibly be accepted by the speculative logical theory of universality. The *first* premise fails to acknowledge that the process of dissolution is a process of abstraction only in the SMM; in the DMM the process of dissolution is *identical* in content with the process of manifestation of a character. Thus, in the DMM this process is a movement towards more and more determinacy, not a movement towards less and less determinacy. The *second* premise is also invalid because it mistakenly assumes that the highest universal can have an existence independent of the process of dissolution and the process of manifestation. In other words, it assumes that there is *first* a process of dissolution which *produces* the highest universal and *then* an act through which the *independently standing* highest universal *generates* its own determinacy.⁶⁴ As I have

⁶⁴ Compare Hegel's discussion of the “spurious” or “untrue” question: *how does the infinite become finite?* (WL I 166–171). See esp. WL I 170–171: “Die Antwort auf die Frage, wie das Unendliche endlich werde, ist somit diese, daß es nicht ein Unendliches gibt, das *vorerst* unendlich ist und das *nachher* erst endlich zu werden, zur Endlichkeit herauszu-gehen nötig habe, sondern es ist für sich selbst schon ebensosehr endlich als unendlich. Indem die Frage annimmt, daß das Unendliche einerseits für sich und daß das Endliche, das aus ihm heraus in die Trennung gegangen (oder wo es hergekommen sein möchte), abgesondert von ihm, wahrhaft real sei, so wäre vielmehr zu sagen, diese Trennung sei

already shown, no such generating, producing or causing takes place in the DMM. The highest universal is distinct from the process of dissolution insofar as the particular universals differentiate themselves; but insofar as it *itself* is *determinate* its content is identical with the process of dissolution, since it incorporates (*aufnehmen*) and permeates (*durchdringen*) the particular universals (rather than *generating* (*hervorbringen*) them).

If my critique of the Schick-Iber argument is correct, there remains only their claim that the speculative logical theory *does not need* the notion of a process of dissolution because it can achieve its aim solely through the notion of a process of manifestation of a character. The concept, for Schick and Iber, simply has a character and based on that character it differentiates itself. In this process there is no place for a functional role to be performed by some *highest* universal, just because no functional role can be assigned to some *higher* universal.

This aspect of the Schick-Iber argument fails exactly there where an explanation is needed for the unification of the negatively related, distinct universals. The element of the self-differentiation of the concept is present in the DMM as well; what distinguishes it from the Schick-Iber argument is that the DMM *makes it explicit* how this unification takes place,

unbegreiflich. Weder solches Endliches noch solches Unendliches hat Wahrheit; das Unwahre aber ist unbegreiflich. Man muß aber ebenso sagen, sie seien begreiflich; die Betrachtung derselben, auch wie sie in der Vorstellung sind, daß in dem einen die Bestimmung des anderen liegt, die einfache Einsicht in diese ihre Untrennbarkeit haben, heißt sie begreifen; *diese Untrennbarkeit ist ihr Begriff*.—In der Selbständigkeit jenes Unendlichen und Endlichen dagegen stellt jene Frage einen unwahren Inhalt auf und enthält in sich schon eine unwahre Beziehung desselben. Darum ist nicht auf sie zu antworten, sondern vielmehr sind die falschen Voraussetzungen, die sie enthält, d.i. die Frage selbst zu negieren. Durch die Frage nach der Wahrheit jenes Unendlichen und Endlichen wird der Standpunkt verändert, und diese Veränderung wird die Verlegenheit, welche die erste Frage hervorbringen sollte, auf sie zurückbringen; jene unsere *Frage* ist der Reflexion, aus der die erste Frage stammt, *neu*, da solches Reflektieren nicht das spekulative Interesse enthält, welches, für sich und ehe es Bestimmungen bezieht, darauf geht zu erkennen, ob diesselben, wie sie vorausgesetzt werden, etwas Wahres seien. Insofern aber die Unwahrheit jenes abstrakten Unendlichen und des ebenso auf seiner Seite stehenbleiben sollenden Endlichen erkannt ist, so ist über das Herausgehen des Endlichen aus dem Unendlichen zu sagen, das Unendliche gehe zur Endlichkeit *heraus*, darum weil es keine Wahrheit, kein Bestehen an ihm, wie es als abstrakte Einheit gefaßt ist, hat; so umgekehrt geht das Endliche aus demselben Grunde seiner Nichtigkeit in das Unendliche *hinein*. Oder vielmehr ist zu sagen, daß das Unendliche ewig zur Endlichkeit herausgegangen, daß es schlechthin nicht *ist*, sowenig als das reine *Sein*, allein für sich, ohne sein Anderes *an ihm selbst* zu haben.”

while the Schick-Iber argument is unable to do that. Of course, they could vaguely claim that the unification occurs because of the presence of a character in the whole process and in each of the particular universals—but how does this enable us to distinguish between a state of differentiation (or particularity) and a state of unification (or self-identity)? Their claim simply fails to provide a distinguishing mark in this instance. Thus, if what is present is a state of differentiation of universals, Schick and Iber can explain to us *why* this state of affairs is dissolved (that is, because of the self-determination of a single, self-identical character), but they cannot tell us *what* arises out of this dissolution! They cannot even say that the dissolution of a state of differentiation represents a *self-identical* universal, for in that case they would admit that the differentiating elements have been dissolved *into* a universal that is *distinct* from them, namely, a higher universal! Thus, *pace* Schick and Iber, my claim is that what the speculative logical theory of universality teaches us is that the universal is not only the process of determinacy itself (including its beginning), *but also* the end of this process.

5.10. Conclusion

This first chapter of the second part of our study has offered a detailed account of the dialectic of universality. The latter is the first onto-logical determination of the *pure concept*, which constitutes the first general category of the final onto-logical sphere, the logic of the concept. We have shown interest in the constitution of this category because it is through its dialectic that the category of the *judgement* will emerge. The concept was the necessary result of the dialectic of *causality*, the last essentialist category in the logic of essence. And this category, causality, was derived immanently from the whole onto-logical development, which started from the positing of pure, indeterminate being—although, unfortunately, due to space restrictions, this has been here only assumed.

Speculative logic (to wit, the cognitive standpoint of thought or reason) aims at the undogmatic expression of the truth of rational being and, therefore, at knowledge of this truth. The collapse or, better, *sublation* of essentialism entails that both the truth of being and the knowledge of that truth have now the structure of conceptuality. This does *not* mean that the onto-logical structures manifested in the two previous super onto-logical spheres, of *being* and of *essence*, have no reality whatsoever, that they are false. It does mean, however, that any reality and truth they have is *now*

incorporated in and becomes meaningful only through the structure of conceptuality. The latter, in other words, 'supervenes' upon them.

Universality is what conceptuality (*the concept*) shows itself to be when it *first* appears. Its fundamental characterization as self-identical and fully determinate gives rise to a certain tension, for while determinacy requires the manifestation of otherness in order to be explicated, self-identity requires the suppression of otherness. This tension, however, has a completely different character from the one it had in essentialist thought. There, thought understood what there is in truth as being constituted by relations of dominance and externality. In the sphere of the concept, by contrast, such relations play absolutely no *hegemonic* role.

This difference in character on the plane of relationality distinguishes the tension found within each sphere. While in the sphere of essence thought is driven by a primordial *division* between self-identity and determinacy, in the sphere of the concept what shapes the whole dialectical development is the primordial *unity* of self-identity and determinacy. The outcome of the logic of essence was that this primordial division cannot be sustained, for the related terms collapse into one another and, therefore, each fails to establish a priority over the other. The logic of the concept begins with this exact picture, namely that the related terms coexist in perfect unity, in perfect equality, in a relation of *love*. The tension, therefore, that we encounter in the sphere of the concept is, as it were, a 'friendly' one. The logic of the concept does *not* proceed by looking for a way to *resolve* the tension between self-identity and determinacy, because this has already been resolved in the outcome of the logic of essence; it only aspires to *understand* or *make explicit* the (already existing) harmony between these two fundamental determinations.

The first step in this explication has been made in the logical dimension of *self-identical* universality and the unity of the determinations has taken up the structure of double shining. The *shining outwards* exemplifies the universal's relation to an *other* and has two sides: it is (a) a manifoldness of particular universals that relate negatively to one another and (b) a process of dissolution of this manifoldness into a higher universal. The *shining inwards* exemplifies the *highest* universal's relation to the negatively related, dissolved universals; this is *not* a relation to an *other*, but a manifestation of a *character*, the character of the *genus*, through the manifoldness of particulars. One could also put it thus: The *shining outwards* exemplifies a relation of differentiation among particular universals and subsumption (*Subsumtion*) under a higher universal; the *shining inwards* exemplifies an event of inherence (*Inhärenz*) of the highest

universal in the particular. The relation between the two sides of double shining is one of *strict implication*: It is logically impossible to have the one without the other.⁶⁵

The exact connection between the disclosed structure of universality and the structure of judgement will become apparent in later chapters and at the moment we should refrain from speculating on this matter. However, it is safe to say that the structure of the judgement must be somehow able to produce the *expression* of double shining, since the latter has proven to be the most minimal determination of the truth of

⁶⁵ I should here note that, in my view, the speculative logical theory of universality relates directly to and is intended to criticize Plato's unsystematic remarks on the complex relation between the forms, the form of the Good and dialectic. As known, in the *Republic* Plato employs dialectic as the only method of inquiry that can provide us with knowledge of what there is in truth, namely of the forms (or *universals*) (510b, 511b–c, 531d–532b, 533c, 534e). Dialectic is constituted by two different movements: a movement upwards which seeks “the first principle of everything” (533b) and discovers it in the form of the Good (this corresponds to the *shining outwards* in speculative theory or, at least, to an aspect of it) and a movement downwards which unifies all the forms in a necessary, unchangeable system of knowledge permeated by the Good (this corresponds to the *shining inwards*) (511b–c). What differentiates this idea of Plato's from the speculative logical theory of universality is exactly that while in the latter the highest universal obtains its *determinacy* through the particular universals that dissolve into it (and, in fact, when it comes down to its determinate existence, it is nothing but those particular universals), Plato insists that the form of the Good, in which the “upward path” of dialectic culminates (504d–505a, 506d–509c, 509d–513e, 514a–518b; cf. Santas 1983: 251), enjoys its determinacy *independently* of any relation with the other forms, despite the fact that the latter *participate* in it (508e; cf. Santas 1983: 255, 268), in the same way that sensible particulars participate in *them* (476a; cf. Allen 1972). As the proper locus of what one could call ‘the Parmenidean properties of being’ (uniqueness, simplicity, indivisibility, non-changeability, eternality, non-relationality, pure positivity), the form of the Good *itself* seems to require absolutely no connection with any other element, be that external or internal to it, in order to be what it is (479a, 479e, 484b, 485a–b, 500c; see also *Phaedo* 75c–d, 77a, 78b–c, 80a–b, 92d–e; *Symposium* 211a; *Timaeus* 37d–e; *Phaedrus* 247c; *Philebus* 15a–b; cf. Wedberg 1978: 48–49). In the *Republic* it is described as being actually “beyond being” (509d) and in the *Seventh Letter* it is explicitly stated that, being incapable of being grasped through language, it “suddenly appears in the soul like light kindled from leaping fire” (341b–c, 342a, 342d–343a, 344d; cf. *Phaedrus* 274c–275b, 276a). In fact every time Plato refers to it he uses a “mystifying and hierophantic language,” to use I. M. Crombie's words (1963: 562). Now, clearly, this isolation of the form of the Good from the other forms is disastrous for Plato's aspiring project to establish a *necessary* relation between dialectic and knowledge of the form of the Good (which represents the ultimate truth, the ultimate reality), for dialectic is rendered *superfluous* if what is needed for knowledge of the Good is only the *sudden* appearance of the latter in the soul. This approach to ‘the highest universal’ seems to be the complete opposite of the one found in the speculative logical theory of universality. In this sense, Hegel seems to have made a first step toward the completion of Plato's own programmatic aspiration to establish a necessary relation between dialectic, the particular forms and the highest form, by showing that the determinacy of the *highest* form is absolutely dependent upon the dialectical development of the *particular* forms that dissolve into it.

rational being. Truth is fundamentally constituted by a *process* of dissolution of *particulars* into *higher universals* and this whole process denotes the manifestation of the *character of the highest universal* in which it shall *culminate*. How the judgement will relate to this state of affairs remains to be seen, but we can now say that its success as a speculative structure depends upon whether it fits in well with this minimal content of speculative truth.

The next two chapters, which conclude our analysis of the logical structure of the pure concept, aspire to make this movement of differentiation, dissolution and manifestation even more transparent by focusing on specific aspects of it. In general, whereas the dialectic of universality has provided us with a somewhat macroscopic view of the most basic structure of the truth of rational being ('most basic structure' in the sense that each and every *preceding* determination—namely, category—and constellation of determinations—or categories—must now be explained and understood in terms of conceptuality, in terms of 'double shining'), the dialectics of particularity and individuality will delve into and disclose the microcosm of this structure.

CHAPTER SIX

PARTICULARITY

6.1. *Introduction*

The last chapter presented the dialectic of universality. The function of this dialectic was to make explicit the meaning of the proposition-of-reason *being as-concept is universal*. The onto-logical determination of universality had been characterized from the outset as a structure that is fundamentally *self-identical* and *fully determinate*. This means that to say that being-as-concept is universal is to say that it is first and foremost self-identical and fully determinate. Since it derived directly from the collapse of the logic of essence, this characterization was a *necessary* one.

The problem with the structure of universality was that there seemed to be a tension between its two fundamental determinations: whereas self-identity requires the suppression of otherness, determinacy requires the affirmation of otherness. The dialectic of universality explicated the meaning of the proposition *being-as-concept is universal* by resolving that apparent tension. Or, simply, it made explicit to us what it means to say that being-as-concept is universal by explaining to us why there is actually no tension in the fundamental structure of universality.

The outcome of the dialectic of universality (that is, the *meaning* of the proposition-of-reason *being-as-concept is universal*) was that being-as-concept is universal in the sense that it is constituted by (a) a manifold of particulars which dissolve themselves into higher universals and (b) a universal which is the highest and incorporates all particulars by pervading them as a single 'character'. In short, the universality of being-as-concept is *both* a manifold of dissolving particulars *and* a pervading character. This is a premise one should always keep in mind in what follows.

Although, however, the dialectic of universality established that this process of dissolution and pervasion is inseparable from a process of determination or *particularization*, the latter was never put in the front line. The particular was always thought of in terms of its dissolution into a higher universal or in terms of its being incorporated by the highest universal: The particular's difference or distinctness either from other particulars or from the universal had not become the centre of attention and hence remained an obscure phenomenon.

So, what if one placed the emphasis on particularity instead? What form would in this instance being-as-concept take and what content would it have? Instead of asking the question ‘what does it mean to say that being-as-concept is universal?’ let us now ask ‘what does it mean to say that being-as-concept is particular?’

The role of the second part of the analysis of the pure concept, “The Particular Concept,”¹ is to balance things by directing our attention to particularity and *its* peculiar structure in the sphere of being-as-concept. The discussion, then, should be expected to focus on difference and determinacy rather than on self-identity and self-containment. Difference and determinacy will be given a certain priority over self-identity and self-containment (whatever this will prove to mean). Although these latter features will not, of course, be discarded, the perspective in which the dialectic of particularity will take place—the perspective of difference—will prove decisive when certain onto-logical dilemmas will appear. That the dialectic has entered into a new perspective is signalled by Hegel in the following way:

Difference, which is an essential moment of the concept, but in the pure universal is not yet posited as such, acquires in the determinate concept its right.²

The one-sidedness of the dialectic of universality generates immanently the positing of the conflicting proposition-of-reason *being-as-concept is particular* in the context of immediacy of the universe of rational discourse. The dialectic of particularity will make explicit the meaning of *this* proposition. For *our* project to succeed the outcome of the dialectic should be such that the conflict between the propositions-of-reason *being-as-concept is universal* and *being-as-concept is particular* is resolved by means of the emergence of a third ‘higher’ proposition-of-reason that incorporates them both.

¹ WL II 280–296.

² WL II 288: “Der Unterschied, welcher wesentliches Moment des Begriffs, aber im rein Allgemeinen noch nicht als solcher gesetzt ist, erhält im bestimmten Begriffe sein Recht.” See also WL II 283: “Zur Form wird die Allgemeinheit, insofern der Unterschied als das Wesentliche ist, wie er im Gegenteil im rein Allgemeinen nur als absolute Negativität, *nicht* als Unterschied ist, der als solcher *gesetzt* ist.”

6.2. *Totality of Particularity*

Particularity is the most general form and content being-as-concept acquires when it exists *determinately*.³ Since being-as-concept is fundamentally a self-identity, that is, it is an element that relates only to itself, its determinacy is *self-determinacy*: it is that kind of determinacy by virtue of which the relata in a determining relation belong explicitly to the same identity from the beginning. This conclusion holds insofar as the perspective of difference works harmoniously with the perspective of self-identity.

As self-determinacy, particularity is distinguished from both the determinacy operative in the sphere of simple being, “determinacy as such,” and the determinacy operative in the sphere of being-as-essence, “reflective determinacy.” *Determinacy as such* has the structure of the *limit*, in which two independent “somethings” determine themselves by *simply* negating each other. This simple negation is one in which the two “somethings” maintain their independence from one another and their relation is only one of “passing over to an other.”⁴ *Reflective determinacy* has the structure of *seeming*, in which a prior essence *causes* an appearance whose determinacy is allegedly independent of essence and only seems to be a manifestation of it. In other words, in reflective determinacy there is a ‘divide’ separating essence and appearance—in determinacy as such there is a ‘divide’ separating two somethings.⁵

In contrast, all elements in the sphere of particularity, the *particulars*, are immanently permeated by the concept’s *character*, which unifies them (that is, places them in the same identity) from the outset.⁶ In this way, the onto-logical sphere of being-as-concept overcomes the dualism

³ WL II 280: “Die *Bestimmtheit* als solche gehört dem Sein und dem Qualitativen an; als Bestimmtheit des Begriffs ist sie *Besonderheit*.”

⁴ For an authoritative account of the relation between *determinacy* and *limit* see Houlgate (2006: 348–369).

⁵ Cf. Winfield (2006: 71–72, 86). Winfield calls determinacy in the sphere of simple being “contrastive determinacy,” in the sphere of essence “determined determinacy,” and in the sphere of the concept “self-determined determinacy.” See also Mure (1950: 152, § 1.2).

⁶ Hegel says that “the particular *contains* universality” (WL II 280; my emphasis). In many important contexts it is quite clear that when he refers to “the particular” or “particularity” what he has in mind is a *manifoldness of particulars*. We can deduce this from sentences or phrases that either immediately precede or immediately follow the expression “the particular.” At the very beginning of this section (WL II 280), for example, he refers to *species* that *are* different from one another, to the relation between *particulars*, and to the identity of the *particulars* with the universal. It is for this reason that my version

that characterizes both the onto-logical sphere of simple being and the onto-logical sphere of being-as-essence. Clearly, then, particularity is the locus where being-as-concept maintains its *self-identity*, the locus where it *persists*.⁷ But, I repeat, this holds in the locus of being-as-concept insofar as the perspective of difference works harmoniously with the perspective of self-identity.

In the dialectic of universality the language Hegel used to describe the persistence of being-as-concept in the field of particularity is one of species and genus: The persistence is procured through the particulars' relating to the character that permeates them as species relate to genus. *Pace* Plato, the genus has its *whole* existence and life in its species and their interrelations. The explication of the self-identical genus is nothing but the explication of the species and their interrelations as a unity.

Yet, the species themselves, besides providing the locus where the self-identical genus persists, exhibit also the *determinacy* of its content. It is this feature of the species the dialectic of particularity is interested in. As we already know, for determinacy to be accomplished, relations of negativity (or *otherness*) must be developed among them,⁸ disclosing in this way their distinctness and difference.⁹ Thus, as Hegel puts it,

the genus remains *unchanged* in its species; the species are not distinct from the universal [i.e. the genus], but only *from one another*.¹⁰

of Hegel's argument thematizes from the beginning a manifoldness of particulars, and not just *particularity as such*—as Winfield (2006), for example, does.

⁷ WL II 280: "[Besonderheit] ist das eigene immanente Moment des Allgemeinen; dieses ist daher in der Besonderheit nicht bei einem Anderen, sondern schlechthin bei sich selbst."

⁸ Thus, I understand Hegel as saying that while *determinacy as such* is no *other* to conceptuality, the *constituents* of determinacy, the particulars, must behave as *other* to each other, although—given that they are all absorbed in the universal element—they actually achieve this as units that have their *other* in the universal's *Diesseits*, not in its *Jenseits*. To my mind, this is why Hegel describes the determinacy of the concept as an element that does not relate to an other *as if this was located in its Jenseits* (WL II 280; my emphasis: "sie ist keine Grenze, so daß sie sich zu einem Anderen *als einem Jenseits ihrer verhielte* [...]"). In other words, Hegel does not say that the determinacy of the concept has nothing to do with an *other*; all he says is that it has nothing to do with an *other* that is in its *Jenseits*. The concept, as pure universality, has indeed nothing to do with an *other*, either *Jenseits* or *Diesseits* (WL II 280; my emphasis: "[Das Allgemeine] ist daher in der Besonderheit nicht bei einem Anderen, sondern *schlechthin* bei sich selbst."). The most one could say in this instance is that the *other* has become a *moment* of the concept. What this exactly means will be explored in this and the next chapter.

⁹ Cf. Burbidge (1981: 115): "A *particular* contains the *universal*. It is *particular*, however, because it can be distinguished from other diverse *particulars*, which contain the same *universal*."

¹⁰ WL II 280.

The field of determinacy, then, is a manifoldness of distinct elements, the particulars (or species), which relate to each other both negatively and positively. Negatively in that their relation is one of *something* to an *other*, positively in that they exhibit *one and the same universal*.¹¹

One may say, therefore, that being-as-concept is not completely devoid of the dualism (or 'divide') that characterizes the sphere of simple being—insofar as there is a distinction of something and an other therein, the particulars (being-as-concept's determinate elements) do indeed behave partially as *somethings*. Nevertheless, this dualism—which is necessary for determinate existence, even if the latter is 'conceptual' in nature—has in the sphere of being-as-concept been fundamentally *fused into* the element of the self-identical genus. Being-as-concept overcomes the dualism of simple being because its determinacy is constituted not only by this dualism but also by its fusion into self-identity. Thus, the particulars are not *just* somethings; they are, as it were, 'sophisticated' somethings. Their inter-determining, inter-limiting activity is an expression not only of their isolated, private character, but also of the character of their common genus. A pair of inter-determining particulars designates *two* somethings, but also *one* universal. It is this latter feature that allows the talk about "particulars," and not just about "somethings." This is exactly the major difference between a structure that belongs to the lower sphere of simple being, on the one hand, and a structure that belongs to the more advanced sphere of being-as-concept, on the other.

So, the particularity of being-as-concept consists of a manifold of particulars which relate negatively and positively to one another. *The expression of this manifold will express the determinacy of being-as-concept*, for the particularity of being-as-concept is its determinacy. In other words, if one desires to find the answer to the question 'what is being-as-concept?' one must find a way to express the manifold of particulars.

Now, as you may recall, the determinacy of being-as-concept is not just determinacy—it is, rather, *full* determinacy. Therefore, since the expression of the field of particularity is the expression of the determinacy of being-as-concept, such an expression can be nothing but the expression of a *totality* (*Totalität*) of particulars.¹² The field of particularity is totality,

¹¹ WL II 280 (my emphasis; Hegel's emphasis has been removed): "Das Besondere hat mit den anderen Besonderen, zu denen es sich verhält, *eine und dieselbe Allgemeinheit*."

¹² WL II 280: "Zugleich ist die Verschiedenheit derselben [d.h. der Arten oder der Besonderen] um ihrer Identität mit dem Allgemeinen willen *als solche* allgemein; sie ist *Totalität*."

“an exhaustive specification of the universal’s character.”¹³ It is, namely, not simply a collection of units, but a collection of units that is the *total* expression of a character; as Shick puts it, “the particulars distribute themselves in an *enclosed* circle, whose scope is *fixed* through the universal.”¹⁴

To conclude: Being-as-concept has a determinate content only because it consists of a manifold of particulars that relate negatively to one another. This manifold of differentiated elements is held together by the self-identity of the universal, the single character of being-as-concept. What the present section has brought out is that the expression of the manifold of particulars equals an “exhaustive specification” of the determinations of being-as-concept. What needs to be expressed is a *totality* of particulars. The determinations of being-as-concept are not constituents of an open-ended material and the expression of such determinacy has the nature of the explication of a ‘system’, a unitary, ‘enclosed’ determinate framework.¹⁵ *Particularization* is the onto-logical process by means of which this “exhaustive specification” occurs.

6.3. *Totality of Particularity as Completeness*

How does, then, ‘particularization’, the expression of the determinacy of being-as-concept occur? Given what has just been said, this question must be understood in the following way: How does the expression of a *totality* of particulars occur? Hegel distinguishes two ways in which this expression could be attempted: either (a) in terms of the totality of particularity’s being expressed as “completeness” (*Vollständigkeit*) or (b) in terms of its being expressed as “principle” (*Prinzip*).¹⁶ In this section we will discuss the first way and Hegel’s reasons for rejecting it. These reasons are not externally posited—they derive directly from the dialectic of the category of “diversity” (*Verschiedenheit*), which is a category introduced in the previous onto-logical sphere, the sphere of being-as-essence. Hegel resurrects that dialectic and associates it with the dialectic of particularity.

¹³ Burbidge (1981: 115).

¹⁴ Schick (1994: 203). Cf. WL II 280: “Das Besondere *enthält* also nicht nur das Allgemeine, sondern stellt dasselbe auch *durch seine Bestimmtheit* dar; dieses macht insofern eine *Sphäre* aus, welche das Besondere erschöpfen muß.”

¹⁵ Cf. Lau (2004: 254): “Diese Totalität ist das, was Hegel als System versteht, und zwar das holistische System des Begriffs, in dem alle begrifflichen Bestimmtheiten in dialektischer Wechselbeziehung geordnet erhalten sind.”

¹⁶ Burbidge (1981: 115–119 and 2006: 82–83) completely ignores this crucial part of Hegel’s argument, which occupies more than half of the second long paragraph of the section on “the particular concept” (WL II 280).

The reader should be especially patient and attentive, for the dialectic of diversity is extremely obscure in the original text. Although I do my best to elucidate it, some of that obscurity remains.

The expression of the totality of particularity (to wit, particularization) as *completeness* is described as follows:

Insofar as the determinacy of the particular is taken as simple *diversity*, this totality appears as *completeness*. Complete are, in this respect, the species, insofar as *no more* of them exist.¹⁷

This is a model of expression that has a purely *quantitative* basis.¹⁸ It tells us that the totality of particularity can be expressed solely through the *enumeration* of the particulars that constitute it (note the “no more”). If *all* the particulars are mentioned, that is, if their enumeration is *complete*, the totality of particularity will be expressed.

At first sight it is not apparent why enumeration is a problematic way of expressing the totality of particularity. Surely, enumeration must be part of *any* way of expressing that totality! To understand why this way of expression is for Hegel problematic we must associate it—as he does—with the essentialist category of *diversity*. Hegel is able to make use of this association at this specific point because he already argued—in the logic of essence—that enumeration is the peculiar mode of expression of the onto-logical structure of diversity. Thus, whenever he refers, implicitly or explicitly, to quantitative expression or enumeration, what he has in mind is *the* way of expressing diversity.

Diversity is an onto-logical structure that emerges from the development of the more general category of *difference* (*Unterschied*).¹⁹ In the onto-logical sphere of this latter category its fundamental moments (or determinations), (a) identity and (b) difference, come to behave *indifferently* (*gleichgültig*) towards each other with the result that the determination of identity becomes dominant in that sphere and encompasses both moments.²⁰ Identity and difference appear explicitly as *absolutely* self-contained, *totally* self-related determinations, *pure* reflections-in-

¹⁷ WL II 280. See also WL II 340 and WL II 341 where Hegel specifies this *Vollständigkeit* more appropriately as *subjektive Vollständigkeit* and *zufällige Vollständigkeit* respectively.

¹⁸ Johnson (1988: 164) comes very close in acknowledging this, but he eventually fails, because he does not realize that this passage describes an explicative model which is *at odds* with a truly speculative one or, at the most, is just a *moment* of the latter.

¹⁹ WL II 46–55.

²⁰ WL II 48: “Das Unterschiedene *besteht* als gegeneinander gleichgültig Verschiedenes, weil es identisch mit sich ist, weil die Identität seinen Boden und Element ausmacht [...]”

themselves.²¹ As we might say, identity has nothing to do with difference and difference has nothing to do with identity: Identity is simply identity and difference is simply difference. This *over*-emphasis on self-relation—that is to say, on *identity*—in the sphere of difference is the distinguishing mark of diversity.²² So, in the structure of *diversity* (a) identity is what it is *independently* of its relation to difference and *vice versa*—and (b) this ‘independence’ allows the determination of *identity* to dominate the sphere of difference.

Basically, then, the onto-logical sphere of diversity is fundamentally characterized by the suppression of negativity and the dominance of absolute, undifferentiated self-relation. Such an absolute self-relation is nothing but sheer *self-subsistence*: All that matters with respect to something is that it is there, that it exists. Sheer self-subsistence, for Hegel, designates only a numerical presence, a *point*. In a manifold of determinations whose relation is only one of diversity what is significant is not the *determinate* relation between them, but only the fact that they exist (self-subsistence); their relation, therefore, is one of *indifference*, a relation that is not actually a relation.

Enumeration, a series of linguistic pointings to sheer self-subsistences (or, if you will, a series of identity statements), denotes exactly that way by means of which alone a manifold of determinations whose relation is only one of diversity can be expressed.²³ To enumerate is to point to each member of a manifold of determinations in an orderly fashion. When there is no other determination to be pointed, the manifold has been expressed in its totality. What the enumeration would produce in this instance is a *list* of points, a *list* of determinations, a *list* of identity statements.

This description of the onto-logical structure of diversity and of its mode of expression took place in the logic of essence. In the dialectic of

²¹ For Hegel, the presence of the onto-logical feature of absolute self-relation or reflection-in-itself implies that the relation to an *other* is suppressed and, therefore, any mobility between the determinacies of two relata is excluded. Absolute reflection-in-itself denotes an isolation, an over-independence. Cf. WL II 285: “Die Allgemeinheit aber, welche sie im Verstande haben, gibt ihnen die Form der Reflexion-in-sich, wodurch sie der Beziehung auf Anderes entnommen und *unvergänglich* geworden sind.”

²² WL II 47: “Der Unterschied hat die beiden Momente, Identität und Unterschied; beide sind so ein *Gesetzsein*, Bestimmtheit. Aber in diesem Gesetzsein ist jedes *Beziehung auf sich selbst*. Das eine, die Identität, ist unmittelbar selbst das Moment der Reflexion-in-sich; ebenso ist aber das andere der Unterschied, Unterschied an sich, der reflektierte Unterschied. Der Unterschied, indem er zwei solche Momente hat, die selbst die Reflexion-in-sich sind, ist *Verschiedenheit*.”

²³ Cf. Enz. I § 17 Zusatz.

particularity, which takes place in the logic of the concept and is the object of our current concern, Hegel considers the possibility that the totality of particulars that constitutes being-as-concept can be expressed solely by enumeration. But if that happened, the totality of particulars would be identified with a manifoldness of determinations whose relation is only one of diversity. Such a totality is precisely what Hegel calls “totality of particularity expressed as *completeness*.”

The totality of particularity, however, cannot possibly be expressed solely by enumeration and, therefore, cannot be identified with a manifold of determinations whose relation is only one of diversity. Enumeration cannot express the totality of particularity for the following two reasons:²⁴

(1) *Indeterminacy*: An act of enumeration fails to do justice by itself to the *determinacy* that comes out explicitly whenever the totality of particularity is expressed. Merely citing (that is, linguistically pointing to) a number of particulars or designating them by means of identity statements does not entail that they are related in a way that is expressive of their determinate character; what one expresses by means of such ‘citing’ and ‘designating’ is only the sheer identity, the sheer presence of a certain number of determinations.

In fact, this is exactly the reason why the structure of diversity collapses in the sphere of essence—in the sense that it is incorporated into (or ‘sublated by’) more sophisticated structures of difference. As already explained, the *over*-emphasis on the determinations’ self-relation suppresses the negativity present in a determinate manifold, whose expression is required if determinacy is to be expressed. This causes the demise of the onto-logical category of diversity. For, while diversity—as a mode of *difference*—should be expressive of difference, the suppression of negativity in its structure leaves the determinacy of the determinations totally unexpressed:²⁵ As a consequence, *difference* vanishes, for without

²⁴ I derive the first reason (‘indeterminacy’) from a further analysis of the dialectic of diversity in the sphere of essence and the second (‘externality’) from an analysis of the following long sentence in WL II 280: “Es ist für sie kein innerer Maßstab oder *Prinzip* vorhanden, weil die *Verschiedenheit* eben der einheitslose Unterschied ist, an welchem die Allgemeinheit, die für sich absolute Einheit ist, bloß äußerlicher Reflex und eine unbeschränkte, zufällige Vollständigkeit ist” (ignore for the moment the first clause of this sentence).

²⁵ WL II 48: “Die Momente des Unterschiedes sind die Identität und der Unterschied selbst. Verschiedene sind sie als in sich selbst reflektierte, *sich auf sich beziehende*; so sind

determinacy there can be no difference. What remains is the *indeterminate* diversity of certain points, which, being indistinguishable from one another, collapse into one another.²⁶

Precisely the same result would arise from the totality of particularity's being expressed as completeness. For in this case too, the absolute diversification, and hence absolute self-reflection, of the particulars would remove determinacy from the field of particularity. The latter, however, is the locus where being-as-concept—a structure that is fundamentally determinate—is expressed determinately. It follows that enumeration, the peculiar mode of expression of diversity, fails to express by itself the totality of particularity.²⁷

(2) *Externality*: The second reason why enumeration cannot express by itself the totality of particularity is the following. To begin with, one may argue that even though enumeration does not contribute to the expression of the *determinacy* of the totality of particularity, it does express that totality by itself in the sense that, firstly, it specifies the *existence* of all determinations in the sphere of being-as-concept and, secondly, this act of specification precedes an act of *determining* that existence. The idea is that enumeration 'runs through' a number of diverse elements and only then 'the mind' or 'thought' assigns determinacy to them. So, yes, enumeration does not express by itself the *determinacy* of the totality of particularity, but it does express that totality *by itself* in the sense that it specifies—by means of a *prior* act—the *existence* of all the elements that constitute it.

sie in der Bestimmung der Identität Beziehungen nur auf sich; die Identität ist nicht bezogen auf den Unterschied, noch ist der Unterschied bezogen auf die Identität; indem so jedes dieser Momente nur auf sich bezogen ist, sind sie *nicht bestimmt* gegeneinander."

²⁶ WL II 48: "Weil sie nun auf diese Weise nicht an ihnen selbst unterschiedene sind, so ist der *Unterschied* ihnen *äußerlich*. Die Verschiedenen verhalten sich also nicht als Identität und Unterschied zueinander, sondern nur als *Verschiedene* überhaupt, die gleichgültig gegeneinander und gegen ihre Bestimmtheit sind."

²⁷ Cf. Johnson (1988: 100): "[...] Numerical difference [...], for Hegel, is no difference at all [...]; Johnson (1988: 103): "[According to Hegel] true individuality is more than the possession of a unique number; to give everyone a number is to treat them all as identical, and precisely to deny their individuality." See also WL II 288: "Es ist schon früher gezeigt worden, dass die Zahl eine unpassende Form ist, um Begriffsbestimmungen darein zu fassen, aber um unpassendsten vollends für Bestimmungen des Begriffs selbst; die Zahl, da sie das Eins zum Prinzip hat, macht die gezählten zu ganz gleichgültigen;" WL II 321: "[...] Die auf der Zahl und dem Quantum überhaupt beruhende Bestimmung ist die wesentlich *gleichgültige, begrifflose*."

Hegel's objection to this argument is overly complicated, but it goes somewhat as follows. The argument promotes a model of expression which renders the determinacy of particularity 'external' to the particulars expressed—as Hegel puts it, it is “a simply external reflex” (*ein bloß äußerlicher Reflex*).²⁸ This is so because the determinacy of the particulars is imposed upon them by the act of an external observer, ‘the mind’ or ‘thought’. Hegel calls this external observer “a third element” or simply “a third” (*ein Drittes*), for it is something distinct from the two particulars that compose a determinate relation between particulars: It is something outside such a relation that adds determinacy to the related particulars.

The problem with the model's rendering the determinacy of particularity external is, Hegel believes, that it assigns a *subjectivist* character to that determinacy. By this he means simply that externality generates the distinction between a particular *in itself* and a *subject* ('the mind') that (a) is distinct from it and (b) determines it. This subjectivism creates a problem for two reasons.

On the one hand, a 'gap' is artificially constructed between the field of particularity and what determines it; the determinacy that is expressed is no longer intrinsic to particularity but it is rather imposed upon it. This creates the *uncertainty* of whether the expressed determinacy corresponds to the determinacy of particularity *itself*.²⁹

On the other hand, subjectivism is here problematic because the subject acquires the power of arbitrarily modifying the determinacy of the field of particularity. That is to say, even if we accept that enumeration can specify the existence of the totality of particulars, the determinacy of this totality is left up to the mercy of the determining subject: The subject might just decide that a certain particular has actually a different or more sophisticated character than the one it assigned to it up to this moment. But this exactly means that in this case the field of particularity would never be expressed as *fully* determinate: At no point in the process of expression could it be said with confidence that the determinacy of particularity has been fully explicated.³⁰ As Hegel puts it, the determinacy

²⁸ WL II 280.

²⁹ This holds especially for the so-called 'representationalist' models, which are based upon the belief that the essence of the particulars is their diversity and self-subsistence, from which it follows that their determinacy is externally imposed upon them. On exactly this point see Winfield (2006: 73–74) and Johnson (1988: 159).

³⁰ Cf. Schick (1994: 203): “Doch da die Unterschiede hier ohne Beziehung aufeinander sind, läßt sich auch nie mit Bestimmtheit sagen, daß Vollständigkeit erreicht sei.”

that is expressed would in this case remain *unbeschränkt* and *zufällig*, a “difference without unity.”³¹

The above objection to the claim that enumeration, even though it cannot express by itself the determinacy of the totality of particulars, can express by itself the existence of that totality mirrors—or, if you will, has its basis upon—the onto-logical *development* of the essentialist category of diversity. As explained, having reached a state of a relation of indifference, the moments of difference are drawn into the one-sided determination of *identity*, with the result that difference ceases being difference: it becomes sheer *diversity*. This is a problem, however, because what was supposed to be expressed is difference—not diversity.

To remedy this problematic state of affairs the suggestion comes to the fore that while the moments of difference must fall into one another as pure self-relations, they can also be held apart as different by a “third element” (*ein Drittes*), namely ‘the mind’ or ‘thought’. In the structure of diversity identity and difference have the status of self-subsistent and totally independent determinations; as we know, however, their *determinate* character is expressed only through their negative relation, their negativity. Thus, since the moments of difference are—in the structure of diversity—what they are in themselves independently of their relation, the function of the ‘recognition’ of their determinate character through negativity is assigned to the interference of an external, ‘third’ element. It is only through this Third that identity relates to difference determinately and *vice versa*.³²

The sharp distinction between the sheer self-relation of the moments of difference, on the one hand, and their determinate relation, on the other, creates a contradiction in the sphere of difference. When the focus is on their self-relation, identity becomes *identical* to difference; but when it is their determinate relation that is under consideration, the moments of difference appear as *different*. Clearly, there is a contradiction here: each of the moments of difference is at the same time both identical to and different from the other.

³¹ WL II 280.

³² WL II 49: “Die *äußere Reflexion* [...] ist der *bestimmte* Unterschied derselben nicht als absolute Reflexion-in-sich, sondern als Bestimmung, wogegen die an sich seiende Reflexion gleichgültig ist; seine beiden Momente, die Identität und der Unterschied selbst, sind so äußerlich gesetzte, nicht an und für sich seiende Bestimmungen;” WL II 49–50: “Diese äußerliche Identität nun ist die Gleichheit und der äußerliche Unterschied die *Ungleichheit*. [...] Ob etwas einem anderen Etwas gleich ist oder nicht, geht weder das eine noch das andere an; jedes derselben ist nur auf sich bezogen, ist an und für sich selbst, was es ist; die Identität oder Nichtidentität als Gleichheit und Ungleichheit ist die Rücksicht eines Dritten, die außer ihnen fällt.”

In its attempt to overcome this contradiction, the dialectic of diversity culminates in its dividing rational being into aspects or sides or “insofar”: *Insofar* as the moments of difference are self-related, they are identical; *insofar* as they are determinate, they are different.³³ The problem with this development, however, is that a ‘gap’ between self-subsistence and determinacy has emerged. Self-subsistence is now independent from determinacy and, therefore, the specification of the latter might have nothing to do with what is determined (the self-subsistent)!

The application of this analysis to the dialectic of particularity has shown that the expression of the totality of particularity by means of enumeration—that is to say, its expression as a structure of diversity—generates externality and subjectivism, which in their turn generate uncertainty and openness. The suggestion was that enumeration, even though it cannot express by itself the determinacy of the totality of particulars, can express by itself the existence of that totality. The problem the dialectic of particularity—via the dialectic of diversity—brought to the fore was that even if it is accepted that enumeration has that capacity, the suggestion leads with necessity to the employment of an act of determinacy that generates uncertainty and openness. Both uncertainty and openness are incompatible with the aspiration to express the totality of particularity. This is so because, on the one hand, uncertainty is incompatible with the identification of the expression of the totality of particularity with the expression of the *truth* of rational being—and on the other hand, openness is incompatible with the expression of a *totality*.

From whatever view one looks at it, then, the model which aspires to express the totality of particularity as *completeness* fails to do so. It produces either indeterminacy or uncertainty and openness, features which are incompatible with that expression. The model should, therefore, be rejected.

Before we proceed to examine the meaning and possibility of expressing the totality of particularity in terms of *principle*, let us note that the appeal to externality as a reason against enumeration’s being a suitable mode of expression of the totality of particularity has another significance as well. One may object that enumeration, since it does not contribute to determinacy, should not be made the mode of expression upon which

³³ WL II 50ff.

the expression of particularity is based anyway. It would be much more appealing if that basis was provided by a mode of expression which allowed determinacy to become apparent. Such a mode would be one that expressed not only the self-subsistence, but also the negativity of the particulars that constitute a pre-given aggregate of particulars. Thus, if an aggregate of particulars is given, this mode of expression will enumerate the particulars and simultaneously specify the negative relations between them without assuming that the act of enumeration is prior to, or even distinct from, the act of determining.

The previous discussion of externality is significant in this instance because it goes against this mode of expression as well. For since the aggregate of particulars is *pre-given*, the expression of their determinacy generates once more uncertainty and openness. On the one hand, it generates uncertainty because the sheer presence of a pre-given aggregate of particulars does not guarantee that the particulars that constitute it are the true determinations of being-as-concept. Indeed, the logical possibility would remain that *none* of those pre-given determinations belong truly to being-as-concept. On the other hand, it generates openness because the sheer presence of a pre-given aggregate of particulars does not guarantee that this aggregate is a *totality*, an ‘*exhaustive specification*’ of the determinations of being-as-concept.

6.4. *Totality of Particularity as Principle*

According to Hegel, the totality of particularity can be expressed, not as completeness, but only as principle.³⁴ We saw why the first way of expression is rejected—but what does it mean to say that the totality of particularity is expressed as principle? What is the difference between expressing a totality solely by means of enumeration, or even by means of specifying the determinacy of a pre-given aggregate, and expressing it as principle?

To express anything whatever as principle means to posit its most general character and let it determine itself by itself—that is to say, let all its determinations and the various (negative and other) relations between them arise out of the sheer positing of its most general character. This development Hegel calls “immanent development” and the determinacy that results from it he calls “immanent determinacy.” Thus, in the case

³⁴ WL II 280: “Die Besonderheit [...] ist Totalität an ihr selbst und *einfache* Bestimmtheit, wesentlich *Prinzip*.”

of the totality of determinations (particulars) that constitute the determinacy of being-as-concept what is required for its expression is simply to observe the *immanent* development of the sheer positing of the most general character of being-as-concept.³⁵

Clearly, this way of expression is radically different from that expression which occurs by means of enumeration alone. It is also different from that expression which takes place by means of specifying the determinacy of a pre-given aggregate. In both of these cases an aggregate of particulars is posited there first, and only then an act comes to specify either their existence or their determinacy. In the case of the totality's being expressed as principle such an aggregate *comes to be constructed out of* the immanent determining of a single element, the most general character of being-as-concept.³⁶ It differs from the enumeration model also because it specifies the *negative* relations between particulars. But why would this difference matter?

The difference would matter only if the emergence of the aggregate from the most general character of being-as-concept gave us what enumeration and non-immanent determining could not give us: determinacy (in the case solely of enumeration), certainty and totality. Firstly, since this model of expression does specify the negative relations between particulars, it avoids the indeterminacy problem. Secondly, since all the determinations emerge from the sheer positing of the most general character of being-as-concept, it is certain that they belong to it truly (as long as they are not entangled in unresolved contradictions).

What remains unanswered is how exactly the emergence of an aggregate of particulars from the most general character of being-as-concept comes to be expressed as a *totality* of particulars. It also needs to be explained how exactly the negative relationality of particulars occurs when the totality of particularity is expressed as principle: What would be the content and form of negativity in the domain of such expression? Clearly, given

³⁵ Cf. WL II 277 (my emphasis; Hegel's emphasis has been removed): "Das Allgemeine ist somit die Totalität des Begriffes, es ist Konkretes, ist nicht ein Leeres, sondern hat vielmehr durch seinen Begriff Inhalt—*einen Inhalt, in dem es sich nicht nur erhält, sondern der ihm eigen und immanent ist.*" See also WL II 280: "Die Verschiedenheit [...] geht in [...] eine *immanente Beziehung* der Verschiedenen über."

³⁶ Cf. Schick (1994: 203): "Daß die Besonderen nicht zufällig verschieden bleiben, gründet darin, daß auch ihr Unterschied gegeneinander von ihrem Allgemeinen hervorgebracht und so Unterschied des Begriffs ist;" Schick (1994: 203): "Es sind nicht beliebig viele Besonderungen denkbar; was für Besondere auftreten hat sein Kriterium im Allgemeinen;" Schick (1994: 204): "Worin sich die Besonderen unterscheiden, ist durch das Allgemeine prinzipiert."

what has just been said, if the whole project is to succeed, the answers to these two questions, which determine *the meaning of particularity*, cannot be given arbitrarily (i.e. non-immanently)—they must themselves emerge from the immanent development of the sheer positing of particularity as this has transpired through the outcome of the dialectic of universality (recall here that both universality and particularity are themselves determinations of being-as-concept). As Hegel himself writes,

[particularity] has no other determinacy than the one which is posited through the universal itself and [which] develops itself from that positing in the following way.³⁷

In other words, the meaning of particularity expressed as principle should be the result of the *dialectic* of particularity, the result of the *development* of the category of particularity as this has emerged from the one-sided dialectic of universality.

All in all, the above discussion of the problem of the expression of the totality of particularity aimed at establishing the superiority of the totality of particularity's being expressed as principle over its being expressed as completeness. Hegel is anxious to pass the message that the determinacy of being-as-concept is not expressed by simply enumerating (that is, linguistically pointing to) a pre-given aggregate of particulars or even by specifying the negativity involved in such an aggregate. This aggregate might be given by tradition or imagination or empirical observation. The rational does not disclose itself by means of an act that comes *after* the *prior* grouping of the categories. Rather, being expressed as principle, being-as-concept actively and immanently explicates itself. It is exactly this act of self-explication—of immanent determining—that takes the shape of a manifold of particulars—and more specifically, of a totality of negatively and positively related particulars.³⁸ As Hegel puts it,

the principle contains the beginning and essence of the development and realization of the concept; any other way of determining the concept is [...] unfruitful.³⁹

³⁷ WL II 280.

³⁸ Cf. Taylor (1975: 304).

³⁹ WL II 285; Enz. I § 163, Zusatz 2: "Der Begriff ist [...] das wahrhaft Erste, und die Dinge sind das, was sie sind, durch die Tätigkeit des ihnen innewohnenden und in ihnen sich offenbarenden Begriffs."

Before we continue with the dialectic of particularity, so as to specify its meaning as being-as-concept's active and immanent determining, let me make the following four remarks:

(1) Hegel's notion of "totality of particularity" should not be confused with Kant's notion of "manifoldness of intuition." Whereas the latter refers to the fleeting representations that are passively received by the faculty of sensibility, the former refers to the determinations of being-as-concept. This term, 'the determinations of being-as-concept', refers to *concepts*, not to intuitions. The dialectic of particularity deals, then, with the expression of a totality of concepts and the various determining relations they have with one another.

(2) Given what I have just said is true, Hegel's account of the relation between being-as-concept (or, what he calls, "*the concept*") and particulars should not be confused with Kant's account of the relation between concepts and intuitions. For Kant, concepts—either empirical or *a priori*—are the elements of the faculty of understanding by means of which intuitions are synthesized and thereby experienced as objects. Hegel neither affirms nor denies this Kantian idea. This is so because the problem he deals with in the onto-logical project of the *Science of Logic* does not have to do with the relation between concepts and intuitions, but rather with the relation between concepts. Thus, it may be the case that Hegel agrees with Kant that the determinations of being-as-concept function as principles of synthesis of manifolds of intuitions—this, however, is not what concerns him in the logic of the concept, in general, and in the dialectic of particularity, in particular.

(3) There is a reason why Hegel is not concerned with *a priori* concepts as principles of synthesis and why Kant is so concerned. In both cases it has to do with what makes an *a priori* concept *true*. For Kant an *a priori* concept is true (or, in the Kantian terminology, has "objective validity") if it is proven that its function of synthesis of intuition is a necessary condition for our experience of objects. In contrast, for Hegel an *a priori* concept (that is, a determination of being-as-concept) is true if the judgement that expresses it, firstly, emerges immanently from the most general character of being-as-concept and, secondly, is not involved in an unresolved contradiction.

(4) A final remark: Note that Hegel's preference for an explicative model that aspires to express the totality of particularity, not as completeness, but as a principle, reveals a crucial feature of the 'speculative structure'

of *judgement*. For if (a) the field of being-as-concept's determinacy is constituted by a *totality* of determinations and (b) this totality cannot be expressed by the enumeration or subsequent determining of a pre-given aggregate, but rather it must be expressed as the *active* (or *processual*) manifestation of a principle, then the judgement as a *unit* must be able to *develop* in such a way as to express both that totality and that active manifestation. In other words, the above discussion allows the—somewhat external—remark that the *single* judgement employed for the expression of being-as-concept should be able to express both a totality of determinations and the process leading up to that totality. How exactly this is done shall be explained in the onto-logical sphere of the judgement. Still, there is plenty more to be said before we enter that sphere.

Our next task is to spell out what it means to say that particularity, when expressed as principle, comes to express the *negativity* involved in the determinacy of being-as-concept—and, in fact, in such a way that what comes to be expressed is a *totality* of determinations. As already pointed out, this should be done by following the onto-logical development of the sheer positing of the category of particularity as this has emerged from the dialectic of universality. We will now see that this brings out a number of novel and quite interesting ideas.

6.5. *The Positing of Particularity and the Fundamental Species of Universality*

Particularity enters the sphere of being-as-concept as that element which has a peculiar connection to universality. What connects the particular to the universal is that in the former the latter's *incorporated* relation to an other, its “shining outwards,” is *extroverted*, to wit, made explicit.⁴⁰ The particular, in other words, takes upon itself the difference of the universal. The particular relates to an *other particular* and this relation of otherness is an expression of the universal, of the genus. As seen, such relation of otherness between particulars is absolutely necessary in the sphere of being-as-concept and emerges directly from the original characterization of universality as what persists in a manifold of *different* units.

⁴⁰ WL II 281 (my emphasis; Hegel's emphasis has been removed): “Das Besondere ist das Allgemeine selbst, *aber* es ist dessen Unterschied oder Beziehung auf ein Anderes, sein Scheinen nach außen [...]”

Nevertheless, the relation between distinct particulars is not the only relation of otherness that is at play in the structure of particularity. In fact, at a moment when the object of investigation is the determining of *particularity itself* (or, if you prefer, *particularity as such*), that relation is not the most primordial relation of otherness one could find in the structure of particularity. This is so because the existence of a relation of distinct particulars does not *determine* particularity as such, since in this instance no *other* to particularity is offered. The particulars are distinct from one another, but *as particulars* they fall into one another—they are simply particularity. (Each of them is simply a particular.) Particularity with no other, however, would immediately vanish.

But particularity as such *does* have an other, the universal, for it has come to the fore as that which is distinct from universality. Hegel writes:

But there is no other at hand, from which the particular would be differentiated, than the universal itself.⁴¹

This is the single most important premise in the dialectic of particularity, as everything that follows stems from it. When this determination of particularity occurs, it is accompanied automatically by the determination of universality. Since particularity is the determinacy of universality and universality determines itself, the universal proves to be what determines itself by bifurcating itself into the species of (a) the particular and (b) the universal.⁴²

⁴¹ WL II 281. Cf. Burbidge (2006: 83).

⁴² WL II 281: "Das Allgemeine bestimmt *sich*, so ist es selbst das Besondere; die Bestimmtheit ist *sein* Unterschied; es ist nur von sich selbst unterschieden. Seine Arten sind daher nur (a) das Allgemeine selbst und (b) das Besondere." See also WL II 282: "In Absicht auf Vollständigkeit hat sich ergeben, daß das Bestimmte der Besonderheit *vollständig* in dem Unterschiede des *Allgemeinen* und *Besonderen* ist und daß nur diese beiden die besonderen Arten ausmachen." Compare my version of Hegel's argument with Burbidge's (1981: 116): "In the realm of pure thought all that we have is conceptual activity itself, which has shown itself to be *universal*. Therefore, when we isolate the concept *particular* with all of its connotations, there is no alien particular to which it can be related as *diverse*. The only difference left that is relevant to such a relation is the self-reflexive one between *particular* and *universal* itself. If conceiving universally has species, then, these species are: (a) the universal as such, and (b) its particularity." According to Burbidge, the isolation of the particular leaves us with no *other* to which it can relate as *diverse* because the act of isolation takes place within the realm of the universal. Since no difference can be produced *within* this realm (for it is universal and, therefore, all its elements are expressive of the same genus), the only difference that remains applicable is the one between the realm itself (namely, the universal) and the elements that are manifested therein (namely, the particulars) *when the realm determines itself*. In contrast to Burbidge's version, I claim that the particular is initially determinately isolated because it stands against an other

Note, importantly, that this relation between universality and particularity on the level of the *species* does not *cancel out* the one between two particulars on that same level (as Winfield, for example, argues).⁴³ The

particular, which means there is “an alien particular to which it can be related as diverse.” It is just that this *other* particular cannot be determined as *particular*, for it would then be no *other*. It must therefore be determined as the *universal*, since there is no other element present which could produce a *difference*. It is in this way, I argue, that Hegel can claim that the universal determines *itself* by differentiating itself from *its own* determinacy (i.e. particularity). In my opinion, Burbidge’s version of Hegel’s argument is mistaken because it tries to establish a self-reflexive difference *immediately*, that is to say, before the postulation of a *manifoldness of particulars*. (This move by Burbidge is very peculiar indeed, for a page earlier he distinguished the particular from the universal by virtue of the former’s relation to other *particulars*). Schick refrains from providing us with an *argument* as to *why* the universal must in this specific instance bifurcate itself to the species of the universal and the particular. All she says on this issue is this: “Daß die Gattung Begriff sich in zwei Arten, nämlich das Allgemeine und das Besondere, scheidet, ist aus ihr selbst zu erschließen” (Schick 1994: 208); and: “Daß der Begriff des Begriffs in Allgemeines und Besonderes und nur in diese Arten sich zerlegt, hat seine Notwendigkeit in ihm selbst” (Schick 2004: 205). Iber (2002: 193) gives us still a different argument; he derives the incorporation of the universal in its species from the premise that “the universal differentiates itself from itself”: “Daß sich das Allgemeine des Begriffs in die beiden Arten, das Allgemeine und Besondere scheidet, ist ihm selbst zu entnehmen. Indem sich das Allgemeine des Begriffs von sich selbst unterscheidet, ist es selbst das Besondere und teilt sich in die Arten (a) das Allgemeine selbst und (b) das Besondere.” He seems to have in mind the following argument: (1) The universal becomes the particular through its own self; (2) Thus: The particular *is* the universal; (3) Thus: The universal is both the universal and the particular (because it is, of course, *itself*; but it is also the particular). My problem is with the first premise: Why should the universal become itself a particular, i.e. why should it place itself next to a particular on the level of the species? Iber leaves this question unanswered; I maintain that it does that because the particular must *determine* itself through its *other* and that other can be only the universal. Mure (1950: 164) has *completely* misunderstood Hegel on this point; he mistakenly thinks that what is at stake here is the relation between a *natural* genus and its species. The same holds for Johnson (1988: 164).

⁴³ See Winfield (2006: 81): “Because the differentiation of self-determined determinacy, of the universal concept, derives exclusively from the determinacy underway determining itself, the difference cannot stand distinguished from other independently given differences, as one particular opposing others. Instead, the differentiation that universality immediately generates is particularity as such, not *a* particular, already contrasted with others, but the particular concept as a whole. [...] The concept of particularity *per se* cannot already involve a multiplicity of particulars, individuated by factors given independently of the universal.” I do *not* agree with Winfield here; as I see it, “particularity as such,” “the particular concept as a whole” is nothing but a manifoldness of particulars. Winfield seems to assume that reference to a manifoldness of particulars *presupposes* reference to *individuality*. Firstly, this is something we will *discover* in the process of the dialectic and it will then acquire a meaning completely different from the one Winfield ascribes to it; and, secondly, such manifoldness derives *immediately* from the notion of a universality-that-is-fully-determinate, without the notion of individuality being mentioned. Of course, we will find out later that the proper explication of particularity requires the involvement of the notion of individuality (or specific particularity). This, however, does not mean that when particularity is first introduced what it designates is “particularity as such” and not a manifoldness of distinct particulars.

latter relation follows from the fact—discovered in the dialectic of universality—that universality persists in a manifoldness, whereas the former relation follows from the sheer positing of particularity as a distinct determination of being-as-concept, that is, as a single phenomenon. Since both relations are real, full-blooded moments of the dialectic of being-as-concept, they must both be taken into consideration when making explicit the onto-logical structure of particularity.

Particularity, then, is the universal's own field of determinacy and it has now been shown that the universal must be included in that field as species. This is a feature we did not explicitly encounter in the dialectic of universality, in which the universal or genus was always taken to be either (a) the locus where the contrasting particulars unify with each other in a dissolving fashion or (b) the character that permeates all particulars. What has now become explicit is that a fundamental characteristic of the process whereby being-as-concept determines itself is that *the particular stands against the universal*. It belongs to the very nature of being-as-concept, therefore, that it places itself as a universal against each of the particulars that constitute its content, *becoming thus an other to its own self*.

One should always remember that this opposition between the universal and the particular just specified arises from within the universality of being-as-concept. This means that being-as-concept *encompasses* the particularized elements that result from *its own* bifurcation. As Hegel puts it,

the universal as the concept is its own self and its opposite, which again is its [i.e. the universal's] own self as *its* posited determinacy [i.e. particularity]; it encompasses it and in it is in union with itself. In this way it is the totality and principle of its diversity, which is determined absolutely and solely through it.⁴⁴

Being-as-concept, then, as the universal, has an extremely complex character, because it is both itself and its *other* at the same time. Particularity is that moment in the structure of being-as-concept in which this becomes explicit; it is the moment of the 'otherness' of being-as-concept, the moment when being-as-concept, as the universal, becomes its *other* while remaining *itself*! The challenge for us is to understand exactly what this paradoxical expression means and how it connects with the theory of judgement.

⁴⁴ WL II 281.

The dialectic of particularity has now distinguished itself explicitly from the dialectic of universality, which we examined in the previous chapter. In the structure of particularity the self-containment of being-as-concept has started showing signs of self-destruction, since it has explicitly shown itself to be determined through a genuine *other*, the particular that stands *against* the universal (that is, the particular that is *not* the universal). Importantly, though, this self-destruction of being-as-concept's universality *has arisen from* being-as-concept's *own* act of positing its *own* determinacy. It is in the very act whereby being-as-concept determines *itself* that it becomes the *other* of itself. Simply, *in* its self-destruction being-as-concept, as the universal, still *encompasses* its other.

In the next stage of the dialectic of particularity, an attempt is made to gain a better understanding of this paradoxical phenomenon, namely of the fact that being-as-concept is both *bifurcating* and *encompassing*. How exactly do (a) the universal as genus, (b) the universal as particular and (c) the particular as particular relate to one another?

6.6. *The Four Dimensions of Particularity*

The universal's turning out to be also a species of its own self (to wit, a particular) complicates enormously the onto-logical structure of particularity (or determinacy of being-as-concept). Its full characterization will need to take into consideration the whole spectrum of the following four, closely intertwined, phenomena, which have been disclosed by the previous discussion:

(1) As a genus or universal, being-as-concept is a totality of determinations (or particulars), which comes to be expressed by means of principle. Since *the universal has now shown itself to be a particular*, that totality and that way of expression necessarily inhere in the particular, they are part of its very own nature.⁴⁵ When one says that the totality of particulars inheres

⁴⁵ WL II 283: "Die Bestimmtheit des Besonderen ist *einfach* als Prinzip [...]." Cf. Schick (1994: 206): "Das Besondere ist so, wie es ist, und ganz wie es ist, mit seinem allgemeinen Wesen identisch. Das heißt: Die Erscheinung dieses Wesens tritt auf das vollkommene Einheit-mit-sich; sie zu erfassen, muß und darf ich nicht auf anderes Bezug nehmen." See also Johnson (1988: 162): "[...] In the true universal, all the properties of the thing are contained in principle;" Harris (1990: 80): "[...] While the parts are in the whole and constitute its determinate unity, the whole is also immanent in every one of the parts [...];" and Enz. I § 160: "Der Begriff ist das *Freie*, als die *für sie seiende substantielle Macht*, und ist *Totalität*, indem *jedes* der Momente *das Ganze* ist, das *er* ist, und als ungetrennte Einheit mit ihm gesetzt ist; so ist er in seiner Identität mit sich das *an und für sich Bestimmte*."

in the particular, what one says is that *the particular is the totality of particulars*. And when it is said that expression by means of principle inheres in the particular, what is said is that *the particular comes to be expressed as a totality of particulars by means of its relating immanently, negatively and positively to other particulars*. The particular, therefore, is, on the one hand, in a sense, a Leibnizian monad, which is a “living, perpetual mirror of the universe,”⁴⁶ but is, on the other hand, not “windowless.”⁴⁷ The totality that it contains is expressed not by means of some “pre-established harmony,”⁴⁸ but rather by means of an immanent negative and positive relating to *other*, distinct particulars (monads).⁴⁹

(2) As a species, the *universal* stands *against* the *particular*; this opposition is an act of *determining*—it is part of the structure the particular has when it expresses the determinacy of being-as-concept. This

⁴⁶ Leibniz (1714: §§ 56, 62). Cf. Düsing (1976: 250).

⁴⁷ Leibniz (1714: § 7).

⁴⁸ Leibniz (1714: §§ 51, 52, 60); Leibniz (1696: 273–275).

⁴⁹ Cf. WL I 180–181: “Es ist in diesem [d.h. dem Leibnizschen] Systeme also das Anderssein aufgehoben; [...] die Monaden überhaupt sind nicht Andere füreinander, sie begrenzen sich nicht, haben keine Einwirkung aufeinander; es fallen überhaupt alle Verhältnisse weg, welchen ein Dasein zum Grunde liegt. Die Mannigfaltigkeit ist nur eine ideelle und innere, die Monade bleibt darin nur auf sich selbst bezogen, die Veränderungen entwickeln sich innerhalb ihrer und sind keine Beziehungen derselben auf andere. Was nach der realen Bestimmung als daseiende Beziehung der Monaden aufeinander genommen wird, ist ein unabhängiges, nur *simultanes* Werden, in das Fürsichsein einer jeden eingeschlossen.—Daß es *mehrere Monaden* gibt, daß sie damit auch als Andere bestimmt werden, geht die Monaden selbst nichts an; es ist dies die außer ihnen fallende Reflexion eines Dritten; sie sind nicht *an ihnen selbst Andere gegeneinander*; das Fürsichsein ist rein ohne das *Daneben* eines Daseins gehalten.—Allein hierin liegt zugleich das Unvollendete dieses Systems. Die Monaden sind nur *an sich* [...].so Vorstellende. Das Anderssein ist gleichfalls vorhanden; es falle wohin es wolle, in die Vorstellung selbst, oder wie das Dritte bestimmt werde, welches sie als Andere, als Viele betrachtet. Die Vielheit ihres Daseins ist nur ausgeschlossen, und zwar nur momentan, die Monaden nur durch die Abstraktion als solche gesetzt, welche Nicht-Andere seien. Wenn es ein Drittes ist, welches ihr Anderssein setzt, so ist es auch ein Drittes, welches ihr Anderssein aufhebt; aber diese ganze *Bewegung, welche sie zu ideellen macht*, fällt außer ihnen. Indem aber daran erinnert werden kann, daß diese Bewegung des Gedankens selbst doch nur innerhalb einer vorstellenden Monade falle, so ist zugleich zu erinnern, daß eben *der Inhalt* solchen Denkens *in sich selbst sich äußerlich* ist. Es wird von der Einheit der absoluten Idealität (der Monade der Monade) unmittelbar, unbegriffen (durch die Vorstellung des Erschaffens) zur Kategorie der abstrakten (beziehungslosen) *Vielheit* des Daseins übergegangen und von dieser ebenso abstrakt zurück zu jener Einheit. [...] Die Idealität in den Monaden [ist] eine der Vielheit äußerlich bleibende Form. Die Idealität soll ihnen immanent, ihre Natur Vorstellen sein; aber ihr Verhalten ist einerseits ihre Harmonie, die nicht in ihr Dasein fällt, sie ist daher prästabiliert; andererseits ist dieses ihr *Dasein* nicht als Sein-für-Anderes, noch weiter als Idealität gefaßt, sondern nur als abstrakte Vielheit bestimmt; die Idealität der Vielheit und die weitere Bestimmung derselben zur Harmonie wird nicht dieser Vielheit selbst immanent und angehörig.”

dimension of particularity is not separate from the first: particularity *is* the totality of determinations, but it is *also* the opposition between the universal and the particular. Our study must clarify in what sense the opposition between the universal and the particular contributes to the determinacy of being-as-concept.

(3) As a species again, the universal is the *particular* that stands against another *particular*; for whenever there is a relation of opposition (the 'standing against'), the relata are both particulars. The particular, then, can be seen either as the *universal* that has particularized itself or as a *particular* that stands against another particular. This dimension of particularity (that is, of the determinacy of being-as-concept) exhibits a relation of *coordination*, whereby a particular is coordinate with another particular.⁵⁰ Again, (3) is not separate from (1) and (2): the particular is the totality of particulars and stands against the universal, while it also stands against another *particular*.

(4) But if the emphasis is indeed so placed on the particularity of the relata that constitute the relation between the universal and the particular, their universality must be *reasserted*. This is the reason why the universal must appear also as a locus into which a pair of interdetermining particulars dissolve themselves—or, if you prefer, as an element under which they are *subordinated*. This dimension of particularity takes, therefore, the character of a relation of *subordination*.⁵¹ And, once more, (4) is not separate from (1), (2) and (3): the particular is the totality of particulars and stands against both the universal and another particular and actively subordinates itself to the universal.

This latter dimension, the universal as the locus of subordination, does not designate a third particular that stands against the two that have dissolved into it. It is rather the concrete manifestation of the 'character' that permeates them both, their 'speculative' relation itself (recall here what we said in the second chapter), a sign of their necessary and intrinsic interconnection. Such universal is the 'return' of being-as-concept into itself out of its outwardness, to wit, out of the simply oppositional negativity of the particulars. As Hegel puts it,

if we speak of *two opposed elements*, we must supplement this by saying that it is not merely *together* that they constitute the particular—as if they were

⁵⁰ WL II 281: "*Beides* ist das Besondere und ist daher *koordiniert*."

⁵¹ WL II 281: "*Beides* ist auch als Besonderes das *Bestimmte gegen* das Allgemeine; es heißt demselben insofern *subordiniert*." Cf. Burbidge (1981: 116) and Iber (2002: 193).

alike (gleich) in being particulars only for external reflection—but rather that their determinacy *against one another* is at the same time essentially only *one* determinacy, the negativity, which in the universal is *simple*.⁵²

This “simple negativity” which Hegel is here referring to is not the contrastive negativity of simple being (“determinacy as such”) or the dominating negativity of being-as-essence (“reflective determinacy”), but the reciprocal, totally intrinsic and self-related negativity of being-as-concept, what we have previously called ‘absolute negativity’. What distinguishes the latter from the rest is that it not only affirms the contrasting or dominating/ dominated self-subsistence of the relata, but also resolves or negates or sublates it. It results, in other words, in “one determinacy,” a *single* element that expresses in *positive* and *unitary* (to wit, in not simply contrastive and reflective) terms the opposition between particulars.

Does this mean that contrastive difference and reflective difference have now vanished from the truth of rational being? This, of course, could not be the case, since the categories of simple being and of being-as-essence have emerged immanently from the pure identity of knowing and being itself: they belong to ‘the rich content’ (recall here the conclusion of the third chapter). But they have now been placed in a greater perspective (the perspective of ‘absolute idealism’), one which makes manifest their rigid or unbalanced duality as an intrinsic unity, the principle of universality.⁵³ In order to acquire knowledge of the truth of rational being one needs to know the categorial structure of the logics of simple being and being-as-essence, but one must also know that the difference they exhibit is just a *moment* of the ‘conceptual’ difference of *particularity*, which is difference “in its truth.”⁵⁴ As Hegel puts it,

[all previous onto-logical categories] are grasped as determinate *concepts* only when each is cognized *in unity* with its other or opposite determination.⁵⁵

⁵² WL II 281.

⁵³ Enz. I § 160, Zusatz: “Der Standpunkt des Begriffs ist überhaupt der des absoluten Idealismus, und die Philosophie ist begreifendes Erkennen, insofern, als in ihr alles, was dem sonstigen Bewußtsein als ein Seiendes und in seiner Unmittelbarkeit Selbständiges gilt, bloß als ein ideelles Moment gewußt wird.”

⁵⁴ WL II 281: “Wie sich der Unterschied hier zeigt, ist er in seinem Begriffe und damit in seiner Wahrheit.”

⁵⁵ WL II 281–282: “Das Übergehen und die Auflösung dieser Bestimmungen hat nur diesen Wahren Sinn, daß sie ihren Begriff, ihre Wahrheit erreichen; Sein, Dasein, Etwas oder Ganzes und Teile usf., Substanz und Akzidenzen, Ursache und Wirkung sind für sich Gedankenbestimmungen; als bestimmte *Begriffe* werden sie aufgefaßt, insofern jede in der Einheit mit ihrer anderen oder entgegengesetzten erkannt wird.” See also WL II 320. Cf. Pippin (1989: 254–255).

Thus, what the dialectic of particularity teaches us, among other things, is that all ‘immediate’ categories of simple being and all ‘reflective’ categories of being-as-essence have this immediate and reflective nature only as moments of being-as-concept;⁵⁶ *in truth*, they are *particulars*, elements which dissolve into “one determinacy.” Cause and effect, for example, are not two determinations one could treat in truth as being independent from one another (although they *appear* to be so); nor could the one be seen in truth as superior (or prior) to the other (although it *appears* to be so). They are rather now *explicitly* shown to be just one concept, the universal into which they dissolve, the simple (*einfacher*) concept of *causality*.⁵⁷ Of course, we learned that much at the end of the dialectic of causality;⁵⁸ but the evaluation of that result had been made in absolutely negative terms, to wit, it designated merely the *collapse* of the sphere of being-as-essence. What we have now discovered is that this sphere does not vanish altogether; it rather works from within the higher and all-encompassing sphere of being-as-concept.⁵⁹

Note here, importantly, that the locus of subordination in the structure of particularity (i.e. determinacy of universality) resolves the fixed opposition between *particulars*; as we will soon discover, there is a difference between individuality (*Einzelheit*) and particularity (*Besonderheit*) on this matter. For individuality is *also* the locus where being-as-concept returns into itself from a state of fixed opposition, but the return is to the *single, isolated, self-subsistent* particular, to wit to *one* of the two inter-determining particulars. In contrast, in the structure of particularity, the return is

⁵⁶ WL II 281: “Aller frühere Unterschied hat diese Einheit im Begriffe.”

⁵⁷ WL II 282: “Das Ganze und die Teile, Ursache und Wirkung z.B. usf. sind noch nicht Verschiedene, die als *Besondere* gegeneinander bestimmt wären [that is to say, this is the case when these determinations are explained or understood from within their peculiar logical spheres], weil sie *an sich* zwar *einen* Begriff ausmachen, aber ihre *Einheit* noch nicht die Form der *Allgemeinheit* erreicht hat; so hat auch der *Unterschied*, der in diesen Verhältnissen ist, noch nicht die Form, daß er *eine* Bestimmtheit ist. Ursache und Wirkung z.B. sind nicht zwei verschiedene Begriffe, sondern nur *ein* bestimmter Begriff, und die Kausalität ist, wie jeder Begriff, ein *einfacher*.” See also Enz. I § 162, Zusatz.

⁵⁸ Cf. WL II 321: “In der Reflexion aber ist es das *Negative*, das sich *wesentlich* auf ein *Positives* bezieht und somit *bestimmt* ist; ein *Negatives* ist schon nicht mehr jenes *unbestimmte Nichtsein* [des Anfangs der *Logik*]; es ist gesetzt, nur zu sein, indem ihm das *Positive* entgegensteht; das Dritte ist ihr *Grund*; das *Negative* ist somit in einer umschlossenen Sphäre gehalten, worin das, was das eine *nicht* ist, etwas *Bestimmtes* ist.”

⁵⁹ Cf. Enz. I § 160, Zusatz: “[...] Der Begriff [enthält] alle die früheren Bestimmungen des Denkens als aufgehoben in sich;” Enz. I § 160, Zusatz: “[...] Der Begriff [...] enthält das Sein und das Wesen und damit den ganzen Reichtum dieser beiden Sphären in ideeller Einheit in sich [...]” Cf. Pippin (1989: 232–260).

to a *higher universal* (or, simply, to a *universal*). When the focus is on the particular, what is thought of is a relation of *otherness* and the *dissolution* of this relation into a higher universal (in the same way that ‘cause’ and ‘effect’ dissolve into ‘causality’). It is exactly in this way that the universal maintains itself in the field of particularity. To be a particular is to relate to an other and unite with this other in terms of a higher universal.

On the whole, in this section I have tried to make a case for the extreme complexity of the onto-logical structure of particularity; a complexity that emerges immanently and necessarily from the onto-logical fact that *the universal determines itself as a particular* (i.e. that the universal *is* a particular). Each and every of the aforementioned dimensions of particularity must be taken into consideration if we want to fully understand the nature of this onto-logical determination. I will finish the chapter by explaining (a) how the notion of *abstraction* comes to relate to particularity and (b) how the move is made to the category of *individuality*.

6.7. *Abstraction in the Structure of Particularity*

The particular is the totality of particulars. Yet, at the same time it *stands against* the other particular, that is to say, it is *not* the other particular, which means that *it stands against the totality of particulars*. How should one understand this negation, the particular’s standing against the totality of particulars?

Hegel says that “the concept, insofar as it determines or differentiates itself, “is directed against its own unity” and that “as determinate concept it has a determinate being (*Dasein*) in general.”⁶⁰ The determinate concept has a *Dasein* because it is exemplified by means of a negative relation between particulars—in addition, however, to have a *Dasein* is to have a determinate *presence*, to *show itself* determinately. Thus, the negative relation between particulars that exemplifies the determinate concept affirms the determinacy of the concept, it does not cancel it out. So, the ‘not’ that relates the particulars maintains the determinacy of the concept. But, if this is the case, what does it mean to say that the particular is not the totality of particulars?

⁶⁰ WL II 283: “Der Begriff, insofern er sich bestimmt oder unterscheidet, ist er negative auf seine Einheit gerichtet und gibt sich die Form eines seiner ideellen Momente des *Seins*; als bestimmter Begriff hat er ein *Dasein* überhaupt.” This is also why Hegel says (WL II 285) that the abstraction is not “empty,” that it has “a certain determinacy as its content.”

Hegel understands the phenomenon of the particular's standing against the totality of particulars in terms of the concept's being directed against its own unity. The concept "is directed against its own unity" in the sense that its determinate expression—the determinate concept—is only a 'moment' of its determinacy, that the particular is only a 'moment' of the totality of particulars. This follows necessarily from the need to maintain the determinate presence of the concept in the 'not' of its *Dasein*. On the one hand, the particular must differentiate itself from the totality of particulars, but, on the other hand, this differentiation should not annihilate their relation, for in this case the concept would no longer show itself determinately. There is no other way for both of these conditions to be satisfied than by understanding the particular's standing against the totality of particulars as the particular's being a 'moment' of the totality of particulars, a 'one-sided' existence of the concept's determinacy:

It can indeed be said that the determinate concept is *empty*, but this only means that it exhibits, not the totality, but only a one-sided determinacy.⁶¹

So, the particular, the determinate universal, is the universal—the totality of particulars—that *shows itself* as only a *part* of itself, that *separates* itself from itself.⁶² Hegel calls this universal, "with which the determinate is clothed," *the abstract universal*.⁶³

The notion of the abstract universal simply makes explicit what is involved in the complex structure of particularity. For the particular has indeed the 'content' of universality, but its immediate 'form' does not do justice to this 'content', since its determinacy requires that it relates negatively to another particular. This negative relation to another particular, "determinacy as such," makes manifest the opposition between particular and universal. For, evidently, if the particular stands against *another particular*, it must stand also against *the totality of particulars*: The differentiation of the particular from another particular entails its differentiation from the totality of particulars.

⁶¹ WL II 285: "Insofern aber ist jeder bestimmte Begriff allerdings *leer*, als er nicht die Totalität sondern nur eine einseitige Bestimmtheit enthält." Cf. Lau (2004: 254): "Hegel bezieht sich offenkundig auf die gewöhnliche Auffassung der Begriffe, die als abstrakte Allgemeine nur diese oder jene Merkmale bezeichnen. Dabei setzt sich jedes abstrakt Allgemeine dem anderen entgegen, weil es sich nur als bestimmt, was das andere nicht ist. Insofern sich jede Bestimmtheit gegeneinander abgrenzt, ist jede ebenso einseitig."

⁶² Cf. Grier (1990: 66).

⁶³ WL II 283: "Diese Allgemeinheit, mit welcher das Bestimmte bekleidet ist, ist die *abstrakte*."

Thus, the totality of particulars that constitutes being-as-concept shows itself determinately always through the medium of a difference of particulars.⁶⁴ Yet, this exactly means that *each* particular, insofar as it is determinate, is an *abstraction* from being-as-concept (“from the concept,” in Hegel’s words), from its own inherent universality. Indeed, the particular is always *less* than the *totality* of particulars, a ‘one-sided’ expression of it—but the totality requires the occurrence of such ‘one-sided’ expression if it is to have a determinate existence. Abstraction, therefore, is absolutely indispensable for being-as-concept’s determinate existence.

The exact number of the particulars that constitute being-as-concept will be decided solely by the immanent development of the sheer positing of its most general character. Thus, it could be the case that there is only one pair of particulars that dissolve themselves into a higher universal (in which case, as already pointed out, the latter acquires the status of ‘the highest universal’); but it could also be the case that there are more than one of those pairs and, therefore, a series of higher universals. *What is important here is that each and every member of such pairs is an abstraction.*

The particular, then, is the quintessential locus of abstraction in the sphere of being-as-concept. In the particular, universality exhibits itself as abstract, simply because only a part (or ‘moment’) of itself is manifested therein. Yet, since the universal *is* the particular, it could also be said that the particular abstracts from its own self (from its own inherent universality, from its own totality of determinations).

The *abstract* universal is the *determinate* universal; its existence denotes the form universality (the totality of particulars) takes when it presents itself determinately, when it *posits* itself.⁶⁵ Whatever appears determinately in the sphere of being-as-concept has the form of a difference between particulars and its determinate content arises exactly from this opposition, from “determinacy as such.”⁶⁶ (These ‘oppositions’,

⁶⁴ See WL II 283: “Die Bestimmtheit des Besonderen ist *einfach* als *Prinzip*, wie wir gesehen haben, aber sie ist es auch als Moment der Totalität, als Bestimmtheit gegen die *andere* Bestimmtheit.”

⁶⁵ Cf. Lau (2004: 254; my emphasis): “Jeder bestimmte Begriff ist nur dann Begriff, wenn er ebenfalls die Totalität in sich hat. Ein bestimmter Begriff ist, so kann man sagen, ein ‘Kristallisationspunkt’ des ganzen Begriffssystems, in dem die Totalität in sich reflektiert und aus einem jeweils bestimmten Blickwinkel *zum Vorschein* kommt;” Lau (2004: 256; my emphasis): “Der Begriff muß sich sozusagen in der Weise seiner bestimmten Begriffe *zeigen*, um überhaupt das zu sein, was er ist.”

⁶⁶ WL II 283: “Das Besondere hat die Allgemeinheit in ihm selbst als sein Wesen; insofern aber die Bestimmtheit des Unterschieds *gesetzt* ist und dadurch Sein hat, ist sie *Form*

according to Hegel, constitute the “data” and “life” of *the understanding* or *Verstand*.)⁶⁷ The abstract, then, is a particular that contains the totality of particulars, but precisely because it is characterized also by its standing against an *other* particular, it is directed against that totality, against “the unity of the concept” as well.

Paradoxically, then, what here Hegel calls “abstraction” is what we would normally call ‘concreteness’, the immediacy of determinate being. What appears in the form of determinate being, what has presence as an immediate difference between particulars, is a sheer abstraction. The universal, therefore, particularizes itself, not only in the sense that it *persists* in relations of *otherness*, but also in the sense that in this very act of persistence it *abstracts* from *itself-as-the-totality-of-determinations*. This discovery is groundbreaking.

The dialectic of particularity has now reached its peak, but—alas—not its end. The difference being manifested in the sphere of being-as-concept has been placed in the front line and the harmonious unity of self-identity and utmost determinacy (to wit, the ‘system’ or the ‘whole’), exemplified in the dialectic of universality, is ‘interrupted’ by the actuality of abstraction. The self-determined totality of particulars has been shown to be mediated by division and alienation, the positing of genuine difference, that is, by the particular’s *not* being the totality of particulars. And yet, given that the difference of the concept is fused into its self-identity, it has taken the form of ‘partiality’ or ‘one-sidedness’—not the form of the particular’s complete isolation from the universal.

Nevertheless, it is this fusion that the perspective of difference has come to challenge. If you recall, the dialectic of particularity has been developed in the perspective of difference with the aim of understanding or explicating difference not only in terms of its fusion into self-identity, but also in terms of a *priority of it over self-identity*. It is the taking seriously of this latter aspect of the development of the dialectic of particularity in the perspective of difference that offers the material for the last stage of the dialectic.

an demselben, und die Bestimmtheit als solche ist der *Inhalt*.” Cf. WL I 174: “Das Dasein ist [...] die Sphäre der Differenz, des Dualismus, das Feld der Endlichkeit. Die Bestimmtheit ist Bestimmtheit als solche, ein relatives, nicht absolutes Bestimmtein.”

⁶⁷ WL II 285ff. For a brilliant discussion of the notion of the *understanding* in the context of the logic of the concept, see Burbidge (1990) and Houlgate (1990).

6.8. *The Emergence of Individuality*

Abstract universality is *determinate universality*, particularity itself; as such it is characterized by all the aforementioned four dimensions. It is the universal as genus because it contains the totality of particulars; it is the particular that stands against another particular because its determinacy arises from a relation to an other; it is the particular that dissolves into a higher universal because in the sphere of being-as-concept two particulars cannot be kept apart as others; and it is the particular that stands against the universal because it falls short of the totality of particulars. What the last section has made abundantly clear is that the first dimension, 'the containment of the totality of particulars' is suppressed by the fourth dimension, 'the falling short of the totality of particulars'. The suppression occurs necessarily whenever the universal has a determinate existence, that is, whenever it 'appears' or 'shows itself' determinately, for determinacy is accomplished by means of two particulars negating one another.

It is this suppression of the totality of particulars in the locus of the particular that facilitates the move from the dialectic of particularity to the dialectic of individuality. The universal has to show itself determinately—it has to particularize itself—and the price it pays for this is that its relationality eventually becomes one of *exclusion*. This is so because the particular, as that which negates and is negated by the other particular, becomes now explicit, not as a relatum, but as that which *excludes* the other and is *totally independent* from it. Did we not, however, say that in the sphere of being-as-concept the distinct particulars are always united by the self-identity of the universal? How could then their relation become one of *exclusion*?

This becomes possible in this instance because the perspective of difference in which the dialectic of particularity has been developed had dictated that the difference of being-as-concept should be explicated also without its immediate placement in the horizon of self-identity. This was supposed to be the impetus behind the development of a dialectic of particularity in the first place—that the difference of being-as-concept would have a certain priority over self-identity. But as soon as difference is allowed to enjoy a moment of independence from self-identity, the relata in a determining relation become indifferent to one another and hence their relation is no longer "determining"—it becomes a relation of *indifference*, a relation that is not actually a relation. All this has already been explained in the third section. In a relation of indifference the relata

become totally self-subsistent and hence totally self-identical. As totally self-identical element, however, each indifferent relatum *excludes* the other from itself—it becomes *isolated*. Thus, whenever difference acquires independence from self-identity, the end-result is—paradoxically—the destruction of difference and the dominance of self-identity (exclusion, isolation).

Again: What gave the negative relation between the particular and the universal the signification of ‘partiality’ or ‘one-sidedness’ was precisely the fact that difference was understood as the difference of a self-identical element (being-as-concept). The dialectic of particularity, however, as it starts from difference, assigns a priority to difference over self-identity and, therefore, is not committed to the immediate fusion of difference into self-identity. This suffices for the negative relation between the particular and the universal to deteriorate into a relation of exclusion; for what kept this deterioration from occurring was only the aforementioned fusion.

This is, then, Hegel’s warning to all those philosophies which aspire to understand the fundamental structure of reality by giving a priority to difference over self-identity—that they necessarily end up being not ‘philosophies of difference’, but rather ‘philosophies of exclusion’. While the particular was introduced as that element which is fundamentally related to an other particular, the perspective of difference, which dominates the dialectic of particularity, has now allowed us to conceive it as an element that stands against the *relation* to an other. The ‘not’ loses its function of *determining* and acquires a function of *excluding*.

The particular is *now* characterized by a relation of exclusion because the difference required for determinacy puts *now* the emphasis on the self-subsistence (or identity or self-relation or independence) of each of the related particulars: *It is that which stands against the relation*, that which excludes the other particular and thereby the totality of particulars. One of the set tasks of the dialectic of particularity was to explain how exactly the immanent *mediation* or *negative relationality* between particulars occurs for the purpose of generating the determinacy of being-as-concept. The disclosure of the four dimensions of particularity has fulfilled this task. Yet, an unavoidable consequence of this disclosure is that the particular is not always mediated—there is a moment when this mediation necessarily destroys itself. Mediation or negative relationality does not always characterize the ‘positing’ of the particular. Here is how Hegel puts it:

[...] But this unity [i.e. the unity of universality and determinacy in abstract universality, in the particular] is *immediate*, and, therefore, particularity

does not subsist as the totality. *Implicitly* (*an sich*) it is also this *totality* and *mediation*; [but now] it is essentially *excluding* relation to an other or suppression of the *negation*, namely of the *other* determinacy—[as a consequence], the *other* [determinacy] has the status only of an opinion, because it vanishes immediately and shows itself to be the same as what should have been its *other*. It is this, therefore, which makes this universality an abstract one, [namely] that the mediation is treated only as a *condition* or is not *posited* [i.e. made explicit] as belonging to its *inner* self. Precisely because mediation is not posited, the unity of the abstract [universal] has the form of immediacy. And the content [has] the form of indifference to its universality, because it [i.e. the content] does not behave as this totality, which is the universality of absolute negativity. Hence the abstract universal is indeed the *concept*, yet it is *concept-less*; it is the concept that is not posited as such.⁶⁸

This long passage is of the utmost importance and needs to be understood correctly. It describes one facet of the abstract universal: the moment of its destruction, its degenerate form and content. Our discussion has made it abundantly clear that the abstract universal *is* the concept because it contains the totality of particulars and the principle of its development. It has also been made clear that abstraction in the sphere of being-as-concept's determinacy does not designate emptiness or elimination of content, but only *one-sidedness* or *partiality*.⁶⁹ It is the explicit form the universal takes when it has a determinate presence and this is manifested as the opposition between a particular and the other particulars that constitute the totality of particulars. The abstract universal, the particular, is the determinate universal.

This abstraction, however, has a side-effect which eventually destroys it. It is exactly this side-effect that the above passage describes. The abstract universal is the concept and is the determinate universal—but equally it is not the concept and is not the determinate universal. This is so because the mediation or negative relationality required for the determinacy of the totality of particulars can acquire the status of a relation of exclusion, in which the related particulars exhibit an absolute independence. In this way, particularity takes the form of excluding difference and, as a

⁶⁸ WL II 284.

⁶⁹ WL II 285; WL I 297: "Die Abstraktion ist [...] eine *Trennung* des Konkreten und eine *Vereinzelung* seiner Bestimmungen; durch sie werden nur einzelne Eigenschaften oder Momente aufgefaßt [...]." Cf. Hibben (1902: 295): "Abstract: A one-sided and partial view of any object of knowledge; a term used in contrast to concrete, which signifies a comprehensive view of things embracing all possible considerations as to the nature of the things themselves, their origin, and the manifold relations which they may sustain." See also Grier (1990: 64, no. 5) and Baillie (1901: 234–235).

consequence, determinacy vanishes: The other is no longer an *other*—it collapses into the particular, which, since it no longer relates determinately to an other, is not actually a ‘particular’. This is why Hegel says that in abstract universality “the *other* has the status only of an opinion, because it vanishes immediately and shows itself to be the same as what should have been its *other*.” This is not a state of affairs that could be avoided: Being-as-concept could appear *determinately* only if it were ‘clothed’ with *abstraction*—but in the perspective of difference abstraction generates exclusion and isolation, which—as already explained—give rise to the absence of determinacy. So Hegel concludes:

the concept places itself on the side as the immediate, *indeterminate* universality.⁷⁰

Exclusion is the degenerate form and content of abstraction and denotes the ‘fixed’ opposition (what Hegel calls “fixity”) between the particular and the other particulars that constitute the determinacy of being-as-concept. This ‘fixity’ becomes initially manifest with regards to that ‘other’ which determines the particular *locally*. Finitude, for example, excludes infinity and cause excludes the effect: as degenerate abstractions of being-as-concept they present themselves as self-subsistent, independent from or superior to their other.⁷¹ As soon as this exclusion becomes explicit, the determinacy of the excluding determination immediately vanishes, for “the other shows itself to be the same as what should have been its other.”

Earlier we argued that it belongs to the nature of the particular to dissolve itself into a higher universal—*cause*, for example, becomes *causality* and *becoming* becomes *determinate being*. We have now argued that it also belongs to its nature *not* to do that, to remain *fixed* in its opposition with its other! This double life of the particular derives from the fact that it is *both* a degenerate abstraction *and* universality. As universality, it *has to* unite with its other. Yet this cannot anymore be immediately asserted—as it was the case in the DMM. For the particular, as the abstract universal, deteriorates into an *excluding* element, an element that is isolated, that “stands alone,” that “relates only to itself.”

⁷⁰ WL II 281.

⁷¹ Iber (2002: 195) is absolutely right here: “Diese seinslogischen und wesenslogischen Kategorien, in denen der Zweck der Erkenntnis, die Wahrheit, nur mangelhaft präsent ist, treten erst auf den Plan, wenn Allgemeines und Besonderes einander äußerlich geworden sind, mithin der Begriff in seiner konkreten Struktur einen Selbstverlust erfahren hat.”

The particular that has excluded all other particulars from itself and thereby has isolated itself Hegel calls “the individual.” The individual (*das Einzelne*) stands before us *alone*, as “one” (*ein*). It is the *point* around which all other points have disappeared. The particular was an abstraction, since its determinacy fell short of the determinacy of being-as-concept. The individual is *not* an abstraction, since it exhibits no determinacy. The individual, the non-abstract (the negation of abstraction), is absolute concreteness.

How can such an element, which relates to no ‘other’, fit into the corpus of being-as-concept, which is fully determinate? The answer to this question can be properly given only by the dialectic of individuality. Nevertheless, two things can be said with certainty even at this point. First, the individual denotes the moment or moments when being-as-concept is *interrupted*, when it loses itself within itself and becomes concept-less. Second, insofar as being-as-concept is in this way interrupted,⁷² it must reassert itself: Both the determining relations between particulars and their dissolution into higher universals must be derived from the presence of an indeterminate element, the specific particular, the degenerate abstract universal, the *individual*.⁷³ This second point sets the main task of the dialectic that follows the dialectic of particularity—to explain how exactly the fully determinate ‘system’ of being-as-concept can emerge from a locus of indeterminacy (*the individual*).

6.9. Conclusion

The argument in this chapter has been developed in two main parts. In the first part (6.2.–6.4.) it has been argued that the particularity of being-as-concept is the field of its determinacy and, as the latter is *full*, that

⁷² Cf. Burbidge (2006: 83): “Particularizing [...] is the process of abstraction [...]. But when thought pushes this process to its extreme, it leaves behind any consideration of what connects one particular to another. It focuses simply on this unique unit, which is no longer thought as one particular over against another, both subsumed under an implicit universal. We are rather thinking something singular [...].”

⁷³ Cf. Lau (2004: 252–253): “Das abstrakte Allgemeine muß sich darum nur aus sich selbst heraus zum konkreten, wahrhaften Allgemeinen weiterentwickeln, genauso wie die Endlichkeit zur Unendlichkeit, oder der Verstand zur Vernunft. Dies geschieht aber nicht in der Weise, daß neue Bestimmungen dem Begriff von außen aufgetragen und als seine wahrhafte Bedeutung behauptet werden, sondern vielmehr so, daß die in ihm ohnehin enthaltenen Bestimmungen konsequent zu Ende gedacht werden, um das Begriffliche des Begriffs in seiner in sich vermittelten Einheit bzw. in seiner Totalität zu fassen.”

particularity is a *totality* of particulars. Since we are interested in finding out the determinacy of being-as-concept (that is, since we are interested in understanding what being-as-concept is), we must find a way to express it, to flesh it out. It has been shown that the expression of the totality of particulars that constitute being-as-concept's determinacy cannot be accomplished by means of an explicative model that is based upon enumeration and/or a pre-given aggregate of particulars, because those elements produce indeterminacy, uncertainty and openness. For these defects to be avoided the determinacy of being-as-concept has to be expressed by means of the emergence of a totality of particulars that relate negatively and positively to one another from the sheer positing of the most general character of being-as-concept.

The second part of the argument (6.5.-6.8) aimed at answering the following two questions:

- (a) How exactly does the *negative* relationality of particulars occur in the sphere of being-as-concept—or, if you will, how does being-as-concept *particularize* itself?
- (b) How exactly does the aggregate of particulars that emerges from the most general character of being-as-concept come to be expressed as a *totality* of particulars?

The first question is answered by drawing the implications of what can be minimally said of the particular, namely that it is distinct from the universal. A relation of distinction (or differentiation) is one between particulars. Hence the universal *is* a particular. But, since the universal is the totality of particulars, this means that *the particular* is the totality of particulars. Thus, the particular is the totality of particulars (because it is the universal), but it is also the case that it is *not* the totality of particulars (because it is distinct from the universal). Particularity is permeated through and through by this paradoxical structure, which Hegel associates with *abstraction*.

The coexistence of the particular's being the totality of particulars and its not being the totality of particulars is effected by distinguishing between a level of implicitness and a level of explicitness or appearance or showing. The particular *is* the totality of particulars only implicitly. When it acquires an explicit presence and thereby shows itself determinately, the particular differentiates itself from the totality of particulars.

The particular's self-differentiation from the totality of particulars on the level of determinate appearance is identified by Hegel with its

existence as an “abstract universal.” This results in two distinct states of affairs. On the one hand, since the particular is the *determinate* concept, the ‘not’ that relates it negatively to the other particulars that constitute the totality of particulars is understood in terms of determinacy, as an element through which the determinate relation to the other particulars is not abolished. The ‘not’, therefore, acquires in this instance the significance of ‘falling short’, of ‘being only a part of’: The particular, the abstract universal, exhibits being-as-concept’s determinacy by falling short of the totality of particulars. In this way, both the relation of determinacy between particulars and the distinctness of the particular from the totality of particulars are maintained.

On the other hand, since the perspective of difference dominates the dialectic of particularity, nothing prevents the ‘not’ from acquiring another significance as well, the significance of an act of exclusion. By saying that the particular is *not* the totality of particulars, one can be understood as saying that this particular excludes all other particulars from itself (for it excludes *each* particular with which it relates), that it is absolutely independent and self-subsistent. In this instance what remains is an element that is implicitly the totality of particulars, but since it exhibits no relation to an *other* (it is *only* a self-identity), it is explicitly indeterminate. It is exactly this element that Hegel calls “the individual.” With the emergence of the individual the abstraction that *necessarily* characterizes the life of being-as-concept takes on a degenerate, concept-less form.

The individual, then, is the particular that no longer relates to another particular and is therefore characterized by a total self-relation. This particular, of course, can no more be called ‘particular’. The individual is that moment or moments of being-as-concept when the latter suppresses all opposition to an *other* and asserts itself as *one*.⁷⁴ The price it pays for this act is *indeterminacy*. Because, however, being-as-concept is fundamentally fully determinate, the task speculative logic *now* sets itself is to explain how the full determinacy of being-as-concept can emerge from the positing of the moment of its individuality.

The dialectic of particularity has in this way reversed the order of tasks in the dialectic of being-as-concept. While at the end of the dialectic of

⁷⁴ Cf. Burbidge (2006: 83): “Particularizing, then, is the process of abstraction—of understanding. But when thought pushes this process to its extreme, it leaves behind any consideration of what connects particular to another. It focuses simply on this unique unit, which is no longer thought as one particular over against another, both subsumed under an implicit universal. We are rather thinking something singular [...].”

universality the aim was to disclose the microstructure of the 'system' of being-as-concept (its structure of determinacy), the aim now is to disclose that 'system' itself through the positing of its most primitive component, the individual. This is as low as we can get in the sphere of being-as-concept, in the universe of rational discourse. The dialectic of individuality, which follows the dialectic of particularity, will attempt to fulfil the new task and thereby reveal more fully the onto-logical nature of the individual and its place in the life of being-as-concept.

The second part of the dialectic of particularity has in this way given a specific answer to the first question it raised, namely how exactly being-as-concept particularizes itself: Being-as-concept particularizes itself by means of abstraction, an act that generates both determinacy and individuality. The second question raised by the second part of the dialectic of particularity, namely how exactly the aggregate of particulars that emerges from the most general character of being-as-concept comes to be expressed as a *totality* of particulars, has received no response. The only conclusion we can reach from this dialectic is that any determination emerging from the sheer positing of the most general character of being-as-concept is *part* of a totality of determinations. This, however, neither entails that this emergence comes to be expressed as a totality of determinations nor explains how such an expression occurs. In fact, this question, albeit raised in the locus of the dialectic of particularity, will not receive an explicit response until the end of the dialectic of the judgement.

Finally, note that the development of the dialectic of particularity, besides offering us a unique detailed account of the particular in the sphere of being-as-concept, has posited the 'higher' proposition-of-reason *being-as-concept is individual* in the context of immediacy of the universe of rational discourse. Why this proposition is 'higher' can be explained only after we delve into the dialectic of individuality. Since, however, (a) the problem with the dialectic that posited the proposition *being-as-concept is universal* was that in its sphere the perspective of self-identity is the dominant factor and (b) the problem with the dialectic that posited the proposition *being-as-concept is particular* has been shown to be that in its sphere the perspective of difference is the dominant factor, it is clear that what would assign the proposition *being-as-concept is individual* a 'higher' character is that in the sphere of the dialectic that posits it the perspective of self-identity and the perspective of difference will prove to have an equal status.

CHAPTER SEVEN

INDIVIDUALITY

7.1. *Introduction*

The category of *individuality* or *the individual concept*¹ or *the individual* appears in the onto-logical project of the *Science of Logic* as the necessary outcome of the development of the dialectics of universality and particularity.² The entire development from universality through particularity to individuality exemplifies the fundamental structure of being-as-concept, a structure that has arisen from the sublation of the onto-logical sphere of being-as-essence. Being-as-concept as a whole stands for that onto-logical sphere which has emerged as the proper—or, if you will, *truthful*—determination of the ‘character’ of the cognitive standpoint of ‘thought’.

Individuality comes to the fore minimally determined as the *specific indeterminate particular*—a paradoxical characterization. Its being *indeterminate* indicates that it is a particular whose opposition to another particular and to the universal has been *cancelled out*. This particular loses its ‘particularity’ and becomes *the individual*. The individual (*das Einzelne*) is *one* (*ein*) and the meaning this statement has at this moment is that the individual has *no other*. Oneness, that is, is *lack of otherness*. Since lack of otherness begets indeterminacy, oneness and indeterminacy are in this instance treated as two sides of the same coin.

¹ Both Burbidge (2006: 84) and McTaggart (1910: 198) argue that the category of individuality does not refer to a concept, but only to something that is pointed; hence they would have a problem with my use of the expression ‘the individual concept’. But, as far as I can see, Hegel nowhere says that ‘the individual’ is not or cannot be characterized as a concept; rather, for Hegel, ‘the individual’ is simply a more radical form of the particular concept. Of course, as we will see in the present chapter, there is *an* element *in* the structure of the individual which can be said to be non-conceptual (the thing-as-the-This, the immediate individual), but this does *not* mean that the individual as a whole cannot be characterized as a concept. See here Enz. § 163: “Die Einzelheit ist [...] nicht in dem Sinne [...] *unmittelbarer* Einzelheit, nach der wir von einzelnen Dingen, Menschen sprechen; diese Bestimmtheit der Einzelheit kommt erst beim Urteile vor.” Note that, as I will show in this chapter, the judgement *is* the truth of individuality and the immediate individual is *part* of the judgement.

² WL II 296–301.

Nonetheless, as what *was* a particular, as the *particular-that-has-isolated-itself*, the individual contains particularity: it is—somehow—still a *particular*. As such, the individual has an enormously complex structure, due to the four dimensions pertaining to the element of particularity. Insofar as this structure belongs necessarily to the individual, the main task of the dialectic of individuality is to explain how it is married with the individual's *indeterminacy*, with its *oneness*. Or, as put at the end of the last chapter, the dialectic's task is to illuminate how the individual as an indeterminate element, as oneness, comes to exhibit a structure of determinacy.

At the finale of his analysis of particularity Hegel refers to *individuality* thus:

Just as universality is immediately in and for itself already particularity, so too particularity is immediately in and for itself also *individuality*; individuality is, in the first instance, to be considered as the third moment of the concept, insofar as it is held fast against the first two moments, but it is also to be considered as the absolute return of the concept into itself, and at the same time as the posited loss of the concept.³

Individuality, then, is referred to as (1) a *distinct* element (a “third moment”) in the fundamental sphere of being-as-concept, to wit, an element that “is held fast *against* the first two moments;” (2) “the *absolute return* of the concept into itself;” and (3) “the *posited loss* of the concept.” What Hegel here suggests is that the individual performs three general functions: (1) it *enriches* the fundamental structure of being-as-concept, (2) it brings this structure to *fulfilment*, and (3) it *destroys* this structure. My strategy in this chapter is to examine whether this external observation can help us clarify how exactly the individual as oneness accommodates the structure of determinacy.

7.2. *The Distinctness of Individuality*

As with the other two ‘moments’ of the fundamental structure of being-as-concept, the distinctness of individuality is established by considering it in the context of being-as-concept's development.⁴ Being-as-concept has emerged from the collapse of essentialism and, due to this collapse,

³ WL II 288.

⁴ See WL I 31. Cf. McTaggart (1910: 195): “The dialectic, for Hegel, is unquestionably continuous. Each result must come from the one before it.”

been determined fundamentally in terms of the unity of self-identity and full determinacy. Yet, in the immediacy of its initial appearance being-as-concept draws all differentiation into the element of self-identity (the 'whole')—in the sense that any difference is understood to immediately dissolve into a universal.

The understanding of difference in terms of an immediate dissolution into self-identity had led to the claim that self-identity *suppresses*—albeit it does not annul—difference. This specific aspect of the fundamental structure of being-as-concept (difference's immediate dissolution into self-identity) is a basic function of the manifestation of being-as-concept as *universality* (or, maybe better, as *immediate universality* or *pure universality*, given that the dialectics of particularity and individuality substantially enrich the notion of universality).

Since, however, determinacy—and hence difference—is a fundamental ingredient of being-as-concept, the state of affairs associated with pure universality does it great injustice. Difference has an immediacy of its own and, therefore, does not simply dissolve into self-identity: Difference lingers on in 'thought' both before and after its dissolution. When this is admitted and full attention is paid to difference, its immediacy is placed in the front line and thereby difference acquires a priority over self-identity. The field of difference—of differentiated elements—constituting being-as-concept Hegel calls *particularity*; the differentiated elements are "the particulars."

As the dialectic of particularity ascertained, what is especially peculiar of it is that the particular both is and is not the totality of particulars. The side of its *not* being the totality of particulars Hegel calls "the abstraction of being-as-concept." This abstraction takes two forms. On the one hand, it is the particular's *falling short* of the totality of particulars; on the other hand, it is the particular's *isolating itself* from all other particulars. In the first case the particular becomes *determinate* (i.e. this is what *makes* it determinate in the first place); in the second case it becomes *indeterminate*. In both cases the particular relates negatively to—'stands against'—the other particular, but only in the first case being-as-concept's determinacy is exhibited. In the second case the 'not' loses its function of determining and acquires a function of *excluding*.

Particularity's act of exclusion generates the isolated indeterminate particular, which Hegel calls *the individual*. Since the individual designates a real, full-blooded moment of being-as-concept (for it was the development of being-as-concept that has given rise to it), its existence breeds a problem for the latter: whereas the individual is indeterminate, in the

sense that it relates to no other, being-as-concept is fully determinate. How can being-as-concept as fully determinate have a moment characterized by indeterminacy?

The very same fact, however, which creates this problem, namely the fact that the individual has emerged from within the sphere of being-as-concept and, therefore, is an intrinsic part of it, opens the path towards its resolution. Since being-as-concept is fully determinate and the individual (the indeterminate) *is indeed* an intrinsic part of it, it must be the case that the individual is *a source of determinacy*. The individual must be an indeterminate element from which—paradoxically—determinacy springs. Individuality is a *fissure* which whenever it takes place determinacy comes out of.

This is a necessary conclusion, a conclusion derived necessarily from the true premises (a) that the individual is a moment (an intrinsic part) of being-as-concept and (b) that being-as-concept is fully determinate. For if the individual were not a fissure out of which determinacy springs, being-as-concept, which contains it, could never survive its contact with it: The presence of individuality would simply cancel out any activity of explication of full determinacy. It would be a point where the movement of determinacy stops. For the movement to continue, individuality must be able to generate determinacy. Simply, it should not be an ingredient that contaminates the field of determinacy, but rather a fissure, a schism (*Riss*) from which determinacy emanates.

This necessary feature of individuality—that it is an element from which determinacy springs—is explicated further through a comparison with a *third* kind of abstraction (hereafter written in single marks: ‘abstraction’). Here is what Hegel writes:

The return of this side [i.e. determinacy] into the universal takes two paths: *either* through *abstraction*, which leaves it [i.e. determinacy] behind and ascends to the *higher* and [finally to the] *highest* genus, *or else* through *individuality*, to which the universal, in the determinacy itself, descends.⁵

In this extremely complex passage lies the secret of understanding the distinctness of individuality. Note, to begin with, that ‘abstraction’ and individuality are in this instance thematized as ways *via* which indeterminacy would be overcome and thereby the return to the unity of determinacy and self-identity would be accomplished. But their character is

⁵ WL II 296.

quite different. 'Abstraction' involves an *ascent* from determinacy to higher universals; individuality is the locus where the universal's *descent* to determinacy is manifested.

How should we understand this distinction: 'ascent' versus 'descent', 'abstraction' versus 'individuality'? The passage tells us that 'abstraction', on the one hand, "leaves determinacy behind" but, on the other hand, brings determinacy back into the universal. It brings determinacy back by "ascending" to higher universals. I understand this as follows: When particularity exercises its function of exclusion, 'abstraction' (a) leaves determinacy behind by 'disregarding' the mutually excluding particulars and (b) brings determinacy back by moving on to another determinate content, the one exemplified by the universal which incorporates them. Thus, 'abstraction' denotes the dissolution of determinacy into a higher universal in the manner of the SMM, that is, in the manner of facilitating a movement toward less and less determinacy.⁶

Let me make this clearer by reference to the very beginning of Hegel's *Science of Logic*. A situation of exclusion would be one in which 'being' and 'nothing' are kept apart as completely distinct, totally self-subsistent determinations. Such state of affairs engenders the indeterminacy of both 'being' and 'nothing'. As indeterminate, though, 'being' and 'nothing' fall into one another and this falling of 'being' into 'nothing' and *vice versa* is called 'becoming'. Thus, from a situation of exclusion a new determinate content has been begotten. 'Abstraction' involves exactly this generation of a new determinate content from a situation of exclusion; but the trade mark of 'abstraction' is something else, namely that it 'disregards' the excluding determinate contents and affirms solely the sheer presence of the new determinate content. For 'abstraction' the determination of simple being and the determination of simple nothing have now totally vanished—the truth of being is *only* becoming. Certainly, this is a view one hears quite often from non-philosophers, that 'the truth of reality is that everything flows', the Heraclitean motto *ta panta rei*. When this view is stated in an absolute manner, the immediacy of 'being' and the immediacy of 'nothing' are no longer recognized as determinations of the truth of being. Such is the position of 'abstraction'.

⁶ WL II 296–297: "Hier geht der Abweg ab, auf welchem die Abstraktion vom Wege des Begriffs abkommt und die Wahrheit verläßt. Ihr höheres und höchstes Allgemeines, zu dem sich erhebt, ist nur die immer inhaltsloser werdende Oberfläche [...]."

As already pointed out in the dialectic of pure universality, 'abstraction', with its characteristic function of minimizing determinacy, is a deficient mode of existence for being-as-concept, since the latter is *fully* determinate. For this reason, "the return of determinacy into the universal," which the above cited passage refers to, cannot be the result of 'abstraction'. Hegel conceives individuality as that element which *complements* 'abstraction' and in this way enables the actualization of being-as-concept's determinacy. Yet, when individuality has a presence, there occurs only one of the two facets of 'abstraction': the unification of the excluding relata under a higher universal and the consequent event of the emergence of a new determinate content. In other words, when individuality has a presence in being-as-concept the function of 'leaving determinacy behind' does *not* occur. Thus, individuality complements 'abstraction' by cancelling it out—or, better, by turning it into a completely different process. The presence of individuality prevents the ascent to a higher universal being accompanied by loss of determinacy.

How does, then, individuality prevent the loss of determinacy whenever the excluding particulars dissolve into a higher universal? Here is where the universal's *descent* to determinacy in the locus of individuality comes in. This 'descent' designates the singularity of the determining movement, the fact that *all* determinacy belongs to *one* element. Whereas the ascending movement of dissolution generates a new determinate content (that is to say, it gives rise to *another* determination from the totality of determinations that constitute being-as-concept), the descending movement of individualization fashions an affirmation that *all* determinations belong to *one* element. In this way no determinacy is lost in the explicating movement of being-as-concept.

Let me make this a bit clearer. Both 'abstraction' and 'individuality' have their starting-point, as it were, in a situation of exclusion, to wit, in a situation where the determinations are viewed as being totally self-subsistent. Individuality, like 'abstraction', is an element from which determinacy springs. This means two things. On the one hand, the excluding particulars are unified under a higher universal and this unification generates a new determinate content. For example, the unification of 'being' and 'nothing' generates 'becoming'. Individuality shares this function with 'abstraction'.

On the other hand, however, to say that individuality is an element from which determinacy springs is to say that individuality affirms that both the excluding determinations and the determination that has emerged from their unification belong to *one* element. This 'affirmation' is unique

to individuality—it is absent from ‘abstraction’—and takes the form of the *explicit constant* presence of a singular element throughout the change of determinations. ‘Being’, ‘nothing’, ‘becoming’ are all accompanied, *in their very immediacy and explicitly*, by a single common element. This element is the individual.

How do all these interpretive remarks illuminate the *distinctness* of individuality? They do it by clarifying the distinct role individuality plays in the sphere of being-as-concept. The universal concept denotes the totality of determinations and the single character that persists therein. It is also characteristic of universality that the persistence of the single character has the structure of an activity of dissolution into higher universals. The particular concept is the positing of the totality as a manifold of differentiated elements and of abstraction as the mode of existence that characterizes each differentiated element.

The individual concept differs from the universal concept in that it is not simply the totality of determinations but rather the isolated particular that *becomes* that totality.⁷ Individuality is the one-that-is-becoming-the-whole.⁸ Universality, of course, also performs a movement in the domain of being-as-concept, but its movement is one of persistence-in-a-totality, not one of becoming-a-totality. These are two completely different functions.

The individual concept differs from the particular concept in that the abstract nature of being-as-concept’s differentiation is continuously counterbalanced by *the repetitive affirmation of the single element* to which each of being-as-concept’s determinations belongs. Individuality is being-as-concept considered at the very moment when the exclusion of the ‘other’ results in the affirmation of each determination as belonging to *one* element. Individuality is ‘absolute negativity’, the element that unifies each and every act of determining in the sphere of being-as-concept by *negating* the *negation* being manifested in a situation of exclusion.

“Individuality, which abstraction so much despises, is the depth, in which the concept seizes itself and is posited as concept.”⁹ The concept “seizes itself” in individuality because it *determines* itself *in* and *from*

⁷ Cf. Grier (1990: 72): “[In] the doctrine of the Concept [...] it is true to say that a single abstract moment could be taken to contain, though only implicitly, the content of the concrete whole of which it is a moment.”

⁸ Cf. Enz. I §163: “Jedes Moment des Begriffs ist selbst der ganze Begriff, aber die Einzelheit, das Subjekt, ist der als Totalität *gesetzte* Begriff.”

⁹ WL II 297: “[...] Die von ihr [d.h. der Abstraktion] verschmähte Einzelheit ist die Tiefe, in der der Begriff sich selbst erfaßt und als Begriff gesetzt ist.”

the individual. The individual, namely, is not a relatum, but rather the element *in* and *from* which determinacy springs. It is for this reason that individuality is described as “self-related determinacy” and as “the determinate determinate.”¹⁰ It is “*self-related* determinacy” because it takes place in something that relates to no other and is “the *determinate* determinate” because what fundamentally characterizes determinacy, to wit, negation, is negated. Moreover, it is said that the concept “is posited as concept in individuality” because the individual gives rise to the totality of particulars—it gives rise, that is, to the full determinacy of being-as-concept.

The individual concept (or individuality or the individual) can be seen both as a locus of active self-determination and as a locus of reconciliation. It is the first because it is the element from which the full determinacy of being-as-concept springs. It is the second because it constantly *takes back* (or ‘negates’) the *otherness* both between the excluding particulars (e.g. ‘being’ and ‘nothing’) and between them and the new determination that unites them (e.g. ‘becoming’). As Hegel puts it:

[Individuality] is the *mediation* of the concept through itself insofar as its otherness has made itself into an *other* again, through which the concept has reinstated itself as self-identical, but in the determination of *absolute negativity*.¹¹

Let us sum up. In the dialectic of pure universality, determinacy was conceived as the totality of the differentiated particulars, whose existence was immediately subsumed under the all-encompassing “love” of self-identity. In the dialectic of particularity, by contrast, determinacy was given a priority over self-identity, with the result that differentiation became extreme and ‘fixed’, a relation of exclusion. It is out of this ‘fixity’ that the individual emerged. As the ‘fixed’ particular the individual became a locus of indeterminacy. But its having emerged in the domain of being-as-concept, an element which is fully determinate, turned the individual into a source of determinacy: it is an element *from which*

¹⁰ WL II 288: “Die Bestimmtheit in der Form der Allgemeinheit ist zum Einfachen mit derselben verbunden; dies bestimmte Allgemeinheit ist die sich auf sich selbst beziehende Bestimmtheit; die bestimmte Bestimmtheit oder absolute Negativität für sich gesetzt;” WL II 288: “Die sich auf sich selbst beziehende Bestimmtheit aber ist die Einzelheit;” WL II 296: “Die *Einzelheit* ist, wie sich ergeben, schon durch die Besonderheit gesetzt; diese ist die *bestimmte Allgemeinheit*, also die sich auf sich beziehende Bestimmtheit, das *bestimmte Bestimmte*.”

¹¹ WL II 296.

determinacy springs. The dialectic of individuality has defined *how* it is that determinacy springs from individuality. This phenomenon has been shown to include two functions. On the one hand, the excluding particulars dissolve into a higher universal, which is a new determinate content. This is a function that individuality shares with 'abstraction'. On the other hand, both the excluding particulars and the new determinate content are affirmed as determinations of *one* element. This function is unique to individuality.

The second function of individuality, the *affirmation* of the determinations of being-as-concept as determinations of one element is *not* a function that individuality shares with pure universality. An affirmation occurs also in the domain of the latter, but its nature is completely different from the one we encounter in the domain of individuality. Universality's affirmation is achieved through the *direct positing* of a totality of determinations permeated by a single character. It is *said* that the totality of determinations is permeated by a single character, but this is not explicitly shown. What is explicitly shown is the movement whereby the conflicting particulars dissolve into higher universals, but the persistence of the single character throughout this movement does not become apparent (to wit, it is not stated explicitly).

Individuality's affirmation is the complete opposite of this. It resolves the conflicts by *explicitly* leading the conflicting determinations back into the *same* element. The move from 'fixity' to individuality denotes the activity of *taking back* the conflicts inherent in the movement of the concept, of *returning into the same* from extreme otherness, and of *specifying the dissolution into a higher universal as the further determination of the isolated particular*.¹² And all this is done *explicitly*: with every resolution of conflict (exclusion) there comes to view not only the new determination but also the single element to which all determinations belong.

All in all, the whole discussion has established the following theses about individuality:

¹² Thus, there could not be a bigger difference between my understanding of individuality and McTaggart's (1910: 198); he writes: "In the Thesis the conception was that the nature of each thing was partially expressed by the Notions which joined it to others. In the Antithesis the conception was that the nature of each thing was partially expressed by the Notions which separated it from others. Here in the Synthesis the conception is that by combining both classes of Notions the nature of the thing is completely determined. From this point onward the thing is called Individual." I challenge anyone to show me where exactly this passage could find support in any of the sections on the pure concept in the *Science of Logic*!

- (1) It is a *locus of indeterminacy*, an element that relates to no other.
- (2) It is an *element from which determinacy springs*.
- (3) In the process of emergence of determinacy individuality functions as a *return*: the return of the fixed determinations into *the same*.¹³
- (4) But in this process individuality functions also as an act of *dissolution into higher universals*, which are new determinate contents.
- (5) If the above four theses are combined, it becomes evident that the higher universal which unifies the conflicting determinations is itself the isolated particular that has determined itself *further*.
- (6) If we do combine theses 1–4, it also becomes clear that both determinacy and its fixity and the latter's dissolution into higher universality arise out of a singular existence, the isolated particular, the individual. Individuality has, in a sense, *swallowed everything*.

In this way the distinctness of individuality has been established generically: If one follows the specific route the dialectic of the fundamental structure of being-as-concept takes, one sees clearly that each of its main constituents has a different character. Universality is *totality* and *persistence*, particularity is *differentiation* and *abstraction*, and individuality is *becoming* and *return-into-the-same*.

7.3. *Individuality as the Absolute Return of the Concept into Itself*

The previous section has demonstrated that the individual is *not* the particular and is *not* the universal—that they are all *distinct*. As already explained, the ‘not’ founding such distinctness generates isolated particularity (exclusion). It can be, then, stated that the fundamental concept-determinations are—among other things—isolated particulars.

A distinctness of this kind, however, cannot remain *fixed*, for this state of affairs would eventuate in the vanishing of the self-identity of being-as-concept.¹⁴ Indeed, what is idiosyncratic to being-as-concept, in contrast to

¹³ WL II 298: “Indem die Einzelheit die Rückkehr des Begriffs als des Negativen in sich ist, so kann diese Rückkehr selbst von der Abstraktion, die darin eigentlich aufgehoben ist, als ein gleichgültiges Moment *neben* die anderen gestellt und gezählt werden.” (Note here the phrase “die darin eigentlich aufgehoben ist,” whose use clearly shows that abstraction and individuality are meant to work together in the sphere of the concept. But, of course, the very moment that abstraction is ‘sublated’ in individuality it stops being abstraction. I explained this in detail in my analysis of universality *per se*.)

¹⁴ Cf. WL II 299: “Jede Unterscheidung konfundiert sich in der Betrachtung, welche sie isolieren und festhalten soll. Nur die bloße *Vorstellung*, für welche sie das Abstrahieren

simple being and being-as-essence, is that its determinations come to the fore as being indistinct, that is, as belonging to the same identity.¹⁵ Recall that the determinations of simple being and of being-as-essence come forth as being totally distinct and only the development of their dialectic proves them indistinct.

So, there is a problem here—to define (a) how exactly the individual is *not* distinct from the particular and the universal and (b) how this indistinctness accords with their *distinctness*. Solving the problem will clarify in what sense individuality is not just “the return of the concept into itself,” but more specifically its “*absolute* return”; for the latter qualification is made in order to specify that individuality, as “the return of the concept into itself,” is the locus (a) where *all* determinations of the fundamental structure of being-as-concept are expressed in their perfect inseparability and (b) outside of which there remains *no residue* of that structure.

Let us first examine how the fundamental concept-determinations are indistinct. As in the last section, the very positing of the problem sires the conditions for its resolution. We are now aware that in the locus of individuality being-as-concept *returns* into itself from a situation of extreme otherness and that this return shows the individual to be *becoming* in the form of self-determining determinacy. Since, though, the previous section has made it abundantly clear that not only the individual but also the universal and the particular come to be isolated particulars (for they are *distinct* from one another), these two features—*return* and *becoming*—hold for them as well. Why is this so and what is its onto-logical significance?

Universality and particularity are now characterized by return and becoming because, if the universal and the particular are isolated particulars, then not only the individual but also the universal and the particular are *individuals*. For, as we know, the very basis of individuality is isolated particularity. Insofar as they are all *individuals*, the universal, the particular and the individual are inseparable and indistinct. Each is what determines itself by returning from a situation of otherness. This conclusion,

isoliert hat, vermag sich das Allgemeine, Besondere und Einzelne fest auseinanderzuhalten; so sind sie zählbar, und für einen weiteren Unterschied hält sie sich an den *völlig äußerlichen* des Seins, die *Quantität*, die nirgend weniger als hierher gehört.”

¹⁵ Cf. Enz. I §164: “Die Momente des Begriffs können insofern nicht abgesondert werden; die Reflexionsbestimmungen *sollen* jede für sich, abgesondert von der entgegengesetzten, gefaßt werden und gelten; aber indem im Begriff ihre *Identität gesetzt* ist, kann jedes seiner Momente unmittelbar nur aus und mit den anderen gefaßt werden.”

paradoxically, arises from the fact that each is distinct from the other.¹⁶ They are indistinct because they are distinct from one another!

Universality, particularity and individuality become indistinct, but it is onto-logically significant that they do so in the constellation of individuality. This confirms our conclusion at the end of the previous section that individuality has 'swallowed' everything. It seems that for Hegel universality (identity) and particularity (difference) do not have an independent, self-subsistent existence, but rather they exist only in the constellation of individuality. Eyebrows will certainly be raised at the reading of this, for the received opinion is that Hegel is the philosopher of universality. The dialectic of the fundamental structure of being-as-concept has now proven to us that Hegel is, by contrast, the philosopher of individuality. Individuality is the alpha and omega of speculative philosophy.

Let us now address the second question raised earlier: What is the fate of the *distinctness* of the fundamental concept-determinations if they all become *indistinct* as the self-determined individual? Does it vanish from the onto-logical scene? This cannot be the case because this distinctness is not illusory; it is the product of being-as-concept's own immanent development. Universality, particularity and individuality have 'earned' their distinctness, for they appeared in the domain of being-as-concept as distinct. But now that this distinctness has generated their indistinctness and placed them in the constellation of individuality, it has no existence *outside* of this constellation. The universal, the particular and the individual cannot be distinct *outside* of the individual. Thus, since their distinctness should be affirmed (for it is not illusory), the only option left is that it has been completely *internalized* in the *individual*; it becomes, as Schick puts it, "the internal difference" of the *individual*.¹⁷

The individual is the negation of the otherness of the fundamental concept-determinations (i.e. the negation of the negation), but this otherness does not vanish; rather, it is incorporated (or 'contained') in the *individual* as the difference between universality, particularity and individuality. In Hegel's terminology, the individual becomes the locus where that difference is *posited*. He writes:

In individuality, that true relation, the *inseparability* of the determinations of the concept, is *posited*; for as negation of the negation it contains [*enthält*] their opposition [*Gegensatz*] and at the same time contains it in its ground or unity, the being-together-in-movement [*das Zusammengegangensein*] of


¹⁶ Hegel establishes the identity of the concept-determinations in a variety of ways. I here simplify things by focusing only on one of these ways.

¹⁷ Schick (1994: 223).

each with its other.¹⁸ Since this reflection is in its very own nature universality, it is essentially the negativity of the determinations of the concept, but not merely as if it were a third something distinct from them; on the contrary, it is now *posited* that *posited being* is *being-in-and-for-itself*; that is, that each of the determinations pertaining to the difference is itself the *totality*. The return of the determinate concept into itself means that it has the determination of being, *in its determinacy*, the *whole concept*.¹⁹

This crucial passage confirms everything we said so far and informs us of something new as well. It confirms that the difference of the fundamental concept-determinations has been *internalized* in the individual. The difference is no longer understood as simply a side-by-side ordering of a manifoldness of self-subsistent concept-determinations, but rather as an ordering of this kind *that has its place in the individual*: the individual “contains their opposition and at the same time contains it in its ground or unity.”

But the passage informs us of something else, equally important, as well: *Each* of the fundamental concept-determinations comprising that internal difference is the *totality* of the fundamental concept-determinations. The truth of this statement is necessary and its necessity emanates from the fact that *all* fundamental concept-determinations are individuals. For if the universal (U) is individual (I) and the particular (P) is individual (I), then the universal (U) must be also particular (P) and *vice versa*. So, the universal is individual and particular, the particular is individual and universal, and, of course, the individual is universal and particular. Therefore, each of the fundamental concept-determinations that comprise the internalized difference of being-as-concept is the *totality* of the fundamental concept-determinations. What this tells us about *the individual* is that it is a single locus, a unity, which exemplifies a difference, each of whose constituents is the totality of the fundamental concept-determinations.



¹⁸ Miller translates the last phrase as “the effected coincidence of each with its other.”

¹⁹ WL II 299.

Individuality is the return of being-as-concept into itself from a situation of otherness (absolute negativity). The two novel features of individuality, internalized difference and internalized multiplicity of totalities, allow the characterization of this return as 'absolute'. Firstly, nothing remains outside the individual—the individual has been shown to contain the whole being-as-concept. Secondly, even each of the elements that comprise the individual is the whole being-as-concept—the one element is simply a mirroring of the other. Thus, the return of being-as-concept into itself in individuality is indeed an absolute return.

All in all, in this section I argued (a) that the distinctness of the fundamental concept-determinations is dissolved to the effect that they are all individuals; and (b) that it is maintained in the individual through an act of internalization. I have also argued (c) that each of the relata that comprises the internalized difference is the totality of the fundamental concept-determinations. These three theses bring out and justify the characterization of the return of being-as-concept into itself in individuality as an 'absolute' return.

The morale of the whole argument is that all there is *initially* in the sphere of being-as-concept is the individual; there is no such thing as a 'system,' a 'universal idea' or a 'manifoldness' that stands *next* to the specific particular. These elements, of course, are not illusory; but the whole point is that they are parts of the structure of *the individual*, facets of *its* existence, manifestations of *its* development.²⁰ What persists in the manifoldness is not some mysterious metaphysical entity, but the self-determining individual concept.

7.4. *Internalized Abstraction*

By internalizing the difference of the fundamental concept-determinations, the individual comes to internalize also the *abstraction* of being-

²⁰ Hegel emphasizes again and again that the movement (the *Fortgehen*) of the concept is a *development* (*Entwicklung*), not a passing-over (logic of being) or a shining in one's other (logic of essence). With the emergence of individuality this feature of the concept becomes intelligible: It is *the individual* that develops into the manifoldness of determinacy and the totality of the pure universal; see Enz. I § 161 and Enz. I § 161, Zusatz. This fits in well with his description of the individual as the "subject," since for Hegel this latter term denotes a dynamic principle that determines its own determinacy; see Enz. I §§ 162–164. Note also that he describes the individual "abstractly" as "the ground" in the sphere of the concept; see Enz. I § 164: "Allgemeinheit, Besonderheit und Einzelheit sind abstrakt genommen dasselbe, was Identität, Unterschied und Grund."

as-concept; for, as argued in detail, abstraction is what emerges from this difference. Abstraction was shown to be of three kinds: (a) falling-short-of-the-totality, (b) exclusion and (c) elimination-of-lower-order-determinacy.²¹ Thus, each of these phenomena will at one time or another regulate the character of individuality and the negativity defining each snakes its way into the self-determined individual.

Note that abstraction occurs on a plane shaped by the fixation of difference. Indeed, the internalization of difference has the consequence of the difference's being there to stay. The possibility, that is, of internalized difference ever being dissolved is zero. Why is this so? This is so because the dissolution of internalized difference would lead us back to where we started, to a locus of indeterminacy. The vanishing of difference would generate pure, isolated individuality; this would mean that individuality had no place in the sphere of being-as-concept, a state of affairs which, of course, finds no support in the actual dialectic of being-as-concept. For, as seen, individuality does indeed have a place therein.

The fixity of internalized difference is not at odds with the character of being-as-concept, for such difference is always explicitly *united* by the individual *in which it has been internalized*. The abstraction holding on such plane of fixed difference Hegel calls "posited abstraction." Posited abstraction is the determinate appearance of individuality and, since individuality has 'swallowed' everything, the determinate appearance of being-as-concept. This is what he writes:

[...] As this negativity, individuality is the determinate determinacy, is differentiation as such; through this reflection of the difference into itself, *the difference becomes fixed*; it is only through individuality that the determining of the particular is effected, for *individuality* is that *abstraction* which, in the simplicity of individuality, is now *posited abstraction*.²²

It has been noted that the character of posited abstraction is determined by the three kinds of abstraction: falling-short-of-the-totality, exclusion and elimination-of-lower-order-determinacy. There is, however, a basic differentiation between falling-short-of-the-totality, on the one hand, and exclusion and elimination-of-lower-order-determinacy, on the other. The latter two kinds of abstraction promote the *self-subsistence* of the relata;

²¹ Hegel's treatment of the notion of *abstraction* is more complicated than it is presented here. For extensive discussion of this notion see Grier (1990), Harris (1990), Kline (1964), Baillie (1901: 232ff.) and Il'in (1946).

²² WL II 299.

as explained, exclusion promotes the self-subsistence of the individual, elimination-of-lower-order-determinacy promotes the self-subsistence of the universal. By contrast, falling-short-of-the-totality suppresses such self-subsistence and thereby represents a somewhat murkier relation between the fundamental concept-determinations. We saw that exclusion and elimination-of-lower-order-determinacy do not fit in well with the characterization of being-as-concept as a unity of self-identity and full determinacy. Falling-short-of-the-totality is more appropriate to this characterization.

Nevertheless, exclusion and elimination-of-lower-order-determinacy dominate the locus of individuality in a context of *immediacy*, that is, when individuality makes its first appearance as posited individuality. This is so because in a context of immediacy the relata always come forth as being self-subsistent—the emphasis is spontaneously put on their simple being, not on their interaction with their other. It is, really, as simple as that. What immediately results from the internalization of difference is the one determination standing against the other in the manner of a self-subsistence standing against its other. True, we do know that this kind of relation is not appropriate to being-as-concept, but this is how individuality *initially* appears. Falling-short-of-the-totality, as the appropriate form of the difference of being-as-concept, is, of course, *already* there, but it is initially not apparent. It has to be teased out by the dialectic and made manifest.

In the present section we will focus on *immediate individuality*. How the dialectic brings out the full force of the relation of falling-short-of-the-totality in the domain of individuality will be examined in great detail in later chapters. Thus, the phenomena we are currently interested in are the following two. On the one hand, the individual is opposed to the universal in the locus of the individual in the manner of exclusion. On the other hand, the universal is opposed to the individual in the locus of the individual in the manner of elimination-of-lower-order-determinacy.

Exclusion and elimination-of-lower-order-determinacy, with their emphasis on the self-subsistence of the relata, are forms of difference that have their proper place in the onto-logical spheres of simple being and being-as-essence. In order to understand, therefore, the negativity they transmit to individuality, we must first display them in their pertinent domain and only then clarify their comportment in the domain of individuality. It is bound to be a change in the behaviour of these species of difference when the move is made from the spheres of simple being and being-as-essence to the sphere of individuality. For in the latter sphere

the unity of individuality supervenes upon any difference. Nevertheless, a common structure remains and this is the one that the present section aspires to disclose.

On the one hand, then, the specific particular (the individual) that stands against the universal in the domain of individuality will be illuminated by reference to “the thing-as-the-This” a category located in the essentialist sphere of *existence*. On the other hand, the universal that stands against the specific particular in that same sphere will be illuminated by reference to “the being-for-self,” a category located in the ‘seinslogische’ sphere of *quality*. The thing-as-the-This is the prime example of a relation of exclusion in the onto-logy of essence and the being-for-self is the prime example of a relation of elimination-of-lower-order-determinacy in the onto-logy of simple being.

I will now proceed to discuss these two categories in their respective onto-logical domains and show how they relate to the internalized abstraction in the domain of individuality. The discussion will once again test the reader’s patience, for the original text is extremely dense and overly complicated. I believe, though, that the outcome will be rewarding and elucidate the phenomenon of posited abstraction.

7.4.1. *The Abstract Individual in the Sphere of Individuality*

To begin with, the self-subsistent, individualized, abstract particular discloses a structure similar to the structure of the *This* in the essentialist sphere of *existence*.²³ The This first appears when existence, through the preceding dialectic, takes the form of a *thing* whose essence is constituted by properties²⁴ which relate to one another in a twofold manner:

²³ See WL II 124–147, esp. 137–142.

²⁴ Read here the section on “the reciprocal action of things” (WL II 137–139); see esp. the following (WL II 138–139): “Die *Eigenschaft*, welche die *Beziehung* der selbstständigen Extreme ausmachen sollte, ist [...] *das Selbständige selbst*. Die Dinge dagegen sind das Unwesentliche. Sie sind ein *Wesentliches* nur als die als sich unterscheidend sich auf sich beziehende Reflexion; aber dies ist die Eigenschaft. Diese ist also nicht das im Dinge aufgehobene oder sein bloßes Moment, sondern das Ding ist in Wahrheit nur jener unwesentliche Umfang, der zwar negative Einheit ist, aber nur wie das Eins des Etwas, nämlich ein *unmittelbares* Eins. Wenn vorhin das Ding als unwesentlicher Umfang insofern bestimmt wurde, als es durch eine äußerliche Abstraktion, welche die Eigenschaft von demselben wegläßt, dazu gemacht wurde, so ist nunmehr diese Abstraktion durch das Übergehen des Dings-as-sich in die Eigenschaft selbst geschehen, aber mit umgekehrten Werte, so daß, wenn jenem Abstrahieren das abstrakte Ding ohne seine Eigenschaft noch als das Wesentliche, die Eigenschaft aber als eine äußerliche Bestimmung vorschwebt, hier das Ding als solches sich durch sich selbst zu einer gleichgueltigen äußerlichen Form der Eigenschaft

(a) as self-subsistent, they are indifferent to one another and reflect only into themselves; (b) as matters (*Materien*), they fall into one another as elements of a *single* continuous self-identity (matter).²⁵ Crucially, none of these two features of the thing's essence allows a *determining* relation to an *other* thing. Hegel calls such determinate relating of one thing to another the *negative self-reflection* of a thing.²⁶ Since, then, negative self-reflection is foreign to the essence of the thing, it becomes what is *inessential* in it.

Does this mean that the essence of the thing remains totally unrelated to negativity? This is prevented by the fact that each thing *is* different from other things. Both elements of its essence, the self-subsistent properties and the continuous matter, can be what they are only if they negate the thing's difference from other things. This movement of negativity assigns determinacy to the thing, for it specifies it against other things *before* determining that determinacy *further* in terms of self-subsistence and continuity.²⁷ Given this movement, the thing has now a structure shaped by two fundamental features: (a) its determination in terms of negative relations to other things and (b) its determination in terms of pure self-subsistence and self-identical continuity. Hegel calls such structure, in which the thing exhibits pure self-subsistence and self-identical continuity *only after* it has interacted with other things, *this thing* or, simply, *the This*.²⁸

However, the movement of negativity exhibited by the thing-as-the-This is not essential to it;²⁹ it "is extinguished in its immediacy."³⁰ The thing is continuous matter. It might be the case that negativity is required in order to make this determination of the thing explicit, but surely if the thing is essentially continuous matter, it does not contain in its essence any difference from other things. This feature of the thing, its difference

bestimmt.—Diese ist somit nunmehr befreit von der unbestimmten und kraftlosen *Verbindung*, die das Eins des Dinges ist; sie ist das, was das *Bestehen* desselben ausmacht, eine *selbständige Materie*. Indem sie einfache Kontinuität mit sich ist, hat sie die Form zunächst nur als *Verschiedenheit* an ihr; es gibt daher *mannigfaltige* dergleichen selbständige Materien, und *das Ding besteht aus ihnen*." See also WL II 139: "[...] Sie [d.h. die Eigenschaften] sind das Wesentliche und damit das wahrhaft Selbständige der Dinge [...]."

²⁵ WL II 139–140.

²⁶ WL II 140.

²⁷ WL II 140.

²⁸ WL II 140.

²⁹ WL II 140.

³⁰ WL II 124: "Das Ding enthält zwar die Reflexion, aber ihre Negativität ist in seiner Unmittelbarkeit zunächst erloschen [...]."

from other things, is only *externally* related to it in order to enable the appearance of its essence. The structure of the This, therefore, gives rise to determinacy, but only externally, not through the essence of the thing itself. As Hegel puts it:

[...] The self-identical continuous *subsistence* (*Bestehen*) constitutes (*ausmachen*) the self-subsistent matter, in which the difference of things, their determinacy in and for itself, is sublated and becomes something external. The thing-as-the-*This* is, then, indeed complete determinacy, but this its determinacy subsists in the element of inessentiality.³¹

The thing-as-the-This, therefore, is the fully determined thing whose determinacy is a function of externality. As the *This*, the thing is *essentially* a continuous matter made of self-subsistent, indifferent-to-one-another properties (matters).³² The negative determining relations between things and the negative unity of the continuous matter itself do not arise out of the essence of the thing, but are assigned to it from the outside. The thing exists, as it were, only as a transparent field, an “absolute porosity,” through which free matters come and go.³³ Hegel writes:

[Free matters] pass *over this* thing, continue their being in other things, and their belonging to this thing is no limitation to them.³⁴

Since, then, the essential constituents of the thing (i.e. the matters or the matter) are not influenced by an external determining act, their determination *in* the thing can be only one of indifference. As such indifferent units, they have the status only of *quanta* (or simple *numerical units*) and their *essential* relation can be expressed only in quantitative terms.³⁵ In this way, the things become the indifferent and infinite singularities of the mathematical continuum or collections of such singularities. Hegel concludes his argument thus:

The thing as the *This* is exactly this their [i.e. the matters'] only quantitative relation, a sheer collection, their *also*. In this way, the thing *consists* of some quantum of a certain matter, *also* of some quantum of another matter, *also*

³¹ WL II 140.

³² WL II 141: “Das Ding besteht aus selbständigen Materien, die gegen ihre Beziehung im Dinge gleichgültig sind.”

³³ WL II 142: “Die Stoffe zirkulieren aus *diesem* Dinge unaufgehalten hinaus oder herein; es selbst ist die absolute Porosität ohne eigenes Maß oder Form.”

³⁴ WL II 141.

³⁵ Cf. WL II 137: “Wenn [...] von einem Dinge oder von Dingen überhaupt ohne die bestimmte Eigenschaft die Rede ist, so ist ihr Unterschied ein bloß gleichgültiger, quantitativer.”

of another, and so on; this connection, which actually cannot be called a connection, is what constitutes the thing.³⁶

This structure of the This can be characterized as *dualistic*, for it is constituted by two sides whose relation is one of tension, externality and forced superiority (as is the case with *all* essentialist categories). On the one hand, the This has an inessential existence: the negative unity of the thing, the point in which the self-subsistent thing returns into itself through the negative relations it has had with other things and the negation of those relations by its continuous matter. On the other hand, this *same* thing that the inessential existence of the This characterizes has an essential existence as a continuous matter, whose sole determination can be achieved only through quantitative characterizations. The fact that the negative unity of the thing is inessential and the continuous matter that constitutes it is essential turns the former into *externality*. The This designates, therefore, two sides of the thing at once: (a) what the thing is externally, to wit, a negative unity (Hegel calls this side of the thing “the abstract This”) and (b) what the thing is “in truth,” namely a continuous matter or a collection of free matters characterized in quantitative terms.

Speculative logic will proceed with the dialectic of existence and show that, given this structure of the thing as the This, the thing must dissolve and transform itself into *appearance*.³⁷ Our inquiry, however, does not require that we follow this move; that is, the above described part of the dialectic of existence suffices for establishing the desired connection between the This of existence and the individual of being-as-concept. Hegel writes:

The individual, which in the reflective sphere of existence has the structure of the *This*, [...] is like the *self-reflected* One, but for itself, without repulsion; or [better] the repulsion is in this reflection indistinguishable from abstraction; it is the reflective *mediation*, which belongs to this individual-as-the-This in such a way that the latter turns into a *posited*, externally *pointed* immediacy.³⁸

Hegel's account of the individual as the This corresponds *perfectly* with the above characterization of the thing as the This. The individual-as-the-This, *considered in essentialist terms*, reflects into itself *without repulsion* because its essence is the *continuous* fluidity of free matters. This does *not*

³⁶ WL II 141–142.

³⁷ WL II 142–147.

³⁸ WL II 300.

mean that it lacks repulsion altogether; rather, the repulsing movement it exemplifies belongs to its abstract, inessential side ("the abstract This"). Crucially, Hegel here repeats that this abstract side, which is the locus of the *mediating* nature of the This, its activity of repulsion, is *external* to the individual (considered in essentialist terms).

This externality of the negative unity of the individual-as-the-This allows the marginalization of its essential immediacy, which, since it is foreign to the mediation that pertains to it, becomes accessible only through pointing (*das Monstrieren*).³⁹ Thus, the individual, considered in these essentialist terms, mirrors, as it were, the 'dualistic' structure of the thing-as-the-This: it has a side of mediation and reflection-into-self through negative relationality, but also a side of immediacy that can only be pointed to; and, crucially, the relation between these two is one of abstraction, since the essential side enjoys a total independence from the external, inessential side.

Now, the individual, *considered in terms of being-as-concept*, still contains those two sides: (a) a side of determination through negative relationality and (b) a side of pure, unaffected immediacy. This is so because *abstraction* is part of its nature. Yet, the all-important difference between the two structures is that now we know that the two sides are *not* external to one another. The relation between them is *conceptual* and, therefore, the one is as essential as the other. Abstraction always takes place under the umbrella of individuality.

To simplify things: the internalized individual *appears* to be an Aristotelian *τόδε τι* or a Lockean substance, the thing-as-the-This, which relates to its determining other (the universal) as an essential to the inessential. Yet, in truth, the inessential is as essential as the essential; the universal is necessarily related to the abstract individual from the very beginning of its existence. To think of the individual independently of its relation to the universal is just impossible in the realm of individuality. This complex and contradictory structure defines the immediacy of the individual concept. As Hegel puts it:

The individual, it is true, is now also a This as the immediate which has been reconstructed out of mediation; however, it does not have this mediation outside of itself [or: this mediation is not external to it]. It is itself repelling

³⁹ WL II 300: "*Dieses ist; es ist unmittelbar; es ist aber nur Dieses, insofern es monstriert wird. Das Monstrieren ist die reflektierende Bewegungm welche sich in sich zusammennimmt und die Unmittelbarkeit setzt, aber als ein sich Äußerliches.*"

separation, *the posited abstraction*; but in this its very separation it exemplifies a positive relation.⁴⁰

And a bit further:

[...] The *individuality*, which posits itself as determinate, does not exemplify this positing in the manner of an external difference, but rather in the manner of the difference of the concept; thus, [it is true,] it excludes the *universal* from itself; but because the universal is a moment of it, it [i.e. the universal] has also an essential relation to it [i.e. to individuality].⁴¹

The individual *is*, therefore, sheer immediacy, the thing that is pointed to. But this immediacy has arisen out of mediation and, therefore, the latter is constitutive of it: it is a *mediated* immediacy. It is an abstraction because it stands against the universal, but it is nevertheless a *posited* abstraction because it exemplifies the unity of the two *in that abstraction*. In its very immediacy and separation from the universal, the abstract individual (or specific particular) is *positively* related to it.

In this way, I have explained what the nature and character of the *abstract* specific particular is. It is an immediacy, self-subsistence, and continuous self-identity that has the structure of the thing-as-the-This with the only difference that its determination through mediation is not externally related to it. This does *not* mean that it is less immediate than the essentialist thing-as-the-This. In fact, the presence of the abstract specific particular, the individual that stands *against* the universal *in the sphere of individuality*, is exactly what causes Hegel's seemingly paradoxical claim that "through individuality, where the concept is *internal to itself*, it becomes *external to itself* and enters into actuality."⁴² What the claim of a *non-external* relation of an *external* (or *non-mediated*) element, on the one hand, and the *concept* (or the *universal*), on the other, means is only that the individual must now exhibit a (contradictory) structure able to account for both (a) its sheer, total, absolute immediacy and (b) its irreducible relation to a determining mediation. Such structure will play a fundamental role in the determination of the first two kinds of judgement: the judgement of determinate being and the judgement of reflection.

⁴⁰ WL II 300.

⁴¹ WL II 301.

⁴² WL II 299. Cf. Lau (2004: 257): "Das Heruntersteigen des Begriffs erreicht schließlich denjenigen Bereich, der gewöhnlich als 'begrifflos' angesehen wird, indem er sich bis zu diesem und jenem Einzelnen erstreckt. Anders ausgedrückt, der Begriff *greift* auf das *über*, was er nicht zu sein scheint."

7.4.2. *The Abstract Universal in the Sphere of Individuality*

The abstraction of the individual exemplified in terms of the internalized individual reveals only one of its two sides; the other side is its exemplification in terms of the internalized *universal*. This takes place by reference to the structure of the *being-for-self*, which is developed in the final stage of the 'seinslogische' sphere of qualitative being, immediately before it turns completely into quantitative being.⁴³

The preceding dialectic in the sphere of simple being has shown that infinity is a *self-relation* whose *determinacy* is finitude itself. For the self-relation to be maintained, finitude relates to infinity in terms of *ideality*.⁴⁴ The latter denotes a structure in which the relation to an *other* is a relation to oneself: the *other* is simply a *moment* of the self-relation (and is, therefore, "ideal"). This *self-relation*, which is determined through the *other's* being there as a *moment*, is called *being-for-self*;⁴⁵ and the *moment* itself which determines the self-relation is called *being-for-one*.⁴⁶

Initially, being-for-self and being-for-one, the simple self-relation and the relation of otherness, are *both* moments of being-for-self. This must be so because what has being-for-one is not distinct from what has being-for-self. To distinguish them is to turn them into self-subsistent immediacies and the very essence of being-for-self excludes this possibility. Their being *moments* of being-for-self prevents exactly this: their fixed distinctness; it guarantees that the being-for-one, the *moment*, is not an *other* to the being-for-self, but the being-for-self itself. But, then, being-for-self and being-for-one have become *indistinct*, for each is as much the other as it is itself.⁴⁷

⁴³ WL I 174–208.

⁴⁴ WL I 165, 166.

⁴⁵ WL I 175: "[...] Wir sagen, daß etwas für sich ist, insofern als es das Anderssein, seine Beziehung und Gemeinschaft mit Anderem aufhebt, sie zurückgestoßen, davon abstrahiert hat. Das Andere ist in ihm nur *als* ein Aufgehobenes, als *sein Moment*; das Fürsichsein besteht darin, über die Schranke, über sein Anderssein so hinausgegangen zu sein, daß es als diese Negation die unendliche *Rückkehr* in sich ist."

⁴⁶ WL I 176: "So ist die Bestimmtheit, welche am Dasein als solchem ein *Anderes* und *Sein-für-Anderes* ist, in die unendliche Einheit des Fürsichseins zurückgebogen, und das Moment des Daseins ist im Fürsichsein als *Sein-für-Eines* vorhanden."

⁴⁷ WL I 176: "Indem nun dies Moment als *Sein-für-Eines* bezeichnet worden, ist noch nichts vorhanden, für welches es wäre,—das Eine nicht, dessen Moment es wäre. Es ist in der Tat dergleichen noch nicht im Fürsichsein fixiert; das, für welches Etwas (und [es] ist hier kein Etwas) wäre, was die andere Seite überhaupt sein sollte, ist gleicherweise Moment, selbst nur *Sein-für-Eines*, noch nicht *Eines*.—Somit ist noch eine Ununterschiedenheit zweier Seiten, die im *Sein-für-Eines* vorschweben können, vorhanden; nur *ein* *Sein-für-Anderes*, und weil es nur *ein* *Sein-für-Anderes* ist, ist dieses auch nur *Sein-für-Eines*; es ist

This indistinctness causes their collapse into *one immediacy*, a being-for-self.⁴⁸ There is no *movement* from one determination to *another* and, therefore, no negation of an *other*, no relation of *otherness*. Determinacy is now a *simple falling back into oneself*, “the *simple* unity of being-for-self and its moment, being-for-one.”⁴⁹ This, of course, involves negation—but the negation is not of an other, but only of oneself, and the result of such negation is again oneself.⁵⁰ Exactly this structure, whereby what is negated and what results from the negation are *immediately* the same, is called *the One*. The One, as being-for-self, *has* moments, but these are not only absolutely the *same* as one another, but also equal to the One; they are, therefore, *no* moments at all.⁵¹ This contradiction is what is most peculiar to the One: It gives out a semblance of movement, but this is immediately cancelled out and it is affirmed that no movement (to wit, differentiation) takes place therein. As Hegel dramatically puts it, “the one is not capable of becoming an other: it is *unalterable*.”⁵² And two lines farther:

Since the One is in accordance with its concept a self-related negation, it has difference in it—a turning away from itself to an other; but this movement is immediately turned back on itself, because it follows from this moment of

nur die eine Idealität dessen, für welches oder in welchem eine Bestimmung als Moment, und dessen, was Moment in ihm sein sollte. So machen *Für-Eines-Sein* und das *Fürsichsein* keine wahren Bestimmungen gegeneinander aus. Insofern der Unterschied auf einen Augenblick angenommen und hier von einem Fürsichseienden gesprochen wird, so ist es das Fürsichseiende, als Aufgehobensein des Anderseins, selbst, welches sich auf sich als auf das aufgehobene Andere bezieht, also *für Eines* ist; es bezieht sich in seinem Anderen nur auf sich. Das Ideelle ist notwendig *für Eines*, aber es ist nicht für ein *Anderes*; das Eine, für welches es ist, ist nur es selbst.—Ich also, der Geist überhaupt oder Gott sind Ideelle, weil sie unendlich sind; aber sie sind ideell nicht—als *für-sich-seiende*—verschieden von dem, das für Eines ist. Denn so wären sie nur unmittelbare oder näher Dasein und ein Sein-für-Anderes, weil das, welches für sie wäre, nicht sie selbst, sondern ein Anderes wäre, wenn das Moment, für Eines zu sein, nicht ihnen zukommen sollte. Gott ist daher *für sich*, insofern er selbst das ist, das *für ihn* ist.”

⁴⁸ WL I 182.

⁴⁹ WL I 182.

⁵⁰ WL I 182: “Es ist nur *eine* Bestimmung vorhanden, die Beziehung-auf-sich-selbst des Aufhebens.”

⁵¹ WL I 182: “Die *Momente* des Fürsichseins sind in *Unterschiedslosigkeit* zusammengesunken, welche Unmittelbarkeit oder Sein ist, aber eine *Unmittelbarkeit*, die sich auf das Negieren gründet, das als ihre Bestimmung gesetzt ist. Das Fürsichsein ist so Fürsichseiendes und, indem in dieser Unmittelbarkeit seine innere Bedeutung verschwindet, die ganz abstrakte Grenze seiner selbst,—*das Eins*.” Cf. WL I 182: “Das Eins ist die einfache Beziehung des Fürsichseins auf sich selbst, in der seine Momente in sich zusammengefallen sind, in der es daher die Form der *Unmittelbarkeit* hat [...]”

⁵² WL I 183.

self-determining that there is no other to which one can go, and the movement has thus returned into itself.⁵³

Difference, determinacy, ideality have now become sheer illusions; *in truth*, the One has *nothing* in it; this is its only determination or *quality*: the One is *nothing*.⁵⁴

Yet, this *nothing* cannot possibly be the same as the nothing into which pure, indeterminate being *vanishes*, for the simple reason that pure nothing has already proven to be an under-determination of the truth of being and collapsed (together with pure being) into determinate being. So, this specific nothing does not *vanish* into positivity and affirmation; it keeps, as it were, a distance from it. *Nothing* relates to the One which it internally determines *as what is absolutely distinct from it*, as what lies *outside* it. The One is, as it were, *surrounded* by *nothing*, but it does not vanish into it. This specific nothing, which is *distinct* from the affirmative being of the One and lies *outside* it, is called *the void*.⁵⁵

Such development, however, reintroduces determinacy and difference into being-for-self, for the One, which exemplifies it, relates now determinately to the void (that is, it does not just *vanish* into it).⁵⁶ Still, this relation is *external* to the One, for it is meant to remain *unaffected* by any *other*, to be “the negation of all otherness”⁵⁷ (and determinacy entails a relation of otherness). The One certainly relates to nothing as its other, but the latter does not affect it in any way; it is, as we commonly say, ‘nothing to it’. The One is, therefore, a positive, immediate being that *relates* to nothing, not in terms of vanishing, but *externally*, in the sense that *nothing* must *be* there outside of the being of the One. “The One and the void is being-for-self, the highest qualitative being-within-self, *sunk back into complete externality*; the immediacy or being of the One, because it is the negation of all otherness, is posited as being no longer determinable and alterable;

⁵³ WL I 183.

⁵⁴ WL I 184: “In dieser einfachen Unmittelbarkeit ist die Vermittlung des Daseins und der Idealität selbst und damit alle Verschiedenheit und Mannigfaltigkeit verschwunden. Es ist *nichts* in ihm [...]”

⁵⁵ WL I 184: “[...] Von der einfachen Unmittelbarkeit, dem auch affirmativen Sein des Eins, ist das Leere als das Nichts schlechthin verschieden, und indem sie in *einer* Beziehung, das Eins selbst nämlich, stehen, ist ihre Verschiedenheit *gesetzt*; verschieden aber vom Seienden ist das Nichts als Leeres *außer* dem seienden Eins.”

⁵⁶ WL I 184: “Das Fürsichsein, indem es sich auf diese Weise als das Eins *und* das Leere bestimmt, hat wieder ein *Dasein* erlangt.”

⁵⁷ WL I 185.

such therefore is its absolute, unyielding rigidity that all determination, variety, conjunction remains for it an utterly external relation.”⁵⁸

In this externality, though, the positive being of the being-for-self, the One, *explicitly* acquires the onto-logical status of being-*not*-the-void and, in turn, the void acquires the onto-logical status of being-*not*-the-One. This move discloses their *determinate* (namely, *negative*) relation and, therefore, assigns to each *determinate being* (*Dasein*).⁵⁹ The being-for-self becomes now a structure in which *two* determinate beings are (still externally) *determinately* related, the determinate being of the One and the determinate being of the void: “The One is negation in the determination of being, and the void is negation in the determination of non-being.”⁶⁰ Hegel identifies this structure with the principle of the Greek Atomists who regarded the determinate relation between the atom (*το ἄτομον*) and the void (*το κενόν*) as the ultimate fabric of what there is.⁶¹

The One and the void, as determinate beings, have now an external determinate relation.⁶² Their relation is still external because the void still lies *outside* the One. Yet, the character of the One as *being-for-self* transforms the void—to wit, its *other*—into *itself*, namely, into One.⁶³ However, precisely because the relation is between *two* determinate beings, two *immediacies*, two *affirmations*, that to which the One relates “remains determined as a *determinate being* and an *other*.”⁶⁴ The One, therefore, relates to an *other*, which is no longer the void, but another *One*. In its *very determinacy*, the One does not *simply* collapse into itself (as it was the case a few onto-logical moves earlier), but it maintains a *difference to itself* and thereby becomes a *plurality* of Ones.⁶⁵

⁵⁸ WL I 185 (my emphasis).

⁵⁹ Harris (1994: 158) maintains that this move is arbitrary. As far as I can see, however, this move is the least arbitrary in the whole argument. For how could the One relate positively to nothing (i.e. not in terms of vanishing) if the latter were not determinately distinct from the One?

⁶⁰ WL I 186.

⁶¹ WL I 184–186.

⁶² WL I 186: “Beide sind [...] *gesetzt* als ein affirmatives *Dasein*, das eine als das Fürsichsein als solches, das andere als unbestimmtes *Dasein* überhaupt, und [beide] sich aufeinander als auf ein *anderes Dasein* beziehend.”

⁶³ WL I 186: “Aber das Eins ist wesentlich nur Beziehung auf sich als beziehende *Negation*, d.h. ist selbst dasjenige, was das Leere außer ihm sein soll;” WL I 186–187: “Das Fürsichsein des Eins ist jedoch wesentlich die Idealität des *Daseins* und des Anderen; es bezieht sich nicht als auf ein Anderes, sondern nur *auf sich*.”

⁶⁴ WL I 187.

⁶⁵ WL I 187: “[...] Als wesentlich *Beziehung auf sich selbst* ist das Andere nicht die unbestimmte *Negation*, als Leeres, sondern ist gleichfalls *Eins*. Das Eins ist somit *Werden zu vielen Eins*.”

The many Ones, though, do not have the transitory relation of *something* to an *other*, for the One is the positive being of the being-for-self: it is self-relation, it relates namely only to itself. This affects the character of its mediated and negative being, since the *other* of the One, that is, *the other One*, must be the One itself. In other words, the One cannot relate to nothing, for the latter has shown itself to be One; but it also cannot relate to a One that is not itself, for it is self-related. The determination of the One arises, thus, out of its own *negative self-relation*: It *extends* itself beyond itself and then negates this *extension* in order to return to its simple, immediate being. Such self-produced negative relation that involves the self-relation of the One mediated by its own extension is called *repulsion*⁶⁶ and results in the *immanent* (or *internal*) *positing* of many same Ones (the extensions of the One itself). This repulsion must be conceived in terms of immanent succession: each One is followed by *another* One, but the latter is no other than the One itself; that is to say, the One constantly *returns* into itself through repelling itself from itself; yet, this return leaves, as it were, a trail behind it, the *plurality* of the Ones.

This structure of repulsion is followed by a second one in which the many Ones are no longer the immanently generated extension of the One, but they stabilize themselves as parallel entities and repel Ones whose existence is *presupposed* rather than internally posited.⁶⁷ In other words, the "One's-coming-forth-from-itself," which characterizes the first repulsion (or "repulsion in itself"),⁶⁸ is missing from the second

⁶⁶ WL I 187: "Eins, das Bezogene, enthält das Negative als Beziehung, hat dasselbe also *an* ihm selbst. Statt des Werdens ist also erstens die eigene immanente Beziehung des Eins vorhanden; und zweitens, insofern sie negativ und das Eins seiendes zugleich ist, so stößt das Eins sich selbst *von sich* ab. Die negative Beziehung des Eins auf sich ist *Repulsion*." The emergence of *repulsion* and its dialectical development and relation to *attraction* is one of the most difficult parts of speculative logical theory. Cf. Harris (1994: 155). Taylor (1975: 246) thinks that Hegel employs these categories only because they were important in the physics of his time and because Kant assigned them philosophical meaning! This is a typical example of Taylor's inability to engage seriously with speculative logical theory. It is characteristic of his attitude that he does not even bother to provide an account of the derivation of repulsion.

⁶⁷ WL I 187: "Die zweite Repulsion ist davon [d.h. vom ersten] unterschieden und ist die der Vorstellung der äußeren Reflexion zunächst vorschwebende, als nicht das Erzeugen des Eins, sondern nur als gegenseitiges Abhalten vorausgesetzter, schon *vorhandener* Eins. Es ist dann zu sehen, wie jene *an sich* seiende Repulsion zur zweiten, der äußerlichen, sich bestimmt."

⁶⁸ WL I 187: "Diese [erste] Repulsion, so als das Setzen der *vielen Eins*, aber durch Eins selbst, ist das eigene Außersichkommen des Eins, aber zu solchen außer ihm, die selbst nur Eins sind. Es ist dies die Repulsion dem *Begriffe* nach, die *an sich* seiende."

repulsion. The move from the first to the second repulsion⁶⁹ is made in the following way.

It has been shown that the many Ones are extensions of the One itself, appearing when the latter repels itself. This activity of repulsion, then, is the activity of a source or ground (or 'essence'). Yet what arises out of this activity are manifestations of the One itself: each of the extensions *is* the One. Thus, each of the extensions *through* which the One returns into itself is not *just* the *extension* of the One, but the One itself. As such, *each* of the extensions returns into itself through *its own* extension. The many Ones exhibit *now* their self-relation, not as a *progressive* return to the same, but as a repulsion *among* a plurality of repulsions. Thus, "the becoming of the many, or the generation of the many, vanishes immediately":⁷⁰ Each of them is indifferent to the other (because they are all *the same*) and relates only to itself through a movement of repulsion (because each is *the One*).⁷¹ The many Ones are no longer posited through the repulsion of the One that returns into itself; they are rather *pre-supposed* (or *pre-positing*) as self-related members of an indifferent plurality.⁷² To put it differently, by showing themselves to be the One itself, the many Ones obtain an *independence* of their own and thereby cancel out their *emergence* from some source; surely, if each is the One itself, it must have existed perennially! Rather than being the positing of a source, they themselves are doing the positing of their own extensions. As Hegel puts it, in the sphere of this second repulsion, the One does not *become*; rather, it is *already*.⁷³

The second repulsion of the One, therefore, has its basis more in its static manifoldness than in its self-determining activity (although the latter is not cancelled out, only given a secondary status and transferred to each of the many Ones). This has enormously significant ramifications: On the one hand, the immanent movement of the One becomes the external *pre-supposing* or *pre-positing* of a multiplicity of immediate

⁶⁹ WL I 187: "Es ist dann zu sehen, wie jene *an sich* seiende Repulsion zur zweiten, der äußerlichen, sich bestimmt."

⁷⁰ WL I 187.

⁷¹ WL I 187: "[...] Die Produzierten sind Eins, nicht für Anderes, sondern beziehen sich unendlich auf sich selbst."

⁷² WL I 188: "Die Eins sind so *vorausgesetzte* gegeneinander;—*gesetzte*: durch die Repulsion des Eins von sich selbst; *voraus*: gesetzt als *nicht* gesetzt; ihr Gesetzsein ist aufgehoben, sie sind *Seiende* gegeneinander, als sich nur auf sich beziehende."

⁷³ WL I 187–188: "Das Eins stößt nur *sich* von sich selbst ab, wird also nicht, sondern *es ist schon*; das als das Repellierte vorgestellt wird, ist gleichfalls ein *Eins*, ein *Seiendes*; Repellieren und Repelliertwerden kommt beiden auf gleich Weise zu und macht keinen Unterschied."

beings (*Seiende*). On the other hand, the *self-relation* of the One through repulsion goes hand in hand with the *indifferent* relation (or “relation of *non-relation*,”⁷⁴ an *external* relation) between the many Ones.⁷⁵ The One repels itself and thereby relates to *itself* determinately, but this repulsion is only one among many, *simultaneous*, *indifferent-to-one-another* repulsions, for the positing of the One *pre-supposes* now an *indifferent* plurality of Ones.⁷⁶

This structure is, of course, contradictory, for (a) the One is intended to be *indifferent* to the many Ones, but (b) those many Ones do *exist next* to the indifferent One. Its very *indifference* requires its *relation* to them. This is a peculiar relation, for its function is to secure the indifference of the One among a plurality of Ones. If the inter-relations among the many Ones were given a function of *determinacy*, they would have a *negative* character. Since, then, the indifference of the One implies its absolutely affirmative being, its non-affection by the other, such *negative* relation between the One and the many Ones must itself be *negated* through the One itself. Hegel calls this kind of relation *exclusion*. Thus, exclusion is the negative relation of the One to the many Ones, a double negation, whereby “the One repels only the many Ones which are neither generated

⁷⁴ WL I 190.

⁷⁵ WL I 188: “Die Vielheit erscheint somit nicht als ein *Anderssein*, sondern als eine dem Eins vollkommen äußere Bestimmung. Eins, indem es sich selbst repelliert, bleibt Beziehung auf sich wie das, das zunächst als repelliert genommen wird. Daß die Eins *andere* gegeneinander, in die Bestimmtheit der Vielheit zusammengefaßt sind, geht also die Eins nichts an. Wäre die Vielheit eine Beziehung der Eins selbst aufeinander, so begrenzen sie einander und hätten ein Sein-für-Anderes affirmativ an ihnen. Ihre Beziehung [...], wie sie hier *gesetzt* ist, ist als keine bestimmt; sie ist wieder das vorhergesetzte *Leere*. Es ist ihre aber ihnen äußerliche Grenze, in der sie nicht *füreinander* sein sollen.” See also WL I 188: “Sie ist ein ebenso einfaches Beziehen des Eins auf Eins als vielmehr die absolute Beziehungslosigkeit des Eins; jenes nach der einfachen affirmativen Beziehung des Eins auf sich, dieses nach eben derselben als negativen. Oder die Vielheit des Eins ist das eigene Setzen des Eins; das Eins ist nichts als die *negative* Beziehung des Eins auf sich, und diese Beziehung, also das Eins selbst, ist das viele Eins. Aber ebenso ist die Vielheit dem Eins schlechthin äußerlich; denn das Eins ist eben das Aufheben des Andersseins, die Repulsion ist seine Beziehung auf sich und einfache Gleichheit mit sich selbst.”

⁷⁶ This sentence expresses the ‘fundamental determination’ of Leibniz’s ‘monadology’. Cf. WL I 189: “Es ist vorhin des *Leibnizischen Idealismus* erwähnt worden. Es kann hier hinzugesetzt werden, daß derselbe von der *vorstellenden Monade* aus, die als fürsichseiende bestimmt ist, nur bis zu der soeben betrachteten Repulsion fortging, und zwar nur zu der *Vielheit* als solcher, in der die Eins jedes nur für sich, gleichgültig gegen das Dasein und Für-sich-Sein Anderer ist oder überhaupt Andere gar nicht für das Eins sind. Die Monade ist für sich die ganze abgeschlossene Welt; es bedarf keine der anderen [...]. In jener gleichgültigen Unabhängigkeit der Monaden [bleibt] die Vielheit als starre *Grundbestimmung*, so daß ihre Beziehung nur in die [äußerliche] Monade der Monaden oder in den betrachtenden Philosophen fällt.”

nor posited by it,"⁷⁷ and whose function is to hinder the affection of the One by the many Ones.

This is the exact point where the structure of being-for-self becomes directly relevant to *abstract* universality in the sphere of individuality. For in the framework of the second, non-immanent repulsion, the relation of exclusion between the many Ones results not in their *indifference*, as it is intended, but in their *absolute sameness* and *indistinguishability*, their "common relation" (*gemeinsame Beziehung*).⁷⁸ This is so because by having *excluded* the *other* Ones from itself, each and every One *should* now manifest itself as an absolutely self-subsistent or independent content, a sheer being-in-itself.⁷⁹ Yet, as Hegel puts it, "this being-in-itself is that they are *Ones*." By *excluding* the other Ones, each One becomes exactly what each other One is and nothing more than that: "*this is what they all are*; they are in their being-in-itself the *same* instead of this latter being the fixed point of their diversity." Of course, each One is a power of repulsion; but given the framework of the second, non-immanent repulsion that determines the present dialectic, such power of repulsion does not result in a distinguishing, but rather in a "going-together-with-self" (*Mit-sich-Zusammengehen*),⁸⁰ namely, in sameness and commonality.

Therefore, the *plurality* of external repulsion, which is the immediate result of the act of *pre-supposing*, results in its turn in the positing of "*one* affirmative unity,"⁸¹ the *oneness* of the many Ones. But these many Ones are now a single, *self-subsistent* unity, not because they have all *arisen immanently* from the One itself, but because they have *collapsed* into their *commonality* or *sameness* through the relation of exclusion. Such unity designates an act whereby the differentiating determinacy of the Ones (to wit, their lower order determinacy) is eliminated and all that remains is their commonality. This common element, the self-subsistent identity of the non-immanent repelling being-for-self, the "*one* affirmative unity" is exactly what constitutes the *abstract universal* in the sphere of *individuality*. Here is how Hegel makes this connection:

[...] The individual [in abstraction] is a qualitative *One* [...]. Based on this quality, the individual is, *firstly*, such repulsion of itself from *itself* through which the many *other* Ones are presupposed; *secondly*, it is now negative

⁷⁷ WL I 190.

⁷⁸ WL I 190–192.

⁷⁹ WL I 191.

⁸⁰ WL I 192.

⁸¹ WL I 191.

relation that goes against those presupposed *other* Ones, and, therefore, is an individual that *excludes*. Universality, taken as relating to these individuals as [if they were] indifferent Ones—and such relation must be considered because universality is a moment of the concept of individuality—is only *the common element* (*das Gemeinsame*) of them. When the universal is conceived as what many individuals *have in common* (*gemeinschaftlich ist*), the beginning [of this conception] is made from their *indifferent* subsistence, and the immediacy of *being* [i.e. sheer affirmation] is incorporated (*eingemischt*) in the determination of the concept. The lowest representation one can have of the universal regarding its relation to the individual is this external relation based on the universal as the merely *common element* (*Gemeinschaftliches*).⁸²

Let us sum up. The individuality of being-as-concept denotes a single locus, a self-determined unity, which exemplifies a *difference*, each of whose constituents is the totality of the fundamental concept-determinations. This difference acquires the character of *abstraction* and in a context of immediacy manifests itself in the following two ways. On the one hand, it appears as the self-subsistent particular, the individual, the thing-as-the-This, whose relation to its determinacy is posited as being external to it, to wit, in the manner of a relation between an essential and an inessential element: the essential is the specific particular or individual, the inessential is the *other* which determines it, namely the universal. On the other hand, abstraction appears as the universal which relates to its *other*, the specific particular or individual, in terms of being a common element that unites externally (i.e. non-immanently) a multiplicity of Ones, namely a multiplicity of indifferent particulars. In this instance, the specific particular or individual is nothing but an indifferent instantiation of the universal, a member of a domain or set; it is an entity that strives to free itself from otherness and affirm its absolute self-subsistence, but the way it attempts to do that, namely through exclusion, fails it, for it immediately collapses into absolute commonality. Hegel, in an indirect polemic against Kant,⁸³ emphasizes that this is the lowest representation one could have of the universal,⁸⁴ but there is no doubt that the kind of

⁸² WL II 300.

⁸³ For Kant's conception of the universal concept as commonality see especially AA IX 91 and KrV A320 / B377. See also Stuhlmann-Laeisz (1976: 73ff.).

⁸⁴ Cf. Enz. I §163, Zusatz 1: "Nun aber ist das Allgemeine des Begriffs nicht bloß ein Gemeinschaftliches, welchem gegenüber das Besondere seinen Bestand für sich hat, sondern vielmehr das sich selbst Besondernde (Spezifizierende) und in seinem Anderen in ungetrübter Klarheit bei sich selbst Bleibende." Note two things here: (a) that the universal is described as "*nicht bloß* ein Gemeinschaftliches," which means that there is a

universality it designates is *indeed* constitutive part of the individuality of being-as-concept.

7.5. *Individuality as the Posited Loss of the Concept*

The preceding discussion has fabricated a detailed portrait of individuality in the sphere of being-as-concept. What remains to be done is to clear up Hegel's statement that individuality is the posited loss of the fundamental structure of being-as-concept. It is evident from the discussion that Hegel could not mean by this that the fundamental structure of being-as-concept *vanishes* from individuality. For individuality has proven to be the quintessential locus of being-as-concept. What does he mean, then?

The possibility of vanishing having been excluded, the only option left is that what Hegel means is that in individuality that structure acquires an altogether *new mode of existence*. It is not absent from individuality—it only exists in a different way than before.

The new mode of existence of the fundamental structure of being-as-concept has gradually been brought to light by the preceding dialectic. It is the effect of the internalization of difference in the locus of individuality. Hegel says that *after* this internalization had occurred, the fundamental concept-determinations stopped being *moments* of an immanent totality.⁸⁵ This connotes that they *were* behaving as such moments *before* the occurrence of the internalization.

To understand what “being a moment” means in this framework one should focus on the new element that the internalization of difference in individuality has introduced in the domain of being-as-concept: the *permanent fixity* of the difference of the fundamental concept-determinations. If you recall, individuality has been shown to be a unity which exemplifies the difference of the fundamental concept-determinations, a difference that cannot be dissolved. Therefore, for a fundamental concept-determination, being a ‘moment’ of an immanent totality means exactly this—having an existence which *lacks the fixity* against the other fundamental concept-determination.

Prior, then, to the internalization of difference the fundamental concept-determinations were *moments* of the immanent totality of being-as-

sense in which it is a *Gemeinschaftliches* and (b) that the *Gemeinschaftliches* is defined as that against which “das Besondere seinen Bestand für sich hat.”

⁸⁵ WL II 301.

concept in the sense that their relation did not have the structure of fixity. What structure did it have? Their relation, so Hegel, had the structure of the-one-*giving-rise-to-the-other*. Accordingly, it was this movement of one fundamental concept-determination giving rise to another that defined one such determination as a 'moment.'

'Being a moment' designates a certain fluidity between the fundamental concept-determinations and a situation of temporal replacement. The universal gives rise to the particular, which replaces it, and the particular gives rise to the individual, which replaces it. In individuality this structure does not vanish altogether (for, if you remember, individuality has 'swallowed' all elements and processes of being-as-concept), but it is sublated by the fixed difference of the fundamental concept-determinations. Or, if you will, this fixed difference provides the space in which the structure of 'being a moment' takes place. How this is actually achieved is certainly a puzzle and its solution will be pursued in the forthcoming chapters.

Let us take stock. The fundamental structure of being-as-concept has now been lost, not in the sense that it disappears, but rather in the sense that it has acquired a new—richer and more sophisticated—mode of existence. The fundamental concept-determinations are no longer solely and primordially stages of a temporal movement of determining ('moments')—they are first and foremost the constituents of a fixed, permanently stable difference. When we say that individuality is 'the posited loss of the concept', what we mean is that the determinate appearance of individuality (that is, its being *posited*) has the form and content of a unity which comes out as the fixed difference of the fundamental concept-determinations.

The term 'fixed difference' has a very simple meaning here. It just means that whenever individuality is posited, the universal, the particular and the individual are *all* present in what appears and that this presence is *explicit* and *simultaneous* (the one does not *follow* the other, they all appear *at once*). The internalization of difference, then, sets up a state of affairs characterized primordially by the fixed difference of the fundamental concept-determinations, a state of affairs that dominates the appearance (or "showing") of the individual as the locus of the whole being-as-concept, and it is this internalization that causes "the loss of the concept."

A new mode of existence requires a new name. Hegel calls the posited individuality by the name of *judgement*. We are thus entering the categorical sphere of *being-as-judgement* or, simply, *the judgement* (or, if you prefer, perhaps more appropriately, *being-as-concept-as-judgement*

or *concept-as-judgement*). Being-as-judgement lives necessarily a life of abstraction and its immediacy (that is, first appearance) is defined by the aforementioned two manifestations of abstraction: the thing-as-the-This and the common element. The dialectic of the judgement, which is the sole concern of the third and final part of the present study, exemplifies the immanent struggle of 'thought' to go beyond these two kinds of abstraction and disclose the true form and content of being-as-judgement.

7.6. Conclusion

The dialectic of individuality has shown how exactly this category enriches, completes and, finally, destroys the fundamental structure of being-as-concept:

- (a) It *enriches* it by showing itself to be distinct from universality and particularity. Universality is totality and persistence, particularity is differentiation and abstraction, individuality is becoming and return-into-the-same. The individual is neither simply the all-encompassing totality of the determinations, nor simply their structure of determinacy: it is an event, a becoming—the development of the totality and its structure of determinacy through the simple positing of the specific particular.⁸⁶
- (b) It *completes* (or *fulfils*) the fundamental structure-of-being-as-concept by 'internalizing' the distinctness of the fundamental concept-determinations and by incorporating each of the latter as the totality of them. The first is accomplished, I argued, via the fact that *in their distinctness* they are all *individuals*. The second occurs because, since the universal and the particular have proven to be individuals, the universal is now also the particular and the individual, the particular is now also the universal and the individual, and, of course, the individual is now also the universal and the particular. The completion of the fundamental structure of being-as-concept results, therefore, in the positing of a specific particular (the individual) in such a way that it exemplifies the *difference* of the fundamental concept-

⁸⁶ See Enz. I §163: "[...] Die Einzelheit des Begriffs [...] ist schlechthin das *Wirkende*, und zwar auch nicht mehr wie die *Ursache* mit dem Scheine, ein Anderes zu wirken, sondern das Wirkende *seiner selbst*."

determinations, each of whose constituents is the *totality* of those determinations.

- (c) Finally, individuality *destroys* the fundamental structure of being-as-concept by transferring it into a new mode of existence: the mode of the *judgement*. Individuality appears determinately as the unity of the fundamental concept-determinations but in such a way that *in this unity* they explicitly fix themselves against one another. The judgement denotes exactly this determinate appearance of individuality as the unity of the fixed difference of the fundamental concept-determinations.

The judgement, then, proves to be the true form and content of being-as-concept; neither the universal, nor the particular, nor the individual could have an existence independently of the judgement. (In fact, the individual *is* the judgement.) What the judgement brings to light is *both* the unity of the fundamental concept-determinations *and* their fixed opposition. But, as the true form of the individual, *conceived as self-determining determinacy*, the judgement is also essentially an active force, "an immanent differentiation and determining of the concept."⁸⁷ Let us now explore these phenomena in their proper domain: the dialectic of the judgement.

⁸⁷ Enz. I § 165: "Die immanente Unterscheidung und Bestimmen des Begriffs ist im Urteile vorhanden, denn das Urteilen ist das Bestimmen des Begriffs."

PART THREE

JUDGEMENT

[...] All things are a judgement [...].

Hegel, *Enzyklopädie* I §167

[...] Judging is the determining of the concept.

Hegel, *Enzyklopädie* I §165

The judgement is in this way the truth, because it is the correspondence of concept and reality.

Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik* II 311

CHAPTER EIGHT

PRELUDE TO THE SPECULATIVE THEORY OF JUDGEMENT

8.1. *Introduction*

In the first part of the present study, I argued (a) that the resolution of the Pyrrhonian problematic requires the formulation of a theory of the *Vernunftssatz* and (b) that such a theory has to emerge from the tautology of pure, indeterminate being by means of conflicting and unificatory judgements. In the second part, I showed that the fundamental structure of being-as-concept, which determines the character of rational being fundamentally, *posits* itself necessarily as *judgement*. This expression, ‘to posit oneself’, I have taken to mean ‘to appear determinately’, ‘to externalize itself in a determinate fashion’, ‘to open up determinately’.¹ Thus, the most general conclusion of the dialectic of the fundamental structure of being-as-concept is that if being-as-concept is to appear determinately, it must have the form of judgement: it is the judgement that explicates the determinacy of being-as-concept, the determinacy of rational being.²

Since the judgement has come forth as a category in the onto-logical project, it must be itself a determination of rational being. Nevertheless, the judgement is peculiarly also a linguistic element, a mode of linguistic expression. So, the *explication* of the determinacy of rational being through the activity of the judgement has also the significance of the *linguistic expression* of this determinacy. Therefore, the linguistic expression

¹ Hegel refers to the judgement as the *Entäußerung*, the *Auftreten*, and the *Erschließen* of the concept; see *Enz.* I §166. Cf. *Enz.* I §166, Zusatz: “[Der Begriff] ist zwar *an sich* schon das Besondere, allein im Begriff als solchem ist das Besondere noch nicht *gesetzt*, sondern noch in durchsichtiger Einsicht mit dem Allgemeinen.”

² Thus, I disagree with Pippin (1989: 237) when he says that Hegel aims “to show that a proper account of [...] ‘what there is in truth’ (as opposed to what simply exists) cannot be formulated within a traditional judgement form.” True, Hegel criticizes traditional *conceptions* of the logical structure of the judgement, but he does not want to say that the expression of truth takes place by means other than the judgement. How could that be possible anyway?! Cf. Harris (1990: 83): “The whole which is the truth is Idea, and Idea is this whole at the level of absolute knowing—the whole fully conscious of itself, of its own self-differentiation. At this level of self-awareness its self-differentiation takes the form of judgement and the process of judgement is that of the self-exposition of the Idea, which is the logical dialectic.”

of the way rational being determines itself is not an enterprise that is foreign or external to the way rational being determines itself.

This does not mean that the one is reducible to the other. But an intrinsic and necessary link between the two must exist since they both depend fundamentally upon the activity of an element which is both a determination of rational being and a mode of linguistic expression—namely, the judgement. It is indeed true that things appear determinately only through the judgement,³ nay that “all things *are* a judgement”⁴—but it is also true that this determinate appearance and existence is *expressed in language* through the judgement. So, whenever the term ‘judgement’ is used in the following discussion, the reference will be both (a) to an element which belongs to and enables the appearance of the determinacy of rational being and (b) to an element which expresses that determinacy in language. Sometimes the emphasis will be more on the one than on the other, but in such cases the context of the discussion should make it clear which one is meant.

The emergence of the *judgement* in the realm of reason establishes a direct link between the logical project and the Pyrrhonian problematic. This is so because the latter is based upon the thematization of the appearance of judgements in the universe of discourse. By *thematizing* the notion of judgement, the logical project will offer us a *presuppositionless* theory of the *Vernunftsatz*.⁵ All we have to do in order to resolve the Pyrrhonian problematic is (a) follow the immanent dialectic of the judgement and extract that theory out of it; and (b) ensure ourselves that this theory thematizes in a satisfactory way the process of conflict and unification of judgements. The starting-point of our analysis, and the sole concern of the present chapter, is Hegel’s *prelude* to that dialectic, where

³ Cf. Enz. I §166 (incl. Zusatz): “Dies Beispiel kann dann auch dazu dienen, um daran bemerklich zu machen, wie weder der Begriff noch das Urteil bloß in unserem Kopfe befindlich sind und nicht bloß von uns gebildet werden. Der Begriff ist das den Dingen selbst Innewohnende, wodurch sie das sind, was sie sind, und einen Gegenstand begreifen heißt somit, sich seines Begriffs bewußt werden; schreiten wir dann zur Beurteilung des Gegenstandes, so ist es nicht unser subjektives Tun, wodurch dem Gegenstand dies oder jenes Prädikat beigelegt wird, sondern wir betrachten den Gegenstand in der durch seinen Begriff gesetzten Bestimmtheit.”

⁴ Enz. I §167: “[...] Alle Dinge sind ein Urteil [...].”

⁵ Cf. WL II 318: “[...] Wer die *Richtigkeit* einer *Anschauung* oder *Wahrnehmung*, die Übereinstimmung der *Vorstellung* mit dem Gegenstand *Wahrheit* nennt, hat wenigstens keinen Ausdruck mehr für dasjenige, was Gegenstand und Zweck der Philosophie ist. Man müßte den letzteren wenigstens Vernunftwahrheit nennen, und man wird wohl zugeben, daß solche Urteile [wie] daß Cicero ein großer Redner gewesen, daß es jetzt Tag ist usf. keine Vernunftwahrheiten sind.” Cf. WL II 320–321.

he provides a preliminary characterization of the onto-logical structure of the judgement and its significance.

8.2. *Concept and Judgement*

The dialectic of the fundamental structure of being-as-concept has culminated in the centralization of *the individual*, whose structure denotes a complex constellation of relations and states of affairs. It is:

- *firstly*, a topos, in which the fundamental concept-determinations (universal, particular, individual) are *immediately, explicitly* and *primordially* bound in a *unity* or *identity*⁶—this is the unity imposed by the encompassing, universal power of individuality, by virtue of which the fundamental concept-determinations “cannot be isolated from one another;”⁷
- *secondly*, a relation between *self-subsistent* fundamental concept-determinations, elements that behave as if their character was fixed or unchangeable and did not depend upon the *other* fundamental concept-determinations⁸ (to wit, as if that character was an *essence*); such state of affairs (which represents the internalized *abstraction* of being-as-concept) manifests itself as (a) the specific particular that stands against the universal, referred to by Hegel as *the immediate individual*, (b) the *abstract universal* that stands against the specific particular, and (c) the relation between them as *particulars*, their co-existence in a single judgement-space;
- *thirdly*, a relation between fundamental concept-determinations, each of which contains the *totality* of the fundamental concept-determinations.

The judgement is nothing but the positing of this structure. Recall that the individual’s being manifested as *the judgement* has the great significance of being-as-concept’s entering into a new mode of existence. By showing itself to be a topos in which the fundamental concept-determinations are connected in an explicit and irreducible unity, the individual exemplifies the fixed difference of those determinations in a unitary manner. As

⁶ Cf. Mure (1950: 167): “Individual is the self-subsistent totality of the Notion in which Universal and Particular are merged immediately in one.”

⁷ Enz. I § 166.

⁸ Enz. I § 166.

pointed out at the end of the last chapter, due to this structure the individual broke off from what the fundamental structure of being-as-concept had until then shown itself to be: a content that *transforms* itself *continuously* from universality to particularity to individuality. The simple original unity out of which difference *emerges* has now given way to an original unity that is explicitly *equally* and *simultaneously* an *original division*, an *Ur-teil*.⁹ Thus, when the concept expresses itself as and by means of the judgement, it does not present itself as a *series* of fundamental concept-determinations. The latter appear all *at once* in a stabilized, irreducible connection.

As a *stabilized* unity of *self-subsistent* concept-determinations, the judgement is being-as-concept's posited *determinacy*.¹⁰ Being-as-concept, that is, has an appearing determinate content, only insofar as it is, and is expressed through, judgement.¹¹ This has already been explained. What we need to emphasize in this instance is that the notion of "the appearing determinate concept" denotes not just the outcome of the dialectic of being-as-concept's fundamental structure (to wit, not just the *category* of judgement); it refers also to *all* determinate manifestations of being-as-concept, to *all* concepts (or categories) that constitute the realm of rational being; for each and every concept is what being-as-concept has shown itself to be—they are its determinate manifestations. Consequently, all the categories that appeared in the spheres of simple being and being-as-essence have now *explicitly* acquired, as determinate appearances of being-as-concept (or, simply, as *determinate concepts*), the form and content of the judgement.¹²

Thus, the dialectic of the fundamental structure of being-as-concept has proven that the determinate appearance of being-as-concept—i.e. rational

⁹ Enz. I §166. It is this *stability* (or 'immediacy') of the *topos* of the judgement that allows Hegel to call the dialectic of the pure concept a "subjective abstraction" (WL II 301): "Die Begriffsbestimmungen [...] sind schon für sich betrachtet worden; aber diese Betrachtung war mehr eine subjektive Reflexion oder subjektive Abstraktion." (Note that this sentence refers to the immediately previous section of the logic of the concept ("The Concept") and not to the content of the logics of being and essence.)

¹⁰ WL II 301: "Das Urteil ist die am *Begriffe* selbst *gesetzte Bestimmtheit* desselben;" WL II 302: "[Das Urteil ist] das *Bestimmen* des Begriffes durch sich selbst;" Enz. I §171: "[...] Das Urteil selbst ist nichts als der *bestimmte* Begriff;" WL II 311: "[...] Das Urteil [ist] der *gesetzte* bestimmte Begriff [...]."

¹¹ WL II 310: "[...] Das Urteil [ist] die Realität des Begriffes [...]."

¹² WL II 301: "Das *Urteil* ist dies Setzen der bestimmten Begriffe durch den Begriff selbst;" Enz. I §171: "In Beziehung auf die beiden vorhergegangenen Sphären des *Seins* und *Wesens* sind die *bestimmten Begriffe* als Urteile Reproduktionen dieser Sphären, aber in der einfachen Beziehung des Begriffs gesetzt."

being—can be achieved only through judging, a *stabilized* connection of the fundamental concept-determinations.¹³ This, as already pointed out, does not mean that the fundamental concept-determinations do not move *within* the judgement-locus. What it means is simply that the judgement cannot exist unless it shows itself to be a *connection* of the *fundamental concept-determinations*, whose existence *no longer* depends upon a process of *emergence*. In the case of judgement, I find myself thinking of two particulars, the universal and the individual, connected to each other *from the beginning*.¹⁴

A complication has now arisen: There seems to be a discrepancy between the *developmental* character of the expressed *categorical* structure of being-as-concept (as the whole rational being), on the one hand, and the *stability* of its structure-as-judgement, on the other. An explanation, therefore, must be given as to how the dialectical movement of the categories combines with the judgement's stability. For, as expressed (or explicated) determinate concepts, the categories have the structure of judgement, to wit, they are stable connections of the fundamental concept-determinations. One of the major challenges the forthcoming analysis faces is to explain how the relation between universality, particularity and individuality in the judgement-locus enables or gives rise to the movement of the categories in the onto-logical project. As Hegel puts it, "what determinate concepts there *are* and how these determinations of the concept produce themselves in a necessary way, this must show itself in the judgement."¹⁵

It seems, then, that the dialectic of the judgement will move in two interwoven general directions: On the one hand, the emphasis will be placed on the microscopic level of the judgement-topos itself. Investigations in this realm must explain how the *fundamental* concept-determinations behave in the judgement-locus. On the other hand, the focus will be on the macroscopic level of the expressed categorical constitution of rational being. This inquiry must explain how exactly the behaviour of the fundamental concept-determinations in the judgement-topos enables the expression of the dynamic *categorical* constitution of rational being.

¹³ In this sense I disagree with Rinaldi (1992: 232ff.) who describes the move from the pure concept to the judgement in purely negative terms, namely as if the judgement had no 'positive value' in the corpus of speculative logical theory.

¹⁴ Rinaldi (1992: 232).

¹⁵ Cf. WL II 302: "Was es für bestimmte Begriffe *gibt* und wie sich diese Bestimmungen desselben notwendig ergeben, dies hat sich im Urteil zu zeigen."

Accordingly, Hegel's statement that "the judgement is the concept's posited distinguishing (*Diremption*) in the difference of its moments through its own activity"¹⁶ entails *two* things: (a) that the judgement as such is the locus wherein the difference of the *fundamental* concept-determinations is posited and (b) that *each and every* judgement in the onto-logical project is a unique determining differentiation of being-as-concept itself. The forthcoming analysis must shed light on both these aspects of the speculative theory of judgement.

All in all, the judgement is that element in the sphere of reason by means of which being-as-concept presents itself determinately when it "particularizes" itself in the field of its appearance or expression.¹⁷ *There is no such thing as an appearing or expressed determinate concept that does not have the peculiar content and form of judgement.*¹⁸ Yet, each and every determinate concept emerges from and discloses the "absolutely active" individual,¹⁹ the facilitator of "the principle of universality"—this, of course, is nothing but being-as-concept itself (for the latter has returned

¹⁶ Enz. I §166, Zusatz: "Nun aber ist der Begriff als solcher nicht, wie der Verstand meint, prozeßlos in sich verharrend, sondern vielmehr, als unendliche Form, schlechthin tätig, gleichsam das *punctum saliens* aller Lebendigkeit und somit sich von sich selbst unterscheidend. Diese durch die eigene Tätigkeit des Begriffs gesetzte Diremption desselben in den Unterschied seiner Momente ist das *Urteil*, dessen Bedeutung hiernach als die *Besonderung* des Begriffs aufzufassen ist." See also WL II 304: "Das Urteil ist die Diremption des Begriffs durch sich selbst [...]."

¹⁷ Enz. I §166, Zusatz; WL II 304: "[...] Der Begriff [ist] im Urteil als *Erscheinung* [...], indem seine Momente darin Selbständigkeit haben [...]."

¹⁸ Pippin's conception of the relation between *determinate concept* and *judgement* is very different from mine; see Pippin (1989: 237–239). He claims that, for Hegel, "the concept's determinacy [...] is primarily a function of the role it can and cannot play in judgements [...]. Hegel is following Kant here in understanding concepts as 'predicates of possible judgements' and likewise insisting that to understand a concept is [...] to understand how to use it in a variety of judgements." He also tells us that, according to Hegel, "judgements are assertions made by a subject." In the interpretation I am offering, by contrast, the judgement is neither a locus in which the concept performs a *role*, nor a locus in which the concept is *used*. Rather, the judgement *is* the concept: *all* elements in the universe of rational discourse, all rational dimensions of reality *are* judgements. *In the sphere of reason*, there is no such thing as a concept that is not a judgement. It is not as if there are concepts which one could use here and there *in* judgements. Moreover, in speculative philosophy the judgement is not, strictly speaking, an assertion made by a subject; it is the content and form *the rational itself* takes when it explicates or expresses itself. (This criticism does not apply if what Pippin refers to by the word "subject" is nothing but the subject-matter of speculative philosophy, the rational itself—but I do not think he does that.)

¹⁹ Enz. I §166, Zusatz.

into itself absolutely *in the individual*).²⁰ In this sense, “the concept is the presupposition of the judgement,”²¹ an *implicit* content that *opens up* its determinations—in the same way that the seed of a plant opens up the determinations of that plant.²² Thus, the judgements which express those determinate concepts (the *categories*) are self-presentations of being-as-concept itself.²³ But the *exact* way in which the judgement, as the stable unity of the fundamental concept-determinations, (a) expresses a determinate concept (and, moreover, a *manifoldness* of determinate concepts) and (b) comes to express being-as-concept itself remains to be seen.

8.3. Subject and Predicate

The judgement, then, is the topos in which the fundamental concept-determinations are, in their distinctness, pinned down and become—in a context of immediacy—self-subsistent totalities connected in an irreducible unity.²⁴ If the judgement is to accommodate these distinct elements, it must provide *distinct* spaces for each one of them. Given what has been said in the first paragraph of the previous section, this means it must provide spaces for two *relata* and a *connector*. The three spaces will be designated by the terms *subject*, *predicate*, and *copula*.²⁵ The *subject* denotes the space in which the self-subsistent immediate individual

²⁰ Enz. I §166, Zusatz: “[Es] ist falsch, von verschiedenartigen Begriffen zu reden, denn der Begriff als solcher, obschon konkret, ist doch wesentlich *einer*, und die in ihm enthaltenen Momente sind nicht als verschiedene Arten zu betrachten [...]”; Enz. I §166: “Das Urteil ist deswegen erst die wahrhafte *Besonderheit* des Begriffs, denn es ist die Bestimmtheit oder Unterscheidung desselben, welche aber *Allgemeinheit* bleibt.”

²¹ Enz. I §166, Zusatz.

²² Enz. I §166, Zusatz: “So enthält z.B. [...] der Keim einer Pflanze zwar bereits das Besondere der Wurzel, der Zweige, der Blätter usf., allein dies Besondere ist nur erst *an sich* vorhanden und wird erst gesetzt, indem der Keim sich erschließt, welches als das Urteil der Pflanze zu betrachten ist.”

²³ Cf. Pippin (1989: 239–240).

²⁴ WL II 302: “Das Urteil kann daher die nächste *Realisierung* des Begriffs genannt werden, insofern die Realität das Treten ins *Dasein* als *bestimmtes* Sein überhaupt bezeichnet. Näher hat sich die Natur dieser Realisierung so ergeben, daß *fürs erste* die Momente des Begriffs durch seine Reflexion-in-sich oder seine Einzelheit selbständige Totalitäten sind, *fürs andere* aber die Einheit des Begriffs als deren *Beziehung* ist. Die in sich reflektierten Bestimmungen sind bestimmte Totalitäten, ebenso wesentlich in gleichgültigem beziehungslosen Bestehen als durch die gegenseitige Vermittlung miteinander. Das Bestimmen selbst ist nur die Totalität, indem es diese Totalitäten und deren Beziehung enthält. Diese Totalität ist das Urteil.”

²⁵ WL II 302: “[Das Urteil] enthält [...] also die beiden Selbständigen, welche *Subjekt* und *Prädikat* heißen.” For the copula see Enz. I §166.

first appears; the *predicate* the space in which the self-subsistent abstract universal first appears;²⁶ and the *copula* the space in which their connection as particulars is first manifested.²⁷ There is nothing puzzling regarding this *distribution*; simply, given the content of the internalized abstraction of being-as-concept, there appears a connection between self-subsistent elements and the new terms designate the distinct spaces that these elements and their connection (which is equally self-subsistent) *must* occupy.

Why, though, should one introduce these new terms, at least with respect to *subject* and *predicate*? Why do we not simply use the terms *individual*, *universal* and *copula*?²⁸ The reason for this is that the self-subsistent relata are inherently *totalities*, which means that *each* space in the judgement-topos must accommodate and exhibit *each and every* fundamental concept-determination.²⁹ If the concept-determinations were identical to the spaces they occupy, the *transformation* of the one into the other *in the occupied space* would not become apparent. For, obviously, in this scenario the individual's being transformed into the universal would appear as a space's being added *next* to another, which is a phenomenon that resembles nothing of *transformation*. Transformation requires change *within* a single (mobile or immobile) space and if that space was identified with a single fundamental concept-determination, no change could occur within it (for it could not be anything else than what it is).

Imagine the individual occupying a space and the universal another in the judgement-topos and then each of them transforming itself into the other—the individual is now the universal and the universal the individual. Were these determinations absolutely identical to the spaces they occupy, there would be no connection between the initial judgement “the individual is the universal” and the one that has emerged from its transformation, namely “the universal is the individual.” It would be impossible to say that the individual transformed itself into the universal. It would seem that we are talking about four distinct elements, two universals and two individuals.

²⁶ Cf. WL II 306: “Insofern [das Urteil] [...] überhaupt die gesetzte Bestimmtheit des Begriffs ist, so hat sie die angegebenen Unterschiede *unmittelbar* und *abstrakt*, als *Einzelheit* und *Allgemeinheit*.”

²⁷ Enz. I §166.

²⁸ Rinaldi (1992: 233) refrains from asking this question and hence does not feel obliged to provide an explanation of Hegel's remarks on the nature of a *name* in WL II 302–303.

²⁹ WL II 303: “[...] Indem die Seiten des Urteils selbst Begriffe, also die Totalität seiner Bestimmungen sind, so müssen sie diesselben alle durchlaufen und an sich zeigen [...].”

Subject and predicate (and copula) are here employed because they can function as *tags* that each time delimit the *same* space in the judgement-topos.³⁰ In this way, they allow the movement *in* the judgement-locus to become *apparent* in terms of transformation. Subject and predicate (and copula) fix and thereby ‘make visible’ the spaces *in which* the transformation of the fundamental concept-determinations occurs. The self-subsistent elements are totalities and as such any of their members (to wit, any of the fundamental concept-determinations) could occupy an empty space at any given moment. By using the terms ‘subject’ and ‘predicate’ (and ‘copula’) as tags we achieve two things: (a) we allow the possibility that each time a different fundamental concept-determination could occupy the same space in the judgement-topos and (b) we can observe the changes happening in the judgement-topos in terms of transformation.

But what is it that is so special about the notion so subject and predicate that enables them to play the role of a tag? Subject and predicate can function as tags because they have the nature of a *name*.³¹ The latter has two basic features: it is (a) initially *indeterminate* and *abstract* and (b) able to *fix* a reference to the *same* (mobile or immobile) space (but not to the same *content*).³² Its initial indeterminacy and abstractness has to do with the fact that it is *initially* empty and receptive of different contents, while its ability to fix a reference to the same space has to do with the fact that the contents it receives are always placed within the same space. The name can be conveniently thought as a ‘container’, a fixed (mobile or immobile) element that provides an empty space to be filled in by a variety of contents.³³

³⁰ WL II 303: “Um nun doch bei dieser Veränderung ihrer Bestimmung die Seiten des Urteils auf eine allgemeine Weise festzuhalten, sind [Subjekt und Prädikat] am dienlichsten, die sich darin gleich bleiben.”

³¹ WL II 302: “Es ist daher passend und Bedürfnis, für die Urteilsbestimmungen diese Namen, Subjekt und Prädikat, zu haben; [...] und mehr als Namen sind sie [...] nicht;” WL II 311: “Das Subjekt und Prädikat sind [...] zunächst Namen, deren wirkliche Bestimmung erst durch den Verlauf des Urteils erhalten wird;” WL II 317: “Das *Subjekt* ist *Prädikat*, oder, da dies nur Namen sind [...]”

³² WL II 302: “[...] Als Namen sind sie etwas Unbestimmtes, das erst noch seine Bestimmung erhalten soll [...]”; WL 302–303: “Begriffsbestimmungen selbst könnten für die zwei Seiten des Urteils [...] nicht gebraucht werden, [...] weil die Natur der Begriffsbestimmung sich hervortut, nicht ein Abstraktes und Festes zu sein, sondern ihre entgegengesetzte in sich zu haben und an sich zu setzen [...]”

³³ Hegel's views about the nature of the *name* are discussed by De Vries (1988). Although De Vries' discussion is very interesting and informative, it is not particularly helpful for understanding the role the name plays in *speculative logical theory*. This is so because he interprets the relevant passages with the narrow aim of clarifying whether or

All in all, subject and predicate are essentially *empty* and *fixed* spaces in the judgement-topos. This goes against those who characterize the subject as *essentially* ‘that about which something is said’ and the predicate as *essentially* ‘that which is said about the subject’; for in this ‘trivial’ characterization the *necessary* link between subject and predicate, on the one hand, and the specific nature of the appearing determinate concept (the transformative character of its basic constituents), on the other hand, is not made explicit. The judgement, as the quintessential locus of the appearing determinate concept, should manifest the *all-encompassing* nature of its *self-subsistent* components. It is for this reason that what constitutes it, namely subject and predicate, must have *essentially* the character we have just specified. Indeed, without this character the two sides of the judgement would never be able to manifest immanently each and every fundamental concept-determination (as they should).³⁴

8.4. Subjective and Objective Unity of the Judgement

As explained, the judgement is characterized by three basic functions: *unity* (or *identity*), *self-subsistence* and *totality*. All three of them will be shown to play a crucial role in the judgement’s onto-logical determination.

not Hegel believes that we can refer to particulars. De Vries aims at showing, *pace* Hamlyn (1961: 140–146), Soll (1969: 91–110), Plumer (1980), and Inwood (1983: 311–317), that it was indeed Hegel’s view that we can refer to particulars by using names and demonstratives, but that this reference—the basis of Russell’s “knowledge by acquaintance”—has by itself no cognitive (informational) import. It can be fairly said that this is a standard view in Hegelian scholarship today. Although De Vries acknowledges the importance of judgemental expression for Hegel, he does not endeavour to explain Hegel’s “two-name” theory of judgement. In a footnote (p. 301, n. 9) he simply asserts, with no further clarification, that such a theory is problematic. However, in his discussion of the general nature of a name and its difference from demonstratives and definite descriptions he seems to agree with my description of that nature (with the crucial difference that I take the name in the *Logic* to refer, first and foremost, to spaces in the judgement-topos, while he takes it to refer to particulars): names *qua* names have no (or, at least, ‘no significant’) cognitive content, their referent—contrary to demonstratives—is fixed (“names can refer to one and only one thing”) and they acquire cognitive content through concepts (in our case, through the concepts of the logical project).

³⁴ Enz. I §169, Zusatz: “Sagt man: ‘das Subjekt ist das, wovon etwas ausgesagt [wird], und das Prädikat ist das Ausgesagt’, so ist dies etwas sehr Triviales [...]. Das Subjekt ist [...] zunächst das Einzelne und das Prädikat das Allgemeine. In der weiteren Entwicklung des Urteils geschieht es dann, daß das Subjekt nicht bloß das unmittelbar Einzelne und das Prädikat nicht bloß das abstrakt Allgemeine bleibt; Subjekt und Prädikat erhalten demnächst auch die Bedeutung jenes, des Besonderen und des Allgemeinen, und dieses, des Besonderen und des Einzelnen. Dieser Wechsel in der Bedeutung der beiden Seiten des Urteils ist es, welcher unter den beiden Benennungen Subjekt und Prädikat stattfindet.”

At the *beginning* of the inquiry, however, it is the function of *self-subsistence* that dominates the dialectic, the reason being that the judgement's *first* positing brings with it a context of *immediacy*.³⁵ In such context the *self-subsistence* of the related elements becomes so powerful that it causes the *suppression* of the other two functions.³⁶ True, subject and predicate appear as *united* through the copula, but this unity, due to its immediate existence, *hypostatizes* itself and becomes a *third* entity, alongside the two relata: the copula as such. Its character of *unity* (of universality, of all-encompassing individuality) is, therefore, suppressed in favour of the *particularity* of the elements. Totality *too* vanishes, for each of the three fundamental concept-determinations acquires a fixity that prevents it from *turning itself into* the others. The only *explicit* state of affairs this immediacy allows is a side-by-side arrangement, an *external* connection of the fundamental concept-determinations.

This state of affairs appeals to *representative* thinking and to *common sense* (under whose heading one can also place *the understanding*, *Verstand*), for which the isolated identity of subject and predicate constitutes their very essence.³⁷ (a) The *subject* is given the status of an element that could exist even if it were not related to a specific predicate; it is the *immediate individual*, "the immediately existing object,"³⁸ whose

³⁵ WL II 304 (my emphasis; Hegel's emphasis has been removed): "Das Urteil hat zu seinen Seiten überhaupt Totalitäten, welche zunächst als wesentlich selbstständig sind. Die Einheit des Begriffes ist daher nur erst eine Beziehung von *Selbstständigen* [...];" Enz. I §171: "Subjekt, Prädikat und [...] die Identität sind zunächst im Urteile in ihrer Beziehung selbst als *verschieden*, auseinanderfallend gesetzt." There is a peculiar sentence in WL II 304 where Hegel suggests that "the observation of the judgement can take off either from the original unity of the concept or from the self-subsistence of the extremes." Independently of what this means, there should be no doubt that the "observation" *actually* takes off from that state of affairs which explicates only the self-subsistence of the extremes, and not the (explicitly manifested) original unity of the concept.

³⁶ Admittedly, Hegel's language is somewhat ambiguous at this point. For he says, on the one hand, that "the moments of the concept are *posited* in the judgement as identical with themselves, *not with one another*" (Enz. I §166, my emphasis); and, on the other, that the copula expresses "their *posited* identity or the universality [of the concept]" (Enz. I §166, my emphasis) or that "in the copula the identity of subject and predicate [with one another] is *posited*" (Enz. I §171). Yet, immediately after these two latter expressions, he goes on to add that the identity expressed through the copula is indeed posited, but *in this positing* it either has an *immediate* character, in which case it becomes *itself* self-subsistent as well, or has only an *implicit* presence, in which case its function of uniting the concept-determinations is *suppressed*.

³⁷ Cf. WL II 304: "Daß aber der Begriff im *Urteil* als *Erscheinung* ist, indem seine Momente darin Selbstständigkeit erlangt haben,—an diese Seite der *Äußerlichkeit* hält sich mehr die *Vorstellung*."

³⁸ WL II 306.

existence, despite its having universal characteristics, does not essentially depend upon them.³⁹ (b) The *predicate* is given the status of an element that could exist even if it were not related to a specific subject; it is the universal determination, which, despite being related to a specific subject, is independent from it, has a life that goes beyond its particular instantiation.⁴⁰ This universal determination is, first and foremost, an idea “in one’s head” (as Hegel puts it, “a representation”), not an inherent characteristic of the thing itself.⁴¹ (c) Then, since representationalism and common sense begin from the assumption that subject and predicate are *primordially* distinct, it is not surprising that they characterize their *connection* in the judgement in terms of *externality* and *subjectivity*; this connection is a *Verbindung*, a non-primordial, subjective unity of subject and predicate.⁴² Thus, for the representationalists, the judgement is nothing but an external “putting together,” a *Verbindung* or *Zusammenbringen*, a *Synthese* of two *originally non-connected* elements: a universal determination that is “in my head” and an immediate existent that lies “outside of my head.” Hegel calls this connection *the subjective unity of the judgement* and describes it as follows:

With the judgement there arises, therefore, the reflection whether this or that predicate, which exists in one’s head, could and should be associated with the object, which has an independent existence *outside* of it. The act of judgement itself has this character; that it is only through it that a predicate is first *put together* (*verbunden*) with the subject, so that if such putting

³⁹ This “immediately existing object” could refer to anything “about which something is said” or “about which the act of judgement is made.” But for us it refers especially to the still undeveloped *subject-matter* (*die Sache*) of the onto-logical project, namely *reason* or *the rational* itself.

⁴⁰ WL II 307: “[...] Das Prädikat dagegen als das *Allgemeine* erscheint als diese *Reflexion* über ihn [d.h. den wirklichen Gegenstand] oder auch vielmehr als dessen Reflexion in sich selbst, welche über jene Unmittelbarkeit hinausgeht und die Bestimmtheiten als bloß seiende aufhebt,—als sein *Ansichsein*.”

⁴¹ WL II 304: “Nach dieser *subjektiven* Betrachtung werden daher Subjekt und Prädikat jedes als außer dem anderen für sich fertig betrachtet: das Subjekt als ein Gegenstand, der auch wäre, wenn er dieses Prädikat nicht hätte; das Prädikat als eine allgemeine Beziehung, die auch wäre, wenn sie diesem Subjekte nicht zukäme.”

⁴² Enz. I §166, Zusatz: “Das Urteil pflegt als eine Verbindung von Begriffen, und zwar von verschiedenartigen Begriffen betrachtet zu werden;” WL II 305–306: “[...] Wenn das Urteil gewöhnlich so erklärt wird, daß es die *Verbindung zweier Begriffe* sei, so kann man für die äußerliche Kopula wohl den unbestimmten Ausdruck *Verbindung* gelten lassen, ferner daß die Verbundenen wenigstens Begriffe sein *sollen*;” WL II 317: “Zur Form des Urteils selbst wird nichts gerechnet, als daß es die Beziehung *zweier* Begriffe sei. Es hat sich aber ergeben, daß diese beiden Begriffe nicht bloß die verhältnislose Bestimmung einer *Anzahl* haben, sondern als *Einzelnes* und *Allgemeines* sich verhalten.”

together (*Verbindung*) did not take place, each of subject and predicate would remain what it is for itself, the first an existing object, the second a representation in my head.⁴³

This unity, which representationalism and common sense take to be an absolute truth, is a direct corollary of the context of immediacy in which the judgement is initially manifested. But, since the judgement is the self-expression of being-as-concept, that subjective unity is *destined* to be *sublated* in the dialectic—as soon as the *objective* (namely primordial) unity of the fundamental concept-determinations⁴⁴ comes out of its *implicitness* and becomes *explicit*. Indeed, the copula is not in its truth an external ‘putting together’ of subject and predicate; it is rather the universal-as-genus, the all-encompassing individual that *has* projected *itself* as *this* determinate relation. It denotes the *unity* of being-as-concept, which means that the predicate is *not* external to the subject. It *arises* in the universe of rational discourse *together* with the subject, its existence is *intrinsically* bound to that subject. The context of immediacy *suppresses* the expression of this intrinsic unity, but the latter *must* nonetheless appear; hence the tension at the beginning of the dialectic, a volcano ready to explode. It is not as if we have a choice to satisfy ourselves with the subjective unity of the judgement and decide to remain eternally captives of representationalism and common sense; the very onto-logical structure of the judgement requires that this subjective unity unsettles and transforms itself (or *returns*) into the *objective* one.

The given explanation of the relation between the subjective and the objective unity of the judgement entails that representationalism and common sense, *as corollaries of the context of immediacy in which the judgement is initially manifested*, are not foreign to being-as-concept itself: it is in fact its own existence that begins with their presence. Representationalism and common sense are, therefore, part of being-as-concept’s

⁴³ WL II 304–305. See also Enz. I §166: “Gewöhnlich denkt man beim Urteil zuerst an die *Selbständigkeit* der Extreme, des Subjekts und Prädikats, daß jenes ein Ding oder eine Bestimmung für sich und ebenso das Prädikat eine allgemeine Bestimmung außer jenem Subjekt, etwa in meinem Kopfe sei,—die dann von mir mit jener zusammengebracht, und hiermit geurteilt werde.”

⁴⁴ For the association of *objectivity* with *the original unity of the concept* see especially WL II 304: “[...] Diese [ursprüngliche] Einheit [des Begriffs] ist daher der Grund, von welchem aus es nach seiner wahrhaften *Objektivität* betrachtet wird. Es ist insofern die *ursprüngliche Teilung* des ursprünglich Einen; das Wort *Urteil* bezieht sich hiermit auf das, was es an und für sich ist.” He repeats this claim in WL II 306: “[...] Der Begriff [macht] den wesentlichen *Grund* des Urteils [aus] [...].”

life and the dialectic that follows must show how the explicit presence of the subjective unity of the judgement which they exemplify *returns* into the explicit presence of the objective unity, namely into the original unity of subject and predicate, the original unity of the fundamental concept-determinations.

These considerations suggest that the dialectic must *necessarily* begin with a *deficient* structure, the *discrepancy* between (a) being-as-concept's *immediate* determinate being and (b) its *original* unity. This entails that the whole dialectic, or part of it, *could* be conceived in terms of a *movement* from that immediate determinacy to this original unity, whereby what the judgement is *implicitly* becomes *explicit*.⁴⁵ On the other hand, though, the dialectic *should not* be conceived in terms of that movement, for the opposition between (a) what appears immediately and (b) what exists implicitly is, as Hegel puts it, *begrifflos*;⁴⁶ it is, namely, in need of a proof which only the dialectic of the judgement itself can provide. As far as the immanent development of the judgement is concerned, what is *presently* real and true is only what exists immediately, the self-subsistent fundamental concept-determinations and their indifferent *Verbindung*. Thus, (a) the *discrepancy* between (i) an immediate state of affairs and (ii) the original unity of the concept, and (b) the projected *goal* of its resolution, have no *functional* value in the analysis of the judgement, to wit, they do not 'cause' or 'explain' its specific dialectical development.

On the whole, the speculative theory of judgement begins with that structure that gives rise to the representationalist conception of judgement. The essential idea here is that subject and predicate are connected in terms of a *Verbindung*. This entails that their existence is self-subsistent, that they can exist independently from one another. Indeed, the notion of *Verbindung* has connotations of an external, non-original, a *posteriori* connection. The predicate is not an inherent part of the subject; it is rather something that is *attached* or *placed next* to it (*beigelegt wird*). Hegel objects to this idea because he thinks that the onto-logical project has *proven* the emergence of the judgement from being-as-concept itself.⁴⁷ The differentiated elements we observe in the judgement-locus

⁴⁵ WL II 310.

⁴⁶ WL II 306.

⁴⁷ Cf. Enz. I §166, Zusatz: "Ein fernerer Mangel der in der formellen Logik gewöhnlichen Auffassung des Urteils besteht dann darin, daß derselben zufolge das Urteil überhaupt bloß als etwas Zufälliges erscheint und daß der Fortgang vom Begriff zum Urteil nicht nachgewiesen wird."

are determinate manifestations of being-as-concept and, therefore, are bound, not *a posteriori*, but *primordially*.⁴⁸ And yet, the immediacy of the initial positing of the judgement suppresses that initial proof ('the proof of the *objectivity* of the judgement') and demands a 'return' to it. This is why subjectivity (a) is incorporated and (b) has to be sublated in the sphere of the judgement.

8.5. *Inherence, Subsumption and Simple Identity*

Subject, predicate and copula are spaces in the judgement-locus that accommodate the fundamental concept-determinations; and, *initially*, the latter appear in those spaces purely as *self-subsistent* elements. Yet, *in its very self-subsistence*, each of the determinations has its own peculiar character. This is the character it received from the *internalization of the concept's abstraction* and which constitutes the core of the representationalist and common sense conceptions of the judgement. What is significant regarding these various characters is that their co-existence in the judgement-locus requires the development of a *system of standpoints* and the development of the judgement *in the context of immediacy* in terms of exactly that system.

To begin with, recall that the self-subsistent element in the subject-space is the *immediate individual*, which, despite the fact that it appears to be connected to universal characteristics ("common elements"), has an independence from them; from its own standpoint, the immediate individual is what is *essential* in the relation, in the sense that removal of the predicates would still leave us with what there is *in truth*: the immediate existent. But, then, from its own standpoint, *in this very relation* it has with the universal (which is now the abstract universal, the common element, 'something that is in my head', not being-as-concept itself), the latter is necessarily the *inessential* element in the judgement-locus and, *therefore*, is *not* self-subsistent. This is so because (a) the existence of the judgement requires the presence of both of the relata and (b) the immediate individual is posited as not requiring a connection with the universal;

⁴⁸ Cf. Enz. I §166, Zusatz: "[Es ist falsch] von einer *Verbindung* der Seiten des Urteils zu sprechen, da, wenn von einer Verbindung die Rede ist, die Verbundenen als auch ohne die Verbindung für sich vorhanden gedacht werden. Diese äußerliche Auffassung zeigt sich dann noch bestimmter, wenn von dem Urteil gesagt wird, daß dasselbe dadurch zustande komme, daß einem Subjekt ein Prädikat *beigelegt* werde. Das Subjekt gilt hierbei als draußen für sich bestehend und das Prädikat als in unserem Kopfe befindlich."

since the connection *does* exist and since the individual is (allegedly) truly self-subsistent, it must be the case that *the universal* is dependent upon the individual, that *it* is the reason why there is such a connection. The individual does not need the universal for the realization of its existence, but the universal must *inhere* in the individual if it is to have reality and truth.⁴⁹

Yet, on the other side, the *abstract universal*, which has proven to be the self-subsistent element in the predicate-space, has an independence from the immediate individual, despite the fact that it appears to be connected to it. From its own standpoint, the abstract universal is what is *essential* in the relation, in the sense that removal of a specific individual would still leave us with that universal—namely, the existence of the universal characteristic does not depend upon any one of its instantiations. But, then, again, from the abstract universal's standpoint, the immediate individual is necessarily the *inessential* element in the judgement-locus and, therefore, is *not* self-subsistent. The universal does not need the individual for the realization of its existence, but the individual must be *subsumed* under the universal if it is to have the character it actually has.⁵⁰

This complex state of affairs, to wit, that each of the relata both is and is not self-subsistent, makes it clear that the dialectic cannot deal with these two standpoints *simultaneously*; for in the context of immediacy each one of them is unambiguously a self-subsistent element. It should, therefore, first develop the inherence-relation that pertains to the immediate individual taken as the essential, and only then develop the subsumption-relation that pertains to the abstract universal taken as the essential.⁵¹ Since, however, the dialectic is fundamentally dynamic and continuous, one would expect the two developments to be immanently linked and not

⁴⁹ WL II 308: "Insofern nun aber das Subjekt das Selbständige ist, so hat jene Identität das Verhältnis, daß das Prädikat nicht ein selbständiges Bestehen für sich, sondern sein Bestehen nur in dem Subjekte hat; es *inhäriert* diesem." See also Enz. I §170.

⁵⁰ WL II 308: "Aber andererseits ist auch das Prädikat selbständige Allgemeinheit und das Subjekt umgekehrt nur eine Bestimmung desselben. Das Prädikat *subsumiert* insofern das Subjekt; die Einzelheit und Besonderheit ist nicht für sich, sondern hat ihr Wesen und ihre Substanz im Allgemeinen. Das Prädikat drückt das Subjekt in seinem Begriffe aus; das Einzelne und Besondere sind zufällige Bestimmungen an demselben; es ist deren absolute Möglichkeit. [...] Die Subsumtion ist hiernach nur die *Anwendung* des Allgemeinen auf ein Besonderes oder Einzelnes, das *unter* dasselbe nach einer unbestimmten Vorstellung als von minderer Quantität gesetzt wird."

⁵¹ Cf. WL II 309: "[...] Um der selbständigen Verschiedenheit der beiden Seiten des Urteils willen hat ihre *gesetzte* Beziehung auch diese zwei Seiten, zunächst als verschiedene."

just posited next to one another. As we shall see in the next two chapters, this is indeed the case, for the inherence-relation characterizes the whole sphere of the first kind of judgement, *the judgement of determinate being*, which then gives rise to the second kind of judgement, *the judgement of reflection*, which is characterized by the subsumption-relation.

The beginning of the dialectic of the judgement is shaped, therefore, by the peculiar content of the self-subsistent subject and of the self-subsistent predicate. Yet, the characterization would not be complete unless we also clarified the peculiar character of the third self-subsistent element in the immediate judgement:⁵² *the copula*. As seen, this denotes the intrinsic and primordial *unity* of being-as-concept in the field of the judgement⁵³ and hence secures the latter's *objectivity*.⁵⁴ Yet, in its *self-subsistence* the copula is characterized fundamentally by the *suppression* of its immanent, speculative meaning.

The distinctive result of this suppression is twofold: On the one hand, the copula acquires simply the meaning that better suits the two external relations of inherence and subsumption. On the other hand, it acquires the meaning of *simple* identity, of a connection between two absolutely

⁵² The phrase "immediate judgement" is used by Hegel himself; see Enz. I §172: "das unmittelbare Urteil."

⁵³ Enz. I §166: "Die Kopula 'ist' kommt von der Natur des Begriffs, in seiner Entäußerung *identisch* mit sich zu sein [...]."

⁵⁴ One must always have in mind this specific significance of the copula; otherwise, some of Hegel's remarks would seem to be really absurd. For he sometimes expresses things in such a way that it would seem that, for him, representationalism and common sense, which, as explained, proceed from the assumption that subject and predicate denote elements that are originally distinct, *are* refuted (or 'sublated') *simply* because subject and predicate appear to be united through the 'is' of the copula. Clearly, the simple fact that a judgement has the form *S is P* does not entail that *S* and *P* are not *externally* or *subjectively* connected: For that entailment to be valid, one needs to add here the specific, immanent *meaning* of the copula as the referent of their *intrinsic (original)* unity. See Enz. I §166: "Indem jedoch die Kopula 'ist' das Prädikat vom Subjekte aussagt, wird jenes äußerliche, subjektive Subsumieren wieder aufgehoben und das Urteil als eine Bestimmung des Gegenstandes selbst genommen;" Enz. I §166, Zusatz: "Das Subjekt gilt hierbei als draußen für sich bestehend und das Prädikat als in unserem Kopfe befindlich. Dieser Vorstellung widerspricht indes schon die Kopula 'ist'. Wenn wir sagen: 'diese Rose ist rot', oder: 'dieses Gemälde ist schön', so ist damit ausgesprochen, daß *wir* es nicht sind, die es der Rose erst äußerlich antun, rot, oder dem Gemälde, schön zu sein, sondern daß dies die eigenen Bestimmungen dieser Gegenstände sind;" WL II 305: "Das Prädikat, welches dem Subjekte beigelegt wird, soll ihm aber auch *zukommen*, d.h. an und für sich identisch mit demselben sein. Durch diese Bedeutung des *Beilegens* wird der *subjektive* Sinn des Urteilens und das gleichgültige äußerliche Bestehen des Subjekts und Prädikats wieder aufgehoben: diese Handlung *ist* gut; die Kopula zeigt an, daß das Prädikat zum *Sein* des Subjekts gehört und nicht bloß äußerlich damit verbunden wird."

similar, undifferentiated elements, a sheer tautology ($A=A$).⁵⁵ This second significance of the copula matters in that exact moment when the transformation of the fundamental concept-determinations produces relations of simple identity (“the universal is universal,” “the individual is individual,” “the particular is particular”). For in such cases there is no explication of the intrinsic—or objective—unity of being-as-concept in the judgement-locus and, therefore, the dialectic must continue. Yet, this exactly means that the explication of being-as-concept’s intrinsic *identity* through the copula requires the *parallel manifestation* of the *difference* of the relata—and not its *elimination*.⁵⁶

Since the copula *must* appear initially in its self-subsistence and since such an appearance does not do justice to its true significance, the dialectic of the judgement, or part of it, can be seen as the *process* whereby the meaning of the copula is “fulfilled” (*erfüllt*).⁵⁷ As Hegel puts it, in the context of immediacy the unity of being-as-concept is “not yet the *concrete, fulfilled* unity, which returns into itself from this reality [of self-subsistence].”⁵⁸ Thus, the dialectic of the judgement, or part of it, is a *return into the original unity of being-as-concept* and this denotes *the fulfillment of the meaning of the copula*. This *return* is accomplished in terms of *explication*: the dialectic will make explicit how exactly the objective unity of being-as-concept comes to determine fundamentally the form and content of the judgement.

⁵⁵ That is, absolute identity in terms of the *fundamental concept-determinations*. Hegel associates these tautological expressions with “mere sentences,” which he distinguishes from judgements. An example of a “mere sentence” is the following: “Aristoteles ist im 73. Jahre seines Alters, in dem 4. Jahr der 115. Olympiade gestorben;” this, according to Hegel, has the logical form “das Einzelne ist das Einzelne” (WL II 305). On this topic see also WL II 312.

⁵⁶ See here especially WL II 314–315: “Weil nun Subjekt und Prädikat im Verhältnisse des Urteils stehen, sollen sie nach den Begriffsbestimmungen entgegengesetzt bleiben; wie in der *Wechselwirkung* der Kausalität, ehe sie ihre Wahrheit erreicht, die beiden Seiten gegen die Gleichheit ihrer Bestimmungen noch selbständige und entgegengesetzte bleiben sollen. [...] Wenn auf jene bloße Identität reflektiert wird, so stellen sich die zwei identischen Sätze dar: ‘Das Einzelne ist Einzelnes’, ‘das Allgemeine ist Allgemeines’, worin die Urteilsbestimmungen ganz auseinandergefallen, nur ihre Beziehung auf sich ausgedrückt, die Beziehung derselben aufeinander aber aufgelöst und das Urteil somit aufgehoben wäre.”

⁵⁷ Enz. I §170; WL II 309.

⁵⁸ WL II 304: “Die Einheit des Begriffes ist daher nur erst eine *Beziehung* von Selbständigen; noch nicht die *konkrete*, aus dieser Realität in sich zurückgekehrte, *erfüllte* Einheit, sondern *außer* der sie als *nicht in ihr aufgehobene Extreme* bestehen.”

Of course, in the context of immediacy, where the judgement first appears, the copula seems to be 'saying' that the relata are identical,⁵⁹ but the way in which it 'says' that, namely, *immediately*, hinders the explication of their identity in terms of being-as-concept.⁶⁰ This deficient aspect of the copula, the "abstract *is*,"⁶¹ underlies all three problematic connections of the relata: inherence, subsumption, and simple identity. By the end of the dialectic all these should be sublated in the successful explication of being-as-concept's identity in the sphere of the judgement, which will thus become expressive of the true meaning of the copula.

8.6. Conclusion

Our discussion has revealed that the resolution of the Pyrrhonian problematic requires the immanent formulation of a theory of judgement in the framework of reason. The first step towards the fulfilment of this requirement has been taken through the dialectic of individuality. The individual has proven to be the judgement. In this way, the basis of a theory of judgement—the very concept of judgement—has been introduced in the onto-logical project in explicit terms.

As *the* locus of being-as-concept, individuality explicates the harmonious unity of self-identity and full determinacy. This can be actualized if, and only if, the totality of the determinations of rational being comes to light through the self-determining activity of the individual. But since the individual is in truth the judgement, the same holds for the judgement: the fundamental character of rational being is actualized if, and only if, the totality of the categorial determinations in the sphere of reason comes to light through the self-determining activity of *the judgement*.

What is it, though, that enables the judgement to function in this way? What is the peculiar structure that allows the judgement to be this self-determining activity that expresses (or explicates) the totality of the determinations of rational being? The answer to this question will be provided by the dialectic of the judgement in the *Science of Logic*, a dialectic which we can refer to as 'the speculative theory of judgement'.

⁵⁹ Enz. I §166, Zusatz (my emphasis, Hegel's emphasis has been removed): "Freilich sind die Bestimmungen Einzelheit und Allgemeinheit, Subjekt und Prädikat auch unterschieden, aber darum bleibt nicht weniger das ganze allgemeine Faktum, daß jedes Urteil sie als identisch aussagt."

⁶⁰ See here especially the last sentence in WL II 311.

⁶¹ Enz. I §170.

Hegel's prelude to the speculative theory of judgement has introduced us, in a preliminary way, to some of the most prominent features of this theory. We have learnt that the judgement denotes the unity of the distinct fundamental concept-determinations; that it is constituted also by the connection of subject and predicate through the copula and that these three determinations have initially the character of empty and fixed spaces in the judgement-topos; that the judgement appears initially in a context of immediacy and that, precisely because of this kind of appearance, the judgement-topos is initially dominated by the self-subsistence of the relata; that the dominance of this self-subsistence moulds the dialectic in such a way that it has to begin with the explication of a deficient state of affairs, to wit, with the explication of the subjective unity of the judgement; and that, given the true nature of the judgement as the determinate self-expression of being-as-concept, the dialectic has to show how exactly the judgement frees itself from subjectivity and returns to a state of affairs where the unity it exemplifies is clearly objective (that is, primordial). This movement or 'return' from the subjective unity of the judgement to its objective unity comprises what in the following chapters will be referred to as *the proof of the objectivity of the judgement*—although, as I will now explain, strictly speaking, this movement constitutes only the second part of such a proof.

What this chapter has made clear to us is that one of Hegel's major contributions to the theory of judgement, and epistemology in general, is the idea that *in the sphere of reason* the judgement is *not* a *Verbindung* of concepts which are originally non-connected, but rather the way being-as-concept (rational being) appears determinately both in the universe of rational discourse and in its own categorial field. But if this idea is true (and it has to be, given the emergence of the category of judgement from the dialectic of the fundamental structure of being-as-concept), the unity the judgement signifies must be objective through and through. *Yet, given that the judgement emerges in the context of immediacy, this part of the theory must be immediately supplemented with a second, which teaches that the proof of the objectivity of the judgement requires also its emergence (or 'return') from its subjectivity, from "representation" and "common sense."* "To restore, or better *posit*, this [true] *identity* of the concept is the goal of the *movement* of the judgement."⁶² This emergence shall take place in

⁶² WL II 309: "Diese *Identität* des Begriffs wieder herzustellen oder vielmehr zu *setzen*, ist das Ziel der *Bewegung* des Urteils." See also WL II 310. Žižek (1991: 179) seems to be mistaken here: "Let us immediately show our cards: the three judgements actually acquire

terms of an *explication*, whereby the implicit true notion of the judgement becomes explicit or whereby what is simply there, what appears, unfolds its implicit content. Thus, according to *this* part of the theory, the initial appearance of the judgement in the sphere of reason falls short of its truth and thereby of the truth of being-as-concept. As Hegel puts it:

However, insofar as the judgement is in general the determinate being [...] of the concept *that has not yet restored itself in that unity through which it exists as concept*, the determinacy that comes forth (*hervortreten*) is concept-less (*begrifflos*), the opposition of being (*Sein*) and [...] implicit being (*Ansichsein*).⁶³

The proof of the objectivity of the judgement, then, requires *two* steps: (a) its immanent emergence from the dialectic of the fundamental structure of being-as-concept (and *we* showed how this is achieved in the second part of the present study) and (b) the explication of being-as-concept's true form and content in the sphere of the judgement. This second step refers to the process through which the meaning of the copula is "fulfilled." The result should be a full account of what it means for the judgement to be a locus of the explication of the fundamental character of being-as-concept, to wit, what it means for the judgement to be *objective*. So, strangely enough, the onto-logical project provides a proof of the objectivity of the judgement, only to take that proof back and demand a 'return' to it! *Thus, until that 'return' is accomplished the objectivity of the judgement remains unproven.*

The extreme peculiarity of Hegel's theory of judgement lies in that this second step of the proof, the *dialectic* of the judgement, must emerge from the behaviour of the fundamental concept-determinations (universality, particularity, individuality); and, to be more precise, from that state of affairs which is dominated by their *self-subsistence*. He writes:

In the judgement, however, this [true, speculative] identity is not yet posited; the copula behaves like the still indeterminate relation of *being* in general: *A is B*; for the *reality* the judgement [initially] has is the self-subsistence of the [fundamental] determinations of the concept [...].⁶⁴

a fourth because 'Substance is Subject'; in other words, the 'lack of identity' between subject and predicate is posited as such in the fourth judgement (that of the Notion).⁶⁴ This cannot be true, since the "lack of identity" is clearly posited in the *first* judgement, not in the last.

⁶³ WL II 306.

⁶⁴ WL II 309: "Im Urteile aber ist diese Identität noch nicht gesetzt; die Kopula ist als die noch unbestimmte Beziehung des *Seins* überhaupt: *A ist B*; denn die Selbständigkeit

This dominance of self-subsistence has, as explained, a very complex structure, characterized by three dimensions: the essentiality of the subject as an immediate individual, the essentiality of the predicate as an abstract universal, and the essentiality of the copula as either an external/subjective connection or a simple identity. How all these are ‘sublated’ in the objective unity of the judgement remains to be seen. One thing is certain, though: Their sublation must be intrinsically linked to the self-transformation of the fundamental concept-determinations in *each* of the spaces of the judgement-topos.

A final note: Hegel remarks that the dialectic of the judgement ‘reproduces’ the ‘general forms’ the ‘logical idea’ took in the two previous super-spheres of the onto-logical project.⁶⁵ These ‘general forms’ reappear in the judgement with their *conceptual* character being now explicit and by the end of the dialectic they will be “ideally united” in the “judgement of the concept.”⁶⁶ The appearance of these ‘general forms’ does not denote an indifferent gathering, whereby one ‘general form’ is produced and then placed *next* to the other. Rather, their appearance is fully integrated in the dialectic of the judgement and, therefore, it has to be made clear how exactly their content and interrelations fit in with the specific route the dialectic of the judgement takes. For one, it has to be made clear how they fit in with the *development* of the proof of the judgement as the objective unity of subject and predicate.⁶⁷

der Bestimmtheiten des Begriffs oder [der] Extreme ist im Urteile die *Realität*, welche der Begriff in ihm hat.”

⁶⁵ Enz. I §171, Zusatz.

⁶⁶ Enz. I §171, Zusatz.

⁶⁷ Enz. I §171, Zusatz.

CHAPTER NINE

THE JUDGEMENT OF DETERMINATE BEING

9.1. *Introduction*

The judgement is the way being-as-concept explicates or expresses itself in a determinate fashion; it is the way being-as-concept appears determinately. This expression arises out of the behaviour of the fundamental concept-determinations, which occupy the judgement's three irreducible spaces: subject, predicate, copula.

The internalization of difference has defined the judgement as the stabilized relation between the distinct terms, universality, individuality and particularity. The stability of the relation is manifested in the *simultaneous* exhibition of these three determinations. Such stability designates not only how the judgement comes forth immediately (or, if you will, in a context of immediacy), but also how the judgement *should* always present itself. The proper form and content of the judgement is a stable exhibited relation between the fundamental concept-determinations. This renders relations of simple identity as deficient manifestations of the judgement.

Since the judgement comes forth immediately as this stabilized relation, each judgement-space exhibits immediately *only one* of the fundamental concept-determinations; and since the nature of the judgement demands the expression of all three of them, each of the judgement-spaces must exhibit a *different* fundamental concept-determination from any of the others. Note, however, that it is not only that each judgement-space *exhibits* immediately only one of the fundamental concept-determinations, but also that it *can exhibit* immediately only one of them. The context of immediacy blocks any mediating movement from one fundamental concept-determination to another, any "reflection" between them.¹ It suppresses, in other words, any transformation in each of the judgement-spaces.

¹ WL II 311: "Das Urteil ist in dieser Weise *Wahrheit*; denn es ist die Übereinstimmung des Begriffs und der Realität. So aber ist *zuerst* das Urteil nicht beschaffen; denn *zuerst* ist es *unmittelbar*, indem sich an ihm noch keine Reflexion und Bewegung der Bestimmungen ergeben hat."

This causes a problem because it is equally true of the judgement that each of its spaces contains the totality of the fundamental concept-determinations.² Since each judgement-space can in the context of immediacy exhibit only one fundamental concept-determination, that totality is necessarily suppressed in this context. But this means it is the truth of the judgement which is suppressed, for one of its fundamental features—the totality contained in each judgement-space—remains unexpressed. The dialectic of the judgement should remedy this by disclosing that totality's presence in each of the judgement-spaces.

As explained, in the context of immediacy the subject expresses the individual, the predicate the universal, and the copula their unity as particulars.³ The context of immediacy, though, not only impedes the manifestation of the totality of the fundamental concept-determinations in each judgement-space, but also affects the character of their exhibited relation. Recall that these determinations relate to one another in terms of unity, totality and self-subsistence. The latter is the result of the internalization of abstraction in the judgement. The context of immediacy suppresses both the function of totality and the function of unity, licensing thereby the function of self-subsistence to dominate the judgement-locus.⁴ Thus, the fundamental concept-determinations are now first and foremost self-subsistent elements. As pointed out, each one's being self-subsistent means that each one is independent from the others.

As also explained, however, this dominance of self-subsistence requires the development of the dialectic in the framework of a system of standpoints. To this effect the dialectic of the judgement must in principle address three standpoints *in turn*—of the self-subsistent individual (*subject*), of the self-subsistent universal (*predicate*), and of the self-subsistent

² Sometimes Hegel seems to exclude the copula from the domain of spaces in which concept-determinations dwell. See, for example, WL II 312 ("Wie die beiden Begriffsbestimmungen bestimmt sind, so ist es auch ihre Beziehung, das *Ist*, Kopula;" "Das Urteil überhaupt aber, und daher selbst das Urteil des Daseins, hat Begriffsbestimmungen zu seinen Extremen").

³ Note that there is nothing arbitrary with this distribution, for the simple reason that subject, predicate and copula are at the beginning nothing but *empty* spaces (or sheer *names*), namely spaces that obtain a nature and a character only through what inhabits them. And, of course, if the judgement is to have the structure it has, all three of the fundamental concept-determinations must appear in the judgement-locus.

⁴ WL II 311: "Als Seiten des Urteils [...], welches der *gesetzte* bestimmte Begriff ist, haben sie die Bestimmung der Momente desselben, aber um der Unmittelbarkeit willen die noch ganz *einfache*, teils nicht durch Vermittlung bereicherte, teils zunächst nach dem abstrakten Gegensatz als *abstrakte Einzelheit* und *Allgemeinheit*." For the copula see WL II 312.

unity of individual and universal (*copula*). The first two standpoints represent the subjective unity of the judgement; the third, suitably qualified, represents its objective unity. The 'task' of the dialectic is to prove (a) the deficiency of the first two standpoints and (b) how the third standpoint comes to liberate itself from the others and from the problematic aspects of its own self-subsistent nature. Whether this third standpoint has a problematic character or not will be decided solely on the basis of whether it fails or succeeds in explicating the objective unity of the judgement, namely that state of affairs which exemplifies the original, irreducible unity of subject and predicate in the judgement-locus.

All these issues will be clarified in the forthcoming dialectic. The reader should be warned that the mode of exposition will at times be extremely obscure. This is so because the material is technical and constitutes a proof, something that does not permit vague or empirical expressions (although the latter are nevertheless sometimes employed)—and certainly does not permit reference to other philosophers and their theories.⁵ The reader is advised to go patiently through the proof, having always in mind that this is the only way for the Pyrrhonian problematic to be resolved in the working framework of our study.

The present chapter offers an account of the dialectic of the judgement from the standpoint of the self-subsistent subject; the kind of judgement that exemplifies this standpoint is called by Hegel *the judgement of determinate being* (*Urteil des Daseins*)⁶ and, if you recall, has the character of the essential immediate individual's standing against the inessential abstract universal:

The judgement, as it exists *immediately*, is *initially* the judgement of *determinate being*;⁷ in this context of immediacy its subject is an *abstract*,

⁵ Of course such reference *can* be made; but it will have no effect either on the proof or on our understanding of the proof.

⁶ In the *Science of Logic* (WL II 311–351) Hegel divides the super-category of *judgement* into four categories: (a) the judgement of determinate being, (b) the judgement of reflection, (c) the judgement of necessity and (d) the judgement of the concept. In the *Encyclopedia Logic* (Enz. I §§ 172–180) he divides it into (a) qualitative judgement, (b) quantitative judgement, (c) judgement of necessity and (d) judgement of the concept. The account in the *Encyclopedia* is very condensed and confusing, with huge gaps in the development of the argument. This is, in a sense, normal, for Hegel tried to squeeze the dense and extremely rich argument of forty pages into a sterile epigrammatic summary that occupies only nine pages. Cf. McTaggart (1910: 203): "This obscurity is increased by the extreme condensation which prevails in the whole treatment of Subjectivity in the *Encyclopedia*."

⁷ Note that Hegel is not saying that 'the judgement, as it exists immediately, is the judgement of determinate being'. Rather, he is saying that "the judgement, as it exists

immediately existing individual; [on the other side,] the predicate is an *immediate determinacy* or property of that individual, an abstract universal.⁸

9.2. Positivity

Beginning, then, from the perspective of the self-subsistent subject-individual, the predicate-universal becomes necessarily what-is-not-self-subsistent. The subject refers to the *immediately existing* individual (the “thing-as-the-This”);⁹ the predicate to a universal quality that has been *abstracted* from a manifold of individuals (part of which is the immediate individual exhibited in the judgement).¹⁰ While the immediate individual could be what it essentially is even if it did not relate to the universal quality, each of the latter’s instances could exist only if it *inherited* in one of the individuals from which the universal quality has been abstracted. The relation of the predicate’s dependence upon the subject is thus an *inherence*-relation. For this reason the judgement of determinate being is also called *the judgement of inherence*:

The judgement of determinate being is [...] the judgement of *inherence*. For since its determination is [characterized by] *immediacy*, and in the difference of subject and predicate it is the subject which is the immediate, and, therefore, the first and the essential in this judgement, it follows that the predicate has the form of what-is-not-self-subsistent, of an element that has its foundation in the subject.¹¹

immediately, is *initially* the judgement of determinate being.” This makes it clear that the *immediate* judgement can (and will) take a different form from the judgement of determinate being.

⁸ WL II 310.

⁹ WL II 312: “Ebenso ist das Subjekt ein *abstrakt* Einzelnes oder das *Unmittelbare*, das *als solches* sein soll; es soll daher das Einzelne als ein *Etwas* überhaupt sein;” see also WL II 325.

¹⁰ WL II 312: “Das Prädikat [...] ist das *abstrakte* Allgemeine; da das Abstrakte aber durch die Vermittlung des Aufhebens des Einzelnen oder Besonderen bedingt ist, so ist sie insofern nur eine *Voraussetzung*.” I understand this as saying that *in the context of immediacy* the universal that occupies the predicate-space is the result of a presupposed act of *abstraction*.

¹¹ WL II 311. Cf. McTaggart (1910: 199): “The problem, to begin with, takes the form that, starting from the Individual, we endeavour to adjust a Notion to it. This is the Judgement of Inherence, as distinguished from the Judgement of Subsumption, in which we start with the Notion and endeavour to connect the Individual with it. The Judgement of Inherence comes first, because in the preceding categories, the problem was to determine the Individual. And so we start here with the Individual as the *datum*, to which the Notion has to be related.”

Therefore, when—in the context of immediacy—the judgement is posited from the subject-individual's standpoint, it says that *the individual is the universal* and means that a universal quality inheres in an immediate individual. But precisely because it is the subject which is the *essential* in this judgement (and, therefore, the unchangeable element therein), it must be the case that in principle all movement and differentiation would take place in the predicate-space, namely in the sphere of the universal *quality*. So, any possible transformation of this judgement should in principle arise from a thematization of the element of quality. But this exactly means that the focus here will be on *qualitative being*.¹²

In the very first appearance of this judgement ("the individual is the universal"), the copula, through which the relation of inherence takes place, appears to be free from *negativity*. It is nothing but a sheer *is*. For this reason the judgement of inherence is characterized by sheer positivity: it is *the positive judgement*.¹³ Since the positive judgement is the judgement as it *first* appears, it expresses the *form* of the judgement *as such*,¹⁴ that is to say, the form of the judgement when the latter is considered in its sheer immediacy. The phrase "judgement as such" here does not mean 'judgement as it exists in truth'—it only means 'judgement as it first appears'. Thus, when one refers to the form of the judgement in the context of immediacy, one always refers to the expression *the individual is the universal* and understands by it that there is a relation between, on the one hand, an immediate individual, an element whose whole essence lies in that it is just there (*Dasein, da-sein*), and, on the other hand, a universal quality, a sheer abstraction, whose only reality is that its instances inhere in immediate individuals.¹⁵

¹² WL II 311, 312.

¹³ WL II 312: "Wie die beiden Begriffsbestimmungen bestimmt sind, so ist es auch ihre Beziehung, das *Ist*, Kopula; sie kann ebenso nur die Bedeutung eines unmittelbaren, abstrakten *Seins* haben. Von der Beziehung, welche noch keine Vermittlung oder Negation enthält, wird dies Urteil das *Positive* genannt." McTaggart (1910: 199) gives a different explanation: "The only relation hitherto considered between an Individual and a Notion has been an affirmative one, and so we start with a Positive Judgement of Inherence."

¹⁴ The expression "the judgement as such" is Hegel's; see WL II 317.

¹⁵ WL II 315: "[...] Der [Satz] 'das Einzelne ist allgemein' [drückt] die *Form* [aus], die durch ihn selbst unmittelbar angegeben ist;" WL II 315: "[...] Und zwar gehört das, was der [...] Satz, 'das Einzelne ist allgemein', enthält, zur Form, weil er die *unmittelbare Bestimmtheit* des Urteils ausdrückt." Wohlfart's claim that the *content* of the judgement refers or is intrinsically related to the relation of *inherence* and that its *form* refers or is intrinsically related to the relation of *subsumption* does not seem to be compatible with Hegel's use of these notions in the dialectic of the judgement of determinate being; see Wohlfart (1985: 85).

Given the inherence-relation, the subject of the positive judgement becomes the *locus* where the universal quality expressed by the predicate actually exists. The universal is in truth nothing but the immediate individual; it exists as *Dasein*. However, if the subject was occupied *fully* only by that *one* universal quality, there would be no *difference* between the two and the judgement would immediately collapse. Think of it in terms of abstraction: If the subject-locus accommodated only one universal quality, the act of abstraction (out of which that universal quality has emerged) would be meaningless, for there would be a *pure identity* between the individual and that quality of it which the judgement expresses. (Note that the distinction between a *universal quality* and an *instance of a universal quality* does not here make any difference). It must be the case, therefore, that *more than one* universal quality expresses itself through the individual and, in this way, the subject becomes the locus in which *more than one* universal quality inheres.¹⁶ And since there is no way, at this stage of the argument, to determine the exact number of universal qualities inhering in the immediate individual, the subject can be more precisely described as the space where an *indefinite* number of universal qualities inhere.¹⁷

Considered from the perspective of the contrast between abstraction and non-abstraction, this development has transformed the subject from an immediate individual into a *concrete individual*;¹⁸ the latter, however, is in truth a *universal*.¹⁹ For it shows itself explicitly as “a something with *many* qualities.”²⁰ Being constituted by many elements is a fundamental feature of universality. Thus, it might be the case that the subject refers to an immediate, self-subsistent individual, but it now clearly refers *also* to a universal; for the manifold of the universal qualities, which comprises

¹⁶ From all the books and articles I have read, which attempt to provide an explanation of how the subject of the positive judgement moves away from its immediate individuality, only John Burbidge has got it right at this point; see Burbidge (1981: 127): “The individual subject, as that from which the qualifying predicate is abstracted, includes more than this one quality. If this were not the case the two terms could not be distinguished by the act of abstracting.”

¹⁷ WL II 317. Hegel uses the stronger adjective “infinite.”

¹⁸ WL II 313, 317.

¹⁹ WL II 313, 314. Thus, McTaggart (1910: 200) is blatantly wrong when he claims that “throughout the categories of the Judgement, Universal means any general idea which is true of an existent Individual.”

²⁰ WL II 313–314: “Das Subjekt ist [...] ein Etwas von vielen Qualitäten [...], ein Ding von mannigfaltigen Eigenschaften, ein Wirkliches von mannigfaltigen Möglichkeiten, eine Substanz von ebensolchen Akzidenzen.”

its determinacy, is now not simply 'connected' to the subject. Rather, it shows itself to be identical with it (for it is no *abstraction*, it exists *before* the act of abstraction). "The subject is, therefore, in itself the universal."²¹

This transformation of the subject, though, entails the transformation of *the predicate*. Indeed, as soon as the subject becomes a *multiplicity* of universal qualities (the concrete individual), the *specific* quality which the predicate expresses acquires, alongside its universal character, a character of *individuality*. For, evidently, it now shows itself as being *only one* of the many qualities that constitute the subject; it becomes a "moment of the totality" and this by *excluding* all the other qualities that constitute the concrete individual. Yet, precisely because it falls short of the universality of the concrete individual (of the manyness of its qualities), this individual universal quality is still *abstract*, the "abstract individual."²²

Due to this transformation in the judgement-spaces, the positive judgement acquires a second structure, equally valid as the first; for now it says not only that *the individual is the universal*, but also that *the universal is the individual*.²³ What the subject and the predicate currently express is the opposite of what they were expressing at the beginning of the dialectic; and this reversal has emerged *immanently* from the very structure of the inherence-relation in the context of immediacy. The dialectic of the positive judgement thus culminates in manifesting the instability of subject and predicate, the slipping of individuality into universality, and *vice versa*.

²¹ WL II 314: "Weil diese Mannigfaltigen hier dem Subjekte des Urteils angehören, so ist das Etwas oder das Ding usf. in seinen Qualitäten, Eigenschaften oder Akzidenzen in sich reflektiert oder sich durch dieselben hindurch *kontinuierend*, sich in ihnen und sie ebenso in sich erhaltend. Das Gesetzsein oder die Bestimmtheit gehört zum Anundfürsichsein. Das Subjekt ist daher an ihm selbst das *Allgemeine*;" WL II 314: "[...] Das Subjekt [ist] zwar unmittelbar als das Seiende oder Einzelne, das Prädikat [ist] aber das Allgemeine. Weil aber das Urteil die *Beziehung* beider und das Subjekt durch das Prädikat als Allgemeines bestimmt ist, so ist das Subjekt das Allgemeine [...]." Cf. Burbidge (1981: 127): "The subject, then, is a being with many qualities, a thing with diverse properties, a substance affected by a number of accidents. As integrating this multiplicity, it is a comprehensive relation that includes a number of terms and is therefore *universal*."

²² WL II 314: "Das Prädikat dagegen, als diese nicht reale oder konkrete, sondern *abstrakte Allgemeinheit*, ist gegen jenes die *Bestimmtheit* und enthält nur ein *Moment* der Totalität desselben mit Ausschluß der anderen. Um dieser Negativität willen, welche zugleich als Extrem des Urteils sich auf sich bezieht, ist das Prädikat ein *abstrakt Einzelnes*.—Es drückt z.B. in dem Satze 'die Rose ist wohlriechend' nur *eine* der *vielen* Eigenschaften der Rose aus; es vereinzelt sie, die im Subjekte mit den anderen zusammengewachsen ist [...]."

²³ WL II 313, 314.

The new structure of the positive judgement, insofar as it arises out of an immanent movement of mediation (the ‘slipping of the one into the other’), namely out of a process that begins from the facts of immediacy (the form of immediate judgement) but actually goes beyond them, constitutes its *content*. The content of the positive judgement is the structure that lies *behind* the surface of immediacy, behind the initial positing of a relation between an immediate individual and an abstract universal quality. Thus, when in this instance we think of the *content* of the positive judgement, we think of the expression *the universal is the individual* and understand by it that there is a relation between a concrete individual, a full-blooded thing with an indefinite number of universal qualities, on the one hand, and a specific universal quality, whose reality emerges from the negation of all the other qualities of the concrete individual, on the other hand.²⁴

It may be argued at this point that this result completes the search for the successful expression of the concept-as-judgement. Indeed, if the two manifestations of the positive judgement are ‘synthesized’, both the subject and the predicate are shown to accommodate *all* of the concept-determinations. It has been shown how each of them is both the *universal* and the *individual* and, since these two concept-determinations are now shown to *co-exist* in a single judgement-space, each of subject and predicate becomes in itself a *particular*. In this way subject and predicate prove to be what they really are, namely *totalities*.²⁵

This argument, however, cannot be sustained in the present framework, in the dark realm of immediacy, the reason being that such framework does not allow the *co-existence* of the two manifestations of the positive

²⁴ WL II 315: “Von jenen beiden Sätzen drückt der eine, ‘das Allgemeine ist einzeln’, das Urteil seinem *Inhalte* nach aus, der im Prädikate eine vereinzelte Bestimmung, im Subjekte aber die Totalität derselben ist [...]”; WL II 315–316: “Das Verhältnis dagegen, das der andere Satz ausdrückt, ‘das Allgemeine ist einzeln’, oder daß das Subjekt als Allgemeines, das Prädikat dagegen als Besonderes oder Einzelnes bestimmt [ist], betrifft den *Inhalt*, weil sich seine Bestimmungen erst durch die Reflexion-in-sich erheben, wodurch die unmittelbaren Bestimmtheiten aufgehoben werden und hiermit die Form sich zu einer in sich gegangenen Identität, zum *Inhalte* macht.”

²⁵ WL II 316: “Wenn nun die beiden Sätze der Form und des Inhalts

(Subjekt) (Prädikat)

das Einzelne ist allgemein

das Allgemeine ist einzeln

darum, weil sie in dem *einen* positiven Urteile enthalten sind, vereinigt würden, so daß damit beide, sowohl das Subjekt als [das] Prädikat, als Einheit der Einzelheit und Allgemeinheit bestimmt wären, so wären beide das *Besondere*, was *an sich* als ihre innere Bestimmung anzuerkennen ist.”

judgement, of its “form” and “content,” in a single judgement-space. The subject of the first positive judgement is what it is *immediately*, to wit, independently of the character that the subject of the second positive judgement has, and *vice versa*.²⁶ The same holds for the relation between the two predicates. True, the dialectic has shown that the subject-space and the predicate-space exchange concept-determinations (by transforming *themselves*), but this exchange is not a *fusion*; it is rather a side-by-side, *external* arrangement.²⁷ The subject, in other words, is *indifferently* both, an individual and a universal; but this exactly means that there are *two* self-subsistent subjects here, located in *two* subject-spaces: the subject-individual and the subject-universal. Consequently, the subject fails to accommodate them both as a relation (a co-existence in a single judgement-space) and, therefore, fails to exhibit *particularity* as well. (And the same holds for the predicate.) Hegel writes:

Individuality and universality cannot yet be unified in particularity, because in the positive judgement they are still posited as *immediate*.²⁸

If, however, subject and predicate are not explicitly inherent totalities, it necessarily follows that the positive judgement must collapse; for in the present state of affairs none of its two manifestations does justice to that meaning of the copula that the context of immediacy promotes: a *sheer identity* between the relata. Indeed, as explained, in the context of immediacy the copula means nothing but “is,” the *in-different* unity of subject and predicate. Yet, while the copula demands their ‘sheer identity’, subject and predicate show themselves as being totally different.

²⁶ This is why Hegel says that “im unmittelbaren positiven Urteile sind die Extremen noch einfach: Form und Inhalt sind daher noch vereinigt. Oder es besteht nicht aus zwei Sätzen; die gedoppelte Beziehung, welche sich in ihm ergab, macht unmittelbar das *eine* positive Urteil aus” (WL II 315). Hegel means that the two expressions of the positive judgement are not speculatively fused, that they are indifferent to one another.

²⁷ Or, if you prefer, this arrangement is the result of *external reflection*; see WL II 316. Wohlfart (1985: 86) has got it absolutely right at this point: “Das positive Urteil enthält beide Sätze: ‘Das Einzelne ist allgemein und umgekehrt’. Das nicht spekulative Denken aber hat dabei nacheinander entweder der einen oder der anderen Satz im Blick. Die einzelnen Ausdrücke werden vom Verstand als einander Gegenübergesetzte einseitig und verkehrt gebraucht.”

²⁸ WL II 316: “Einzelheit und Allgemeinheit können noch nicht in die Besonderheit vereinigt werden, weil sie im positiven Urteile noch als *unmittelbare* gesetzt sind.—Oder es muß das Urteil seiner Form und seinem Inhalte nach noch unterschieden werden, weil eben Subjekt und Prädikat noch als Unmittelbarkeit und Vermitteltes unterschieden sind oder weil das Urteil nach seiner Beziehung beides ist: Selbständigkeit der Bezogenen und ihre Wechselbestimmung oder Vermittlung.”

*It is exactly this discrepancy between the meaning of the copula in the context of immediacy, on the one hand, and the meaning the dialectic has assigned to the two manifestations of the positive judgement, on the other, that leads to the collapse of the positive judgement as a whole.*²⁹ This can be specified as follows:

(a) With respect to the first expression of the positive judgement (*the individual is the universal*), the expression of its *form*, while the copula specifies that the individual is inherently and immediately universal (namely, that the two are immediately identical), there is clearly a difference in their *scope* (*Umfang*). The individual refers to the *singular* existent; the universal to a universal quality, namely to an element that applies to *many* individuals (since it has been abstracted from them). Thus, given this difference, there is no identity between the two and the expression *the individual is the universal* must give its place to the expression *the individual is not the universal*.³⁰

(b) With respect to the second expression of the positive judgement (*the universal is the individual*), the expression of its *content*, while, again, the copula specifies that the universal is identical to the individual, the referent of the predicate is immediately *only one* of the *many* qualities that constitute the concrete individual. In this case too, then, the desired identity is not actualized; for the *scope* of the subject is wider than the

²⁹ Cf. Burbidge (1981: 128): "The copula, however, does not adequately express their relation. It simply conjoins by juxtaposition and fails to articulate the contrast that is essential to the content. There is, then, a contradiction between the form of the positive judgement 'S is P' and the conditions that must be fulfilled for its valid use;" Burbidge (1981: 132): "Because the simple coupling of subject and predicate in the *positive judgement* does not do justice to their difference its form is inadequate to its content—the implicit criteria. Therefore it is not inherently true." Cf. WL II 319: "Das positive Urteil ist die Beziehung des *unmittelbar* Einzelnen und Allgemeinen, also solcher, deren das eine zugleich *nicht* ist, was das andere; die Beziehung ist daher ebenso wesentlich *Trennung* oder *negativ*; daher das positive Urteil als negatives zu setzen [ist]." I think McTaggart fails to understand the important role played by the copula here, for he does not seem to acknowledge that, for Hegel, in the sphere of the positive judgement the copula *does* have the meaning of "absolute equivalence;" see McTaggart (1910: 200–202). (McTaggart makes the interesting point that an objector might suggest that all these problems would be solved if we substituted 'has' for 'is'. But the whole point is that the 'is' has emerged from the preceding dialectic of the concept and hence we cannot simply remove it!)

³⁰ WL II 316: "Das Urteil also *erstens* nach seiner Form betrachtet, heißt es: 'Das Einzelne ist allgemein'. Vielmehr aber ist ein solches *unmittelbares* Einzelnes *nicht* allgemein; sein Prädikat ist vom weiteren Umfang, es entspricht ihm also nicht. Das Subjekt ist ein *unmittelbar für sich seiendes* und daher das Gegenteil jener Abstraktion, der durch Vermittlung gesetzten Allgemeinheit, die von ihm ausgesagt werden sollte." Cf. McTaggart (1910: 200).

scope of the predicate. Thus, the second expression must be denied as well and give way to the expression *the universal is not the individual*.³¹

On the whole, the collapse of the positive judgement³² has been achieved through the following basic steps:

- (1) The positive judgement is posited as having the form *the individual is the universal*.
- (2) Given the character of the related terms, the *individual* is shown to be inherently *universal*.
- (3) The transformation of the content of the *subject* into *universality* turns immediately the content of the *predicate* into *individuality*.
- (4) Subject and predicate now each makes a claim to exhibit the required *totality* of the fundamental concept-determinations.
- (5) This claim fails because the co-existence of individuality and universality in each of subject and predicate is not a *fusion*, but an external *Verbindung*, the product of *external reflection*.
- (6) Given that there is no fusion, each of the two expressions of the positive judgement proves deficient in its own terms:³³ for the meaning the copula acquires in a context of immediacy, *bloße Identität*, is not compatible with the meaning the two relata exhibit in each of the two expressions—while it demands a *bloße Identität*, they exhibit an *Unterschied im Umfang*.

³¹ WL II 316–317: “Zweitens das Urteil nach seinem *Inhalt* betrachtet oder als der Satz ‘Das Allgemeine ist einzeln’, so ist das Subjekt ein Allgemeines von Qualitäten, ein Konkretes, das unendlich bestimmt ist, und indem seine Bestimmtheiten nur erst Qualitäten, Eigenschaften oder Akzidenzen sind, so ist seine Totalität die *schlecht unendliche Vielheit* derselben. Ein solches Subjekt ist daher vielmehr nicht eine *einzelne* solche Eigenschaft, als sein Prädikat aussagt. Beide Sätze müssen daher *verneint* werden und das positive Urteil vielmehr als *negatives* gesetzt werden.” Cf. McTaggart (1910: 200).

³² WL II 318: “Das positive Urteil hat alsdann durch seine *Form* als positives Urteil keine Wahrheit [...]”

³³ Wohlfart (1985: 87) does not seem to quite understand this, for he seems to locate the problem in an alleged contradiction of form and content *with one another*: “Form und Inhalt des positiven Urteils widersprechen sich. Ihre *Dialektik* kommt in den einander *widersprechenden* Fassungen des positiven Inhalts zum Ausdruck. In diesem Widerspruch besteht die Unwahrheit des positiven Urteils. Weil Form und Inhalt sich nicht *entsprechen*, kann es wohl richtig, aber nicht wahr sein. Es kann das Spekulative nicht fassen. Das positive Urteil hat seine Wahrheit zunächst im negativen Urteil.”

9.3. *Negativity*

The dialectic of the positive judgement has shown that the judgement, while it initially appears to be free of negativity, has actually the latter in its very core; for both of its manifestations have turned out to be in truth negations. This result translates into a new structure of the determinate concept: *the negative judgement*.³⁴ Having emerged from the double manifestation of the positive judgement, the negative judgement is itself double: (a) the individual is *not* the universal and (b) the universal is *not* the individual. Yet, this double expression is reduced into one: *the individual is the particular*.³⁵ The latter is called *the positive expression of the negative judgement*; and to this effect each of the previous expressions is called *the negative expression of the negative judgement*.³⁶ The following argument explains how the reduction is accomplished.

To begin with, note that in the positive expression of the negative judgement the subject-universal has been eliminated in favour of the subject-individual. This happens because the whole dialectic of the judgement of determinate being occurs from the standpoint of the self-subsistent subject-individual. Thus, when this judgement takes a negative form, the latter is immediately re-posed from that perspective.³⁷ The subject is reasserted as the immediate individual, for it is this which is the essential, not the universal (or concrete individual). In this way, the mediated character (the *content*) of the subject is suppressed. Accordingly, the subject-space of the negative judgement must be re-occupied fully by immediate individuality.

If that is the case, though, one would expect the predicate-space to be re-occupied by the abstract universal quality. Yet, the *form* of the negative

³⁴ WL II 317: "Um dieses *rein logischen Inhalts* willen ist das positive Urteil *nicht wahr*, sondern hat seine Wahrheit im negativen Urteil;" WL II 318: "Das positive Urteil hat seine Wahrheit zunächst in dem negativen [...]." Wohlfart (1985: 87) correctly points out that the passage to the negative judgement brings forth the previously suppressed, but required, non-identity of subject and predicate.

³⁵ WL II 318.

³⁶ WL II 322.

³⁷ This premise will not be found so clearly formulated in the text itself, but without it one finds oneself unable to explain why the subject of the negative judgement has *only* the character of *individuality*. Hegel is not very helpful at this point; for he does not actually explain why the, already disclosed, universality of the subject is suppressed in favour of its individuality. This is one of the very few places in the *Logic* where Hegel fails to express properly the immanent dialectic of the subject-matter. See the paragraph beginning with "Das positive Urteil hat seine Wahrheit zunächst in dem negativen" and ending with "Das Einzelne ist ein Besonderes" (WL II 318).

judgement prevents this from happening; for, due to the 'not' now explicitly embedded in it, the abstract universal quality vanishes altogether, in the sense that it is now immediately 'restricted' by the 'not' (recall that the universal of the form was absolutely positive): "the individual is *not* the universal." Thus, the perspective of the self-subsistent individual, albeit it can re-establish the immediate individual, cannot re-establish the abstract universal quality.

This, of course, does not mean that the predicate-space is now empty. The candidates for filling in it cannot but be the two mediated predicate-structures having emerged from the negation of the positive judgement. These are (a) not-the-universal (*form*) and (b) not-the-individual (*content*). Thus, the expression of the negative judgement has now this two-fold form: (a) *The individual is not the universal* and (b) *the individual is not the individual*.

One might here object that this development rests on the arbitrary presupposition that the 'not' should be attached to the predicate rather than to the copula and that if this were not accepted, the abstract universal quality would still be present in the negative judgement. This objection, however, cannot be sustained, for the so-called 'presupposition' is far from arbitrary. Indeed, recall that one of the fundamental functions of the judgement is the *connection* of subject and predicate and that this function is performed through the copula. Removing this function means cancelling the judgement out. Therefore, since the copula should *never* stop expressing this connection, the negativity of the judgement must emerge through the predicate.³⁸ This is not to say that the copula remains *indifferent* to

³⁸ WL II 318: "Diese Bestimmung ergibt sich hier nur für das Prädikat." As Hegel points out, this fits in well with the fact that, since the dialectic takes place from the perspective of the self-subsistent subject, all movement and differentiation must in principle take place in the predicate-space; see WL II 318–319: "Im *unmittelbaren* Urteile, dem Urteile des Daseins, ist das Subjekt das zum Grunde Liegende; die *Bestimmung* scheint sich daher zunächst am *Prädikate* zu *verlaufen*." See also WL II 319–320; WL II 321: "Das Subjekt als das zugrunde liegende Unmittelbare bleibt unberührt von der Negation [...]." So, I disagree with Wohlfart, who claims that the negative expression of the negative judgement attaches the 'not' not only to the predicate, but also to the copula. Here is how he puts it (1985: 88–89): "Rücksichtlich des negativen Ausdrucks des negativen Urteils: 'Das Einzelne ist nicht abstrakt allgemein' bedeutet das, daß dieser Ausdruck nicht unmittelbar positiv nur so aufzufassen ist, daß das 'nicht' zum Prädikat geschlagen wird (Das Einzelne ist das Nicht-Allgemeine bzw. das Einzelne ist nicht-allgemein), sondern negativ auch so, daß das 'nicht' zur Kopula gezogen wird (Das Einzelne ist-nicht das Allgemeine bzw. das Einzelne ist-nicht allgemein.)" In my view, it is of the utmost importance for the success of Hegel's argument to insist that in the negative expression of the negative judgement the 'not' attaches explicitly only to the predicate, and not to the copula. Strangely enough, Hegel's

negativity, that it is the locus of absolute positivity (as its explicit *meaning* in the context of *immediacy* suggests). Rather, the negativity that the copula—despite its own intentions—*does* now express is the negativity expressed through the predicate. To put it figuratively, one could imagine the copula now ‘pushing’ the ‘not’—which has been shown to belong to it intrinsically—into the predicate-space.

Now, the last *two* expressions of the negative judgement collapse *necessarily* into *one*. The following dialectic explains how this event occurs:

(1) The expression *the individual is not the universal* says that the immediate individual does *not* relate to the abstract universal quality. But the individual, *as the subject of the judgement*, *must* relate to the predicate. The negation of the universal should, therefore, denote a *positive* content, namely a content that could provide the judgement with a relatum; it is not a pure nothing. Yet, neither the universal as such (since it is specifically asserted that it is negated), nor the individual as such (since a tautology would then emerge) are suitable for filling in the predicate-space.³⁹ But since the predicate can be *neither* (a) either the universal or the individual *nor* (b) neither the universal nor the individual, it must *necessarily* be (c) both the universal and the individual. Such onto-logical structure, however, the explicit unity of universality and individuality in a single judgement-space, corresponds to nothing but *particularity*. Thus, the expression *the individual is not the universal* has now given its place to the expression *the individual is the particular*.⁴⁰

(2) The second expression of the negative judgement, *the individual is not the individual*, says that the immediate individual does not relate to an individual universal quality. Yet, again, the individual, *as the subject of the judgement*, *must* relate to the predicate. The negation of the individual in the sphere of the predicate should, therefore, denote a positive content. But this can be fulfilled neither by the individual (since it is explicitly negated) nor by the universal. The latter fails to do so because the emerging expression, *the individual is the universal*, would simply repeat the deficient form of the *positive* judgement. Thus, once more, since the predicate can be *neither* (a) either the universal or the individual *nor* (b) neither the universal nor the individual, it must *necessarily* be (c) both

notion of “the negative expression of the negative judgement” corresponds to Kant’s notion of “infinite judgement” (which means that *Hegel’s* notion of “infinite judgement” does *not* derive from the Kantian notion); see KrV A71ff. / B97ff.; KrV A574 / B602; AA IX § 22.

³⁹ Cf. WL II 315.

⁴⁰ WL II 318.

the universal and the individual. Hence it is the *particular*, the explicit unity of universality and individuality. Consequently, the expression *the individual is not the individual* has now given its place to the expression *the individual is the particular*.⁴¹

In this way, the negative judgement's twofold expression has been reduced to the single, *positive* relation of the individual and the particular—to the “positive expression of the negative judgement.”⁴² The predicate, however, *as the unity of individuality and universality in the sphere of the negative judgement*, has now a specific *content*. This content arises from the negation of the two predicates that have been affirmed in the conclusion of the dialectic of the positive judgement: the *immediate* abstract universal quality and the *immediate* individual universal quality. (Recall that the individual universal quality has at the end lost its mediated nature.) Thus, the predicate of the positive expression of the negative judgement is (a) the *universal* that is *not* the immediate abstract universal quality (*form*) and (b) the *individual* that is *not* the immediate individual universal quality (*content*).⁴³

But exactly if the universal is not the *immediate* abstract universal quality, it must necessarily be a *mediated* abstract universal quality (since to be none of these is to be, *per impossibile*, pure nothing);⁴⁴ and if the individual is not an immediately specific universal quality, it must necessarily be a ‘*mediately*’ specific universal quality. Since, though, the predicate-space accommodates only two elements, (a) the abstract universal quality and (b) the specific universal quality, their mediation arises necessarily *from one another*. Mediation, however, involves *negation*; hence, the abstract universal quality is what it is by negating the *specific* universal quality and the latter is what it is by negating the abstract universal quality. But these

⁴¹ WL II 318.

⁴² WL II 318: “Es kann bemerkt werden, daß sich hier die *Besonderheit* für das Prädikat ergibt, von der vorhin schon die Rede war; allein hier ist sie nicht durch äußerliche Reflexion gesetzt, sondern vermittelt der am Urteil aufgezeigten negativen Beziehung entstanden;” WL II 319: “Das Einzelne ist ein Besonderes’ ist der *positive* Ausdruck des negativen Urteils;” WL II 322: “*Das Einzelne ist ein Besonderes*’—diese positive Form des negativen Urteils [...]”; WL II 322: “Die *Besonderheit*, welche sich als die positive Bestimmung des negativen Urteils ergeben, ist das Vermittelnde zwischen der Einzelheit und Allgemeinheit [...]”; WL II 322–323: “*Das Einzelne ist Besonderes*, nach dem positiven Ausdrucke des negativen Urteils.”

⁴³ See esp. WL II 321: “Was daher negiert wird, ist nicht die Allgemeinheit überhaupt im Prädikate, sondern [a] die Abstraktion oder [b] die Bestimmtheit desselben, welche gegen jene Allgemeinheit als *Inhalt* erschien.”

⁴⁴ WL II 321–322 (my emphasis): “Das negative Urteil ist also *nicht* die totale Negation [...]”

two elements are indispensable for the structure of the predicate; if any one of them is removed, the predicate will collapse and, consequently, the positive relation between subject and predicate will also collapse. Their mutual negation, therefore, does not lead to their annihilation. Rather, despite the fact that the one negates the other, *in* that very act of negation they remain present in the predicate-locus. But how can this be possible?

The answer to this question stems from reflection on the *difference* between (a) the abstract universal quality and (b) the specific universal quality. There can be a difference between the two only if the abstract universal quality is universal quality *as such*, which means that it would be *not only* that specific universal quality but also another and another and another. It is a multiplicity of specific universal qualities, a *universal sphere*.⁴⁵ Yet, *only one* universal quality *appears* in the predicate-space and, therefore, *only one* of those many universal qualities is manifested as *specific* at a time. Although, then, the predicate exemplifies a *universal sphere*, it is only one *moment* of the latter that each time shows itself as specific. Simply, the universal sphere is expressed determinately only if a *part* of it is manifested in the predicate-space.

Now, since (a) the universal sphere does *not* vanish each time a specific universal quality is negated,⁴⁶ (b) this negation is *actual* and (c) the universal sphere must *always* be 'accompanied' with the manifestation of a specific universal quality, the *result* of that negation can be nothing but *another* specific universal quality *taken from the universal sphere*. The manifested specific universal qualities must be *different* from one another (otherwise, their negation would be impossible), but they must also be moments of the same universal sphere, "species of the same genus." Thus: (1) the *affirmation* of the universal sphere occurs because each time a specific universal quality is negated another one appears *from within the universal sphere itself*;⁴⁷ (2) the *negation* of the universal sphere occurs because the predicate manifests *only* a *specific* universal quality; (3) the *affirmation* of the specific universal quality occurs because each time a

⁴⁵ WL II 322.

⁴⁶ WL II 322: "Die allgemeine Sphäre, welche das Prädikat enthält, bleibt noch bestehen; die Beziehung des Subjekts auf das Prädikat ist daher wesentlich noch *positiv*; die noch gebliebene *Bestimmung* des Prädikats ist ebensosehr *Beziehung*."

⁴⁷ This is why Hegel says that "diese positive Form des negativen Urteils drückt dies unmittelbar aus; das Besondere enthält die Allgemeinheit" (WL II 322).

specific universal quality is negated *another* appears in its place;⁴⁸ and (4) the *negation* of the specific universal quality occurs because a specific universal quality *necessarily* gives its place to *another*. All these functions have to operate in the predicate-space if the judgement *the individual is the particular* is to be maintained!

The above analysis has shown that *the particular* exemplifies the unity of individuality and universality in the positive expression of the negative judgement by becoming a structure of *rotation*, whereby the *totality* of determinations (categories) shows consecutively *one* of its determinations.⁴⁹ The positive expression of the negative judgement, therefore, designates the relation of an immediate individual to a *universal sphere*, a totality of determinations that *rotates* from one determination to another. The subject refers to the immediate individual, the predicate to this structure of rotation, and the copula to the unity of the two.

As this structure of rotation, the *predicate* shows itself *explicitly* as the totality of the *fundamental* concept-determinations. For (a) as a universal sphere it manifests its universality, (b) as the specific universal quality it manifests its individuality, and (c) as the specific universal quality that gives way to *another* specific universal quality it manifests its particularity. So, the *predicate* of the positive expression of the negative judgement exemplifies a *harmonious fusion* between the fundamental concept-determinations. It is "the first *mediated* determination."⁵⁰

Can this structure be what we have been looking for all along? Is the true judgement of the concept exemplified by the unity of immediate individuality and rotating universal sphere? *As before, the answer must be negative, due to the meaning the copula has in the present framework*: while the predicate's *scope* is clearly wider than the subject's scope, what the copula demands is the *simple identity* between the relata. Consequently,

⁴⁸ This is why Hegel says that "[die positive Form des negativen Urteils] drückt überdem auch aus, daß das Prädikat nicht nur ein Allgemeines sei, sondern auch noch ein Bestimmtes" (WL II 322) and associates this form with "die unendliche Rückkehr der Einzelheit in sich selbst" (WL II 323).

⁴⁹ WL II 322: "Es ist nach seiner objektiven Bedeutung nur das Moment der Veränderung der Akzidenzen oder, im Dasein, der vereinzelt Eigenschaften des Konkreten. Durch diese Veränderung tritt die vollständige Bestimmtheit des Prädikats oder das *Konkrete* als gesetzt hervor." Cf. WL II 321: "[...] Das Negative ist somit in einer umschlossenen Sphäre gehalten, worin das, was das eine *nicht* ist, etwas *Bestimmtes* ist."

⁵⁰ WL II 319: "Dieser Ausdruck ist insofern nicht positives Urteil selbst, als dieses um seiner Unmittelbarkeit willen nur das Abstrakte zu seinem Extremen hat, das Besondere aber eben durch das Setzen der Beziehung des Urteils sich als die erste *vermittelte* Bestimmung ergibt."

the positive form of the negative judgement must in its turn be *negated* and instead of the expression *the individual is the particular*, we now have the expression *the individual is not the particular*.⁵¹ This negation exemplifies a *second negation*, the negation of the 'not' contained in the predicate-space.

This form forces the judgement to go beyond its own boundaries and, in fact, to do that in a *destructive* fashion, in the sense that it would no longer exist as judgement. For, the *predicate*, being wholly negated, can now accommodate *none* of the fundamental concept-determinations: it cannot exemplify the particular because it explicitly negates it, it cannot exemplify the universal because this structure has been refuted in the dialectic of the positive judgement, and it cannot exemplify the individual because the judgement would then vanish. What appears thus before us is a pseudo-judgement, a structure that externally appears to be a judgement, but in truth lacks the latter's onto-logical structure and, therefore, any connection with being-as-concept. Such structure represents *the infinite judgement* and its fundamental characteristic is that its predicate exemplifies the negation of a *totality* of determinations, the total negation of a *universal sphere*. By negating particularity the infinite judgement attaches negativity (the 'not') to the copula itself and, therefore, destroys any sense of unity between subject and predicate.⁵²

9.4. *Infinity*

The infinite judgement emerges, then, from the *negation* of the positive expression of the negative judgement; for this reason it is more specifically called *the negative-infinite*.⁵³ As explained, this second 'not' is attached to the *copula* and, therefore, cuts off any link between subject and predicate. Given this unconnectedness, the judgement's onto-logical structure col-

⁵¹ WL II 323: "*Das Einzelne ist Besonderes*, nach dem positiven Ausdrucke des negativen Urteils. Aber das Einzelne ist auch *nicht* Besonderes; denn die Besonderheit ist von weiteren Umfange als die Einzelheit; sie ist also ein Prädikat, das dem Subjekt nicht entspricht, in dem es also seine Wahrheit noch nicht hat."

⁵² WL II 324: "Auf diese Weise ist der *ganze Umfang* des Prädikats negiert und keine positive Beziehung mehr zwischen ihm und dem Subjekte. Dies ist das *unendliche Urteil*."

⁵³ WL II 324. This alerts us to the fact that there will soon be mention to 'the positive-infinite'.

lapses and what remains is only the *empty* form of a judgement, a judgement that is *not judgement*,⁵⁴ a *mere sentence* (*bloßer Satz*).

This paradoxical judgement corresponds to *nonsense* (or *absurdity: Widersinnigkeit*) and cannot express the determinate concept.⁵⁵ The structure of nonsense typifies the totally external relation between subject and predicate, in the sense that the universal sphere which constitutes the predicate could not provide a determination that belongs to the subject: The latter relates to a world of determinations that cannot be its own.

Consider, for example, the 'judgement' *reason is not a table*. This 'judgement' could not explicate the unity between the subject and a positive content, because the totality of determinations that *arises* from the *negation* of 'a table' is totally irrelevant to the subject: none of the determinations that compose it could belong to the subject.⁵⁶ Indeed, in this peculiar sphere, the negation of a specific universal quality could not give rise to a specific universal quality that relates truly to the subject. The negation of the universal quality 'being a table' could not give rise to a universal quality that belongs to 'reason'. When the statement is made that reason is not a table, one immediately asks, 'is it, then, a chair?' or something similar. The problem is that neither the chair nor any other component of the universal sphere 'furniture' could characterize reason.

Given that the subject and the universal sphere exemplified by the predicate remain totally unconnected, the predicate-space could be filled in by any world of determinations that could not belong to the subject. This number is infinite, however; therefore, the predicate-space could be

⁵⁴ WL II 324: "Das negative Urteil ist sowenig ein wahres Urteil als das positive. Das unendliche Urteil aber, das seine Wahrheit sein soll, ist nach seinem negativen Ausdrucke, das *Negativ-Unendliche*, ein Urteil, worin auch die Form des Urteils aufgehoben ist."

⁵⁵ WL II 324: "Dies aber ist ein *widersinniges* Urteil. Es soll ein *Urteil* sein, somit eine Beziehung von Subjekt und Prädikat enthalten; aber eine solche soll *zugleich nicht* darin sein;" WL II 324: "Diese Urteile sind *richtig* oder *wahr*, wie man es nennt, aber einer solchen Wahrheit ungeachtet widersinnig und abgeschmackt.—Oder vielmehr sie sind *keine Urteile*." Cf. Burbidge (1981: 132): "Since the two negations are explicitly distinguished so that the 'not' does not simply determine the 'non', the infinite judgement expresses the fact that there is no relation at all between subject and predicate. But if there is no relation at all, the act of judging itself is absurd since it is supposed to couple the two on the basis of something inherent to the abstraction process. To couple them so as to indicate a lack of relation may produce a correct expression, but one that is so insipid that it abandons the rationale for judging altogether."

⁵⁶ WL II 324: "Beispiele von negativ-unendlichen Urteilen sind leicht zu haben, indem Bestimmungen zu Subjekt und Prädikat negativ verbunden werden, deren eine nicht nur die Bestimmtheit der andern nicht, sondern auch ihre allgemeine Sphäre nicht enthält; also z.B. der Geist [ist] nicht rot, gelb usf., nicht sauer, nicht kalisch usf., die Rose ist kein Elephant, der Verstand ist kein Tisch und dergleichen."

filled in by an *infinity* of worlds. Reason is not only not *a table*, but also not *sweet* and also not *depressed* and also not *hungry* and so on. Since the predicate does not exclude any universal sphere that does not belong to the subject from occupying its space, this empty form of judgement is called *the infinite judgement*.

Note that the infinity of the predicate does not refer to any capacity of it to receive any world of determinations whatsoever. For there is at least one world of determinations some or all of whose components belong to the subject. The infinity of the predicate refers rather to its capacity to receive any world of determinations that is foreign to the subject. Since there is not an end to these worlds, the 'judgement' in question is called 'infinite' and the onto-logy underlying it is the relation between two totally unconnected elements, the subject and the predicate.

McTaggart⁵⁷ argues that "a real infinite judgement is impossible." The judgement 'reason is not a table', for example, would not be an infinite judgement, because reason has certain universal qualities in common with tables. They are, for example, "both substances and both existent." McTaggart points out that the infinite judgement would collapse if "all individuals have any universal common to all of them." He concludes that this is indeed the case, for "all individuals have, at any rate, the common universal of individuality."

This objection would be valid if we assume—along with McTaggart—that the universal sphere could accommodate any given universal quality (the 'whole universe'). This matters because if any given universal quality could be accommodated therein, the negation of 'being a table' in the judgement 'reason is not a table' could still lead to the judgement 'reason is an individual' or 'reason exists'. In this way, the universal sphere that contains the determination 'being a table' would not be disjointed from the subject and, therefore, the judgement 'reason is not a table' could not be said to be an infinite judgement.

The only way to save the argument is by refusing to accept the assumption in question. But then we must subscribe to the opposite belief that the notion of a 'universal sphere' is *not* meant to refer to a sphere that accommodates any given universal quality ('the whole universe'). In my view, this would be the right thing to do, since the success of the argument requires the presence of the infinite judgement. A direct consequence of this would be that there is not just one universal sphere and that the

⁵⁷ McTaggart (1910: 204–205).

predicate-space of *the infinite judgement* could accommodate many—indeed, an infinity of—universal spheres (at different times). In this way, there would be a universal sphere that includes the determination of ‘being a table’ but not the determination of ‘individuality’ and another distinct sphere that includes the latter but not the former.

McTaggart’s objection, then, fails because when the judgement ‘reason is not a table’ is posited, the judgement ‘reason is existent’ does not come up. What makes the first judgement absurd is that the universal sphere that incorporates the determination ‘being a table’ cannot replace its negation with a determination that could belong to reason. ‘Being a table’ and ‘being existent’ belong to different universal spheres. When for example one states the judgement ‘my father is not an orange’, the absurdity of this sentence stems from the fact that the universal sphere ‘fruit’ contains no determination that could characterize one’s father. Such determination does not come up when the determination ‘being an orange’ is negated.

I will return to this point later. In particular, I will argue that the predicate-space of *the judgement of the concept* refers only to one universal sphere, the sphere of the onto-logical categories or the determinations of rational being. Having considered McTaggart’s objection, let us now return to the immanent dialectic of the infinite judgement.

The collapse of the judgement forces each of subject and predicate to *explicitly* return into itself and *show itself* as totally independent from the other.⁵⁸ True, one can still ‘see’ them standing side by side, but this relation is nothing but one of *absolute indifference*. Being totally self-subsistent existences, subject and predicate designate in truth only *sheer identities*—“the positive infinite”.⁵⁹

⁵⁸ While both Hegel (WL II 325) and Burbidge (1981: 132–133) seem to understand the infinite judgement as having two *independent* manifestations, the negative and the positive, I have tried to show that the ‘positive-infinite’ emerges from the negation of the ‘negative-infinite’. McTaggart (1910: 202–203) follows Hegel and Burbidge at this point; but note how arbitrary this move sounds: “He [i.e. Hegel] now tells us that, besides this Infinite Judgement, which he also calls the Negative-Infinite Judgement, there is also a Positive-Infinite Judgement, the Judgement of Identity.” As if Hegel could simply decide that there are two kinds of infinite judgement!!! (It is, therefore, not surprising that McTaggart goes on to say that “Hegel’s treatment of these identities as if they were a subdivision of the Infinite Judgement is misleading” (!).)

⁵⁹ Wohlfart (1985: 92) writes: “Das Urteil: ‘Das Einzelne ist Einzelnes’ (bzw. ‘Das Allgemeine ist Allgemeines’) ist der abstrakte Ausdruck des positive unendlichen Urteils.” In my opinion, this is mere confusion. The judgements in question are simply the positive expression of the infinite judgement; the addition of the qualification “abstract” is superfluous.

- (1) Since any link it had with the predicate has been cut off, the subject refers to the immediate individual that relates only to itself, the "abstract This." The only judgement that can express this absolute self-reflection is this: *the individual is the individual*.⁶⁰ Such sheer tautology, however, is *not* a judgement; it is a *pseudo-judgement* (or, if you prefer, only a *sheer Satz*).⁶¹
- (2) The predicate, on the other hand, since it no longer relates intrinsically to the immediate individual, loses its element of *determinacy* and, therefore, its structure of *rotation*. What remains therein is only *the universal sphere per se*, without the manifested *individual* determination. The predicate exemplifies now *only* a collection, a being-together of distinct determinations, immobile worlds of properties that have obtained an *independent* existence in the universe of discourse. The predicate, then, refers to the universal as a Platonic world of ideas, an element that enjoys existence and truth independently of any individual manifestation. The only judgement that can express this absolute self-reflection is this: *the universal is the universal*.⁶² Such sheer tautology, however, is, again, *not* a judgement, but *only* a pseudo-judgement.⁶³

⁶⁰ E.g. 'Reason is reason'.

⁶¹ WL II 325: "Das *Positive* des unendlichen Urteils, der Negation der Negation, ist die *Reflexion der Einzelheit* in sich selbst, wodurch sie erst als die *bestimmte Bestimmtheit* gesetzt ist. 'Das Einzelne ist einzeln' war der Ausdruck desselben nach jener Reflexion. Das Subjekt ist im Urteile des Daseins als *unmittelbares* Einzelnes, insofern mehr nur als *Etwas* überhaupt. Durch die Vermittlung des negativen und unendlichen Urteils ist es erst als Einzelnes *gesetzt*." Cf. Wohlfart (1985: 93, n. 33): "So ist das identische Urteil strenggenommen als identischer Satz zu bezeichnen, weil sich in ihm Subjekt und Prädikat nicht wie ein Besonderes (bzw. Einzelnes) zu einem Allgemeinen verhalten."

⁶² E.g. 'A table is a table'.

⁶³ WL II 325: "Das Einzelne ist hiermit *gesetzt* als sich *in sein Prädikat*, das mit ihm identisch ist, *kontinuierend*; somit ist auch die Allgemeinheit ebenso sehr nicht mehr als die *unmittelbare*, sondern als ein *Zusammenfassen* von Unterschiedenen. Das positiv-unendliche Urteil lautet ebensowohl: 'Das Allgemeine ist allgemein', so ist es ebensowohl als die Rückkehr in sich selbst." McTaggart writes (1910: 204): "But this would not be sufficient for Hegel's purpose. For to pass from Infinite Judgement to the Judgement of Subsumption it would be necessary to show that there is some contradiction in Infinite Judgement. And this is not done by showing that the propositions which, from the point of view of Infinite Judgement, would describe the universe, are trivial and unimportant. It would be necessary to show that they would be, taken by themselves, contradictory, whereas Hegel admits them to be correct and true." The answer to McTaggart's question, which he himself does not provide, is exactly that the "Infinite Judgement" must necessarily collapse to the "Judgement of Identity," which in turn is by definition incompatible with the judgement of the concept.

These sheer identities cannot be expressive of the judgement of being-as-concept, for the latter must *necessarily* incorporate both the individual and the universal.⁶⁴ This result of the dialectic of the infinite judgement *concludes* the attempt to explicate the judgement of the concept in a context of *immediacy* in which the *individual/subject* is conceived as being self-subsistent; in other words, the dialectic of the infinite judgement concludes *the dialectic of the judgement of determinate being*.

What has now become crystal clear is that the meaning that the *copula* of this kind of judgement has⁶⁵ translates necessarily into the following *inappropriate* state of affairs: (1) The entities that being-as-concept accommodates are (a) immediate, absolutely self-reflected individuals and (b) abstract, absolutely self-reflected totalities of determinations; and (2) the relation that takes place between them is either (a) *non-existent* (in the case of absolute—or “too much”—identity)⁶⁶ or (b) *nonsensical* (in the case of absolute—or “too much”—difference).⁶⁷ Having such ramifications, the judgement of determinate being reveals itself as being fundamentally *incapable* of ever expressing by itself being-as-concept. The dialectic of the judgement must, therefore, be transferred onto a different plane, one whose character would *not* be determined by the immediacy and dominance of the individual/subject, but rather by the immediacy and dominance of the universal/predicate.⁶⁸

Nonetheless, the dialectic of the judgement of determinate being has provided us also with a positive element, the true nature of the *predicate*, which has been shown to be a universal sphere, a structure of rotation of a totality of determinations, the perfect unity of individuality and

⁶⁴ WL II 325: “Durch diese Reflexion der Urteilsbestimmungen in sich hat nun sich das Urteil aufgehoben [...]”

⁶⁵ WL II 326.

⁶⁶ For a similar critique of identity statements (tautologies) see Maimon (1794: 55). Cf. Düsing (1976: 168, n. 47).

⁶⁷ Cf. Burbidge (1981: 133); and Wohlfart (1985: 91): “Im unendlichen Urteil als dem Daseinsurteil in seiner reinsten Form erst ist gesagt, was das Urteil des Daseins bzw. der Inhärenz in Wahrheit ist, bzw. worin seine Unwahrheit besteht. Die Unwahrheit der endlichen Urteile des Daseins besteht darin, daß Subjekt und Prädikat einander nicht entsprechen. Die Allgemeinheit und die Besonderheit sind von weiterem Umfang als die Einzelheit. Erst im positiv unendlichen Urteil ist der Umfang des Subjekts mit dem Umfang des Prädikats gänzlich—wenn auch noch abstrakt—identisch, im negativ unendlichen Urteil dagegen sind sie gänzlich unterschieden.”

⁶⁸ WL II 325: “Näher ist es das *Urteil des Daseins*, welches sich aufgehoben hat [...]” Cf. Burbidge (1981: 134): “[...] The subject is no longer thought as simply an abstract individual, isolated from all conceptual reference—a being distinguished from any predicated quality that might inhere in it.”

universality. Based on this element a whole new dialectic will be developed, in which it will be immanently examined how the, no longer self-subsistent, subject behaves toward a predicate that is now conceived as a totality of determinations that manifest themselves in a rotating fashion. This dialectic will constitute the structure of a new kind of judgement, the *judgement of reflection*.⁶⁹

9.5. Conclusion

The dialectic of the judgement of determinate being has shown that such a kind of judgement cannot possibly express being-as-concept. The main obstacle for the realization of this expression is the reappearance of the non-speculative meaning of the copula at the end of the dialectic's first two stages. For both the positive judgement and the positive form of the negative judgement collapse because the copula persists in the sphere of *Dasein* as a sheer identity: This meaning of the copula is incompatible with the meanings pertaining to subject and predicate. The incompatibility culminates in the infinite judgement, where the world of determinations (the 'universal sphere') appears to be completely external to the subject. Given this externality, either (a) any property that does not belong to the subject is attached to it, proving thereby that the identification of the judgement of determinate being with the judgement of the concept leads necessarily to *nonsense*; or (b) the only 'property' that is ascribed to the subject is its own undifferentiated self, proving thereby that such identification leads necessarily to an *empty tautology*.

Wohlfart⁷⁰ raises a serious objection to the above argument: If the copula's meaning as *simple identity* is indeed playing such a functional role in the development of the dialectic, the latter's culmination in the positive infinite judgement should be seen as its *successful* conclusion; for the positive infinite is nothing but the sheer tautology. In my view, however, there is no contradiction between these two: (a) that the copula plays a functional role in the judgement of determinate being as a simple identity and (b) that the positive infinite judgement denotes the *collapse* of the judgement of determinate being.

⁶⁹ WL II 326: "Das Urteil des Daseins ist in das Urteil der Reflexion übergegangen."

⁷⁰ Wohlfart (1985: 98).

This is so because the dialectic in question is deeply paradoxical. For, on the one hand, the judgement's fundamental character demands the presence of difference in the judgement-locus and, on the other hand, the non-speculative (immediate) meaning of the copula demands the presence of simple identity therein. The significance of the dialectic of the judgement of determinate being is that it has made explicit what it means to demand *both* the simple identity *and* the difference of the judgement-sides in a context where *the self-subsistent subject* reigns. It means either nonsense or empty tautology.

The natural reaction to this rejoinder is to ask: *But why should the relation between the self-subsistent subject and the abstract universal quality be explicated in terms of difference and simple identity?* Why does one not explicate it in terms of difference *and some other kind of identity?* But this option is excluded by the conditions that determined the emergence of the judgement: The self-subsistent subject is always 'accompanied' by the self-subsistent copula, to wit, by the 'simple' identity.

The dialectic of the judgement of determinate being verifies the pre-suppositionless character of one of the two pillars of the Pyrrhonian problematic, namely the idea that in the context of immediacy a positive judgement must directly confront its negation. The only difference is that, while for the Pyrrhonists the negative judgement is externally posited in the universe of discourse, in truth it emerges immanently therein due to the onto-logical structure of the positive judgement. Yet, even so, the fact that the speculative theory of judgement has *thematized* the inherent interconnectedness of positive and negative judgement in the context of immediacy (and the fact that it does so at its very first stage) proves one of our main theses, namely that the theory in question can be seen as working towards the resolution of the Pyrrhonian problematic.

While for the Pyrrhonists the confrontation between the positive and the negative judgement in the context of immediacy is totally destructive in character, in speculative onto-logy something true is revealed through it, namely, the true character of the *predicate* in the sphere of reason. Indeed, the great significance of the move from the positive judgement to the positive expression of the negative judgement is that it has unified (or *fused*) the two, initially disjointed, constituents of the positive judgement's predicate-space: the universal quality as such and the specific universal quality. Its true content is now a dynamic structure whereby the totality of determinations (the universal sphere) presents itself in a rotating fashion. And, as we have discovered in our discussion of McTaggart's

objection, this totality of determinations cannot possibly be referring to 'the whole universe'.

Thus, since the predicate's true character has been discovered, one would expect the forthcoming dialectic to focus (a) on the fusion of the two disjointed constituents of the *subject*-space, namely (i) the immediate individual (which dominates that space) and (ii) the totality of determinations (which, after the collapse of the positive judgement, has been suppressed *therein*); and (b) on the transformation of the meaning of the copula from *bloße Identität* to *Begriffsidentität*. Both of these issues will be tackled in *the judgement of reflection*.

The dialectic of the judgement of determinate being was intended as an explication of the fundamental onto-logical structure of the judgement's behaviour *in the categorial sphere of determinate or qualitative being*. It has shown us how the judgement behaves (in its fundamental onto-logical core) when it expresses the categories of qualitative being; or, alternatively, how *these categories* behave when they are *expressed* by the judgement in their *peculiar* onto-logical domain. (Note that this does not mean that the judgement 'causes' the behaviour of those categories; it does mean, however, that it relates intrinsically to the way that behaviour appears.) Indeed, what fundamentally characterizes these categories is that they initially appear as being absolutely self-subsistent, as immediate individualities, elements whose determination by an other is not essential to them. When the local dialectic gives rise to the *negation* of a specific category, namely to its *other*, the latter acquires self-subsistence and stands against the first category as an independent determination. The dialectic proceeds by showing that the two categories are united in a universal sphere. However, this universal sphere acquires a positive significance only in the logic of being-as-concept (or only as a 'conceptual' determination). In the logic of qualitative being (in the sphere of simple being), by contrast, the relation between the universal sphere and the immediate categories appears *explicitly* only as an unresolved contradiction (or, if you prefer, a *conjunction*, a *Verbindung*) and is treated as a 'mistake'. On the one hand, the *intention* of an onto-logical category to prove itself as an element that is *absolutely immediate* (or *positive*) has *failed* to be actualized. Yet, on the other hand, the universal sphere appears only in a self-reflective, 'indifferent' manner and its encompassing, self-determining function is pushed to the level of *implicitness*.

Finally, Hegel seems to associate the judgement of determinate being also with the realm of the sensory (*das Sinnliche*) and perception (*Wahrnehmung*). It seems as if, for him, the collapse of the judgement of determinate

being proves the deficiency of the sensory realm and of perception regarding the expression of truth. In particular, he explicitly associates the universal in the first expression of the positive judgement, namely in the judgement “the individual is the universal,” with the sensory quality; the way in which he makes this association implies that, for him, an *immediate* universal quality is, or is peculiarly related to, a *sensory* quality.⁷¹ Moreover, most of the examples he uses are taken from the sensory realm, like “the rose is red”⁷² or “the rose is fragrant”⁷³ or “the sun is round.”⁷⁴ He then goes on to say that perception can validate only the correctness, not the truth of the positive judgement.⁷⁵

Yet, Hegel also says that the content of the positive judgement consists only of the fundamental concept-determinations;⁷⁶ and that

any other content that might appear in a judgement (‘the sun is round’, ‘Cicero was a great orator situated in Rome’, ‘now is day’, and so on), has nothing to do with the judgement as such [...].⁷⁷

To my mind this passage shows without any doubt that Hegel does not intend the thematization of the judgement of determinate being as a thematization of ‘sensory’ or ‘empirical’ judgements—despite some contrary evidence. It might be the case (given the evidence) that, for Hegel, these judgements have the onto-logical structure of the judgement of determinate being, but it is definitely not the case that, for him, the domain of the latter contains only the former. (Indeed, as I have just argued, it must first and foremost contain those judgements which express the categories of the onto-logical sphere of ‘qualitative being’.) See also the following passage from the *Logic*:

Whoever calls the *correctness* of *intuition* or *perception*, the correspondence of the *representation* with the object, *truth*, has, to say the least, left no expression for that which is the object and goal of philosophy. One should call the latter truth-of-reason (*Vernunftwahrheit*), at least, and one, really,

⁷¹ Enz. I § 172 (my emphasis; Hegel’s emphasis has been removed): “Das unmittelbare Urteil ist das Urteil des Daseins; das Subjekt in einer Allgemeinheit, als seinem Prädikate, gesetzt, welches *eine unmittelbare (somit sinnliche)* Qualität ist.” I take it that the “welches” refers to “das Prädikat.”

⁷² Enz. § 172.

⁷³ WL II 314.

⁷⁴ WL II 317.

⁷⁵ Enz. I § 172.

⁷⁶ WL II 317.

⁷⁷ WL II 317.

must admit that such judgements as these—that Cicero was a great orator, that now is day, etc.—are no truths-of-reason.⁷⁸

One might claim here that this passage is not incompatible with the judgement of determinate being's 'representing' only 'sensory' or 'empirical' judgements; it would just be that the *further development* of the dialectic of the judgement, and especially its culmination in *the judgement of the concept*, will prove that such judgements "are no truths-of-reason." Yet, this claim is refuted by the way Hegel concludes the passage:

However, such judgements are not truths-of-reason, not because they, at the same time, contingently have an empirical content, but because they are only positive judgements, which can and should have no other content than an immediate individual and an abstract determinacy.⁷⁹

As far as I can see, this means that 'sensory' and 'empirical' judgements fail to function as judgements of the concept, *not because they have an empirical content*, but because they have the onto-logical structure of the positive judgement. This, I argue, means that the latter is not reducible to the representation of an empirical content. This supports my suggestion that the judgement of determinate being refers to the judgements that explicate or express the *categories* of the onto-logical sphere of determinate being.

⁷⁸ WL II 318.

⁷⁹ WL II 318.

CHAPTER TEN

THE JUDGEMENT OF REFLECTION

10.1. *Introduction*

The dialectic of the judgement of determinate being has resulted in the isolation of individuality and universality from one another. This state of affairs—which cancels the judgement out—hinders the expression of being-as-concept and, therefore, must be superseded. This is accomplished immanently from that isolation itself: The individual that occupies the *subject*-space of the *tautology of individuality* relates to another individual, the one that occupies the *predicate*-space. So, a multiplicity of individuals, a *universality*, emerges directly from the tautology of individuality. And, in fact, this universality is a *totality*—no residue of individuality is left outside the locus of the tautology. Consequently, what stands before us is the judgement “the individual is the universal.” That is to say, the individuality that the tautology affirms has proven to be universality.

Given the above argument, the universality now appearing in the judgement is neither abstract universality nor individual universal quality, but rather a *gathering* of differentiated elements.¹ In this way, the tautology of individuality brings out what has already proven to be a key feature of predicate’s true nature.

The true nature of the predicate, however, has, as we discovered, a supplementary key feature. Its universality does not collapse into abstract universality or individual universal quality precisely because it is in itself the harmonious fusion—the *mediation*—of these elements; it is in truth *particularity*, a universal sphere that exhibits its determinations in a rotating fashion. This rotating exhibition is what is missing from the universality that initially characterizes the judgement of reflection.

There is a reason why this happens: the context of *immediacy* (that is, non-mediation) in which the new judgement comes to life. This context affects the character of the universality in question, because in it the ‘not’ that mobilizes—that generates the mediation that constitutes—the rotating movement in the predicate-space has to be suppressed. Without the

¹ WL II 326.

'not', therefore, the true character of universality in the predicate-space remains suppressed. As a consequence, the universal of the judgement of reflection appears initially as having the significance of a *static* (non-mediated) collection of individual determinations—a *class* that *subsumes* individuals under it.

The context of immediacy affects also the character of *individuality* in the new judgement. The subject-individual that relates to the predicate-individual in the tautology of individuality finds itself in a relation of *otherness*—but at the same time, in this very relation, it finds itself in a *self-relation*. For by relating to another *individual* it relates to *itself*; it brings out its existence as the (tautological) individual that it is. The other individual *mediates* the relation of the individual to itself. In this way, by passing over into the predicate-individual the subject-individual *reflects* into its own self. This is why the new judgement is called *the judgement of reflection*: because it *intends* to exemplify the relation between individuality and universality as the self-relation of individuality. But the context of *immediacy* (i.e. non-mediation), in which the judgement of reflection first appears, suppresses the *mediated* element of *reflection* with the result that what explicitly appears before us is simply the relation between the immediate individual (or 'the This') and a class (a static collection of individuals).

Now, as we already know, internalized abstraction brings forth the *self-subsistence* of the fundamental concept-determinations in the judgement-locus. Yet, as shown, the subject-individual can no longer be the self-subsistent element therein. Thus, this element must be exemplified either by the predicate-universal or by the copula. But the very emergence of the judgement of reflection from the tautology of individuality clearly shows that the self-subsistent element in the sphere of this judgement is the predicate-universal; for its intention is to affirm the self-relation of individuality, something that makes the individual *dependent* upon the universal. Without the universal there can be no individual—the individual is affirmed only because it relates to *another* individual, to wit, only because it belongs to a manifoldness of individuals ("the *individual* is the *individual*"). It is only via this manifoldness that it can reflect back into itself.²

² Cf. Salomon (1982: 54): "Zu Beginn des Reflexionsurteils war das Einzelne gesetzt, insofern es aus seinem Unterschiedensein, aus seiner Andersheit in sich zurückgekehrt ist."

This essentiality of the predicate-universal is of paramount importance for the development of the dialectic. The essentiality of the subject-individual in *the judgement of determinate being* affected the latter's development because it entailed that all change and transformation in the judgement-locus should occur in the predicate-space, not in the subject-space. The subject, as the essential, "what lay on the ground" (*das Zugrundeliegende*), should have remained immobile and unaffected.³ This had become especially clear at the end of the dialectic when only the predicate had been explicitly transformed. But now that the essential is the predicate, the latter is the one which should in principle exhibit those features. Thus, the dialectical moves should in principle take place in the *subject-space*.⁴ The predicate-universal "has become what lies on the ground, and the subject is to be determined in terms of its measurement against and correspondence with it."⁵

From the above it can be deduced that the 'movement' that will take place in the subject-space must in principle have *quantitative*, not qualitative, character. This is so because (a) qualitative determinacy is initially located *wholly* in the predicate-space (recall that the subject-space accommodates explicitly only the sheer This), (b) the predicate, as the essential, should remain *immobile* and *unaffected* and (c) quality's *other* is quantity. So, the subject's striving to 'correspond with' the predicate must initially have a quantitative character. This is why the judgement of reflection is also called *the judgement of quantity*.

On the whole, the judgement of reflection has the following fundamental character. It is simultaneously (a) the *self-relation* of the subject-individual and (b) the *gathering* of individuals. This gathering denotes the *totality* of individuals, which in truth has the structure of rotation. The context of immediacy, however, in which this judgement first appears, suppresses both the exhibition of this rotation and the self-relation of individuality with the result that the exhibited relation is one between the This and a class. The forthcoming dialectic will strive to bring out the true character of the judgement of reflection. This should be done by taking into consideration the essentiality of the predicate over the subject and the demand that all movement must in principle take place in the subject-space in quantitative terms.

³ WL II 327.

⁴ WL II 327.

⁵ WL II 327.

10.2. Singularity

The dialectic of the judgement of reflection begins with the connection between (a) the inessential immediate individual, the sheer This and (b) the essential universal, a unified manifoldness of distinct elements. Thus, its first expression is again that *the individual is the universal*, but what this now means is that *the This is the essential universal*.⁶ Such expression corresponds to the structure of *the singular judgement*.

The singular judgement immediately collapses; for (a) there is a *discrepancy* between the individual's and the universal's scope and (b) the copula still demands the *simple identity* of the two.⁷ While the universal refers to a manifoldness, the This refers to a singular element; but the copula demands that this should not be the case. The singular judgement, therefore, must be negated: *the This is not the essential universal* (i.e. *the individual is not the universal*).⁸

Yet, the negation of the singular judgement *cannot* have this form; for (a) if the 'not' is attached to the copula, the judgement itself would collapse—and (b) it cannot be attached to the predicate, since it is the essential, namely what should remain as it is, completely unaffected.⁹ The 'not', then, should be attached neither to the predicate nor to the copula. Hence it is *necessarily* attached to the subject. By immanently having the 'not' placed in its sphere, the subject opens up to determinacy and breathes an air of change and transformation (as we will see by the end of the dialectic).¹⁰ The negation of the singular judgement is, therefore, in truth expressed thus: *not-the-individual is the universal* or *not-the-This is the essential universal*.¹¹

⁶ WL II 328: "Das unmittelbare Reflexionsurteil ist nun wieder: 'Das Einzelne ist allgemein',—aber Subjekt und Prädikat in der angegebenen Bedeutung; es kann daher näher so ausgedrückt werden: 'Dieses ist ein wesentlich Allgemeines'."

⁷ Cf. Burbidge (1981: 135; my emphasis): "Dialectic points out that the subject, insofar as it is only an indicated 'this', is quite distinct from the universal predicate. Even though its individuality stands out against this essential characteristic, the difference is not expressed by *the straightforward positive copula*."

⁸ WL II 328: "Aber ein Dieses ist *nicht* ein wesentlich Allgemeines. Jenes seiner allgemeinen Form nach *positive* Urteil überhaupt muß negativ genommen werden."

⁹ WL II 328: "Aber indem das Urteil der Reflexion nicht bloß ein Positives ist, so geht die Negation nicht direkt das Prädikat an, das nicht inhäriert, sondern das *Ansichseiende* ist."

¹⁰ WL II 328: "Das Subjekt ist vielmehr das Veränderliche und zu Bestimmende."

¹¹ WL II 328: "Das negative Urteil ist hier daher so zu fassen: *Nicht ein Dieses* ist ein Allgemeines der Reflexion; ein solches *Ansich* hat eine allgemeinere Existenz als nur in einem Diesen."

Still, the attachment of the 'not' to the subject does *not* produce its *annihilation*. Were that the case, the judgement would immediately vanish.¹² Consequently, what arises out of the subject's negativity is a positive result, something that *remains* as a relatum in the judgement-topos. This, however, can be neither the individual (since it is explicitly negated), nor the universal (since a tautology would then emerge). The only alternative is to conceive the subject-space as being occupied by the *presence of both*. It is *necessarily* the case, therefore, that what results from the subject's negation in the singular judgement is the subject-as-the-*particular*, that is, the subject-as-the-*unity-of-individuality-and-universality*.¹³ This expression of the negation (*not-the-individual is the universal*) translates, then, into the expression *the particular is the universal*. This new form of the judgement of reflection is called *the particular judgement*.¹⁴

10.3. *Partiality*

The particularity now appearing in the subject-space is quite different from the one that appeared in the predicate-space of the judgement of determinate being. While the latter had been characterized in terms of *quality* (relations between properties or determinations), the former *must* (in principle) be characterized in terms of *quantity* (relations between indeterminate points).¹⁵

Since the subject cannot be the universal, it shall not refer exclusively to a (quantitative) *totality*, to *all* the points that constitute a whole. Yet, because it cannot be the individual either, it also shall not refer exclusively to the simple This. Given, however, that these two elements should not vanish altogether, what appears is a structure that incorporates both while still not limiting itself to any one of them. This structure is particularity as *partiality* or *someness*.¹⁶

The particular (or *partial*) exemplifies only *some* of the elements present in a totality. Since we are in *quantity's* sphere, the manifoldness which the 'some' denotes maintains the elements' *diversity* and *quantitative*

¹² Cf. Burbidge (1981: 135): "Such a negation does not dissolve the subject completely, else no judgement would remain."

¹³ WL II 329: "Die Nicht-Einzelheit des Subjekts, welche statt seiner Singularität im ersten Reflexionsurteile gesetzt werden muß, ist die *Besonderheit*."

¹⁴ WL II 328: "Das singuläre Urteil hat hiermit seine nächste Wahrheit im *partikulären*."

¹⁵ This is why Hegel calls it "das partikuläre Urteil," and not "das besondere Urteil."

¹⁶ WL II 329.

individuality. Under the ‘some’ the points are *gathered* in their *individual* existence. The particular is not *just* a This, but *many Thises*; these many Thises, however, still *fall short* of all the Thises.¹⁷ This first explication of particularity in the subject-space shows that the expression *the particular is the universal* equals the expression *some individuals are the universal* or *some Thises are the essential universal*.¹⁸ Yet, while such an expression accommodates the This-ness of the subject’s contents (for they retain their individuality *in* the gathering), and it does so successfully since it ‘widens’ it with the addition of the ‘some’,¹⁹ it does not accommodate their universality, their belonging to a *totality* (which is what the judgement “the particular is the universal” affirms).

The expression of the particular judgement, though, is not as *positive* as it seems. For by being specified as *partiality*, the subject-particular entails *another* subject-particular.²⁰ The latter refers to the *remaining* individuals, the *some-other*-individuals. Since, that is, only *some* individuals are so-and-so, *some other* individuals must immediately arise in the subject’s sphere. Simply, the subject’s partiality leads *necessarily* to its bifurcation into (a) “the some” and (b) “the some-other” or “the remaining some.” But as the predicate under which *some* individuals are subsumed is their *essence*, the *remaining* individuals are *not* subsumed under it. Hence the particular judgement not only says that *some individuals are the universal* but also implies that *some individuals are not the universal*.²¹ The first is the particular judgement’s *positive* expression; the second is its *negative* one.

¹⁷ Burbidge (1981: 135) does not explain this point very well: “Because in a particular judgement what is essential to the subject is not its individuality, the act of reference is no longer restricted to this singular entity; it could apply to others as well.” One wonders, if that is what is really at stake here, what prevents this “act of reference” from being “applied” not only to some individuals but to *all* of them instead?

¹⁸ WL II 329.

¹⁹ WL II 329.

²⁰ Cf. Burbidge (1981: 137): “The limitation in its range implies the possibility of going beyond to something else—to some other individuals for whom the predicate is not the essential characteristic.”

²¹ WL II 329. McTaggart (1910: 209, 210 n. 1) maintains that the negative expression of the particular judgement (“some individuals are not the universal”) is not a *necessary* consequence of its positive expression (“some individuals are the universal”), but only a *possible* one. (He admits, however, that Hegel himself takes it to be a necessary consequence). First, I see no grounds for McTaggart’s claim (and he himself provides none). Surely, if we leave aside the meaningless caprice of modern (Fregean) logic, when one says that ‘some x are y’ we all immediately infer that ‘some x are not y’. If this were not the case, the speaker would have *said* either that ‘all x are y’ or that ‘no x is y’ or that ‘this is y’. Second, the necessity of this implication, and the ‘not’ that it involves, is crucial for the remaining of Hegel’s argument. (McTaggart seems to have a completely different view.

The particular judgement's bifurcation has ramifications for both the subject and the predicate. To begin with the former, both the "some individuals" and the "some other individuals" have lost their putatively quantitative character and express a combination of quantity and quality. This is so because the first 'some' necessarily relates to the second in terms of a *common qualitative determination* (a "content-determination"), to wit, in terms of a *universal*. This can be appreciated if we reflect on the move from the *negation* of the This in the subject-space to the positing of the "some-Thises" therein.

The very possibility of referring to a gathering of Thises in the subject-space *in terms of someness* requires their placing under a single qualitative concept or determination. Otherwise, what would prevent one from describing such gathering in terms of *simple conjunction*: This and This and This and so on? Such an expression only affirms the indeterminate This again and again, with the result that the deficient singular judgement is revived.²² To put it differently: 'some Thises' is equivalent to the simple 'some', which is meaningless if used in a judgement. There exists no judgement stating that *some are wise*; it must say that *some men or dogs or whatever* are wise. Thus, the first 'some' *must* be accompanied by a qualitative determination that applies to all individuals to which the 'some' refers.²³

He says: "In this, however, he [i.e. Hegel] seems to me to be wrong. He has no right to put any more into this new category than is required to avoid the inadequacy of the previous category. Now all that is required for that purpose is that the Individuals in the subject should be united by all being X. It would not be at all helped by the existence of other X's which were not Y." Note here how different McTaggart's conception of the *Logic* is from mine. While I take it that Hegel *himself* has nothing to do with the determination of the categories, McTaggart believes that this determination emerges from Hegel's attempt to 'fix' or 'correct' the inadequacies of previous categories. In this sense, his understanding of the *Logic* is very close to Pinkard's (1988).)

²² Exactly the same point is made by McTaggart (1910: 208–209).

²³ This argument could be presented in a more sophisticated way. The problem is to explain the move from the single This to a manifoldness of Thises in such a way that the explication of the manifoldness necessarily involves a *common* qualitative determination, a *single* universal. I used the (rather uncontroversial) premises (a) that a conjunction of indeterminate Thises collapses into or simply re-poses the single indeterminate This and (b) that the use of the 'some' in a judgement produces meaninglessness unless it is accompanied by a common qualitative determination. But one might object that the desired manifoldness *could* also arise from the conjunction of Thises each of which is immediately accompanied by a distinct qualitative determination. For example, 'this elephant and this car and this wine'. Such expression, it is argued, refers to a manifoldness of Thises without involving a common qualitative determination and does not collapse into the single indeterminate This. There are three ways in which Hegel could go about refuting this argument, only the third of which can be considered as being successful. First, he might point

The second 'some' shares with the first the same qualitative determination *in the domain of the subject*, exactly because the dialectic differentiates it from the first *only* in terms of quantitative otherness. It comes to light as an element that has the same qualitative determination as the first 'some' in the domain of the subject, but differs from it only in that it is constituted by different Thises. The move is not from 'some' to 'some other' *simpliciter* but from 'some x' to 'some other x'. When a judgement asserts that *some men are wise*, what is implied is that *some men are not wise*, not that *some dogs are not wise*. The first 'some' places a (quantitative and qualitative) *limit* in the subject-space; in this way it discloses both what lies beyond the limit (the 'some-other') and the unity of the two sides *in the limit* (the 'common determination').

Thus we come to realize that the subject-space accommodates universality, the totality of the quantitative elements; the 'some' contains universality, it is "comprehensive."²⁴ The argument's peculiarity is that such

out that the expression in question is meant to function as the subject in a *judgement* and this makes it impossible that the elements involved would have no qualitative determination in common. Simply, the predicate which is attached to all of them guarantees that there is a universal that unites them. This either is or derives from the so-and-so in the judgement 'this elephant and this car and this wine are so-and-so'. But this response would not be a good one, especially because it would involve the predicate; on the one hand, Hegel wants to argue that the This turns itself immanently into a gathering of Thises without relying on its connection with the predicate and, on the other hand, the response does not really give grounds for a universal's appearing in the subject-space—indeed, it would seem that the so-and-so that appears in the predicate-space achieves the unity of the elements by itself and, therefore, that any other universal would just be superfluous. (And the expression 'some so-and-so are so-and-so' would be ridiculous). Second, he might put forth the strong claim that *each* of the elements in the expression in question (e.g. 'this elephant') could not have the form they have unless they were mediated by a quantitative universality whose units were united by a common qualitative determination (e.g. 'elephant'). In this way, 'some elephants' would have logical priority over 'this elephant'. But such commitment to the priority of the 'sociality' of the quantitative elements lacks satisfactory justification and encounters extreme difficulties in its application. In what sense, for example, would the element 'this earth' or 'this moon' or 'this sea'—given that these are not simple proper names, but rather they involve unique qualitative determinations—be mediated by *common* qualitative determinations? Third, Hegel might argue that the expression in question fails to express *partiality* or *someness* and that this feature is exactly what is needed if the not-This would be a unity of universality and individuality. Such a response, which I take to be successful, clarifies that the establishment of a manifoldness (or a 'gathering') of Thises is not the major desideratum here. The aim, rather, is to establish this gathering *as a partiality*. The expression in question fails because it fails to manifest this character. 'This elephant and this car and this wine' do *not* designate a state of affairs that lies between individuality and universality. But, then, if the 'some' *must* be present in the subject-space, it *has to* be accompanied by a common qualitative determination (to prevent meaninglessness).

²⁴ WL II 329.

quantitative universality is established through a *qualitative* determination, “the universal nature” or “the genus.”²⁵ ‘Some’ and ‘some other’ are united through their common qualitative determination, which is the universal nature they exemplify (‘some *men*’ and ‘some other *men*’).

We now see that the *subject*-space in the judgement of reflection accommodates all three fundamental concept-determinations: (a) individuality, for the ‘This’ is still present in the ‘someness’; (b) particularity, because there is still the distinction between ‘some’ and ‘some other’; and (c) universality, since the ‘some’ and ‘some other’ are united through a ‘universal nature’ that encompasses and unites them.²⁶ The true nature of the subject has, then, in this way been disclosed.

The subject’s disclosed true structure affects the structure of the *predicate*. For if ‘some’ and ‘some other’ are united through a common ‘content-determination’, the subject must affirm the *unity* of its bifurcation: there are no two subjects present, but only one, which presents itself also (but not only) as partiality. Burbidge puts it well: “Thought moves beyond the indefinite particularity of the original subject to *include* its contrary.”²⁷ If this is the case, then necessarily the *predicate* applies not only to ‘some *x*’ and ‘some other *x*’, but also to ‘*x*’ taken on its own. If some men are wise and (therefore) some men are not wise, then man is wise and not wise.

The emergence of quality in the subject-space of the judgement of reflection, a space that was devoid of quality and fully occupied by quantity, reveals the *predicate*—the essential and the locus where the *whole* of quality was contained—as the space in which the determination of ‘*x*’ (the unified, ‘comprehensive’ subject) is *originally* located, the space *from which* the subject’s ‘content-determination’ ‘draws’ its content. *Simply, the determination ‘man’ located in the subject-space ‘mirrors’ a content that cannot but be also present in the predicate-space.* This is a necessary conclusion, given the starting-point of the dialectic of the judgement of reflection.

But the unity of the subject means that after all there is unity also in the predicate-space, for, given the original characterization of the judgement of reflection, it must provide the essential determination of the subject. The subject’s conflicting determinations previously manifested by the

²⁵ WL II 330.

²⁶ WL II 330: “Das Subjekt, das [1] die Einzelnen, [2] deren Beziehung zur Besonderheit und [3] die allgemeine Natur enthält, ist insofern schon gesetzt als die Totalität der Begriffsbestimmungen.”

²⁷ Burbidge (1981: 137; my emphasis).

predicate ('wise'-'not wise') are united in the latter; they are parts of a *single* (and 'higher') universal.²⁸ This is necessarily so because the predicate has been shown both to contain such conflicts and to be the essential determination of the subject. Man has an essence, but this essence contains conflicting determinations. See again what Burbidge says: "[...] The original predicate is no longer a simple universal, but a particular contrasted with its opposite. As such it refers to another universal that includes both. The original class simply becomes incorporated into one more comprehensive."²⁹ *In this way, the particular judgement gives rise to a judgement that has a united (or 'higher') subject and a united (or 'higher') predicate as its extremes.*

The dialectic of the particular judgement has now proven the identity of subject and predicate. The 'common-determination' or 'universal nature' that appears in the subject-space is exactly the same as the 'universal sphere' that occupies the predicate-space. As shown, not only the first ('man') flows from the second (the unity of 'being wise' and 'not being wise'), but also they contain exactly the same determinations ('being wise', 'not being wise'). If we represent the unity of being wise and not being wise with the letter *p*, then the following two statements hold: (1) Man is both wise and not wise; (2) *p* is both wise and not wise. Evidently 'man' and 'p' have the same content. Even if we enrich the determinacy of 'man' *through additional particular judgements*, the identity of subject and predicate would remain—the 'p' would become 'r', an element that would incorporate both 'p' and some other unifying determination, let us say 'q', and so on.

Note that subject and predicate are both structured in terms of conflicts (or contradictions) and unifications of conflicts (or contradictions): The 'common-determination' in the subject-space unifies the 'some' and the 'some-other' in terms of the simultaneous affirmation and negation of a qualitative determination offered by the predicate—and the 'universal sphere' in the predicate-space unifies determinations with their negations.

²⁸ This is why Burbidge (1981: 137) says the following: "This dialectical conclusion [i.e. that some individuals are not the essential universal] raises a problem, for *the particular judgement* does not in fact refer to individuals that are not members of the predicate class. Simply taken as a class the predicate is a universal, not the particular range of individuals related negatively to another range of individuals. Speculative reason must bring together the two statements."

²⁹ Burbidge (1981: 137).

The disclosure of the subject's true structure in the particular judgement gives rise to another kind of judgement, the *universal judgement* (*all individuals are the universal*). There are two reasons for this:

(a) The particular judgement *expresses* only partiality—the unity achieved through the 'x' is never made 'visible'. Hegel notes that the structure of the subject of the particular judgement "has been posited as the totality of the concept-determinations."³⁰ Yet, he immediately adds that "this observation is at the end of the day an external one."³¹ This is indeed so because the 'universal nature' that the subject discloses is always hampered by the partiality with which it is immediately associated. The universal judgement attempts to capture a full, unhampered universality in the subject-space; it aspires to enable a *direct* reference to *all* the units that are x.³² Therefore, the 'some' is transformed into 'all'—partiality is transformed into *allness*.

(b) The 'some' makes it uncertain which of the subject-universal's members are determined by the predicate-universal's positive form and which by its negative form. For an individual might be so-and-so, but it also might not be so-and-so. The particular judgement does not decide between these two options, but rather simply affirms them both. In this way, as McTaggart puts it, "of every member of the class we assert that it may or may not have [a certain determination]."³³ (And, as McTaggart notes, "we cannot take them one by one, and, pointing to each in turn, say that A has it, B has it not, and so on," since this would revive the singular judgement).³⁴ This has the undesirable result that the quantitative base of the subject-universal, its *individuality*, loses its determinacy. The Theses are supposed to gain full determinacy through their relating with

³⁰ WL II 330.

³¹ WL II 330.

³² NHS 147: "Das Subjekt erhält seine vollkommene Bestimmung dem Umfang der Form nach durch die Allheit in dem universellen Urteil."

³³ McTaggart (1910: 210). His whole account of the deficiency of the particular judgement goes as follows (p. 210): "The Particular Judgement says of a certain class that some of its members have a certain Universal. This leaves it possible that some have not got it. [Footnote: If we take the Particular Judgement as Hegel does himself this is not only possible, but necessary.] Thus of every member of the class we assert that it may or may not have it. But this is not the whole truth. For the truth about certain members of the class is that they *do* have it. And the truth about certain members of the class may be that they *do not* have it. Thus assertions of actual possession or non-possession must be true about each member while all that the Particular Judgement gives us about each member is an assertion of possible possession."

³⁴ McTaggart (1910: 210).

the predicate-universal; but the particular judgement says they do not. The move to the universal judgement is intended as a move away from uncertainty and indeterminacy and as an establishment of certainty and determinacy.

Despite its collapse, the dialectic of the particular judgement has been of the utmost significance concerning the battle against Pyrrhonian scepticism. Firstly, the universal's being incorporated into the subject-space binds the two parts of the judgement in an intrinsic, necessary way, which is exactly what one needed in order to prove the objectivity of the judgement. Secondly, if the subject's 'content-determination' is *necessarily* related to the predicate's universal sphere, the sceptic's insistence that the affirmed predicate can be externally negated appears as a mere whim. As suggested earlier, the realm of the rational excludes the freedom of external positing by pre-empting it. Now there has been given *proof* for this: No subject can be posited in the universe of rational discourse without being accompanied by a 'universal nature' which in turn is intrinsically related to the 'universal sphere' exemplified by the predicate. That is to say, when a judgement is posited in the universe of rational discourse, the subject has *already* opened up a nature and the predicate says something *of* that nature. (Burbidge puts it brilliantly: "[...] The subject [is no longer] subsumed under a denotative class [...]. For the self-specification of the subject *justifies* the predication of the general term.")³⁵

The problem with the particular judgement is that the relation between subject and predicate, despite being now fully objective, is still burdened with indeterminacy and implicitness. The task of the universal judgement is to present this relation in such a way that the quantitative base (individuality) will appear as being fully determinate and 'visibly' united under a *subject-universal*.

10.4. *Allness*

The dialectic of the particular judgement has concluded (a) that the subject-space contains a qualitative universal and (b) that through this universal the individuals—the quantitative base—are united as a totality. The problem with the particular judgement lay in its *form*, which could not express the individual's totality and full determinacy. So the

³⁵ Burbidge (1981: 139).

judgement replacing the particular judgement should be evaluated in terms of how successfully it *expresses* those two elements. To this we must add the requirement specified at the beginning of this chapter, namely the expression of *self-reflective individuality*.

This task is affected by the judgement of reflection's being a judgement of *quantity*; for the emphasis is placed initially on the *quantitative* rather than on the qualitative dimension of subject-universality. True, the individuals are united through a qualitative determination; this unity, however, is expressed in such a way that its very existence is made dependent upon quantitative universality. Hegel makes this point by stressing that the universal judgement expresses the subject's universality by making latent (and excessive) use of the This-ness of individuality, *a procedure associated with a reflection that is 'external'*. Such universality whose expression depends so heavily upon the quantitative base of the subject-space is called *allness* (*Allheit*).³⁶

Hegel makes it clear that the universal judgement is problematic (a "spurious universality," according to Rinaldi),³⁷ which could *only* mean that it fails to express the three aforementioned elements: totality, full determinacy and self-reflection. He continuously describes "allness" as *external* universality and as "commonality" (*Gemeinschaftlichkeit*), and associates these two features with the fact that this judgement fails. He also links them with the excessive emphasis on the This-ness of individuality; and he says that "this universality is [...] only a putting-together (*Zusammenfassen*) of individuals *that exist for themselves*".³⁸ He then describes this "putting-together" as "comparison" (*Vergleichung*). This vocabulary suggests that "allness" is a universality achieved by means of externality, which means that it is a putting-together of immediate individuals, which can in turn be understood as a procedure of *comparing* such immediate individuals.³⁹

The universal judgement says that *all x are F*. What is it in this formulation that when combined with the excessive emphasis on immediate individuality fails to account for the presence of a totality of individuals

³⁶ WL II 330.

³⁷ Rinaldi (1992: 236).

³⁸ WL II 331 (my emphasis).

³⁹ WL II 330–331: "Die Allgemeinheit, wie sie am Subjekte des universellen Urteils ist, ist die äußere Reflexionsallgemeinheit, *Allheit*; *alle* sind alle *Einzelnen*; das Einzelne ist unverändert darin. Diese Allgemeinheit ist daher nur ein *Zusammenfassen* der für sich bestehenden Einzelnen; sie ist eine *Gemeinschaftlichkeit*, welche ihnen nur in der *Vergleichung* zukommt."

that are *x*? After all, it does say that *all x* are *F*. The problem has to do with the phrase “excessive emphasis on immediate individuality;” for, since the subject-space is the kingdom of *quantity*, that phrase refers to the posited *priority* of the individuals as quantitative units, as *quanta*: they are presupposed, found there, in their immediacy, *before* the gathering. The universality which the ‘all’ refers to is an element that *emerges from* such quanta. In more concrete terms, one might say that, precisely because ‘allness’ is a universality that depends upon the prior presence of immediate individuals, the expression ‘all *x* are *F*’ arises from a collection of judgements which make specific reference to the This-ness of individuals. This can be shown by reducing the universal judgement to the following schema: ‘This₁ *x* is *F*’ and ‘This₂ *x* is *F*’ and . . . ‘This₁₀ *x* is *F*’.

The dependence upon this schema discloses the universal judgement’s empirical, inductive character.⁴⁰ And here lies the ground for its collapse: Its *intention* to express a totality (and, therefore, full determinacy) can *never* be satisfied by a universality that is empirically established.⁴¹ In addition, ‘empirical universality’ can be associated *only* with the “external reflection” of individuality, which prevents the actualization of the latter’s *self-reflection*.⁴²

The universal judgement’s failure lies in the problematic relation between the This—which is given priority in the subject-space—and the external reflection that attempts to turn it into the universal. For the This, as the *immediate* (or “what is pre-posed”), does not ‘pass over’ into the predicate by itself. It requires a Third to mediate this ‘passing over’ for it; this Third will do the pointing and the comparing of the units. Yet, exactly because the This *is* the immediate, it is, as Hegel puts it, “indifferent” to external reflection.

This ‘indifference’ can be explicated in three, somewhat distinct, ways. *Firstly*, the This or the quantum has the fundamental character of belonging to an infinite continuum; thus, the comparison of the units by a Third

⁴⁰ WL II 332: “Dies zeigt sich [...] an der Allheit, welche überhaupt die *empirische* Allgemeinheit ist.” This is why Hegel calls it “das universelle Urteil” and not ‘das allgemeine Urteil’.

⁴¹ Cf. Burbidge (1981: 138; my emphasis): “[...] A number actually pointed out, no matter how many, never includes all that is *intended* by the class terms;” “There remains a discrepancy between what is *intended* in the universal judgement and what is actually expressed by it. What is expressed is the specific reference to the indicated individuals. What is *intended* or presupposed is a complete universal, the exhaustive enumeration of all members of the class.”

⁴² WL 332.

can never explicate a totality—there will always be a This beyond the limits of the ‘totality’. In other words, the This, precisely because it is a This, always gives rise to another This. So the gathering of the Thises by external reflection produces what Hegel calls “bad infinity,” to wit, infinite progress toward a telos that is never actualized. The telos is the totality of individuals and the existence of an infinite progress of immediate individuals throws the universal judgement back into the darkness of the particular judgement; for, at any given moment, what one could positively say is only that ‘some x are F’. As Hegel puts it, allness turns out to be only *manyness* (*Vielheit*):

We have already discussed bad infinity and its collapse; the universality of the concept is the *fulfilled beyond* (*das erreichte Jenseits*); that infinity, in contrast, remains connected to the beyond as something that cannot be reached, since it never stops being the mere *progress* to the infinite. When universality is put forth only as an *allness*, a universality that should be exhausted in the individual *qua* individual, so this is nothing but a return to that bad infinity; or, simply, it is only *manyness* which is taken for allness. Manyness, however, as great as it is, remains, at the end of the day, only partiality (*Partikularität*) and is not allness.⁴³

(Note here, importantly, that the universality of being-as-concept, namely, the universality which the dialectic aspires to establish, is described as a “fulfilled” or “achieved” state of affairs.⁴⁴ Thus, the onto-logical project, *pace* many Hegel scholars—among them Pippin and Burbidge—seeks to establish (or express: *ausdrücken* or present: *darstellen*)⁴⁵ a *completed* corpus of knowledge.⁴⁶ Besides any direct claims that verify this, it follows

⁴³ WL II 331.

⁴⁴ Cf. WL II 332: “Es schwebt aber dabei die an und für sich seiende Allgemeinheit des *Begriffs* dunkel vor; er ist es, der gewaltsam über die beharrliche Einzelheit, woran sich die Vorstellung hält, und über das Äußerliche ihrer Reflexion hinaustreibt und die Allheit *als Totalität* [...] unterschiebt.” This is also made clear in Hegel’s brief comment on mathematical *analysis* (WL II 331), where he identifies *Allgemeinheit* with *die erschöpfte Unendlichkeit*.

⁴⁵ In this study there has been given affluent evidence of Hegel’s interest in the problem of the expression or presentation of the concept’s universality. With respect to the present stage of the argument see WL II 331 where Hegel clearly associates the dialectic with the problem of the *Darstellung* of *Allgemeinheit* in the area of mathematical *analysis*.

⁴⁶ As I have tried to show in numerous places in the present study, and as I will clearly state in the overall conclusion, the explication of speculative universality involves the explication of a completed system of logical categories; it is not exhausted in the specification of a *method*, *pattern* or *rule* that repeats itself endlessly in a scientific framework. Unfortunately, many Hegelians seem to have this mistaken idea—and Hegel himself sometimes encourages this misunderstanding, going against his own immanent analysis of the concept of ‘universality’. See e.g. WL II 331 and WL II 548–573. In my opinion, the

necessarily and logically from Hegel's vehement *denial* of the priority of the empirical and the subjective—which includes the so-called 'history'—in the subject-space.)

Secondly, the This is 'indifferent' to external reflection in the sense that the Theses that are put together are not 'transformed' into genuinely self-reflected individuality. Indeed, the very fact that each exists prior to its relation to the other Theses excludes the possibility of an intrinsic, immanent relation. So, really, nothing guarantees that the members of an externally constructed class are—in themselves—identical to one another, namely that one's relation to the other entails one's reflection into *oneself*.

Thirdly, this relation of 'indifference' can be understood in terms of the arbitrariness of the Third's decision to label its gathering 'allness' or 'universality'. For, just because a number of individuals have been collected, it does not mean that there are no other individuals that could be added to this collection.⁴⁷ The Third has no power over the immediacy of the This (that is, in the case that the latter is posited as the prior element in the subject-space); a residue of individuality is always at play.

So, the universal judgement is deficient because the *priority* of the 'This' in the subject-space—"the individual as the This"⁴⁸—renders the established universality endless, non-immanent and subjective. "The empirical allness *remains* a task, an *ought*."⁴⁹ What it expresses is actually *manyness*—not allness. And manyness revives the particular judgement, because it makes implicit reference to a beyond—the 'some other'—which is unknown and possibly at odds with the 'universality' the currently collected individuals strive to exemplify. The judgement 'all x are F' perpetually collapses into 'some x are F' and, thus, perpetually gives rise to the judgement that 'some other x are not F'. The dialectic aims at showing

specification of a speculative method is not incompatible with the explication of a completed corpus of knowledge; in fact, this is exactly the virtue of speculative science (and speculative logical theory, in particular).

⁴⁷ Cf. Hegel's ironic remark in WL II: "Ein empirisch-allgemeiner Satz [...] beruht nun auf der stillschweigenden Übereinkunft, daß, wenn nur keine *Instanz* des Gegenteils angeführt werden könne, die *Mehrheit* von Fällen für *Allheit* gelten solle oder daß die *subjektive* Allheit, nämlich die der *zur Kenntnis gekommenen Fälle*, für eine *objektive* Allheit genommen werden dürfe."

⁴⁸ WL II 332.

⁴⁹ WL II 332. Hegel makes the same point in his discussion of mathematical *analysis* when he says that the attempt to establish a *Pantonomium* from a purely quantitative basis can result in the establishment only of a Polynomium and, therefore, "die Darstellung der unendlichen Menge muß sich mit dem *Sollen* derselben [...] begnügen" (WL II 331).

how one can escape from this 'subjective universality' (which is not, actually, universality)⁵⁰ and establish an 'objective universality', a universality, namely, which does manage to express that 'all x are F'.⁵¹

To begin with, since the totality and self-reflection of individuality cannot be gained through the quantitative determination of the Theses, it must be gained through their *qualitative* determination, namely, through the *common determination* that is at play in the subject-space. This, if you recall, denotes the 'universal nature' or 'genus' of the collected Theses. Hegel clearly envisions the solution to the problem in terms of a *reversal* of what is *prior* in the explication of subject-universality.⁵² While the analysis of the universal judgement in terms of *allness* started with the positing of a collection of immediate individuals ("the external reflection of individuality"), its present analysis starts with the positing of the 'genus'.⁵³ The following very important passage thematizes that transitional move:

'All men' expresses *firstly* the *genus* of man, [and] *secondly* this genus in its individualization (*Vereinzelung*), but it does so in such a way that the individuals are at the same time widened to [correspond to] the universality of the genus. Conversely, through this connection with individuality, universality is as fully determined as individuality; in this way the posited universality becomes equal to the presupposed universality.⁵⁴

Subject-universality arises first and foremost from the presence of the genus—not from the presence of a collection of immediate individuals. The genus is inherently connected to such a collection, but it does not *arise* from it; the collection cannot be given an independent status, an existence that is devoid of the element of the genus. Again, Hegel is clear in the above passage (and elsewhere) that through the presence of the genus the *quantitative* base of subject-universality is *exhausted* (it becomes a totality). The 'full determination' of this universality is *harmonious* with the exhaustion of *quantitative* universality. It is in this way that "the posited universality," namely quantitative universality, "becomes equal to

⁵⁰ Cf. Burbidge (1981: 138): "Something is taken as all when it is not in fact all."

⁵¹ WL II 332.

⁵² Compare his complaint that "als der *zunächstliegende Grund*, warum eine Bestimmung als eine allgemeine angesehen werden soll, wird angegeben, weil sie *mehreren zukomme*" (WL II 331; first emphasis is mine; second emphasis is Hegel's).

⁵³ WL II 332: "Näher nun das *universelle Urteil*, bei dem wir stehen, betrachtet, so hat das Subjekt, das, wie vorhin bemerkt worden, die anundfürsichseiende Allgemeinheit als *vorausgesetzte* enthält, dieselbe nun auch als *gesetzte* an ihm."

⁵⁴ WL II 332–333.

the presupposed universality,” namely the genus.⁵⁵ By giving priority to the genus and by affirming its power to exhaust the quantitative base of subject-universality, Hegel has found a way to avoid both the relapse to the particular judgement and the establishment of a universality that is external and subjective.

So, how exactly does this difference in terms of priority affect the *form-determination* of the subject-space, namely, the way the subject *appears* in the judgement-locus? An answer to this question can be given as soon as we clarify the relation between the This, on the one hand, and the genus, on the other. Indeed, the emphasis on the genus' priority over the immediate individuals has the result that the *addition* of an immediate individual in the collection of individuals present in the subject-space does not affect the expression of genuine universality by that collection. Yet, this *exactly* means that the universality of the genus is—paradoxically—located *wholly* in *each* of the collection's members. In other words, each immediate individual contains within itself the totality of the genus. Thus, the “common-determination,” which *now* dominates the subject-space, has been *fully* integrated in each and every immediate individual, in the very This itself. As Hegel puts it, individuality in the *subject-space* is in truth “the determination which is identical with universality or the absolutely determinate being of the universal.”⁵⁶ In this way, the *self-reflection* of individuality loses its ‘external’ or ‘empirical’ nature and becomes *immanent*.

This move is important because it disrupts the necessity of a direct link between the form-determination ‘all’ and subject-universality. For the ‘all’ was needed just because it had been *assumed* that it was only through it that the quantitative base could be expressed. Since it has now been made clear that subject-universality is located wholly in *each* of the immediate individuals that constitute a collection, the ‘all’ should be removed (given its problematic function to *prioritize* quantitative universality). Instead of ‘all’ a form-determination will be used which manages to refer to quantitative universality without prioritizing it. This will be the locution ‘the x’ (with the ‘x’ referring to the genus); or, as Hegel puts it, “instead of ‘all men’ we will now say ‘the man’.”⁵⁷ In this way the challenge raised by the particular judgement is finally met; or what had been shown to

⁵⁵ Cf. WL II 332.

⁵⁶ WL II 333.

⁵⁷ WL II 333.

be 'implicit' (*an sich*) in the subject-space—the self-reflection, totality, and full determinacy of individuality—has now been made fully 'explicit' (*für sich*).⁵⁸

10.5. Conclusion

The universal judgement has collapsed, since what was fundamental to it, namely the presence of *allness* or "subjective universality," has been replaced by the presence of the genus or "objective universality."⁵⁹ And alongside it the whole *judgement of reflection* has collapsed as well, for none of its fundamental characteristics has remained intact: (a) The purely quantitative character of the subject-space has vanished—the subject is in itself both quantitative and qualitative. (b) The predicate is no longer the essential, for the unification of individuality in the sphere of universality—its *reflection*—takes place *before* the movement of the subject to the predicate. (c) The predicate no longer subsumes the individual under it, because the latter is already subsumed under the universality of the subject (to wit, under *itself*).⁶⁰ All in all, as Hegel puts it, "the subject has now dislodged the form-determination of the judgement of reflection, which ran from the This through Someness to Allness."⁶¹

The judgement of reflection has emerged from (a) the positing of the tautology of individuality and (b) the suppression of the elements of reflection and totality (to which that tautology gives rise) in the context of immediacy. Reflection and totality have now been restored, but *not* through the *movement* of the subject to the predicate. The individual posited in the subject-space reflects into itself and is a totality of individuals

⁵⁸ WL II 333; cf. Salomon (1982: 53).

⁵⁹ WL II 333: "Das Resultat ist somit in Wahrheit die *objektive Allgemeinheit*."

⁶⁰ WL II 334. So, the individual is now both what is subsumed and what subsumes. Cf. Salomon (1982: 55): "Weil diese Beziehung eine Selbstbeziehung ist, sind die Subsumierten nichts anderes als das Subsumierende;" "Insofern all dies bereits im Subjekt ausgedrückt ist, ist die für das Subsumtionsverhältnis konstitutive quantitative Differenz zwischen Subjekt und Prädikat aufgehoben;" "Die Subsumtion wird dadurch aufgehoben, daß sie gleichsam 'allseitig' wird und so ihre Richtung verliert, daß das Subsumierte subsumierend und das Subsumierende subsumiert wird." See also JL 84: "Die Allgemeinheit des Subjekts hebt das Subsumieren des Prädikats auf; daß dieses sei, muß jene eingeschränkt werden und an sich dies Subsumiertwerden ausdrücken."

⁶¹ WL II 333. Cf. Burbidge (1981: 139): "In the whole discussion of the judgement of reflection it is the subject that has been progressively modified in its definition. Originally one individual it has become an exhaustively specified set of individuals."

before it moves to the predicate-space.⁶² Since it is united with universality in the subject-space, it has, *in that space*, both a negative and a positive relation to itself. It is both “negativity” and “identical self-relation;”⁶³ it has in itself both its otherness and its identity.

The subject is, of course, still united with the predicate in the judgement-locus. Their relation, however, is now one of “equality;” for they both, *in their own spaces*, denote the unity of individuality and universality in the sphere of particularity.⁶⁴ By unifying its manifold of individuality under a comprehensive genus, the subject has explicitly become *exactly* what the predicate is. As Hegel puts it, “they have [now] gone together into the copula,”⁶⁵ meaning that they are no longer external to or independent from one another. Moreover, as proven in the dialectic of the particular judgement, the universality that binds the individuality of the subject has been ‘channelled’ into that space *from the predicate-space*. Therefore, it is not only that subject and predicate have similar ‘formal structures’; it is also that the totality of determinations that constitutes subject-universality *is* the totality of determinations that constitutes predicate-universality.

Yet, this identity does not cause the vanishing of the judgement; for while the extremes depict the same conceptual structure and contain the same totality of determinations, they are different *functions*. The predicate denotes the *universal sphere* that exhibits its determinacy in a rotating fashion; the subject denotes a *static, individualized locus of gathering*. The genus neither exhibits nor has shown the potential to exhibit a structure of rotation *in the subject-space*. Hegel captures this peculiarity of the genus by saying that it “contains all individualized determinacy [but as] dissolved in its [i.e. the genus’] substantial purity.”⁶⁶ But he also describes

⁶² Cf. Salomon (1982: 56): “Im universellen Urteil ergibt sich also als Resultat der Bewegung des Reflexionsurteils eine Allgemeinheit, die als Einheit von Allgemeinheit und Einzelheit so aufgefaßt werden kann, daß die vollkommene Bestimmtheit, die mit der Einzelheit gedacht ist, die Allgemeinheit ist und umgekehrt.”

⁶³ WL II 333; cf. JL 84.

⁶⁴ WL II 334.

⁶⁵ WL II 334.

⁶⁶ WL II 333: “[...] Sie [d.h. die Gattung] enthält alle vereinzelt Bestimmtheit in ihrer substantiellen Gediegenheit aufgelöst.” The word “Gediegenheit” could be also translated as ‘solidity’ or even ‘spontaneity’. With the word “purity” I wanted to capture the fact that the genus does not exhibit a structure of rotation in the subject-space. But, of course, since it is not empty but rather absolutely ‘concrete’, ‘solidity’ would also be an appropriate translation; and as we will see in the remaining chapters its relation to the predicate is one of ‘spontaneity’, so this translation would fit in as well.

it as “the concrete,”⁶⁷ clearly because its emergence in the subject-space has ‘channelled’ the whole spectrum of determinacy *in* the subject; or, if you prefer, the subject has now become the full-blooded thing (which means that the genus *is* the full-blooded thing).⁶⁸ All in all, while subject and predicate have now proven to have exactly the same content, the one is explicitly posited as a pure concentration of a totality of determinations, while the other as that same totality’s structure of rotation that awaits for its mobilization.

The enormous significance of the collapse of the judgement of reflection is that it proves that the difference of subject and predicate emerges *objectively*, from their very *identity*. They are manifestations of one and the same *universal nature* that expresses itself by means of the judgement. So, their relation is no longer the subjective one between the individual and something that, in one way or another, does not fully belong to it: an abstraction, an individual property, a subsuming class. Given this ‘objectivation’ (for need of a better word), the relation between the extremes can be taken to denote a single element: the genus, the universal sphere, the full-blooded thing. In other words, there is no reflective *movement* from the genus to the universal sphere; rather, the former expresses itself *as* the latter. Yet, the different functions *do* occupy distinct spaces; the challenge is to find a way to express—in terms of the judgement-*form*—their interaction without undermining the fact that each of them is already the whole concept and the one and the same totality of determinations. The new judgement, *the judgement of necessity*, will seek to thematize and express this very first appearance of the objective unity of the judgement in terms of a proper judgement-*form*.

Regarding our attempt to resolve the Pyrrhonian problematic, the dialectic of the judgement of reflection has, firstly, provided the proof that the positing of the subject in the universe of rational discourse entails the parallel positing of a genus therein. In other words, the appearance of the subject gives rise to a totality of determinations, whose presence constitutes what the subject is in truth. And, secondly, the predicate has been shown to be exactly *that* totality of determinations. Subject and predicate are therefore ‘equalized’. These two monumental discoveries completely

⁶⁷ WL II 333.

⁶⁸ Cf. Salomon (1982: 56): “Insofern das Allgemeine im Subjekt des universellen Reflexionsurteils als Einheit von Allgemeinheit und Einzelnem, gleichsam als das Allgemeine, das das Einzelne ist und das Einzelne, das das Allgemeine ist, ausgewiesen wurde, ist es konkret allgemein.”

transform the basis of the Pyrrhonian problematic; for we now *know* that, when a judgement is posited in the universe of rational discourse, its immediate existence is *necessarily* ‘accompanied’ by a specific totality of determinations and that its further development will express only that totality of determinations (for that is the content of the predicate-space).

Finally, the whole sphere of the judgement of reflection ‘mirrors’ the fundamental structure of that kind of judgement which is at play in the logic of quantitative being and the logic of being-as-essence, with the exception of the latter’s three final stages (substantiality, causality, reciprocity), which will be ‘mirrored’ in the dialectic of the judgement of necessity. The ‘mirroring’ of the quantitative categories occurred in the development of the form and content of the subject; the ‘mirroring’ of the essentialist categories took place in the thematization of the self-reflection of individuality. Indeed, what is fundamental regarding these latter categories is their immediate relationality, namely, the fact that each comes into existence as being related to its other (or opposite): essence-seeming, thing-property, ground-being-grounded. While, however, this relation is *intended* as *self-relation*, it is *at the same time* intended also as a relation of non-immanent causality and dominance, i.e. as a non-immanent causal relation between an essential element and an inessential one. The resolution of this contradiction is what determines the movement in the logic of being-as-essence: the inessential strives to “measure itself against and correspond with” the essential—in the same way that the subject strives to “measure itself against and correspond with” the predicate. This is finally resolved in the final stages of the logic of being-as-essence, where those elements are fully integrated in the dynamic, self-determining movement of being-as-concept. In judgemental terms, the essential and the inessential “have gone together into the copula.”⁶⁹

⁶⁹ Cf. WL II 326–328; Enz. §124; WL II 132; WL II 24–25; Theunissen (1980: 451).

CHAPTER ELEVEN

THE JUDGEMENT OF NECESSITY

11.1. *Introduction*

The dialectic of the judgement of reflection resulted in the establishment of *objective universality* in the judgement-locus.¹ This notion has several connotations. It means that subject and predicate are the *same* totality of determinations;² that the subject does not *become* determinate and universal by ‘moving’ to the predicate, but rather it has its determinacy and universality *in itself*;³ and that subject and predicate are not connected externally or contingently or *a posteriori*, but rather immanently or necessarily or *a priori*.

Objective universality, so characterized, comprises the *content* or *meaning* of the claim that the individual is in itself the genus. In terms of the fundamental concept-determinations this claim has the familiar *form*: *the individual is the universal*. Precisely because its content is the objective universal, it no longer has the meaning of an immediate individual’s relating to an abstract universal or to an individual property or to a subsuming class. Rather, it now means that the posited individual (the subject) *determines* itself *in its own self* (or *space*): it has its *other* in itself and *maintains* itself by *negating* this other.⁴ Simply, the judgement *the individual is the universal* means that the individual is immanently both reflective (or *identical* with its other) and negative (or *distinct* from its other). As Salomon has it, “with objective universality a position has been reached, where the

¹ WL II 335: “Die Bestimmung, zu der sich die Allgemeinheit fortgebildet hat, ist, wie sich ergeben, die *anundfürsichseiende* oder *objektive Allgemeinheit* [...]”

² Cf. Burbidge (1981: 141): “[...] The x indicated in the subject ϕx has the same range as the x indicated in the predicate $x \in C$.”

³ Cf. Salomon (1982: 59; my emphasis): “Erst mit dem universellen Urteil wurde der Ausgleich zwischen Subjekt und Prädikat [...] bewirkt, und zwar dadurch, daß im Subjekt das positive Selbstverhältnis des Einzelnen in seinem Verhältnis zu seinem Anderen gesetzt wurde. Damit war das Einzelne selbst als das Allgemeine ausgewiesen.” See also Burbidge (1981: 140): “The relation signified by such a judgement is one in which the self-specifying subject, which contains the criteria for its own operation, determines what is to be coupled with the predicated genus [...]”

⁴ WL II 335: “[...] der Unterschied [ist] ihr immanent [...]”

individual, as what differentiates itself from itself, has in its relation with an other a positive self-relation.”⁵ (Thus, what appeared problematic at the *beginning* of the judgement of *reflection* has now been proven.)

Given that the subject becomes determinate *in its own self*, the predicate (the rotating universal sphere), with which it is *necessarily* connected, has now explicitly acquired the significance of the *expression* of the subject’s immanent determinacy. It is the space in which the subject expresses its own internal determinacy. Hence we no longer need to prove the objectivity of the judgement in the sphere of reason; for the connection it now exemplifies is not one between elements which could be external to one another. The reader should take a note of this—the *proof of the judgement’s objectivity has now been completed*. This is why Hegel says that our entering the judgement of necessity is equivalent to our entering *the judgement’s truth*.⁶

Yet, this is *not* to say that *the dialectic of the judgement* has been completed. Indeed, once the judgement’s *content* has proven to have an objective character, the discrepancy between it and the immediate judgement-form (“the individual is the universal”) becomes apparent (as we will see shortly). This form does not do justice to—does not ‘make visible’—the judgement’s meaning (or content). Accordingly, the dialectic of the judgement will be completed only after the ‘reconciliation’ between judgement-form and judgement-content has taken place. In this way, the aim of the two final spheres of the dialectic of the judgement (‘necessity’ and ‘concept’) is firmly established: *it is the struggle of ‘thought’ (or reason) to explicate a judgement-form that would suit the disclosed judgement-content*.

11.2. *Categoricity*

The dialectic of the new judgement, *the judgement of necessity* (or, if you will, the judgement of *objectivity* or the judgement of *immanence*), commences with *the categorical judgement*. This judgement posits the exact conclusion of the dialectic of the judgement of reflection, but it does so in a context of *immediacy*.⁷ What appears immediately is the judgement

⁵ Salomon (1982: 59).

⁶ Enz. §177, Zusatz.

⁷ WL II 335: “Es [d.h. das kategorische Urteil] ist [...] selbst das erste oder *unmittelbare* Urteil der Notwendigkeit [...]” Enz. I §177, Zusatz: “Das kategorische Urteil [...] ist das *unmittelbare* Urteil der Notwendigkeit [...]”

the individual is the universal; yet, as we know, what is *intended* is that the individual is in itself the genus or the objective universal.⁸

Thus, the categorical judgement intends to express all those connotations involved in the claim that the individual is in itself the genus—and it aspires to achieve this through its peculiar form, the immediate judgement “the individual is the universal.” If you recall, the claim in question has the twofold significance (a) that the individual is in itself the totality of determinations (or individuals) and (b) that the individual distinguishes—in *itself*—itself from each and every determination (or individual). The categorical judgement attempts to capture these two elements by having its extremes be specified as the immanent totality of determinations or the *genus*, on the one side (predicate),⁹ and as the individual that distinguishes—in *itself*—itself from each and every other determination (or individual), on the other side (subject).¹⁰ The copula, which—as you recall—is now the only remaining self-subsistent element in the judgement-locus, is *intended* as the *symbol* of their immanent relation, the space “into which they have gone together.” In other words, the categorical judgement explicitly conceives of the copula as *not* being a connection between externalities (namely, as not being a ‘connection’ at all).¹¹

Nevertheless, the *form* the categorical judgement has in the context of *immediacy* destroys its *intentions*. This can be shown in two ways. *First*, the categorical judgement is ‘visibly’ *indistinguishable* from the positive

⁸ Cf. Salomon (1982: 59): “Das kategorische Urteil behauptet die Beziehung des Einzelnen auf das Allgemeine so, daß das Einzelne als objektiv Allgemeines zu denken sei.” It may be of note here that the categorical judgement intends to express the truth of what was only the *subject* in the universal judgement. Thus, the *predicate* of the judgement in general has in this instance vanished. But, of course, it immediately re-emerges when the attempt of expressing the subject is actualized. This verifies one of my main claims in the present study, namely that there can be no expression of the truth of anything without the use of the judgement.

⁹ WL II 335: “Das kategorische Urteil hat nun eine solche Allgemeinheit zum Prädikate, an dem das Subjekt seine *immanente* Natur hat.”

¹⁰ WL II 335: “Im Urteil ist nun diese objektive Allgemeinheit *gesetzt*, somit *erstlich* mit dieser ihrer wesentlichen Bestimmtheit als ihr immanent, *zweitens* als von ihr als *Besonderheit* verschieden, von der jene Allgemeinheit die *substantielle Grundlage* ausmacht. Sie ist auf diese Weise als *Gattung* und *Art* bestimmt.”

¹¹ I must here note that my understanding of the categorical judgement is different from many commentators. Whereas they conceive of it as the asserted relation between species (subject) and genus (predicate), I conceive of it simply as the relation between the individual that contains the totality of determinations and that totality itself. The notion of the ‘species’ is not philosophically important in my account. Thus I agree with Rinaldi (1992: 237) who describes the categorical judgement without employing the notion of the ‘species’ and refers to the predicate as “the substantial principle of [the subject’s] being what it is, that by which the *whole* of its ontological constitution is actually determined.”

judgement, which thematized the individual, not as a genus, but as an *immediate* individual that is *externally* or *contingently* connected to the universal. Thus, the categorical judgement gives the impression that, despite its own intentions, it exemplifies “the determinacy of the subject [...] as belonging to the immediacy of external existence.”¹² So, this judgement fails to *express* the judgement’s objective universality—the nature of the latter as the immanent principle of the self-relation and self-differentiation of the subject remains completely hidden.¹³ The categorical judgement has in this way the *semblance* of a locus of *contingency* and *externality*.¹⁴

Second, since the categorical judgement has to appear in a context of immediacy, one of its constituents must be explicitly posited as self-subsistent; and, in the present stage, this cannot be but the copula. The unqualifiedly self-subsistent copula has, as explained, the meaning of *simple identity*. Consequently, the form of the categorical judgement affirms *only* the *indistinguishability* or “substantial identity” of individuality and universality.¹⁵ In this way, what belongs fundamentally to the judgement of necessity, namely the immanent *negativity* of individuality (the *difference* between subject and predicate), becomes something “inessential.” Hegel writes:

¹² WL II 335.

¹³ WL II 335–336: “Die objektive Allgemeinheit [...] ist [...] nicht gerade die *nächste*, d.h. deren Bestimmtheit nicht gerade das Prinzip der spezifischen Besonderheit des Subjekts ist.”

¹⁴ Rinaldi is one of the very few commentators who have realized that the problem with the categorical judgement is the indistinguishability of its form from the form of the positive or “mere affirmative” judgement; see Rinaldi (1992: 237): “Yet this plainly concerns only the *content* of the Categorical Judgement [...] and not its *form*. For this latter, as such, does not differ in anything from that of a mere affirmative judgement, thus sharing the latter’s essential contradictoriness and accidentality.” Schick (2002: 216–217), on the other hand, fails to see this. Cf. Burbidge (1981: 141): “Dialectic shows that the form of this judgement is ambiguous and does not adequately express the nature of the relationship. The contingent judgement ‘The rose is red’ has the same form as the necessary judgement ‘The rose is a plant’. This common structure fails to indicate the difference in the act of judging. In the former the term ‘rose’ refers to an individual in which a quality inheres. In the latter it signifies a species that is particularized in individuals. The necessary relation that couples this particularizing species to the predicated genus is only implicit, however, because the form is ambiguous.”

¹⁵ Cf. Salomon (1982: 60): “Es wird mit dem kategorischen Urteil denn auch zunächst nicht mehr als die substantielle Identität des Subjekts und Prädikats behauptet, d.h. es wird die Kopula ausgelegt, in der die Formbestimmtheit aufgehoben ist.” And, as Salomon (1982: 61) correctly points out, in this case the judgement as such is destroyed.

What [...] appears as *necessary* in the categorical judgement is the *substantial identity* of subject and predicate, against which that element that distinguishes the one from the other appears only as an inessential positing—or, if you prefer, it is only a name [...].¹⁶

Yet, the all important difference between the categorical judgement and the positive judgement, and what characterizes the former fundamentally, is exactly that it is a judgement of *necessity*—it has in itself the content of objective universality. Thus, it will be *transformed* in such a way so as to give rise to a judgement that fulfils its very own intentions.¹⁷ This means that the categorical judgement will give rise to a judgement-form that will be, on the one hand, ‘visibly’ different from the form that applies to the positive judgement and, on the other hand, expressive not only of the immanent reflection (or identity), but also of the immanent negativity (or difference) of the posited individuality.¹⁸

The *content* of the categorical judgement asks for a *form* that will relate individual A to individual B in such a way that A will be ‘visibly’ and ‘unambiguously’ differentiated from B, but at the same time B will be ‘visibly shown’ to be the immanent expression (or reflection) of A (so that an identity of individuals is established). The ‘unambiguous’ differentiation of A from B seems to require the copula’s removal as their connector; for if the copula remains, the judgement-form would, on the one hand, still resemble the form of the positive judgement and, on the other hand, make no progress beyond the context of immediacy (i.e. beyond the immediate judgement-form).

The required form emerges from the fact that (a) the content has already proven to be *objective* and (b) it *affirms* that B is the expression—a *further* specification, the *immanent* reflection—of A. B (that is, the ‘other’) is, if you recall, not simply ‘connected’ to A; rather, A specifies *itself*, in its own self, as B. This has already been proven with respect to the content. But if B is to be the expression of A, then when A is posited, B must be immediately

¹⁶ WL II 335. My explanation of the problematic nature of the categorical judgement differs from Schick’s (2002: 216–217).

¹⁷ Salomon (1982: 61) seems to agree that the way out of the ‘indifference’ between immanent identity and immanent negativity is the “Überlegung” that the judgement of necessity requires their inherent, non-indifferent unity. Cf. Burbidge (1981: 141): “Speculative reason recognizes that the form of the judgement is to indicate the necessary relation implicit in the content.”

¹⁸ Cf. Burbidge (1981: 141): “In that relation [i.e. in the necessary relation implicit in the content] the two terms, subject and predicate, are not simply conjoined to each other, but are explicitly opposed as particular [i.e. individual] to universal.”

posited as well.¹⁹ So, the immediate individual designates the being of another individual, which in its very otherness *reflects* that first individual itself.²⁰ This immediate reference of an individual to another individual which is its very own expression is exemplified by the *hypothetical* form of the judgement: *if A, then B*. This means that the positing of A brings forth the positing of B. A does not pass over into B; rather, it specifies itself as B. In this way the hypothetical judgement simply ‘mirrors’ what the—already proven—content affirms. And, as Rinaldi puts it, “the *form* of the *necessary connection* [...] is [now] explicitly stated in the hypothetical judgement [...], for in this the positing of the subject [or ‘protasis’] is *necessarily* determined by that of the predicate [or ‘apodosis’].”²¹

On the whole, the categorical judgement is fundamentally ‘schizophrenic’. While its content is objective universality, the perfect unity of immanent identity and immanent negativity, its form generates contingency, externality and simple identity in the judgement-locus. “The determinacy of the subject,” the individual’s negative relation to its inherent other, “is initially still a *contingent* one.”²² Therefore,

subject and predicate are not shown through the *form* or *determinacy* to be connected in terms of necessity; the latter, then, still remains *inner* necessity.²³

So, the form must *bring out* (or *make explicit*) a determinacy—a negativity—that is *inherently* (or ‘immanently’) necessary. As explained, it is proposed that this can be achieved by ‘visibly showing’ that the immediate individual entails its own otherness: if A, then B. In this way, the particularity or determinate manifoldness of individuality is explicitly posited in the framework of necessity and, therefore, the ‘indifference’ between identity and negativity is ‘sublated’. Yet, the judgement’s form has now been radically transformed—it no longer has the ‘standard’ shape ‘subject-copula-predicate’, but rather the shape of a conditional: ‘if A, then B’. Hegel concludes:

¹⁹ Cf. Burbidge (1981: 141): “The subject specifies itself as that which would be comprehended in the predicate; it is the condition that grounds their being coupled in a single judgement.”

²⁰ Cf. Salomon (1982: 61): “Es ist so das Selbstverhältnis, das eines im Verhältnis zu seinem Anderen erreichen kann, ein gedoppeltes, sowohl das Verhältnis zu sich als demselben als auch das Verhältnis zu sich als dem Anderen.”

²¹ Rinaldi (1992: 237).

²² WL II 336.

²³ WL II 336.

The objective universal, since it *determines* itself, namely since it posits itself in the judgement, must be essentially posited in terms of an identical relation with the *determinacy* [...] that has been separated from it; in other words, this determinacy must not be essentially posited as sheer contingency. It is only through this *necessity* of its immediate being that the categorical judgement manages to correspond to objective universality; [but] in this way it passes over to the *hypothetical judgement*.²⁴

The hypothetical judgement, then, which emerges from the collapse of the categorical judgement, should thematize objective universality in terms of “its identical relation with the determinacy that has been separated from it.” This means that it should express the relation between individuality and universality as (a) the relation of the individual to *another* individual (i.e. the relation between particulars) and (b) the relation of the individual to itself. In this way, the hypothetical judgement aspires to express (a) the immanent negativity of individuality and (b) its positive self-relation. The form of the conditional is supposed to actualize that aspiration.

11.3. *Hypothesis*

The categorical judgement collapsed because its form expressed only the sheer positivity and identity of individuality. The hypothetical judgement improves upon the categorical one by having a form which expresses both the immanent identity and the immanent negativity of individuality. It expresses the negativity because the positing of the individual is ‘visibly shown’ to give rise to *another* individual. Hegel writes:

‘If A is, then B is’; or ‘the being of A is not its own being, but rather the being of an other, of B’.²⁵

Yet, it also expresses the identity of individuality, for B is ‘visibly shown’ to *emerge* from A. B, as we know, is not ‘attached’ to A; rather, the latter, being objectively universal, specifies *itself* as B. B is the expression *of* A.²⁶

²⁴ WL II 336–337. Cf. Salomon (1985: 61–62): “Daß eines auch als Besonderes oder Anderes objektiv Allgemeines ist, ist im kategorischen Urteil gerade nicht ausgedrückt, insofern dort die Bestimmtheit des Einzelnen nur ein ‘ein unwesentliches Gesetzsein’ und zufällig ist. Mit dem kategorischen Urteil wird nur der Sachverhalt ausgesprochen, daß eines sich als Einzelnes kontinuieriert, bzw. daß es ein Sich-Kontinuierendes ist. Daß es dies ebenso als Bestimmtes, Besonderes oder Anderes ist, kann mit dem kategorischen Urteil nicht gedacht werden.”

²⁵ WL II 337.

²⁶ Note here that Hume’s problem of ‘necessary connection’ does not arise in this instance, for the conditional simply expresses the *already known*—i.e. *proven*—content of

However, the structure of the hypothetical judgement is itself deficient. This can be shown in three steps:

(1) As argued, the hypothetical judgement betters the judgement in the sense that its form expresses both identity and negativity (or difference or otherness). But the element of negativity would require that each of the relata exhibits a character of immediacy or self-subsistence, or, as Hegel puts it, a character of “concrete being.” It is only through this “concrete being” that the distinction from an *other* takes place. The problem is that this concreteness cannot be absolutized, namely be taken to designate the absolute *indifference* of the one individual (or determination) to the other. For, in this case, the ‘immediate existences’ of the relata would lose their determinate content and thereby collapse into one another. But if this occurred, the relation would no longer be one of otherness. Thus, conceived as a connection between absolute immediacies, the hypothetical judgement would become “a sentence of the empty form,”²⁷ that is, a judgement that would fail to manifest the element of otherness (a pseudo-judgement). In this way, it would fail to actualize its intention, which is the expression of a relation of identity *and difference*.

(2) The above first step is important because it clarifies that the ‘immediate existences’, the ‘concrete beings’ present in the hypothetical judgement should not be absolutized. What prevents A and B from collapsing into one another is exactly the fact that B is a further immanent specification of A, namely that they are the relata of a *relation of necessity*. A and B are distinct from one another, but they are also identical because—as we know—the one emerges from the other. The point here is exactly that what prevents the collapse of A into B, and *vice versa*, is their *relation of necessity*. This is why Hegel says that “it is the relation between them that is the essential.”²⁸ So the hypothetical judgement intends to affirm (a) the immediate existences of two individuals and (b) their relation of necessity (i.e. that the one is a further immanent specification of the other).

the determinate universal in the sphere of reason. The movement is not from the conditional to the objective content, but from the latter to the former.

²⁷ WL II 337.

²⁸ WL II 337. Cf. Burbidge (1981: 142): “Understanding individuates what is specifically stated in this judgement: that the relation is necessary and not contingent. In this regard the terms related are inessential. What is explicitly expressed is not what they are in themselves but how they are coupled. Therefore the act of judging does not pay attention to the immediate character or content of the two clauses. Any content at all will do as long as the relation holds.”

(3) However, this intention of the hypothetical judgement fails to be realized because its *form* does not allow the coexistence of (a) the immediate existences of the individuals with (b) their relation of necessity. The problem is that the form of hypothesis can affirm only the *relation* between the individuals, their necessary connection. The immediacy or ‘concrete being’ of the relata is not equally affirmed in the expression of that connection. This is so because from the form ‘if A, then B’, one *cannot* deduce either *that A is* or *that B is*. Hegel writes:

The hypothetical judgement entails neither *that A is* nor *that B is*; it entails only that, *if* the one is, *then* the other is; only the connection of the extremes is posited as existent, not the extremes themselves.²⁹

Thus, the hypothetical judgement brings out (a) that the positing of an individual in the sphere of reason gives rise to *another* individual therein and (b) that the connection between the two is a *necessary* one (to wit, one of *identity*). Yet, its form fails to affirm the moment of self-subsistence or actuality that each of the relata enjoys. This has the consequence that negativity or otherness is suppressed once more. Of course, as Hegel notes, one might arbitrarily and from an external standpoint decide to assign a determinate character to the two sides of the judgement. But in this case the being of the relata becomes only *possible* and/or *contingent* and, therefore, the judgement loses its character of *actuality* and *necessity*.³⁰

This conclusion reflects the very form of the hypothetical judgement itself. The suppression of otherness and determinacy is ‘mirrored’ in the elimination of subject and predicate from the judgement-locus—or, if you prefer, in the elimination of the *opposition* of individuality and universality. The sides of the hypothetical judgement no longer exemplify the fundamental concept-determinations; they are “moments in general.”³¹ Consequently, the dialectic of the hypothetical judgement results in proving that this judgement has a form that, despite its own intentions, promotes the indeterminacy of the relata and, therefore, turns the judgement into a sheer *sentence*. Hegel writes:

The hypothetical judgement has, then, the shape (*Gestalt*) of a sentence; in the same way that the particular judgement had an indeterminate content, so the hypothetical judgement has an indeterminate form; this is so because

²⁹ WL II 337.

³⁰ Cf. Burbidge (1981: 144): “The hypothetical judgement is inadequate because it is possible that neither antecedent nor consequent be actual.”

³¹ WL II 338.

it does not express its content by means of the determination of subject and predicate.³²

We have to conclude, then, that the hypothetical judgement fails to actualize its own intentions and, therefore, collapses.

The hypothetical judgement *must* now give rise to a new judgement-form which should be able to express the immanent identity and the immanent negativity of individuality without sacrificing the moment of the latter's 'self-subsistent' or 'concrete' being. It has become clear that the 'shape' of hypothesis cannot possibly perform this task; hence there is a relapse into the 'standard' 'shape' of *subject-copula-predicate*. But this should not resemble the form of the categorical judgement.

The solution is found—as in the case of the categorical judgement—in the true *content* of the judgement of necessity that dwells in the hypothetical judgement. According to this content, the individual is in itself the genus, the totality of determinations. Instead of focusing on the individual as subject and trying to specify its relation to its other through a structure of hypothesis, let us this time focus on the predicate and try to specify *its* character as the immanently expressed totality of determinations. The subject-individual is explicitly identical to the predicate-universal—for it is connected to it through the copula; this time, however, it is also explicitly different, for the predicate 'visibly shows' a manifoldness of individuals. Furthermore, this difference (or negativity) is explicitly asserted *of* the individual, since it occupies the predicate-space; simply, the individual is 'visibly' *determined* as a totality of individuals (which is exactly what is demanded by the content of objective universality). Hegel writes:

However, what is posited is not the *simple* abstract particularity [as it was the case in the categorical judgement]; rather, the moments of particularity are posited as different through the *immediacy* that pertains to the *determinations*. Simultaneously, through their unity, which constitutes their relation, particularity has also the significance of being their totality.³³

This structure corresponds to *the disjunctive judgement*. This judgement escapes the deficiency of the categorical judgement because the predicate 'visibly shows' the *totality* of individuals that are contained in the subject-individual. And it escapes the deficiency of the hypothetical judgement

³² WL II 338.

³³ WL II 338.

because its *form* affirms the immediacy and actuality (the ‘concrete being’) of the *relata*.³⁴

11.4. *Disjunction*

In the domain of the categorical judgement the content of objective universality was burdened—through the form—with the semblance of external individuality.³⁵ In the domain of the hypothetical judgement this external individuality transforms itself into the ‘negative identity’ of the concept; that is to say, the individual is explicitly expressed as a relation to an *other*, which, however, is nothing but the individual’s *own* self, its own “immanent nature.”³⁶ Since the *form* of the hypothetical judgement suppresses the actuality of the individuals and, thereby, the *negativity* embedded in their very identity, it is left up to the disjunctive judgement to provide the form for the proper expression of the concept’s ‘negative identity’. As Hegel puts it, “the disjunctive judgement is [...] the objective universality which is at the same time posited in its unity with the form.”³⁷

As already noted, this “unity with the form” denotes the explicit positing of a unification of a *simplicity* and a *totality* through the *copula*. In line with the discoveries made hitherto by the speculative theory of judgement, the simplicity (or individuality) and the totality (or universality) found in the judgement-locus are exactly the same, namely the genus or the objective universal.³⁸ The *subject* accommodates the pure genus, the concentrated totality of determinations; the *predicate* accommodates the particularizing genus, the explicitly manifested totality of determinations.³⁹ The *form* of the disjunctive judgement expresses this state of

³⁴ Cf. Burbidge (1981: 144): “On the one hand this expression is not like the *hypothetical*, ignoring the actuality of its terms. On the other hand, it is not like the *categorical* because the subject specifies itself not in relation to an abstract genus, but in relation to the either/or of the predicate.” See also Burbidge (1981: 145): “The primary change from the categorical judgement is found in the predicate, because it refers not to a single concept, but rather to the relation among several.”

³⁵ WL II 339: “Im kategorischen Urteil ist der Begriff als objektive Allgemeinheit und eine äußerliche Einzelheit.”

³⁶ WL II 339: “Im hypothetischen tritt an dieser Äußerlichkeit der Begriff in seiner negativen Identität hervor [...]”

³⁷ WL II 339.

³⁸ Enz. I §177, Zusatz: “Die beiden Seiten des disjunktiven Urteils sind identisch; die Gattung ist die Totalität ihrer Arten, und die Totalität der Arten ist die Gattung.”

³⁹ WL II 339: “Es [d.h. das disjunktive Urteil] enthält also *erstens* [1] die konkrete Allgemeinheit oder die Gattung in *einfacher* Form als das Subjekt, *zweitens* [2] *dieselbe*, aber als Totalität ihrer unterschiedenen Bestimmungen. A ist entweder B oder C.”

affairs in the most 'literal' way possible: *A is either B or C*. A is the pure genus—B and C comprise the whole spectrum of A's determinacy, but in a particularized form.⁴⁰

The judgement-form "A is either B or C" becomes the object of our analysis. It expresses the necessity of the concept. The copula is the 'symbol' of this necessity, the locus into which the extremes "have gone together." What *immediately* follows from the copula's presence is the 'sameness' of the relata, the fact that they have "one and the same scope, content and universality."⁴¹ However, the objective universal requires that the form makes explicit also the *difference* of the extremes—this is so because immanent negativity is essential to the content. Therefore, "the extremes are differentiated in terms of the *form* of the concept-determinations."⁴²

In this way, the form of the disjunctive judgement becomes identical with its content. The identity-and-difference that fundamentally characterizes the latter is now 'visibly shown' in the former. Hegel describes this 'showing' by using a language that verifies the interpretation developed in the present study. Indeed, he refers to the subject as "the *simple* determinacy of the genus" and to the predicate as "that simple determinacy *developed in its difference*." This "developed determinacy" is a totality and a particularization—it is, namely, a universal sphere whose structure is fundamentally determined by a movement of *rotation* (*A is either B or C*).⁴³ The difference between the extremes 'becomes visible' because the predicate *explicitly appears* to be 'more universal' than the subject; however, Hegel never tires of reminding us that the particularization that fundamentally characterizes the predicate-space is nothing other than the content of the universal sphere *of the subject*.⁴⁴

This explication of the predicate's meaning in the sphere of the disjunctive judgement makes it clear that the 'either-or' that constitutes it is *inclusive*. Indeed, since the particularized determinations are the content *of the subject*, it must be the case that *their* relation denotes a united

⁴⁰ Cf. Burbidge (1981: 144): "In disjunctive judgement, the form articulates explicitly the relation between the self-specifying universal and its specified particulars [...]."

⁴¹ WL II 339: "Dies ist die *Notwendigkeit des Begriffs*, worin erstens die Dieselbigkeit beider Extreme einerlei Umfang, Inhalt und Allgemeinheit ist [...]."

⁴² WL II 339: "[...] Zweitens sind sie nach der Form der Begriffsbestimmungen unterschieden [...]."

⁴³ In the *Encyclopedia Logic* (Enz. I §177) Hegel refers to the predicate-space as "Kreis" and "Umkreis."

⁴⁴ WL II 339: "Die Besonderheit in ihrer Entwicklung macht *das Prädikat* aus, weil sie insofern das *Allgemeinere* ist, als sie die ganze allgemeine Sphäre des Subjekts, aber auch dieselbe in der Auseinandersetzung der Besonderung enthält."

totality of determinations—it must be a *positive* identity.⁴⁵ Simply, A (i.e. the subject) is *not only* B, *but also* C. B and C both belong to the identity of A. So, the ‘either-or’ that comprises the predicate should be regarded as having also the meaning of ‘not only-but also’.⁴⁶ This signifies exactly that “the objective universal maintains [and exhibits] itself fully in its particularity.”⁴⁷

Nonetheless, Hegel insists that the ‘either-or’ is not only inclusive, but also utterly *exclusive*. The particularized determinations (or “species”), he says, “exclude one another” and do this in an “oppositional” or “contradictory” manner.⁴⁸ So, his claim is not simply that the elements in the predicate-space relate negatively to each other, but rather that they relate to each other contradictorily. I take it that this explicit acknowledgment by Hegel that the domain of the predicate contains contradictions—and not just differences or ‘contraries’—provides an indisputable verification of the interpretation developed in the present study. Indeed, he continues by saying that the disjunctive judgement is the locus where “the so-called contrary *and* contradictory concepts” find their truth. This truth, which exemplifies “the essential difference of the concept,”⁴⁹ has the significance of each determination disclosed in the predicate-space being *both* contrary *and* contradictory.⁵⁰ “Each of these determinations, considered only for itself, is one-sided and without truth.”⁵¹

There are two important questions that naturally come to mind in this instance, only one of which—the second—can receive a proper response in our working framework. The *first* asks what Hegel means by ‘contradiction’ and/or ‘opposition’ and how exactly these notions differ from ‘contrariety’, ‘difference’ and ‘diversity’. Clearly, Hegel does give an answer to these questions—in the logic of being-as-essence—and, in fact, one which is compatible with the general character of what I have called and described as ‘the speculative theory of judgement’. However, to specify

⁴⁵ WL II 340.

⁴⁶ WL II 340.

⁴⁷ WL II 340.

⁴⁸ WL II 340.

⁴⁹ WL II 340: “Die sogenannten *konträren* und *kontradiktorischen* Begriffe sollten hier eigentlich erst ihre Stelle finden; denn im disjunktiven Urteile ist der wesentliche Begriffsunterschied gesetzt [...]”

⁵⁰ WL II 340–341: “[...] Sie haben darin [...] ihre Wahrheit, daß nämlich das konträre und kontradiktorische selbst ebensowohl konträr als kontradiktorisch ist.”

⁵¹ WL II 341.

this answer in a detailed and concrete fashion would require another book and another decade of intensive research. Suffice it to say, then, that what had been said about contradiction in the early essay *The Relation of Scepticism to Philosophy* still holds for speculative logical theory and, moreover, that it is *proven* in the latter. In other words, the theory proves:

- (a) that there are two kinds of contradiction, a 'problematic' and a 'non-problematic' one;
- (b) that the 'problematic' contradiction denotes a state of affairs where two determinations, a positive and a negative one, relate in such a way that (i) the presence of the one in a domain should exclude the presence of the other in that same domain and (ii) this exclusion fails to materialize; and
- (c) that the 'non-problematic' contradiction denotes a state of affairs where two determinations, which had been previously considered to be exclusive of one another, prove to be united in a 'higher' determination.

Thus, for the purposes of the present inquiry, we will understand the claim that each determination in the predicate-space is both contrary and contradictory in the following way:

- (a) Each determination is 'contrary' in the sense that it actively negates—namely, differentiates itself from—each and every determination in the predicate-space.
- (b) A certain determination is 'contradictory' in the sense that there *is* at least one other determination in the predicate-space whose presence is *exclusive* of the presence of that first determination (in this instance, of course, the coexistence of the two determinations would be regarded as 'problematic').
- (c) After the 'problematic' contradiction has dissolved into a 'higher' determination the presence of the two 'lower' determinations would still designate a contradiction, but now in the much different sense of a state of affairs that allows unproblematically their coexistence in the predicate-space.

The *second* question, to which a proper response *can* be given, inquires as to why the element of contradiction should be associated with the predicate-space of the disjunctive judgement in the first place. Indeed, the disjunctive judgement has arisen because one needed to make explicit

the difference involved in the determinacy of the subject-matter: Hegel clearly states that the determinations have to “exclude one another” *if* there is going to be any “determinate difference in the universal sphere” of the predicate.⁵² Yet, if ‘exclusion’ is required only because it produces determinacy, then, obviously, it does not have to have the character of contradiction; for determinacy is produced even if the determinations relate to each other only negatively, without, namely, the presence of the one being associated with the demand for the absolute vanishing of the other from the predicate-space. If this objection were correct, contrariety would suffice for determinacy and, therefore, contradiction would be a superfluous element in the predicate-space.

This is a legitimate objection, but a satisfactory response can be given to it. Simply, the element of contradiction is allowed a presence in the predicate-space, not because it enables determinacy, but because it has *already* been incorporated therein through the previous dialectic of the judgement. Indeed, if you recall, the dialectic of the judgement of reflection—in the move from the particular to the universal judgement—proved that the element of contradiction belongs fundamentally to the universal sphere of the predicate. And even before that, in the dialectic of the judgement of determinate being, it had been shown that a posited determination *immediately* generates *its own* direct negation (without the mediation of a process of reduction). Consequently, there should really be no puzzlement over the fact that the “determinate difference of the universal sphere” of the predicate is characterized in terms of *both* contrariety—or simple difference—and contradiction.

So, the ‘either-or’, which constitutes the predicate-space of the disjunctive judgement, has the meaning of both a positive identity and a relation of exclusion (understood in terms of both simple difference or contrariety and contradiction). The success of the disjunctive judgement rests upon whether its *form* is expressive not only of the positive identity of the particularized determinations (something that it achieves through the copula), but also of their relation of exclusion (their ‘negative relation’). Does the predicate’s *form* as ‘either-or’ express the relation of exclusion between the particularized determinations?

To begin with, consider the disjunctive judgement as *not* being able to express the ‘negative relation’ that holds between the elements of the

⁵² WL II 340.

predicate-space, that is, as explicating the predicate's meaning solely in terms of the 'not only-but also'. In this case, the objective universal expressed in the judgement-locus would give way to the 'quantitative' universal, the theme of the judgement of reflection. For a multiplicity which is explicating without reference to negativity or otherness denotes nothing but an aggregate of *diverse* elements, namely elements which relate to each other only *indifferently*. But an indifferent relation is a problematic relation in our working framework, for it produces *indeterminacy*—a feature that is utterly incompatible with objective universality.

The objection will surely be raised that the problem disappears as soon as we assign determinate contents to the elements of an aggregate and then incorporate the latter in the predicate-space of the disjunctive judgement. In this instance, the elements of the predicate-space would designate individuals that do relate to each other determinately, namely through negative relations. If this stance is taken, the disjunctive judgement can be clearly seen as expressing not only the 'positive', but also the 'negative identity' of the individuals.

Yet, as already explained, this act of assigning determinacy to an element via a Third (namely, *us*) is incompatible with the true nature of being-as-concept. This is so because the only universality it can produce is 'empirical universality', in the context of which the—externally determined—individuals must be conceived as having a priority over the universality that unites them—they must be, as Hegel puts it, "vorgefunden." But, as I have already explained in great detail, this state of affairs is productive of subjectivity, contingency, abstraction⁵³ and incompleteness,⁵⁴ features all of which are foreign to the true universality of the concept

⁵³ 'Empirical universality' is productive of abstraction because if the individuals are in truth self-subsistent and absolutely independent from one another, then their gathering into a universal has to be achieved through the external means of comparison and elimination of lower order determinacy; see WL II 340: "Wäre die Gattung eine abstrakte Allgemeinheit wie in den Urteilen des Daseins, so wären die Arten auch nur als *verschiedene* und gegeneinander gleichgültige zu nehmen; sie ist aber nicht jene äußere, nur durch *Vergleichung* und *Weglassung*, sondern ihre immanente und konkrete."

⁵⁴ 'Empirical universality' produces incompleteness because the subjectivity that characterizes it prevents us from regarding the manifoldness of the predicate-space as being conclusive; in other words, there would always be the possibility that a new determination might arise which has to be incorporated in that manifoldness. It is for this reason that the form of the disjunctive judgement would change if the latter were expressive of 'empirical universality'—it would no longer be 'A is either B or C or D', but rather 'A is either B or C or D etc.'. On this see WL II 340: "[...] A ist entweder B oder C oder D usf., weil die Arten B, C, D usf. sich *vorgefunden* haben, es kann eigentlich kein *Entweder-Oder* dadurch ausgesprochen werden, denn solche machen nur etwa eine subjektive Vollständigkeit aus [...]."

(‘objective or necessary universality’). Thus, if the predicate-space of the disjunctive judgement were expressive of ‘empirical universality’, the disjunctive judgement would become a “judgement without necessity.”⁵⁵

All in all, the ‘either-or’ has to be explicated in terms not only of the positive identity of the particularized determinations, but also of their ‘negative identity’. For, if this does not happen, the predicate-space would produce an indeterminate content. Yet, the ‘negative identity’ should not be explicated in terms of ‘empirical universality’, because this is productive of subjectivity, contingency, abstraction and incompleteness. But, as we already know, the only way for a determinate manifold to avoid this identification with ‘empirical universality’ is by reversing the *priority*-relation between individuality and universality. In other words, the individuals should not be taken to be “vorgefunden,” but they should rather be shown to *derive* from the principle of universality itself. This kind of universality, which exemplifies the derivation of a manifold of individual determinations from a simple principle (rather than *vice versa*), is *immanent* universality and corresponds to the universality of the concept (‘objective universality’). Accordingly, the *form* of the predicate-space of the disjunctive judgement must be expressive of immanent—and not ‘empirical’—universality. This means that the form of the disjunctive judgement must be able to bring out the negativity that characterizes the predicate-space *in an immanent way*.

Hegel never tires of emphasizing (a) that the predicate-space of the disjunctive judgement is a “*total sphere*,” (b) that this totality contains, not only a positive, but also a “*negative unity*,” and (c) that the explication of this negativity requires reference to the “simple principle of difference that is *immanently* present in the objective-universal.”⁵⁶ Totality, identity, negativity and *immanence* are the elements which the form of the disjunctive judgement must bring forth in order to do justice to the true content of the concept, namely, to objective universality.

So, the question which we now need to give a response to is whether or not the *form* of the disjunctive judgement expresses the identity and difference of being-as-concept in an *immanent* fashion. The answer must be negative; for while the *extremes* are indeed ‘visibly shown’ to be both identical and different, the copula maintains an essentially *static* character,

⁵⁵ WL II 340: “Ein empirisches disjunktives Urteil ist ohne Notwendigkeit [...]”

⁵⁶ WL II 340.

something that *allows* the predicate-space to be expressive of 'empirical universality'. The disjunctive judgement manifests the content of objective universality; it 'shows' that the individuality of being-as-concept (i.e. the subject-matter of reason) is in truth the totality of its determinations. Nevertheless, it is compatible with a 'putting together' or 'synthesis' of the determinate individuals that constitute the predicate-space—and *this* state of affairs immediately gives rise to "empirical universality."⁵⁷ Simply, there is nothing in the form of the disjunctive judgement which prevents its association with the expression of 'empirical universality'. That is to say, nothing in this form prevents us from regarding the determinations of the predicate-space as externally determined, "vorgefundene" individuals.

In order to exclude this association, the totality of the determinations of the predicate-space has to be shown to emerge immanently from the subject-space, from the posited individual or concentrated genus. The form of the disjunctive judgement fails to bring out this immanence. The 'judgement of the concept', which derives from this failure, is nothing but the disjunctive judgement with the added element of *immanence*. In simpler terms, the judgement of the concept denotes the very *process* whereby the concentrated genus, the subject-matter of reason *develops* itself in such a way so as to posit itself as a disjunctive judgement, as the affirmation of the identity of individuality and universality-as-the-manifested-totality-of-determinations.

Hegel says that the identity expressed by the disjunctive judgement has now acquired the following twofold significance: On the one hand, it is the simple identity, achieved through the 'static' copula, of (a) the 'pure genus', which is located in the subject-space, and (b) the particularized 'universal sphere', which is located in the predicate-space. On the other hand, it is the 'dynamic', 'active', 'developmental' identity associated with the 'negative unity of the concept', by virtue of which the copula appears to bring out

the *developed* connection of necessity, whereby the simple determinacy present in the subject *goes over* to the difference of the species [i.e. the par-

⁵⁷ Cf. Burbidge (1981: 15): "This double structure of the disjunctive 'or' defines the criteria for its valid use. On the one hand it implies an integrating identification of its terms, on the other a determining differentiation of one from the other. The pure form of the disjunctive judgement, however, can be applied to things that include one of these relations without the other—empirical species, for example, or abstracted synonymous concepts. Because the formal structure does not articulate its inherent criteria, it does not adequately represent the necessary combination of both moments."

ticularized determinations], where it becomes its own essential relation and its identity with its own self.⁵⁸

The dialectic of 'the judgement of the concept' will seek to bring a closure to the speculative theory of judgement by showing us how *the dynamic movement of the judgement* comes to express the identity-and-difference of the subject-matter with the totality of its own determinations.

11.5. Conclusion

The dialectic of the judgement of *determinate being* and the dialectic of the judgement of *reflection* comprised the two general stages of the proof of the judgement's *objectivity*. The first has shown that the predicate is in truth a rotating universal sphere; the second that the subject is exactly that same universal sphere in a concentrated form. So, when the subject is posited in the universe of rational discourse, it has *already* had its whole determinacy in itself; the predicate is simply the locus where that determinacy is expressed. Therefore, the sphere of *the judgement of necessity*, which emerges from the establishment of the judgement's objectivity, does not aim at *proving* this objectivity (for the possibility of an *external connection* between the judgement's 'extremes' is now logically excluded); rather, its aim is to make a case for the compatibility of the judgement's *form* with its truthful, already proven *content* (which we refer to by using the term 'objective universality').

Each of the three manifestations of the judgement of necessity fails to provide the form that would do justice to objective universality. First, the form of the categorical judgement is indistinguishable from the form of the positive or immediate judgement. On the one hand, this attaches to it a semblance of contingency, externality and subjectivity; on the other hand, it suppresses the difference between the extremes and establishes the illusion of simple identity. Second, the form of the hypothetical judgement, by excessively emphasizing the *relation* itself, annihilates the immediacy or self-subsistence or actuality of the *relata* with the result that it acquires an indeterminate, non-differential character. Third, the form of the disjunctive judgement, precisely because it assigns a static character to the copula, suppresses the immanence that fundamentally characterizes objective universality and thereby *allows* the expression of

⁵⁸ WL II 343 (my emphasis).

a universality in the predicate-space that is utterly at odds with objective universality—that universality is ‘empirical universality’.

The failure of the disjunctive judgement specifies the general character of the dialectic of the final kind of judgement, the judgement of the concept. This should make a case for the *process* whereby the immediate or positive or categorical judgement *comes* to have the form of the disjunctive judgement. In addition to this, it should clearly and unambiguously make a case for the presence of *oppositions* or *contradictions* in the corpus of this process. The different transfigurations of the judgement in the *whole* of this process will denote the form of the judgement in the universe of rational discourse, namely that form which does justice to objective universality, the true *content* of being-as-concept. So, the judgement of the concept will—*necessarily*—treat the form of the judgement in a dynamic, processual way. The true judgement-form is not, *pace* ‘traditional metaphysics’, the *immediate* positing of the totality of the determinations of the rational (i.e. the disjunctive judgement); rather, it is the manifold of shapes the judgement takes in the very process whereby it comes to make that positing. Hegel says that “if the disjunction of a genus into species has not yet reached this form [i.e. the *dynamic* form], this is a proof that such a disjunction has not raised itself to the determinacy of the concept and has not emerged from it.”⁵⁹

Finally, Hegel is clear that the three manifestations of the judgement of necessity ‘mirror’ the fundamental categorial structures of the last three stages of the logic of being-as-essence. The categorial judgement ‘mirrors’ the fundamental structure of *substantiality*; the hypothetical judgement the fundamental structure of *causality*; and the disjunctive judgement the fundamental structure of *reciprocity*.⁶⁰ The categorial judgement ‘mir-

⁵⁹ WL II 342–343.

⁶⁰ Enz. I §177, Zusatz: “Das kategorische Urteil [...] entspricht in der Sphäre des Wesens dem Substantialitätsverhältnis. [...] Hierin liegt der Fortgang vom kategorischen zum *hypothetischen* Urteil, welches durch die Formel ausgedrückt werden kann: Wenn A ist, so ist B. Wir haben hier denselben Fortgang wie früher vom Verhältnis der Substantialität zum Verhältnis der Kausalität.” WL II 338: “Das hypothetische Urteil kann durch die Reflexionsverhältnisse in näherer Bestimmtheit genommen werden als Verhältnis von *Grund* und *Folge*, *Bedingung* und *Bedingtem*, *Kausalität* usf. Wie im kategorischen Urteile die Substantialität, so ist im hypothetischen der Zusammenhang der Kausalität [...]” Admittedly, there is no similarly clear evidence that Hegel associates the disjunctive judgement with the sphere of reciprocity. However, this is obvious from the content of the disjunctive judgement and the fact that it would naturally complete the project of ‘matching’ the various stages of the dialectic of the judgement with the main parts of the logics of being and essence. Cf. Winfield (2006: 99; my emphasis): “[...] Hegel points out that substance, causality and reciprocity figure in the three forms of necessary judgement [...]”

rors' substantiality in the sense that (a) an existing, individual thing is posited in its connection with what is substantial to it, namely its genus, and (b) this substantial element has the status of an 'inner necessity' that determines that thing from a 'hidden' and 'unspecified' place. The hypothetical judgement 'mirrors' causality in the sense that (a) the posited individual appears to be the cause of another individual and (b) the intended self-subsistence or 'concrete being' of the individuals is 'swallowed' by the causal relation itself. Finally, the disjunctive judgement 'mirrors' reciprocity in the sense that it (a) explicates the interconnection of a totality of determinations and (b) fails to explicate the immanence (or, if you prefer, 'developmental necessity') that fundamentally characterizes this interconnection. Such immanence is thematized explicitly only in the logic of being-as-concept, whose fundamental structure is 'mirrored' by the judgement of the concept. Given, though, that the logic of being-as-concept provides the truth of the whole onto-logical project, there must be a sense in which the judgement of the concept 'mirrors' the fundamental structure of the whole onto-logical project.

CHAPTER TWELVE

THE JUDGEMENT OF THE CONCEPT

12.1. *Introduction*

The dialectic of the judgement of the concept (or of the judgement of being-as-concept) completes the present inquiry by offering us an account of that judgement-*form* which can express the true judgement-*content* in the domain of reason (objective universality).

The last chapter concluded that the judgement of necessity crumbled because, although the disjunctive judgement's content has proven to be the objective universal,¹ its form fails to explicate it. While this judgement does indeed manage to express the identity-and-difference between the extremes—since it 'visibly shows' the individualized universal ("the x" or the subject-matter) as relating to the totality of its own particularized determinations ("either F or G or H") through the copula—it does that in a slightly inappropriate way, with the result that it undermines the objectivity of the judgement. As explained, this inappropriateness is due to the failure of the form of the disjunctive judgement to express (a) the *negativity* and *contradiction* intrinsically characterizing the sphere of explicated determinacy (for the 'not' is absent from the form) and (b) the *immanence* and *necessity* pertaining to the subject-predicate relation.²

Thus, the collapse of the disjunctive judgement regulates what the new kind of judgement needs to accomplish if it is to succeed: It has to have a form capable of expressing—in addition to all other discovered features of conceptuality—the negativity and contradiction of the determinations of the subject-matter and the immanence and necessity of the subject-predicate relation (or, if you prefer, of the relation between the concentrated genus and the explicated totality of determinations). So,

¹ WL II 344: "[...] in dem Urteile der Notwendigkeit ist der Gegenstand [...] in seiner objektiven Allgemeinheit [...]."

² Cf. WL II 345 (my emphasis; Hegel's emphasis has been removed): "Der Mangel des Resultats kann bestimmter auch so ausgedrückt werden, daß im disjunktiven Urteile die objektive Allgemeinheit zwar in ihrer Besonderung *vollkommen* geworden ist, daß aber die negative Einheit der letzteren *nur* in jene zurückgeht und noch nicht zum Dritten, *zur Einzelheit*, sich bestimmt hat."

the forthcoming dialectic aims at making a case for such a form, and if no other problems emerge, the new judgement will deservedly acquire the title of *the judgement of the concept*. In this way, the speculative theory of judgement will be completed and the Pyrrhonian problematic will be fully resolved.

It may be important to note here that my presentation of the dialectic of the judgement of the concept draws only on those parts of it which are germane to the attempted resolution of the Pyrrhonian problematic. In general, the text accommodating this dialectic in the *Science of Logic*³ can be read as addressing three issues: (a) the *onto-logical* structure of the judgement of the concept and how this completes the speculative *theory* of judgement; (b) the association of this structure with the so-called *evaluative* judgement; and (c) the emergence of the *sylllogism* from the conclusion of the whole dialectic of the judgement. In this chapter I am interested only in the first of these issues, following thus authors like Werner Salomon and Chong-Fuk Lau, who explain the dialectic of the judgement of the concept without making any substantial reference either to the evaluative judgement or to the syllogism.⁴ I fully agree with these authors that (a) the reference to the evaluative judgement is quite inappropriate in the corpus of the onto-logical project or it has at best only a symbolic significance and (b) the passage to the sphere of the syllogism does not in any way undermine the positive status of the dialectic of the judgement of the concept and the fact that it can by itself explain how truth is expressed by the onto-logical project. Indeed, the syllogism does not *replace* the judgement as the locus of the expression of truth, as if the two were completely distinct elements. Rather, it provides only a more *detailed* version of the form and content of the judgement of the concept. Despite the enormous significance of this part of the onto-logical project, its explication does not really add anything substantial to *our* problem, namely the attempt to provide a resolution of the Pyrrhonian problematic.

12.2. *Pure Being and the Sollen*

To begin with, one must always remember that the dialectic's three preceding stages have *proven* salient features of the true nature of the judgement

³ WL II 344–351.

⁴ Salomon (1982: 86–104); Lau (2004: 11–20, 147–162).

of being-as-concept. We now have no doubt that the *predicate* is neither an abstract universal quality nor an individual universal quality nor a subsuming class nor even an immediately posited totality of determinations. It is, rather, an emerging universal sphere that comes to exhibit the determinations of that element which occupies the subject-space; and in the dialectic of the judgement of reflection it has been discovered that this 'exhibition' proceeds by means of unification of contradictories. One has also learnt that the *subject* is not *in itself* (*an sich*) an immediate, *indeterminate* individual; it is the concentrated genus—the reserved, implicitly present, totality of determinations—that has an immediate, individual existence. Finally, we are now fully aware that the *copula* does not denote the bare identity of the extremes—it denotes rather their identity-and-difference, which should materialize by means of the expression of the subject's determinacy in the predicate-space.

Combining these facts with the collapse of the disjunctive judgement permits the deduction that the judgement of the concept must *initially* be explicitly only a tautology, the affirmation of the subject-matter's utmost simplicity. Since in the sphere of the rational this simplicity has—as we know—the character of the *pure* identity of knowing and being, to wit, the character of *pure, indeterminate being*, the first appearance of the judgement of the concept has *necessarily* the form of the pseudo-judgement *being is being* or, simply, *is is is* or *being being being*. The question, of course, is why this deduction is permitted in this instance. Why should the first form of the judgement of the concept be the tautology of pure, indeterminate being?

Well, this must be so because the proviso of immanence—established at the end of the dialectic of the disjunctive judgement—demands the *emergence of each and every* determination of the subject-matter from the simple presence of this subject-matter itself (i.e. *rational being*, whose first appearance is, as explained, necessarily pure, indeterminate being). Simply, given the requirement that the *whole* content of the predicate-space of the disjunctive judgement must be established immanently, there must be a first moment in the sphere of reason when the predicate exhibits no other determination than (the non-determination of) the sheer presence of the subject-matter itself. *All* determinations of the subject-matter should be shown to emerge from the subject-matter, which means that what is exhibited at the very beginning is only the subject-matter itself, devoid of all its determinations. As Hegel puts it, referring to the form of the predicate-space, "this *concrete* [unity] of universality and particularization [which has resulted from the collapse of the disjunctive judgement]

is initially a *simple* (*einfaches*) result.”⁵ Thus, the first form of the judgement of being-as-concept *has to* be the tautology of simple being. But, as we know, such structure is not judgemental (or, better, it is only pseudo-judgemental), for it exhibits no difference, and, therefore, is expressive of nothing—absolutely nothing.

This development provides a second proof not only of the beginning of the *Science of Logic* (a proof this time constructed from the standpoint of the judgement, not from the standpoint of the phenomenological project), but also of what we said about the individuality of being-as-concept. If you recall, the dialectic of individuality established that the whole of being-as-concept is placed in the locus of individuality and that the latter is initially explicitly indeterminate. Individuality is a locus of indeterminacy from which determinacy springs. Since individuality has been shown to *be* the judgement, this fits in perfectly with the discovery that the first form of the judgement of the concept is the tautology of pure, indeterminate being and that it is only its development that will bring the determinacy of being-as-concept to light.

Let us take some stock. The dialectic of the judgement has proven that the subject is in itself a *concentrated genus*, a totality of determinations enclosed in an individual, immediate existence. It has also proven, however, that although the expression of this totality can take place *only* in the predicate-space, the totality cannot be *immediately* posited in that space (in the manner of the disjunctive judgement). Therefore, the initial form of the judgement expressing the totality of the determinations of rational being (being-as-concept) must be the tautology of pure, indeterminate being. When this tautology is posited, a *world of determinations* is opened up, albeit only implicitly. Since this world of determinations cannot be posited immediately in the predicate-space, the only way for it to be expressed is via its gradual emergence therein from the subject-space. But the question may be raised here: why *should* such emergence occur in the sphere of being-as-concept? Why *should* the judgement of being-as-concept undertake the task of gradually expressing the totality of determinations in the predicate-space? Why does it not stop with the tautology of pure, indeterminate being and thereby force us to admit our ignorance of the truth of the rational?

Two distinct answers are offered in this instance, both of which are successful. Firstly, the dialectic of the judgement has proven that *the*

⁵ WL II 345.

disjunctive judgement exemplifies the *truth* of being-as-concept with the only defect that the relation between subject and predicate is not immanent therein. Therefore, the judgement of the concept, which aspires to establish such immanent relation, *ought* to re-establish the disjunctive judgment—with a touch of immanence! But then it necessarily follows that the judgement of the concept *ought* to move beyond the tautology of pure, indeterminate being and express the totality of determinations in the predicate-space (for this is what the disjunctive judgement does).

Secondly, the dialectic of individuality has proven that the individual is the *becoming* of the totality of the determinations of being-as-concept. It has also proven that the *judgement* is the medium (the way, the mode) through which this becoming occurs. But then it necessarily follows that the judgement of the concept has the function of expressing the totality of the determinations, of letting them become. Thus, the judgement of the concept *ought* to move beyond its initial manifestation as the tautology of pure, indeterminate being and express the totality of the determinations of rational being.

These two arguments make it crystal clear that the subject-matter has an *implicit* content (the totality of determinations) that the judgement *ought* (*soll*) to make explicit. Thus, the element of the *Sollen* proves to belong to the very core of the judgement of the concept and particularly to the subject-space. “The concept has now been laid to the ground [...] as an *ought*.”⁶ It is exactly this *Sollen* which at the end of the day distinguishes the judgement of the concept from the static disjunctive judgement, for it is only because of the *Sollen* that a *movement* is generated in the onto-logical project.⁷ The *whole* of being-as-concept has been placed *in* the subject-space—in the ‘subject-matter’ itself—and *ought* to gradually move to the predicate-space so as to express itself.

Note that this principle—that the judgement of the concept expresses the determinacy of rational being by *making* the implicit content of the subject-matter of the tautology of pure, indeterminate being *explicit* and that it *ought* to do so—has *now* been *proven*; it is not a dogmatic principle that is arbitrarily employed in the onto-logical corpus. This should be noted by the great majority of Hegel scholars who seem to think that the expression of truth in terms of “making pure, indeterminate being

⁶ WL II 344.

⁷ WL II 344. Cf. WL II 345: “Im disjunktiven Urteile war der Begriff als Identität des allgemeinen Natur mit ihrer Besonderung gesetzt; hiermit hatte sich das Verhältnis des Urteils aufgehoben.”

explicit" is a principle that Hegel simply *assumes* at the beginning of the onto-logical project. I regard the reconstruction and/or clarification of this proof as one of the greatest achievements of the present study, an achievement that has the potential of rejuvenating our understanding of Hegel's *Science of Logic* and of strengthening the latter's philosophical status.

12.3. *The Difference of the Subject-Matter*

The discovery that the *Sollen* is fundamentally present in the subject-matter of the judgement of the concept entails that the subject-matter is in itself *divided*. On the one hand, it is the concentrated genus, the implicit totality of determinations; but on the other hand, it must have an existence that is *distinct* from this totality. This is so because there is the possibility that the way the subject-matter *ought* to be does not correspond with the way it expresses itself. In fact, given the initial form of the judgement of the concept (the tautology of pure, indeterminate being), that possibility becomes actuality.

A difference, then, is embedded in the very core of the subject-matter of the judgement of the concept: the way the subject-matter ought to be *versus* the way it expresses itself. This second dimension of the subject, its existing in the way it expresses itself, is the individualized, concrete, *explicitly* determinate existence of the genus—what Hegel calls its "actuality"⁸ or "reality"⁹ or "constitution."¹⁰ It is the 'life' of the subject-matter, the way its determinacy becomes manifest.¹¹ But then it necessarily has the *form* of judgement, the structure of subject-copula-predicate, for the judgement is exactly the way that determinacy becomes manifest.

The distinction between the concentrated genus and its actuality is a platitude in Hegel studies, a principle that everyone who has ever studied a bit of Hegel acknowledges as belonging to the core of his philosophy. What is significant in my treatment of it is that the principle has now been *proven* through the speculative theory of and in terms of the judgement.

⁸ WL II 346.

⁹ WL II 344.

¹⁰ WL II 346. See also WL II 346: "Diese Beschaffenheit ist die Einzelheit, welche über die notwendige Bestimmung des Allgemeinen im disjunktiven Urteil hinausliegt [...]."

¹¹ WL II 346. This is also why Hegel says (WL II 344) that it is only in the judgement of the concept that the connection between the "object" (i.e. the individualized existence of the subject-matter) and the concept (the subject-matter itself, the totality of the determinations) becomes "ready to hand" (*vorhanden*).

Indeed, it has been shown that the structure of the judgement of the concept *entails* that distinction.

12.4. *The Speculative Criterion of Truth and the Speculative Notion of Falsity*

The distinction between the concentrated genus (the unified, implicit totality of determinations) and its actuality (its expression through the judgement) gives rise to the 'speculative' *criterion of the truth* of the expressed subject-matter, of the expressed rational being. It gives rise, that is, to the criterion of the truth of *judgement* in the domain of reason. The 'positing' of this criterion is immune to Pyrrhonian scepticism, precisely because it has emerged through the *dialectic* of the judgement, through the unification of conflicting judgements-of-reason (there could be no other way any such criterion could escape Pyrrhonian scepticism.)

Since the totality of determinations belongs *inherently* to the subject of the judgement of the concept and this judgement's *function* is to express that totality (to exhibit it in the predicate-space), its truth is determined by whether it expresses that totality or not. Thus, the speculative criterion of truth specifies that the judgement of the concept is true if, and only if, it expresses the totality of the determinations of the subject-matter. Evidently, given that there is *at the beginning* a difference between what is expressed and what exists *implicitly* as true, it is *necessarily* the case that the judgement of the concept *ought to develop itself* in such a way that it finally comes to produce that implicit content. Only in this way the speculative criterion of truth will be satisfied. As Hegel puts it, the "simple result" of the disjunctive judgement

must now built itself up to the totality, insofar as the moments which it contains have initially descended therein [i.e. in the 'simple result'] and have not yet stood against one another in determinate self-subsistence.¹²

When exactly the criterion will be satisfied depends *absolutely* on the immanent dialectic of the categories. We will know that the criterion has been satisfied when this dialectic will by itself come to an end, when it

¹² WL II 345. Cf. WL II 345: "Insofern aber das Resultat selbst die *negative Einheit* ist, so ist es zwar schon diese *Einzelheit*; aber so ist es nur diese *eine* Bestimmtheit [d.h. das *einfache* Resultat], die nun ihre Negativität *zu setzen* [d.h. *zu entwickeln*] [und] sich in die Extreme zu dirimieren [...] hat."

will no longer be immanently producing determinations of the rational (categories). This will denote that the expressed content has exhausted the concentrated genus. There is nothing more to be said on this issue in our working framework.

As the development of the judgement of the concept proceeds by means of the subject-matter's immanently generating its determinations in the predicate-space, it becomes clear that there is never a moment of absolute falsity in the onto-logical project. By 'absolute falsity' I mean a state of affairs which denotes a total disconnection between the genus' actuality and its concentrated existence. The judgements-of-reason can never be 'absolutely false', since they necessarily express a *part* of the concentrated genus (to wit, the determination that has immanently emerged from the subject-matter and been exhibited in the predicate-space of a specific judgement-of-reason).¹³ The only falsity that can take place in the onto-logical project is 'partial correspondence' and is exemplified by each and every *immediate* judgement-of-reason (but also by any collection of those judgements that does not exhaust the totality of determinations).

Hegel says that the individualized genus is an actuality which "may or may not be adequate" to the *Sollen*.¹⁴ He also says that the judgement of the concept, which is the only kind of judgement that "contains a truthful evaluation," expresses truth or falsity by means of "the subject-matter's *measuring* itself against its own concept as the absolutely presupposed *ought*" and determining "whether it is in *agreement* with it or *not*."¹⁵ This 'disagreement' or 'inadequacy' or 'non-correspondence' should be understood in the way I have explained, in the sense of 'partial agreement' or 'partial adequacy' or 'partial correspondence'.¹⁶ Even the 'empirical' examples Hegel gives conform to this interpretation; for the evaluative judgement "this house is bad"¹⁷ surely does not claim that the house's individualized existence has absolutely nothing to do with the concept of the house. This would be *nonsensical*! Rather, this house is bad because it fulfils *its* concept *only partially*.

If there is 'a critique of judgement' in the onto-logical project, it arises out of this speculative notion of falsity as partial correspondence. The

¹³ Cf. Lau (2004: 62–67, 290).

¹⁴ WL II 344, 346.

¹⁵ WL II 344.

¹⁶ Cf. PhdG 40 (my emphasis): "Man kann wohl falsch wissen. Es wird etwas falsch gewußt, heißt, das Wissen ist in Ungleichheit mit *seiner* Substanz."

¹⁷ WL II 346.

posited judgement can be 'criticized' because the judgement of being-as-concept has come to the fore as that element whose 'mission' is to express the *full* determinacy of being-as-concept, the totality of determinations. Having necessarily moments of *immediacy* (namely, moments characterized by positivity, singularity and categoricity) and *partiality*, the judgement of the concept has a certain (deficient) form that fails to express that totality.

The greatest discovery of the speculative theory of judgement is that this 'abstraction' (the partial correspondence) is overcome by that form of judgement which exemplifies the *dynamic* or *processual* expression of objective universality. It is overcome, that is to say, by that judgement which expresses the totality of determinations by *developing itself* from the sheer tautology of being to the static disjunctive judgement. This judgement has moments of immediacy, but these moments do not exhaust its *form*—it has *also* the form of a *process*, of a *movement* that breaks the barriers of immediacy and brings forth more and more categorial determinations. I elaborate on this 'advanced' form of judgement, which concludes the dialectic of the judgement as a whole, and on how it resolves the Pyrrhonian problematic in the next section and in the conclusion.

12.5. *Assertion, Problem, Proof*

The emergence of the speculative notion of falsity is the pinnacle of the speculative theory of judgement, for it undermines that criterion of truth which emanates automatically from the context of immediacy of the universe of discourse and which functions as the basis of the Pyrrhonian problematic. This criterion says that a judgement is true if, and only if, its posited negation is not true as well. Conflicts between judgements are obstacles to the expression of truth. It can *now* be recognized that such criterion cannot be applied to the judgements-of-reason, to the universe of rational discourse. Given the speculative notion of falsity and its application to that universe, *all* immediate judgements-of-reason, positive and negative, participate, each in its own way, in the *truth* of reason. Therefore a conflict in the universe of rational discourse does not constitute an obstacle to the expression of the truth of the subject-matter; it is, rather, an expression of a part of that truth.

The objection may be raised that if it is stated that each immediate judgement-of-reason expresses a part of the truth of the subject-matter *because it emerges from the latter*, the Pyrrhonian problematic is resolved

at the very beginning of the onto-logical project. The objection, however, fails because the principle of emergence, *as it applies to the judgements-of-reason*, works against Pyrrhonian scepticism only if it is *proven*. And this proof, if you recall, cannot be achieved immediately, through the sheer positing of the principle. Rather, the latter has to appear in the onto-logical project through a process of unification of conflicting judgements and be shown to be a constituent of the true nature of the judgement in the sphere of reason. Indeed, as seen, the establishment of this nature—through a process of unification of conflicting judgements—entails that whatever appears in the predicate-space of the judgement-of-reason emerges from the subject-space of that same judgement. And this is what makes the principle true: the simple fact that it is manifested in the locus of the judgement. Thus, the principle of emergence, as it applies to the judgements-of-reason, is not an arbitrary, external assumption, but rather a simple description of a facet of the—already proven—nature of the judgement in the sphere of reason.

Now, if the conflicts in the universe of rational discourse are not after all obstacles to the expression of the truth of the subject-matter, why should there be such a process in the sphere of reason as unification of conflicting judgements? Indeed, this process seems to no longer be imperative, to have lost its purposeful meaning. In truth, though, the necessity of a process of unification arises from the simple *description* of the true nature of the judgement of the concept. The disclosure of this nature shows that such a process does take place through the judgement. The process of unification belongs to the onto-logical structure of the judgement of the concept—it is *not* a tool one introduces in the onto-logical project *in order to resolve the Pyrrhonian problematic*.

It is exactly at this point that Hegel's genius shines. For until the nature of the judgement in the sphere of reason is fully proven, the Pyrrhonian problematic holds sway therein. Until that proof is accomplished, the judgements-of-reason are still vulnerable to Pyrrhonian scepticism. The great virtue of the onto-logical project is not so much that it comes to furnish an account of the true nature of the judgement of the concept, but mainly that it deals successfully with Pyrrhonian scepticism until that description emerges. Hegel takes advantage of the existence of the onto-logical phenomenon of unification of conflicting judgements so as to safeguard the speculative theory of judgement against the Pyrrhonian interruption. So, the process of unification is not present in the ontological project *because* of the Pyrrhonian problematic, *but* it is nevertheless employed against it!

Since the expression of the onto-logical project has the structure of the Pyrrhonian problematic up to the point where the true nature of the judgement of the concept is fully revealed, this judgement, which undertakes that expression, must itself exhibit the basic pattern of that structure and the speculative theory of judgement has the obligation to thematize this phenomenon. If you recall, the basic pattern of the structure of the Pyrrhonian problematic consists of the act of *assertion* and the *problematic conflict* that it immediately generates. Therefore, assertions and conflicts (or, if you will, *problems*) are necessarily present in the very being of the judgement of the concept. In other words, the movement from the sheer tautology of being to the speculative criterion of truth *must* contain assertions and conflicts.

The character of *assertion* belongs to all those judgements appearing in a context of *immediacy* and having the semblance of a *subjective, a posteriori* relation between *self-subsistent extremes*.¹⁸ Due to their immediacy, they show themselves to be entangled in a relation of equipollence with their contradictories.¹⁹ This equipollence is represented by “the problematic judgement,” a term that denotes nothing but the bifurcation of the immediate judgement into a pair of contradictory judgements.²⁰ In this way, *the negative judgement* proves to belong inherently to the true *form* of the judgement. Since this contradiction denotes a *problem* in the context of the Pyrrhonian problematic, which, as just explained, has to be taken into account until the true nature of the judgement of the concept is established, it has to be resolved.

The resolution of each conflict that appears in the onto-logical project is achieved by means of *unification* of the contradictories. Since we now *know* that the development of the judgement is the development of a *concentrated genus* that *ought* to become explicit, we are now aware that the *unifications* of those conflicts, which we witness in the *performance* of that development, are not sheer conjunctions, that they have a *positive* character. Or, at least, we can now claim this without falling into the Pyrrhonian trap; for the Pyrrhonist *must* accept the results of the dialectic of the judgement, given that these have emerged immanently and through a process of unification of contradictory judgements. In this way, the dia-

¹⁸ WL II 346: “Insofern ist die konkrete Allgemeinheit, die aus dem disjunktiven Urteil hervorgegangen ist, in dem assertorischen Urteil in die Form von *Extremen* entzweit, denen der Begriff selbst als *gesetzte*, sie beziehende Einheit noch fehlt.”

¹⁹ WL II 347.

²⁰ WL II 347: “Das problematische Urteil ist das assertorische, insofern dieses ebenso-wohl positiv als negativ genommen werden muß.”

lectic of the judgement of the concept *proves* not only that this judgement contains assertions and problems or contradictions, but also that it has the character of a *proof* (or, in Hegel's terminology, "apodeixis"). (Recall here that *for us* a judgemental structure constitutes a proof if, and only if, it does not fall into the Pyrrhonian trap.)

The Pyrrhonist demanded two things from us (and *only* two things!): First, that the onto-logical project should affirm the presence of immediate judgements (i.e. assertions) and conflicts between them (i.e. contradictions); second, that at some point in the project's development a content should be expressed affirming the *positive* unification of these conflicts into higher *Vernunftsätze*. *Both of these demands have now been satisfied*. Firstly, the onto-logical project has indeed developed through a process that contained moments of immediacy and conflicts between such moments (these conflicts had the semblance of 'fixity', of 'untrue contradiction'); the Pyrrhonist himself has *witnessed* this process first hand since he was present every step of the way.

Secondly, the witnessed unifications of the contradictories have *now* acquired a *positive* character (or, as Hegel puts it, the contradictories have now become "concepts"), exactly because the speculative theory of judgement has *thematized* the judgement of the concept as the development of a *concentrated genus* that *ought* to become explicit. This means (a) that *any* determination appearing in the onto-logical project belongs inherently to this genus, to the totality of the determinations of rational being; and, more importantly, (b) that the onto-logical project, as an inquiry into the truth of rational being, exists *because* that totality ought to be made explicit. From this second point it is necessarily inferred that any new determination appearing in the onto-logical project does so *because* it explicates a *new* determination of the subject-matter. Thus, if two contradictories are shown to be united *as* a new determination, then that determination is *necessarily* a *positive* determination (for, clearly, a simple conjunction of contradictories would not provide a *further* determination of the subject-matter). The Pyrrhonist cannot deny this claim, for it has emerged immanently from the sheer presence of the cognitive standpoint of thought, from pure being itself, *and, more importantly, through a process of unification of conflicting judgements*. In this way, the Pyrrhonian problematic has now been fully resolved.

Let me emphasize once more that the conflicts in the universe of rational discourse are 'problematic' up to the point where the true nature of the judgement of being-as-concept is disclosed. This characterization, depending on one's perspective, connotes two different things. If made from the standpoint of the Pyrrhonian problematic, it connotes that for

truth to be expressed the conflicts in question have to be resolved. If made from the standpoint of the true nature of the judgement of the concept, it connotes that these conflicts hinder the involved determinations from behaving as concepts (they behave instead as determinations of simple being or determinations of being-as-essence). But, as explained, the speculative theory of judgement has the obligation of thematizing both of these phenomena in the onto-logical project, in the sphere of reason.

On the whole, the dialectic of the judgement of the concept has resolved the Pyrrhonian problematic by providing us with that *form* of the judgement which expresses perfectly the content of the judgement, objective universality. This *single but composite* form is enormously complex, but one may explicate it in terms of three basic 'sub-forms'. Firstly, it has the form of a simple assertion or immediate judgement, which exhibits a single determination of the subject-matter. Secondly, it has the form of a conflict or contradiction between two judgements. In this way, in contradistinction to the disjunctive judgement, the requirement of negativity is satisfied in terms of the form. The 'not', that is, becomes 'visible' in the form of the judgement. And thirdly, it has the form of a *process*, whereby the actuality of the subject-matter (namely, the manifested individual judgement) gradually expresses its implicit content, which consists of a totality of determinations. This satisfies the requirement of immanence, which was lacking in the form of the disjunctive judgement. As it happens, this gradual expression of the determinations is accomplished by means of conflicts and unifications of these conflicts. And in fact the discovery of the true nature of the judgement shows beyond any doubt that the unifications in question have a positive character (they are not sheer conjunctions). For the onto-logical project to become *a proof that is immune to Pyrrhonian scepticism* all three 'sub-forms' must work together and be united under one scheme, the single form of the judgement of the concept.²¹ Hopefully my point will become even clearer in the conclusion that follows.

²¹ In the Preface to the *Phenomenology* (PhdG 61) Hegel identifies the expression of truth with "the dialectical movement of the proposition." And he clearly treats the term "proposition" (*Satz*) as being synonymous with the term "judgement" (*Urteil*) in this instance; see PhdG 59 (my emphasis): "[...] die Natur des Urteils oder Satzes überhaupt, die den Unterschied des Subjekts und Prädikats in sich schließt [...]." (It seems that Kant also treats them as being synonymous; see Dicker (2004: 7).) Note also that the Greek term ἀπόδειξις, which Hegel associates with the judgement of the concept, meant both proof (*Beweis*) and presentation (*Darstellung*).

CONCLUSION

(1) Scientific inquiry, conceived specifically and generically as *the* human inquiry into the *truth* of being, has as one of its fundamental components the positing of *judgements* (or *propositions*) in *the universe of discourse*. A judgement is in a state of 'mediation' when its relation to other judgements is made explicit; it exists 'immediately' when that relation is not made explicit. This 'immediacy' is a *necessary* feature of a judgement's overall existence. Simply, there is a *moment* in a judgement's life when it is necessarily *not* characterized by means of its relation to other judgements; this is undoubtedly the case when the judgement emerges for the *first* time in the universe of discourse. In such a context of immediacy the posited judgement comes forth with the intention of presenting itself as *true*—it is, namely, a truth-claim.

(2) The problem lies in the fact that when the universe of discourse accommodates both the immediate judgement and its *negation* (which is freely posited therein as another truth-claim), the truth-status of the one is equal to the truth-status of the other—precisely because in a context of immediacy nothing matters but their sheer, isolated existence. So, the context of immediacy, which *necessarily* shapes a part or dimension of the universe of discourse, *necessarily* gives rise to conflicts (or contradictions) between judgements. This state of affairs is catastrophic for scientific inquiry, for the immediate judgements fail to actualize their intention, which is that *they*, and *not* their negations, are the truth. There is not a single scientific discipline that is not plagued by this problem; for their very character as 'sciences' entails that at least some of their claims are posited with the intention of presenting themselves as true.

(3) Thus, the urgent task of science is to find a way out of such a context of immediacy whose surface is fully occupied by contradictions; or, in simpler terms, it has to find a way to resolve the conflicts between immediate judgements. To this effect there appears the *suggestion* that such conflicts are resolved by *privileging* one judgement over its contradictory through the positing of *grounds* (or *criteria of truth*) in the universe of discourse. Pyrrhonian scepticism comes then forth as the presuppositionless 'manifestation' that such a process of privileging and grounding

can never manage to resolve a conflict between immediate judgements. Indeed, given that the grounds (or criteria of truth) that are posited in the universe of discourse are themselves necessarily truth-claims, such a process soon ends up in the establishment of either vicious infinite regress or vicious circularity.

(4) In his revolutionary early essay *The Relation of Scepticism to Philosophy* Hegel diagnosed that the refutation of that model of science which is based upon the acts of privileging and grounding does not extinguish the possibility of scientific inquiry. This is so because, logically speaking, one could attempt to resolve the conflict between two contradictory judgements by means of their *unification* into a third, 'higher' judgement. For this suggestion to be effective against Pyrrhonian scepticism, however, the judgement as such must be able to perform this unification in a positive manner, namely not just in terms of simple conjunction of contradictories. So, Hegel now has to provide a *theory of judgement* which would explain what this positive unification means and how it comes about. Yet, given its ontological significance, this theory would have a force against the Pyrrhonist *only* if it were *proven*. But, given Hegel's specific suggestion as to how conflicts are resolved, such a proof can be provided only by means of positive unification of contradictory judgements. Thus, the resolution of the Pyrrhonian problematic requires (a) that a theory of judgement *emerges* from a process of positive unification of contradictory judgements and (b) that at least a part of this theory *thematizes* such a process. Hegel concludes by *suggesting* that the cognitive standpoint or framework of *reason* (*Vernunft*) can indeed provide us with such a theory of judgement (or a theory of the *Vernunftssatz*).

(5) The project developed in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* thematizes an objection to this argument and a response to this objection. The objection is that even if such a theory is successfully formulated from the cognitive standpoint of reason, this will not matter if the conflict between this cognitive standpoint and *other competing cognitive standpoints* remains unresolved. Since the general character of the cognitive standpoint of reason is determined as *the identity of knowing and being*, all those cognitive standpoints which compete with it necessarily have the general character of *the non-identity of knowing and being*. The super cognitive standpoint that incorporates all the cognitive standpoints that have this latter general character is called *consciousness*. Given that in the context of immediacy the relation between reason (or, in Hegel's new terminology, 'thought')

and consciousness is one of *equipollence*, the phenomenological project sets for itself the task of resolving this equipollence in favour of reason and thereby proving its truth, namely *justifying* it. Yet, the very way the phenomenological project proceeds to accomplish this task shows beyond any doubt that the issue of resolving the equipollence in favour of the cognitive standpoint of reason has nothing to do with the issue of justifying this cognitive standpoint. Consequently, the attempt to resolve the Pyrrhonian problematic from the cognitive standpoint of reason has very little to gain (or lose) from a consideration of the phenomenological project.

(6) This conclusion makes it clear that, *pace* Kenneth Westphal, there is the possibility of resolving the Pyrrhonian problematic solely from within the framework of reason, which is thematized in the *Science of Logic* (the 'logical' or 'onto-logical' project). Since (a) the starting-point of the onto-logical project is the pure identity of knowing and being and (b) nothing but this starting-point is initially true therein, the truth-claims-of-reason have to *emerge* (instead of simply be *posited*) from this pure identity; otherwise what is to guarantee that those claims do indeed belong to the framework of reason (or rational being)? Yet, although such an emergence is a necessary condition for proving the truth of those truth-claims, it is not also a sufficient one. *The sheer performance of the onto-logical movement does not prove the truth of the truth-claims-of-reason*. For this proof to be accomplished, the onto-logical movement must give rise to a specific theory of *judgement*. The latter, as just explained, should (a) arise specifically from a process of conflict and unification of truth-claims-of-reason and (b) thematize such a process. My brief examination—due to lack of space—of the first few onto-logical moves in the *Science of Logic* has shown that the concrete onto-logical movement is indeed structured in terms of the process in question.

(7) This process of conflict and unification comes to organize rational being (and, therefore, the universe of rational discourse) into three onto-logical macro-spheres: the sphere of being, the sphere of essence and the sphere of the concept. *Firstly*, the sphere of being exemplifies the immediacy and indifferent fixity of oppositional or contradictory onto-logical categories. This is still the case when the contradictories are shown to be unified in a 'higher' category; for in this instance, due to the unavailability of more sophisticated categories (which will emerge in the final onto-logical sphere), the unification is treated as a 'mistake' and its content is

taken to denote only an immediate existence—which in its turn comes to be in conflict with its own negation. *Secondly*, the sphere of essence thematizes categories which relate to each other not only contradictorily, but also seemingly in terms of non-immanent causality and dominance. Again, this general character persists even when such relations are shown to dissolve into (or be unified in) a relation of absolute equality; for in this instance, due to the unavailability of more sophisticated categories (which will emerge in the final onto-logical sphere), this relation of equality is regarded as a ‘mistake’ and its content is treated as a new relation of non-immanent causality and dominance. *Finally*, the sphere of the concept sublates the two preceding spheres, since its categorial structure is fundamentally characterized by the harmonious unity of self-identity and full determinacy. When this position is reached, and precisely because its very character requires that it supervenes upon (or encompasses) the whole field of reason’s determinacy, the true meaning of the unification of indifferent oppositional categories and of the dissolution of relations of non-immanent causality and dominance is fully revealed: they are not ‘mistakes’ but rather the true determinations—the ‘rich content’—of the standpoint or framework or *the concept* of reason. Fixity, non-immanent causality and dominance are illusory moments in the speculative onto-logical corpus (or, if you prefer, moments with an inferior status, ‘sublated’ moments).

(8) The harmonious unity of self-identity and full determinacy that fundamentally characterizes the categorial structure of the sphere of the concept denotes nothing but the content and interrelations of universality, particularity and individuality—the so-called ‘fundamental concept-determinations’. Our analysis of the extremely complicated structure of the most primitive phase of the ‘life’ of these fundamental concept-determinations—to wit, of what Hegel calls ‘the pure concept’ or ‘the concept as such’—reached three important conclusions: (a) that the content and interrelations of the fundamental concept-determinations entail the need for *the explication of a totality of categorial determinations*; (b) that the explication of this totality must arise out of *the self-determining activity of the individual*; and (c) that the individual is in truth *the judgement*. But if the results of our analysis are correct, we can deduce further that the explication of a totality of categorial determinations must arise out of the self-determining activity of *the judgement*. So, it seems that the harmonious unity of self-identity and full determinacy that fundamentally characterizes the categorial structure of the sphere of the concept (which,

if you recall, supervenes upon the whole categorial field of rational being) denotes—maybe among other things as well—the explication of a totality of categorial determinations by the self-determining activity of the judgement; and, given our working framework, that totality must be the totality of the categorial determinations of rational being or reason or ‘thought’.

(9) If the harmonious unity of self-identity and full determinacy denotes the explication of the totality of determinations of ‘thought’ by the self-determining activity of the judgement, then the latter must be, *pace* Houlgate, “the essential character of thought.”¹ It must also be true that Kant was, *mutatis mutandis*, right when he claimed that the judgement produces or determines the categories of ‘thought’;² the same holds also for Lau regarding his claim that the judgement provides the motor or “moving force” of the movement of the categories in the speculative ontological project.³ The problem with Kant is that he never proves that the categories which are produced through the judgement do indeed belong to ‘thought’, precisely because he never proves that the judgement is “the essential character of thought”—he simply assumes this. The problem with Lau is that his argument in support of the claim that the judgement provides the motor of the movement of the categories is based exclusively on external considerations, largely on the ‘doctrine of the speculative proposition’, which is formulated by Hegel in the Preface to the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, a text that in no way constitutes a *proof*. The argument developed in the present study, if valid, would provide justification, on Hegel’s behalf, for both Kant’s and Lau’s claim.

(10) Since the judgement emerges as a category in the onto-logical project, it must be a determination of rational being. Yet the judgement is also peculiarly a linguistic entity, a mode of linguistic expression. So, the explication of the totality of determinations of rational being through the self-determining activity of the judgement has also the significance of the *linguistic expression* of the totality of determinations of rational being through the self-determining activity of the judgement. Therefore, the linguistic expression of the development of the onto-logical categories is not an enterprise that is foreign or external to the development of

¹ Houlgate (2006: 14).

² KrV B 92–94, 106, 128, 143; A 245. Cf. Houlgate (2006: 12–23); Enz. I § 42.

³ Lau (2004: 6, 275).

the onto-logical categories. Of course, this does not mean that the one is reducible to the other; we have not found immanently any reason to justify such a reduction. Yet, an intrinsic and necessary link between the two must exist since they both depend fundamentally on the self-determining activity of an element which is both a determination of rational being and a mode of linguistic expression—namely, the judgement.

(11) This inference would be objected by those who would want to claim that the category of judgement in the speculative onto-logical project has nothing to do with the judgement as a mode of linguistic expression. As far as I can see, however, such a claim finds absolutely no support in any of Hegel's writings. Clearly, in the *Science of Logic*, Hegel does treat the judgement as being also a mode of linguistic expression; and this is also obvious in the Preface to the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, where he identifies the judgement (*Urteil*) with the proposition (*Satz*) in the context of the problem of the linguistic expression of truth. But, even if this textual support were absent, the objection would still have no force, since the judgement *does* have, immediately and unreflectively, the character of a mode of linguistic expression.

(12) So, the harmonious unity of self-identity and full determinacy that fundamentally characterizes rational being or reason or 'thought', which is the framework in which the truth of being should be established, is expressed in language by the self-determining activity of the judgement. But, what is it that enables the judgement to function in this way? What is the peculiar structure that allows the judgement to be this self-determining activity that expresses (or explicates) the totality of the determinations of rational being? The answer to this question is provided by the dialectic of the judgement in the *Science of Logic*, a dialectic that constitutes what we have called 'the speculative theory of judgement'.

(13) The speculative theory of judgement is developed immanently in two parts. In the first part the dialectic discloses the true *content* of the judgement in the sphere of reason, namely that the judgement is in truth *the objective universal*. The most important connotations of this notion are the following: (a) subject and predicate are explicit unities of the fundamental concept-determinations; (b) subject and predicate contain exactly the same totality of categorial determinations; (c) whereas the subject is a concentrated genus that has an immediate, individualized existence, the predicate is a universal sphere that manifests its constituents in a

particularizing, rotating fashion; (d) the universal sphere of the predicate contains conflicts or contradictions between its constituent determinations and also unifications of them in 'higher' determinations; (e) the subject is fully determinate in itself—it does not require the predicate in order to become determinate; (f) subject and predicate are not connected externally or contingently or *a posteriori*, but rather immanently or necessarily or *a priori*; (g) the role of the predicate is not to 'attach' determinacy to the subject, but to explicate or 'express' the determinacy—i.e. the totality of determinations—that the subject already has in itself; (h) the copula is the only truly self-subsistent element in the judgement; (i) the true meaning of the copula is not one of simple identity, but one of identity-and-difference. If all these connotations are put together, it *has to* be concluded that the content of the judgement—objective universality—gives rise to a self-determining movement that comes to explicate the subject's totality of determinations in the locus of the predicate. But the totality of determinations that is explicated in the judgement-locus in the framework of reason can be no other totality than the one which constitutes the concept of reason. Hence objective universality necessarily gives rise to a self-determining activity that explicates the totality of the determinations of rational being.

(14) In the second part of the speculative theory of judgement the dialectic brings to the fore the true *form* of the judgement in the sphere of reason, namely *the judgement of the concept* or *Vernunftsatz*. The most important connotations of this notion are the following: (a) the *Vernunftsatz* is constituted by a multiplicity of judgements and a variety of sub-forms (or species of the form in general), which include the form of the immediate positive judgement, the form of the immediate negative judgement, the form of the hypothetical judgement and the form of the disjunctive judgement; (b) these judgements and these sub-forms of the judgement-form are not placed next to one another in the manner of an indifferent, 'empirical' or 'quantitative' relation—rather they all *emerge* from the self-determining movement of a single judgement, which initially has the form of a peculiar immediate positive judgement, namely that specific judgement which expresses pure, indeterminate being (this judgement is a sheer tautology and, therefore, a 'pseudo-judgement'): this is why Hegel says that the onto-logical project denotes "the dialectical movement of *the* [one and only] proposition;" (c) the final sub-form of the *Vernunftsatz* is the disjunctive judgement which expresses in a static manner the totality of those true determinations that have been disclosed through "the

dialectical movement of the proposition;" (d) the movement from the first immediate positive judgement to the disjunctive judgement includes (i) the generation of immediate negative judgements from immediate positive judgements ('assertions'), (ii) states of affairs where immediate positive judgements are 'fixed' against the immediate negative judgements that they themselves generate—these are states of affairs which denote non-unified contradictions (and, therefore, illusory or 'problematic' or eventually 'sublated' determinations of rational being), and (iii) states of affairs where the 'fixities' are dissolved and the contradictory judgements are unified in a 'higher' judgement—this unification is signalled by the emergence of a *new* immediate positive judgement; (e) the first immediate positive judgement (the sheer tautology of being) is fundamentally characterized by three discovered facts: (i) that it has an implicit content, (ii) that this implicit content is the totality of the determinations of rational being (its explicit content is pure, indeterminate being), and (iii) that it is a *Sollen*, to wit, that it *ought* to express its implicit content. If all these connotations are put together, it *has to* be concluded that the form of the judgement—the *Vernunftssatz*—is perfectly suitable to express the true content of the judgement in the sphere of reason, namely objective universality.

(15) Note that the static disjunctive judgement, which the movement of the expression of truth establishes, does *not* thereby acquire an independence from this movement. Obviously, if this were the case, it would no longer be *proven*, since its connection with its proof—namely, the *process* that gives rise to it—would vanish.⁴ The disjunctive judgement is no longer simply immediate; rather, it is explicitly mediated immediacy. As such, it is the proper, immanent expression of Hegel's external claim in the Preface to the *Phenomenology of Spirit* that "the true is the whole."⁵ Indeed, the arbitrariness and dogmatic character of this claim has now been removed: its truth has been proven through the speculative theory

⁴ Cf. PhdG 13: "Denn die Sache ist nicht in ihrem *Zwecke* erschöpft, sondern in ihrer *Ausführung*, noch ist das *Resultat* das *wirkliche* Ganze, sondern es zusammen mit seiner Werden; der *Zweck* für sich ist das unlebendige Allgemeine, wie die Tendenz das bloße Treiben, das seiner Wirklichkeit noch entbehrt, und das nackte Resultat ist der Leichnam, der die Tendenz hinter sich gelassen." Lau (2004: 67) explains it well: "Der Prozeß des Wahrwerdens ist eben für die Wahrheit wesentlich. Sie ist nicht lediglich das Resultat, in dem der Begriff mit sich in seiner Objektivität vollkommen übereinstimmt, sondern ebenso sehr der Weg dazu; nur die beiden zusammen machen das Ganze der Wahrheit aus."

⁵ PhdG 24.

of judgement and its proper form is the generated static disjunctive judgement that expresses the totality of the determinations of rational being.

(16) The speculative theory of judgement fully resolves the Pyrrhonian problematic because (a) it *emerges* from a process that consists of the presence of immediate judgements, conflicts between immediate judgements (namely contradictions) and unifications of contradictory judgements and (b) it *thematizes* this process in such a way that the unifications of contradictory judgements are shown to necessarily have a *positive* character. The proof of the positive character of the unifications of contradictory judgements is provided in the second part of the speculative theory of judgement, namely in the immanent account of the true form of the judgement. Indeed, if each and every judgement in the sphere of reason emerges from the *Sollen* of the tautology of pure being, then the *new* immediate positive judgement that unifies contradictory judgements cannot possibly be simply the conjunction of those judgements. If that were the case, there would certainly not be there any *new* immediate positive judgement, namely a judgement whose predicate is *visibly* different from both of the predicates of the contradictory judgements.

(17) Let me make this crucial point even clearer. In each and every unification of contradictory judgements in the sphere of reason the Pyrrhonist expresses his doubt as to whether such unification is something more than sheer conjunction of contradictories. Yet, as soon as the speculative theory of judgement has been formulated immanently and through a process of unification, the Pyrrhonist must raise his hands in defeat; for the theory assigns an indisputably positive character to the unification (through which it has emerged). This is indeed so because according to this (proven) theory (a) each and every immediate positive judgement in the sphere of reason is implicitly contained in the immediate positive judgement that expresses pure, indeterminate being and (b) new immediate positive judgements appear (i.e. become explicit) *because* the subject-matter (or, if you prefer, its very first manifestation, namely the tautology of being) strives, as the *Sollen* that it is, to determine itself *further* and, thereby, *complete* itself. So, a new immediate positive judgement that expresses the unification of certain contradictories (e.g. determinate being or true infinity or immanent causality) cannot possibly be the sheer conjunction of those contradictories—such conjunction would not provide a *further* determination of the subject-matter. Yet, this exactly means that the judgements expressing those determinations have a positive character

(that is, they are not sheer conjunctions of contradictory judgements); they are, in other words, genuine “higher *Vernunftsätze*.”

(18) The way the positive character of the unificatory proposition is established in the project of the *Science of logic* discloses Hegel's conception of propositional truth. For if the propositions that are posited in the universe of rational discourse are nothing but the subject's self-expressed determinacy, there can be no proposition that is false. That is to say, there can be no truth-claim-of-reason whose predicate does not express a determination that belongs to the subject. But at the same time no *single* proposition can be absolutely true either, because the subject is a totality of determinations whose expression requires the gradual positing of a multiplicity of propositions. So, for Hegel, “the true is the whole,” in the sense that the totality of the rational determinations of the subject (*being*) is expressed by a multiplicity of propositions, namely those propositions which have emerged immanently from the tautology of pure being. A single ontological proposition is only partially true—it expresses a determination of the subject, but it always falls short of the expressed totality of its determinations.

(19) In this way Hegel's conception of propositional truth shows itself to be a version of the coherence theory of truth. No proposition is true by itself and it is true only insofar as it belongs to a coherent whole, a totality of propositions. The coherence of the whole, *however*, is neither pre-given nor constructed externally; it emerges immanently from the simple positing of the tautology of pure, indeterminate being and this emergence has the structure of conflicts and unifications of propositions.

(20) This conclusion seems to resolve the problem of contradiction in the universe of rational discourse altogether. The emergence of a theory of onto-logical proposition (or ‘speculative’ proposition) with the above described content in the project of the *Science of Logic* implies that the contradictions which the onto-logical proposition unifies are not obstacles to the expression of truth regarding the fundamental determinations of being (onto-logical truth). If this is correct, though, does it not mean that the problem of contradiction in the universe of rational discourse does not after all apply to the onto-logical project of the *Science of Logic*? Although one would be right to say this, one should also note that one would be able to make this claim *justifiably* only after the nature of the onto-logical proposition has been undogmatically disclosed (i.e. proven)

and that until such disclosure occurs the onto-logical project is susceptible to the threat of Pyrrhonian scepticism.

(21) It is exactly at this point that Hegel's genius shines. The great virtue of the *Science of Logic* is not so much that it comes to furnish an account of the onto-logical (or speculative) proposition, but mainly that it deals successfully with Pyrrhonian scepticism until that account emerges. Hegel takes advantage of the onto-logical phenomenon of unification of conflicting propositions so as to safeguard the theory of the onto-logical proposition against the Pyrrhonian interruption. So, the process of conflict and unification is not present in the onto-logical project *because* of Pyrrhonian scepticism, but it is employed against it *nevertheless*!

(22) So, the project of the *Science of Logic* refutes Pyrrhonian scepticism by allowing a theory of the onto-logical proposition to be constructed through a process of conflicts and unifications of contradictory propositions, a theory that proves to have a content that justifies the assertion that a unificatory proposition is *not* a simple conjunction of contradictions. This process generates the meaning of onto-logical discourse and thereby defines its subject-matter, the fundamental determinations of rational being. Hegel's solution has, of course, a limited scope, since it applies only to the domain of speculative ontology, but this does not prevent it from being regarded as a successful solution to the problem of Pyrrhonian scepticism. Moreover, it affirms the contradictory (and unificatory) structure of fundamental reality, but insofar as this affirmation is a consequence of a successful refutation of Pyrrhonian scepticism, it cannot be disputed.

(23) On the whole, the present study has tried to formulate a theory based on some of Hegel's writings (*Relation of Scepticism to Philosophy*, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, and *Science of Logic*) which would make a strong case against Pyrrhonian scepticism. Whether it has been successful or not, it is for others to judge. If it has been, it proves that scientific inquiry (and hence the striving for knowledge of the truth of being) is not a futile enterprise when it has the form and content of speculative ontology. Of course, given the (unavoidable) spatial restrictions this study had to face and the genuinely enormous complexity of the theory it aspired to formulate (which simply 'mirrors' the complexity of Hegel's systematic philosophy itself), it necessarily remains incomplete. Indeed, a wealth of details still needs to be provided for the concepts and arguments involved to start

revealing their true force and significance. However, it is my contention that the present study has filled, in an interesting and clear way, a long-lasting gap in the Anglophone Hegel scholarship: the formulation of a coherent and unambiguous solution to *the problem of the expression of truth* from a Hegelian perspective. This should not be identified with the so-called ‘problem of the speculative method’, although it does involve crucial aspects of it. While the latter problem could be—and usually is—formulated without reference to *language* and to *Pyrrhonian scepticism*, the problem of the expression of truth is inconceivable (or, at least, devoid of any philosophical significance) without this reference. My humble hope is that the present study will finally open (albeit not necessarily ‘fix’) the horizon for research into this problem *in the framework of speculative science* in a systematic fashion.

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